How did the fraudsters commit the crime?
Exploiting his position as a senior IT employee and his unique access to the SFFP payment processing system, Madan crafted an elaborate scam that involved fake identities, fraudulent bank accounts, and deceiving subordinates, according to Toronto Life.
Subordinate deception: Madan directed his subordinate, Hong Shi, to remove a security system that triggered an alert when SFFP claims were made for more than six children in a single household. He misled Shi into believing the order came from the ministry’s chief information officer, Soussan Tabari.
Falsified identities: Madan allegedly opened hundreds of sub-accounts at Canadian banks where subsidies would be deposited. He created these accounts in his name, his companies’ names, his family members’ accounts, and even in the name of his deceased father.
Fake bank accounts: Madan created some 9,000 false identities to use as applicants for the SFFP. More than 43,000 applications were filed on behalf of fake families from April to August 2020, and nearly $11 million was funnelled to 2,982 bank accounts.
CAPTCHA bypass: A CAPTCHA test, which determines whether an online user is a human or a bot, was required to submit an SFFP application. To bypass this control, Madan instructed one of his subordinates, Geetika Verma, to complete these checks manually for the false applicants.
Misleading records: The Bank of Montreal (BMO), one of the financial institutions where Madan created accounts, noticed a series of deposits where payee names didn’t match. After being questioned about it, Madan claimed the money was from tenants who owed him rent money and provided BMO with falsified emails from the renters.
Concealing evidence: Madan later deleted his database of fake names and wiped his computer.2