

Clerk's Stamp:

COURT FILE NUMBER

2503 06252

COURT OF KING'S BENCH OF ALBERTA

JUDICIAL CENTRE

EDMONTON

PLAINTIFF

ROYAL BANK OF CANADA


DEFENDANT

**MAHINDRA INVESTMENTS (AB) LTD.  
MAHINDRA JEWELLERS (AB) LTD., SURREY  
GOLD JEWELLERS (AB) LTD. and  
BLUEWATER (786) CONTRACTORS LTD.  
BRIEF OF LAW FOR ORDER APPROVING  
SALE AND OTHER RELIEF**

DOCUMENT

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

1. This brief of law is submitted on behalf of BDO Canada Limited (the "**Receiver**") in its capacity as Court-appointed Receiver of Mahindra Investments (AB) Ltd. ("**Investments**") and Mahindra Jewellers (AB) Ltd. ("**Jewellers**") in support of its application (the "**Application**") for, among other things:
  - a. an Order approving and ratifying the Sale Agreement, as defined herein, between the Receiver and 2730496 Alberta Inc., or nominee (the "**Purchaser**") for the sale of the Condo Units, as defined herein, to the Purchaser;
  - b. an Order approving and ratifying the Bonhams Agreement, as defined herein, between the Receiver and Bonhams Canada ("**Bonhams**"), to facilitate the sale of certain jewellery inventory;
  - c. an Order approving and ratifying the Guardian Agreement, as defined herein, between the Receiver and Guardian International Gold Corp. ("**Guardian**"), to facilitate the refinement of certain jewellery inventory; and
  - d. an Order sealing the Confidential Supplement (the "**Confidential Supplement**") to the Second Report of the Receiver (the "**Second Report**").
2. The Application has been brought in accordance with paragraphs 3(h), (k), (l), and (m) of the Order of the Honourable Justice C. Simard of the Court of King's Bench of Alberta granted on April 25, 2025 (the "**Receivership Order**"), which authorized the Receiver to, among other things, execute, assign, issue and endorse documents of whatever nature in respect of any of the Property (as defined in the Receivership Order) for any purpose pursuant to the Receivership Order and market any or all of the Property, sell the Property or any parts thereof, and apply for any vesting order necessary to convey the Property or any parts thereof, free and clear of any liens of encumbrances<sup>1</sup>.
3. As set out below, the Receiver has met the test for this Honourable Court to grant the Order accepting and ratifying the transactions contemplated in this Application.
4. The Plaintiff in these proceedings, Royal Bank of Canada ("**RBC**"), who is also the primary secured creditor of Investments and Jewellers, is supportive of the Application.
5. The Receiver submits that the relief sought is reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances and at this stage of these proceedings.

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<sup>1</sup> Receivership Order granted on April 25, 2025 in Court of King's Bench Action 2503 06252.

## II. **BACKGROUND**

6. A detailed background of the Debtors and the Receiver's activities leading up to the Application is more fully described in the Second Report and the Confidential Supplement. A brief overview is set out herein.

### **A. The Debtors and the Assets**

7. Investments is the registered owner of two adjoining commercial condominium units located in Calgary, Alberta (the "**Condo Units**").<sup>2</sup>
8. The primary assets of Jewellers are made up of gold and silver jewellery inventory (the "**Jewellery**").<sup>3</sup>

### **B. The Marketing of the Assets**

9. The Receiver has undertaken a thorough due diligence process in respect of the sale of the Condo Units and the Jewellery (collectively, the "**Assets**"), which is summarized in detail in the Second Report and the Confidential Supplement.
10. These efforts have resulted in:
- a. the Purchaser presenting the Receiver with an Offer to Purchase and Interim Agreement for Sale for the Condo Units Assets on July 23, 2025 (the "**Sale Agreement**")<sup>4</sup>;
  - b. Bonhams presenting the Receiver with a Master Consignment Agreement dated July 29, 2025 (the "**Bonhams Agreement**"), which contemplates the auction of certain items that make up the Jewellery inventory;<sup>5</sup> and
  - c. Guardian presenting the Receiver with a Gold Purchase Agreement dated July 9, 2025 (the "**Guardian Agreement**"), which contemplates the sale and refinement of certain items that make up the Jewellery inventory.<sup>6</sup>

### **The Condo Units**

11. After careful consideration, the Receiver accepted the Sale Agreement and further recommends that the Sale Agreement be approved and accepted by this Honorable Court for the following reasons, among others:

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<sup>2</sup> The Second Report at para 19.

<sup>3</sup> The Second Report at paras. 34 and 89.

<sup>4</sup> Second Report at para 25.

<sup>5</sup> The Second Report at para 91.

<sup>6</sup> The Second Report at paras. 90 and 97

- a. the Receiver conducted a process inviting submissions from realtors to market the Condo Units, resulting in two proposals being submitted by realtors;
  - b. the Condo Units were widely marketed by the realtor appointed by the Receiver;
  - c. the marketing process immediately attracted significant interest, resulting in a bid deadline being established, for parties to submit their best and final offers;
  - d. multiple offers to purchase the Condo Units were submitted;
  - e. the Sale Agreement is unconditional;
  - f. the Purchaser has paid a \$100,000 non-refundable deposit; and
  - g. the reasons set out in the Second Report and the Confidential Supplement.
12. The specific information pertaining to any due diligence completed by the Receiver in relation to the Condo Units, and any offers received by the Receiver in relation to the Condo Units, are sensitive in nature and should be sealed and kept confidential until the administration of this proceeding is completed, and the Receiver is discharged. If this Honourable Court does not grant an order approving the Sale Agreement as recommended by the Receiver, or in the case that that any proposed transaction does not close, the Receiver is concerned that efforts to re-market the Condo Units could be impaired by disclosing the details of the offers.

### **The Jewellery**

13. The Receiver has carried out a significant amount of research and investigation in relation to the sale of the Jewellery, as set out in the Second Report.
14. For the reasons set out in the Second Report, it is the Receiver's opinion that the best opportunity to maximize the liquidation value of the Jewellery is by way of entering into the Bonhams Agreement and the Guardian Agreement.

### **III. ISSUES**

15. The issues to be determined by this Honourable Court are whether it is appropriate and reasonable in the circumstances:
- a. to approve the Receiver's acceptance of the Sale Agreement, the Bonhams Agreement and the Guardian Agreement (collectively, the "**Transaction Agreements**"); and

- b. to seal the Confidential Supplement.

#### IV. ARGUMENT

##### A. Approval and Ratification of the Transaction Agreements

16. The *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c B-3 (the "**BIA**") permits the Court to appoint a receiver to do any of the following:
  - a. take possession of all or substantially all of the property of an insolvent person used in relation to the business carried on by the insolvent person;
  - b. exercise any control that the Court considers advisable over the property and over the insolvent corporation's business; and
  - c. take any other action that the Court considers advisable<sup>7</sup>.
17. The criteria to be applied when considering the approval of a sale recommended by a receiver were first set out by the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Royal Bank v Soundair Corp*<sup>8</sup>. When considering whether a proposal accepted by a receiver should be approved and ratified by the Court, the Court is to consider and determine:
  - a. whether the receiver made sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;
  - b. the interests of all parties;
  - c. the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers were obtained; and
  - d. whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process<sup>9</sup>.
18. The Alberta Courts have adopted these criteria and have applied them in receivership proceedings on numerous occasions<sup>10</sup>. In particular, the *Soundair* principles were adopted by the Alberta Court of Appeal in *River Rentals Group Ltd. v Hutterian Brethren Church of Codesa*, and recently by the Honourable Justice B.E. Romaine in *Sydco Energy Inc., Re*<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> *BIA*, section 243(1) [TAB 1].

<sup>8</sup> *Royal Bank v Soundair Corp.* (1991), 1991 CarswellOnt 205, 7 CBR (3d) 1, 83 OLR (41") 76 [Soundair] [TAB 2]; *Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc. v 1905393 Alberta Ltd.*, 2019 ABCA 433 at paras 10-12 [PwC][TAB 3]

<sup>9</sup> *Soundair* at para 16 [TAB 2].

<sup>10</sup> See for example *Computershare Trust Company of Canada v Venti Investment Corporation*, 2011 ABQB 726 at para 3. [TAB 4]

<sup>11</sup> *River Rentals Group Ltd. v Hutterian Brethren Church of Codesa*, 2010 ABCA 16 at para 12 [TAB 5]; *Sydco Energy Inc., Re*, 2018 ABQB 75 at para. 50 [TAB 6]

19. Further, when reviewing the sales and marketing process proposed by a receiver a Court should assess:
  - a. the fairness, transparency and integrity of the proposed process;
  - b. the commercial efficacy of the proposed process in light of the specific circumstances facing the receiver; and
  - c. whether the sale process will optimize the chances, in the particular circumstances, of securing the best possible price for the assets up for sale<sup>12</sup>.
20. In addition, a proposed sale process need not be perfect, only reasonable<sup>13</sup>.
21. It has been further acknowledged that the Court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by a receiver, and should assume that a receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown<sup>14</sup>.
22. If the Court is satisfied that the receiver has acted providently in its efforts to sell the debtor's assets, the case law instructs that the Court should approve the sale in question, as the Court provides deference to the Court-appointed receivers, assuming that the receiver's course of action and recommendation is appropriate and nothing contrary is shown. To order otherwise improperly calls into question the receiver's expertise and authority in the receivership process, thereby compromising both the integrity of the sales process and undermining commercial certainty<sup>15</sup>.
  1. *Sufficient Effort*
23. The Receiver respectfully submits that the marketing efforts it has undertaken, as outlined in the Second Report and the Confidential Supplement, are "sufficient" as contemplated in the *Soundair* criteria.
24. The Receiver further submits that it has made sufficient effort to get the best price for the Assets and has not acted improvidently and that the Transaction Agreements are reasonable.
  2. *Interest of All Parties*
25. Courts have acknowledged that a receiver's primary concern should be to protect the interest of the debtor's creditors<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>12</sup> *CCM Master Qualified Fund Ltd v blutip Power Technologies Ltd.*, 2012 ONSC 1750 at para 6 [TAB 7].

<sup>13</sup> *Re Sanjel Corporation*, 2016 ABQB 257 at para 80 [TAB 8].

<sup>14</sup> *Soundair* supra, at para 14 [TAB 2].

<sup>15</sup> *Soundair*, supra at paras 14 and 43 [TAB 2]; PwC, supra at paras 10 and 12-14 [TAB 3].

<sup>16</sup> *Cobrico Developments Inc. v Tucker Industries Inc.*, 2000 ABQB 766 at paras 22 and 27 [TAB 9].

26. In considering the "interest of all parties", Courts have recognized that a receiver's duty to act in the interests of the general body of creditors does not necessarily mean that the majority rules. Rather, the receiver must consider the interest of all creditors and then act for the benefit of the general body<sup>17</sup>.
27. The Debtors' largest creditor, RBC, supports the Receiver's acceptance of the Transaction Agreements.
28. The Receiver is of the opinion that the Transaction Agreements provide a fair and reasonable recovery to the benefit of all of the creditors, and as it relates to the Condo Units, is in line with the current fair market value of the Condo Units.
29. In these circumstances, it is commercially reasonable and in the best interest of the Debtors' stakeholders that the Transaction Agreements receive Court-approval.

### 3. *The Efficacy and Integrity of the Process*

30. When dealing with property of an insolvent corporation, the Court should assume that a receiver has acted properly unless the contrary is clearly demonstrated<sup>18</sup>.
31. The Receiver has conducted a thorough due diligence process to ensure that its acceptance of the Transaction Agreements would be considered commercially reasonable in the circumstances.
32. The Receiver submits that the negotiation of the Transaction Agreements was conducted with both efficacy and integrity, and not improvidently.

### 4. *Unfairness in the Process*

33. The Receiver submits that it acted reasonably, prudently, fairly, and not arbitrarily in pursuing and negotiating the Transaction Agreements. The Receiver accepted the Transaction Agreements in good faith with a view to maximizing the recovery for all of the creditors of the Debtors.
34. Based on the forgoing, the Receiver submits that the *Soundair* criteria have been satisfied by the Receiver and that the Receiver has acted in a commercially reasonable manner in accepting the Transaction Agreements.
35. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Court should grant an Order approving and ratifying the Receiver's acceptance of the Transaction Agreements.

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<sup>17</sup> *Alberta Treasury Branches v Elaborate Homes Ltd.*, 2014 ABQB 350 [**Elaborate Homes**] at para 61 [TAB 10] citing *Scanwood Canada Ltd., Re*, 2011 NSSC 189, 305 NSR (2d) 34 [TAB 11].

<sup>18</sup> *Crown Trust Co. et al Rosenberg et al* (1986), 60 OR (2d) 87 (Ont HC) at paras 66-70 and 77 [TAB 12].

## B. Sealing of Confidential Supplement

36. In addition to an Order approving and ratifying the Transaction Agreements, the Receiver seeks a sealing order with respect to the Confidential Supplement.
37. The Court's authority to grant sealing orders is contemplated under Rule 6.28 and Division 4 of Part 6 of the *Alberta Rules of Court*<sup>19</sup>.
38. The seminal case of *Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance)* previously provided the guiding principles in granting sealing orders and publications bans. Justice Iacobucci for the Court accepted that a confidentiality or sealing order could be granted when:
- a. such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
  - b. the salutary effects of the confidentiality order outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which includes public interest in open and accessible Court proceedings<sup>20</sup>.
39. However, in 2021, the Supreme Court of Canada reformulated the legal test as follows in *Sherman Estate v Donovan*:
- a. Court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;
  - b. the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and
  - c. as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects<sup>21</sup>.
40. It is important to note that the Court in *Sherman Estate v Donovan* stated that the reformulation of the test for a sealing order did not alter the essence of the test for a sealing order as previously set out in *Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance)*<sup>22</sup>.

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<sup>19</sup> *Alberta Rules of Court*, AR 124/2010, Division 4 of Part 6 including Rule 6.28 [TAB 13].

<sup>20</sup> *Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41 at para 45 [TAB 14].

<sup>21</sup> *Sherman Estate v Donovan*, 2021 SCC 25 at para 38 [TAB 15].

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid* at para 38 [TAB 15].

41. In the insolvency context, it is common when assets are being sold pursuant to a Court process to seal various bids and other commercially sensitive material, in case a further bidding process is required should the transaction being approved falls through<sup>23</sup>.
42. The Ontario Courts have further noted that sealing orders in the insolvency context are normally granted to maintain fair play so that competitors and potential purchasers do not obtain an unfair advantage by obtaining such information while others have to rely on their own resources<sup>24</sup>.
43. In *Alberta Treasury Branches v Elaborate Homes Ltd.*, Justice K.G. Nielsen accepted the reasons and rationale of the Ontario Courts and acknowledged that it is common practice in the insolvency context that information relating to the sale of the assets of an insolvent corporation be kept confidential until after the sale is completed pursuant to a Court order<sup>25</sup>.
44. The Receiver respectfully submits that, in these circumstances, it is necessary to seal the Confidential Supplement to prevent a real and substantial risk of harm to the Debtors' commercial interests. The Confidential Supplement contains sensitive information related to the value and sales process for the Assets. If such information was to be made public, any subsequent sale process by the Receiver could be compromised to the detriment of the Debtors and the Debtors' creditors.
45. Release of the information prior to the conclusion of the sale of the Assets may cause irreparable harm to the fairness of any further sales process of the Assets. This would negatively impact the stakeholders of the Debtors, who have an interest in ensuring the highest value possible is received for the Assets.
46. The Receiver further submits that salutary effects of a sealing of the Confidential Supplement outweigh any deleterious effects that may be caused by the sealing.
47. The sealing of the Confidential Supplement is essential to the Receiver satisfying the *Soundair* principles as required by this Court, and therefore it is both reasonable and appropriate for the Court to seal the Confidential Supplement on the Court Record.

## **V. RELIEF CLAIMED**

48. Based upon the materials filed and the foregoing submissions, the Receiver respectfully requests:
  - a. an Order approving the Transaction Agreements, for the sale of the Assets;

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<sup>23</sup> *Look Communications Inc v Look Mobile Corp.* 2009 CarswellOnt 7952 (Ont SCJ) [Commercial List] at para 17 [TAB 16].

<sup>24</sup> *887574 Ontario Inc v Pizza Pizza Ltd.*, 1994 CarswellOnt 1214, [1994] OJ No 3112 at para 6 [TAB 17].

<sup>25</sup> *Elaborate Homes*, supra. at para 54 [TAB 11].

- b. an Order sealing the Confidential Supplement to the Second Report; and
- c. such further or other relief as may be requested of the Court by the Receiver.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 1<sup>st</sup> DAY OF AUGUST, 2025.

**DENTONS CANADA LLP**

DocuSigned by:

*Tom Gusa*

83942681104547F  
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Tom Gusa, Legal Counsel for the Applicant,  
BDO Canada Limited

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

### TAB

1. *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985 c B-3, section 243(1)
2. *Royal Bank v Soundair Corp.* (1991), 1991 CarswellOnt 205, 7 CBR (3d) 1, 83 OLR (41") 76
3. *Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc. v 1905393 Alberta Ltd.*, 2019 ABCA 433
4. *Computershare Trust Company of Canada v Venti Investment Corporation*, 2011 ABQB 726
5. *River Rentals Group Ltd. v Hutterian Brethren Church of Codesa*, 2010 ABCA 16
6. *Sydco Energy Inc., Re*, 2018 ABQB 75
7. *CCM Master Qualified Fund Ltd v blutip Power Technologies Ltd.*, 2012 ONSC 1750
8. *Re Sanjel Corporation*, 2016 ABQB 257
9. *Cobrico Developments Inc. v Tucker Industries Inc.*, 2000 ABQB 766
10. *Alberta Treasury Branches v Elaborate Homes Ltd.*, 2014 ABQB 350
11. *Scanwood Canada Ltd., Re*, 2011 NSSC 189, 305 NSR (2d) 34
12. *Crown Trust Co. et al Rosenberg et al* (1986), 60 OR (2d) 87 (Ont HC)
13. *Alberta Rules of Court*, AR 124/2010, Division 4 of Part 6 including Rule 6.28
14. *Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41
15. *Sherman Estate v Donovan*, 2021 SCC 25
16. *Look Communications Inc v Look Mobile Corp.* 2009 CarswellOnt 7952 (Ont SCJ) [Commercial List]
17. *887574 Ontario Inc v Pizza Pizza Ltd.*, 1994 CarswellOnt 1214, [1994] OJ No 3112

# TAB 1

Canada Federal Statutes  
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act  
Part XI — Secured Creditors and Receivers (ss. 243-252)

**Most Recently Cited in:** [Aquilini Development Limited Partnership v. Garibaldi at Squamish Limited Partnership](#), 2024 BCSC 764, 2024 CarswellBC 1277 | (B.C. S.C., May 3, 2024); [Podollan v. Trustee of Estate of David Podollan](#), 2024 BCCA 173, 2024 CarswellBC 1247 | (B.C. C.A., May 3, 2024)

R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 243

s 243.

Currency

**243.**

**243(1) Court may appoint receiver**

Subject to subsection (1.1), on application by a secured creditor, a court may appoint a receiver to do any or all of the following if it considers it to be just or convenient to do so:

- (a) take possession of all or substantially all of the inventory, accounts receivable or other property of an insolvent person or bankrupt that was acquired for or used in relation to a business carried on by the insolvent person or bankrupt;
- (b) exercise any control that the court considers advisable over that property and over the insolvent person's or bankrupt's business; or
- (c) take any other action that the court considers advisable.

**243(1.1) Restriction on appointment of receiver**

In the case of an insolvent person in respect of whose property a notice is to be sent under [subsection 244\(1\)](#), the court may not appoint a receiver under subsection (1) before the expiry of 10 days after the day on which the secured creditor sends the notice unless

- (a) the insolvent person consents to an earlier enforcement under [subsection 244\(2\)](#); or
- (b) the court considers it appropriate to appoint a receiver before then.

**243(2) Definition of "receiver"**

Subject to subsections (3) and (4), in this Part, "receiver" means a person who

- (a) is appointed under subsection (1); or
- (b) is appointed to take or takes possession or control — of all or substantially all of the inventory, accounts receivable or other property of an insolvent person or bankrupt that was acquired for or used in relation to a business carried on by the insolvent person or bankrupt — under
  - (i) an agreement under which property becomes subject to a security (in this Part referred to as a "security agreement"),or

(ii) a court order made under another Act of Parliament, or an Act of a legislature of a province, that provides for or authorizes the appointment of a receiver or receiver-manager.

**243(3) Definition of "receiver" — subsection 248(2)**

For the purposes of [subsection 248\(2\)](#), the definition "receiver" in subsection (2) is to be read without reference to paragraph (a) or subparagraph (b)(ii).

**243(4) Trustee to be appointed**

Only a trustee may be appointed under subsection (1) or under an agreement or order referred to in paragraph (2)(b).

**243(5) Place of filing**

The application is to be filed in a court having jurisdiction in the judicial district of the locality of the debtor.

**243(6) Orders respecting fees and disbursements**

If a receiver is appointed under subsection (1), the court may make any order respecting the payment of fees and disbursements of the receiver that it considers proper, including one that gives the receiver a charge, ranking ahead of any or all of the secured creditors, over all or part of the property of the insolvent person or bankrupt in respect of the receiver's claim for fees or disbursements, but the court may not make the order unless it is satisfied that the secured creditors who would be materially affected by the order were given reasonable notice and an opportunity to make representations.

**243(7) Meaning of "disbursements"**

In subsection (6), "**disbursements**" does not include payments made in the operation of a business of the insolvent person or bankrupt.

**Amendment History**

1992, c. 27, s. 89(1); 2005, c. 47, s. 115; 2007, c. 36, s. 58

**Judicial Consideration (8)**

**Currency**

Federal English Statutes reflect amendments current to April 24, 2024

Federal English Regulations Current to Gazette Vol. 158:7 (March 27, 2024)

# TAB 2

**Most Negative Treatment:** Distinguished

**Most Recent Distinguished:** [PCAS Patient Care Automation Services Inc., Re](#) | 2012 ONSC 3367, 2012 CarswellOnt 7248, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 285, 216 A.C.W.S. (3d) 551 | (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List], Jun 9, 2012)

1991 CarswellOnt 205  
Ontario Court of Appeal

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.

1991 CarswellOnt 205, [1991] O.J. No. 1137, 27 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1178,  
46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76

**ROYAL BANK OF CANADA (plaintiff/respondent) v. SOUNDAIR CORPORATION  
(respondent), CANADIAN PENSION CAPITAL LIMITED (appellant)  
and CANADIAN INSURERS' CAPITAL CORPORATION (appellant)**

Goodman, McKinlay and Galligan JJ.A.

Heard: June 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1991

Judgment: July 3, 1991

Docket: Doc. CA 318/91

Counsel: *J. B. Berkow* and *S. H. Goldman* , for appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation.

*J. T. Morin, Q.C.* , for Air Canada.

*L.A.J. Barnes* and *L.E. Ritchie* , for plaintiff/respondent Royal Bank of Canada.

*S.F. Dunphy* and *G.K. Ketcheson* , for Ernst & Young Inc., receiver of respondent Soundair Corporation.

*W.G. Horton* , for Ontario Express Limited.

*N.J. Spies* , for Frontier Air Limited.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Debtors and creditors

**VII Receivers**

**VII.6** Conduct and liability of receiver

**VII.6.a** General conduct of receiver

**Headnote**

Receivers --- Conduct and liability of receiver — General conduct of receiver

Court considering its position when approving sale recommended by receiver.

S Corp., which engaged in the air transport business, had a division known as AT. When S Corp. experienced financial difficulties, one of the secured creditors, who had an interest in the assets of AT, brought a motion for the appointment of a receiver. The receiver was ordered to operate AT and to sell it as a going concern. The receiver had two offers. It accepted the offer made by OEL and rejected an offer by 922 which contained an unacceptable condition. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer removing the condition. The secured creditors supported acceptance of the 922 offer. The court approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer. An appeal was brought from this order.

**Held:**

The appeal was dismissed.

Per Galligan J.A.: When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. The court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver.

The conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court. The order appointing the receiver did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. The order obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially to the discretion of the receiver.

To determine whether a receiver has acted providently, the conduct of the receiver should be examined in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. On the date the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers: that of OEL, which was acceptable, and that of 922, which contained an unacceptable condition. The decision made was a sound one in the circumstances. The receiver made a sufficient effort to obtain the best price, and did not act improvidently.

The court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the assets to them.

Per McKinlay J.A. (concurring in the result): It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. In all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver. While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the asset involved, it may not be a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

Per Goodman J.A. (dissenting): It was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to the receiver. The offer accepted by the receiver was improvident and unfair insofar as two creditors were concerned.

#### **Table of Authorities**

##### **Cases considered:**

- Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd., Re* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to
- British Columbia Development Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Ltd.* (1977), 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28, 5 B.C.L.R. 94 (S.C.) — referred to
- Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.) — referred to
- Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.) — applied
- Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 65 A.R. 372, 21 D.L.R. (4th) (C.A.) — referred to
- Selkirk, Re* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to
- Selkirk, Re* (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

##### **Statutes considered:**

- Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137.
- Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141.

Appeal from order approving sale of assets by receiver.

#### **Galligan J.A. :**

1 This is an appeal from the order of Rosenberg J. made on May 1, 1991. By that order, he approved the sale of Air Toronto to Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Air Limited, and he dismissed a motion to approve an offer to purchase Air Toronto by 922246 Ontario Limited.

2 It is necessary at the outset to give some background to the dispute. Soundair Corporation ("Soundair") is a corporation engaged in the air transport business. It has three divisions. One of them is Air Toronto. Air Toronto operates a scheduled airline from Toronto to a number of mid-sized cities in the United States of America. Its routes serve as feeders to several of Air

Canada's routes. Pursuant to a connector agreement, Air Canada provides some services to Air Toronto and benefits from the feeder traffic provided by it. The operational relationship between Air Canada and Air Toronto is a close one.

3 In the latter part of 1989 and the early part of 1990, Soundair was in financial difficulty. Soundair has two secured creditors who have an interest in the assets of Air Toronto. The Royal Bank of Canada (the "Royal Bank") is owed at least \$65 million dollars. The appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation (collectively called "CCFL") are owed approximately \$9,500,000. Those creditors will have a deficiency expected to be in excess of \$50 million on the winding up of Soundair.

4 On April 26, 1990, upon the motion of the Royal Bank, O'Brien J. appointed Ernst & Young Inc. (the "receiver") as receiver of all of the assets, property and undertakings of Soundair. The order required the receiver to operate Air Toronto and sell it as a going concern. Because of the close relationship between Air Toronto and Air Canada, it was contemplated that the receiver would obtain the assistance of Air Canada to operate Air Toronto. The order authorized the receiver:

(b) to enter into contractual arrangements with Air Canada to retain a manager or operator, including Air Canada, to manage and operate Air Toronto under the supervision of Ernst & Young Inc. until the completion of the sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada or other person.

Also because of the close relationship, it was expected that Air Canada would purchase Air Toronto. To that end, the order of O'Brien J. authorized the Receiver:

(c) to negotiate and do all things necessary or desirable to complete a sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada and, if a sale to Air Canada cannot be completed, to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person, subject to terms and conditions approved by this Court.

5 Over a period of several weeks following that order, negotiations directed towards the sale of Air Toronto took place between the receiver and Air Canada. Air Canada had an agreement with the receiver that it would have exclusive negotiating rights during that period. I do not think it is necessary to review those negotiations, but I note that Air Canada had complete access to all of the operations of Air Toronto and conducted due diligence examinations. It became thoroughly acquainted with every aspect of Air Toronto's operations.

6 Those negotiations came to an end when an offer made by Air Canada on June 19, 1990, was considered unsatisfactory by the receiver. The offer was not accepted and lapsed. Having regard to the tenor of Air Canada's negotiating stance and a letter sent by its solicitors on July 20, 1990, I think that the receiver was eminently reasonable when it decided that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto to Air Canada.

7 The receiver then looked elsewhere. Air Toronto's feeder business is very attractive, but it only has value to a national airline. The receiver concluded reasonably, therefore, that it was commercially necessary for one of Canada's two national airlines to be involved in any sale of Air Toronto. Realistically, there were only two possible purchasers, whether direct or indirect. They were Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International.

8 It was well known in the air transport industry that Air Toronto was for sale. During the months following the collapse of the negotiations with Air Canada, the receiver tried unsuccessfully to find viable purchasers. In late 1990, the receiver turned to Canadian Airlines International, the only realistic alternative. Negotiations began between them. Those negotiations led to a letter of intent dated February 11, 1990. On March 6, 1991, the receiver received an offer from Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Airlines Limited, who are subsidiaries of Canadian Airlines International. This offer is called the OEL offer.

9 In the meantime, Air Canada and CCFL were having discussions about making an offer for the purchase of Air Toronto. They formed 922246 Ontario Limited ("922") for the purpose of purchasing Air Toronto. On March 1, 1991, CCFL wrote to the receiver saying that it proposed to make an offer. On March 7, 1991, Air Canada and CCFL presented an offer to the receiver in the name of 922. For convenience, its offers are called the "922 offers."

10 The first 922 offer contained a condition which was unacceptable to the receiver. I will refer to that condition in more detail later. The receiver declined the 922 offer and on March 8, 1991, accepted the OEL offer. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer. It then submitted an offer which was virtually identical to that of March 7, 1991, except that the unacceptable condition had been removed.

11 The proceedings before Rosenberg J. then followed. He approved the sale to OEL and dismissed a motion for the acceptance of the 922 offer. Before Rosenberg J., and in this court, both CCFL and the Royal Bank supported the acceptance of the second 922 offer.

12 There are only two issues which must be resolved in this appeal. They are:

- (1) Did the receiver act properly when it entered into an agreement to sell Air Toronto to OEL?
- (2) What effect does the support of the 922 offer by the secured creditors have on the result?

13 I will deal with the two issues separately.

### **1. Did the Receiver Act Properly in Agreeing to Sell to OEL?**

14 Before dealing with that issue, there are three general observations which I think I should make. The first is that the sale of an airline as a going concern is a very complex process. The best method of selling an airline at the best price is something far removed from the expertise of a court. When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. Therefore, the court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by the receiver. It should also assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. The second observation is that the court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver. The third observation which I wish to make is that the conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court.

15 The order of O'Brien J. provided that if the receiver could not complete the sale to Air Canada that it was "to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person." The court did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. It did not say it was to call for bids or conduct an auction. It told the receiver to negotiate and sell. It obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially in the discretion of the receiver. I think, therefore, that the court should not review minutely the process of the sale when, broadly speaking, it appears to the court to be a just process.

16 As did Rosenberg J., I adopt as correct the statement made by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.), at pp. 92-94 [O.R.], of the duties which a court must perform when deciding whether a receiver who has sold a property acted properly. When he set out the court's duties, he did not put them in any order of priority, nor do I. I summarize those duties as follows:

1. It should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.
2. It should consider the interests of all parties.
3. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained.
4. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

17 I intend to discuss the performance of those duties separately.

### **1. Did the Receiver make a sufficient effort to get the best price and did it act providently?**

18 Having regard to the fact that it was highly unlikely that a commercially viable sale could be made to anyone but the two national airlines, or to someone supported by either of them, it is my view that the receiver acted wisely and reasonably when it

negotiated only with Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International. Furthermore, when Air Canada said that it would submit no further offers and gave the impression that it would not participate further in the receiver's efforts to sell, the only course reasonably open to the receiver was to negotiate with Canadian Airlines International. Realistically, there was nowhere else to go but to Canadian Airlines International. In doing so, it is my opinion that the receiver made sufficient efforts to sell the airline.

19 When the receiver got the OEL offer on March 6, 1991, it was over 10 months since it had been charged with the responsibility of selling Air Toronto. Until then, the receiver had not received one offer which it thought was acceptable. After substantial efforts to sell the airline over that period, I find it difficult to think that the receiver acted improvidently in accepting the only acceptable offer which it had.

20 On March 8, 1991, the date when the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers, the OEL offer, which was acceptable, and the 922 offer, which contained an unacceptable condition. I cannot see how the receiver, assuming for the moment that the price was reasonable, could have done anything but accept the OEL offer.

21 When deciding whether a receiver had acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. In this case, the court should look at the receiver's conduct in the light of the information it had when it made its decision on March 8, 1991. The court should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. To do so, in my view, would derogate from the mandate to sell given to the receiver by the order of O'Brien J. I agree with and adopt what was said by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 112 [O.R.]:

Its decision was made as a matter of business judgment *on the elements then available to it*. It is of the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them to act seriously and responsibly so as to be prepared to stand behind them.

If the court were to reject the recommendation of the Receiver in any but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception of receivers and in the perception of any others who might have occasion to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by court-appointed receivers.

[Emphasis added.]

22 I also agree with and adopt what was said by Macdonald J.A. in *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981)*, 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), at p. 11 [C.B.R.]:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances *at the time existing* it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement.

[Emphasis added.]

23 On March 8, 1991, the receiver had two offers. One was the OEL offer, which it considered satisfactory but which could be withdrawn by OEL at any time before it was accepted. The receiver also had the 922 offer, which contained a condition that was totally unacceptable. It had no other offers. It was faced with the dilemma of whether it should decline to accept the OEL offer and run the risk of it being withdrawn, in the hope that an acceptable offer would be forthcoming from 922. An affidavit filed by the president of the receiver describes the dilemma which the receiver faced, and the judgment made in the light of that dilemma:

24. An asset purchase agreement was received by Ernst & Young on March 7, 1991 which was dated March 6, 1991. This agreement was received from CCFL in respect of their offer to purchase the assets and undertaking of Air Toronto. Apart from financial considerations, which will be considered in a subsequent affidavit, the *Receiver determined that it would not*

*be prudent to delay acceptance of the OEL agreement to negotiate a highly uncertain arrangement with Air Canada and CCFL . Air Canada had the benefit of an 'exclusive' in negotiations for Air Toronto and had clearly indicated its intention take itself out of the running while ensuring that no other party could seek to purchase Air Toronto and maintain the Air Canada connector arrangement vital to its survival. The CCFL offer represented a radical reversal of this position by Air Canada at the eleventh hour. However, it contained a significant number of conditions to closing which were entirely beyond the control of the Receiver. As well, the CCFL offer came less than 24 hours before signing of the agreement with OEL which had been negotiated over a period of months, at great time and expense.*

[Emphasis added.] I am convinced that the decision made was a sound one in the circumstances faced by the receiver on March 8, 1991.

24 I now turn to consider whether the price contained in the OEL offer was one which it was provident to accept. At the outset, I think that the fact that the OEL offer was the only acceptable one available to the receiver on March 8, 1991, after 10 months of trying to sell the airline, is strong evidence that the price in it was reasonable. In a deteriorating economy, I doubt that it would have been wise to wait any longer.

25 I mentioned earlier that, pursuant to an order, 922 was permitted to present a second offer. During the hearing of the appeal, counsel compared at great length the price contained in the second 922 offer with the price contained in the OEL offer. Counsel put forth various hypotheses supporting their contentions that one offer was better than the other.

26 It is my opinion that the price contained in the 922 offer is relevant only if it shows that the price obtained by the receiver in the OEL offer was not a reasonable one. In *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* , supra, Anderson J., at p. 113 [O.R.], discussed the comparison of offers in the following way:

No doubt, as the cases have indicated, situations might arise where the disparity was so great as to call in question the adequacy of the mechanism which had produced the offers. It is not so here, and in my view that is substantially an end of the matter.

27 In two judgments, Saunders J. considered the circumstances in which an offer submitted after the receiver had agreed to a sale should be considered by the court. The first is *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.) , at p. 247:

If, for example, in this case there had been a second offer of a substantially higher amount, then the court would have to take that offer into consideration in assessing whether the receiver had properly carried out his function of endeavouring to obtain the best price for the property.

28 The second is *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.) , at p. 243:

If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate.

29 In *Re Selkirk* (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. S.C.) , at p. 142, McRae J. expressed a similar view:

The court will not lightly withhold approval of a sale by the receiver, particularly in a case such as this where the receiver is given rather wide discretionary authority as per the order of Mr. Justice Trainor and, of course, where the receiver is an officer of this court. Only in a case where there seems to be some unfairness in the process of the sale or *where there are substantially higher offers which would tend to show that the sale was improvident* will the court withhold approval. It is important that the court recognize the commercial exigencies that would flow if prospective purchasers are allowed to wait until the sale is in court for approval before submitting their final offer. This is something that must be discouraged.

[Emphasis added.]

30 What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. I

am of the opinion, therefore, that if they do not tend to show that the receiver was improvident, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If they were, the process would be changed from a sale by a receiver, subject to court approval, into an auction conducted by the court at the time approval is sought. In my opinion, the latter course is unfair to the person who has entered bona fide into an agreement with the receiver, can only lead to chaos, and must be discouraged.

31 If, however, the subsequent offer is so substantially higher than the sale recommended by the receiver, then it may be that the receiver has not conducted the sale properly. In such circumstances, the court would be justified itself in entering into the sale process by considering competitive bids. However, I think that that process should be entered into only if the court is satisfied that the receiver has not properly conducted the sale which it has recommended to the court.

32 It is necessary to consider the two offers. Rosenberg J. held that the 922 offer was slightly better or marginally better than the OEL offer. He concluded that the difference in the two offers did not show that the sale process adopted by the receiver was inadequate or improvident.

33 Counsel for the appellants complained about the manner in which Rosenberg J. conducted the hearing of the motion to confirm the OEL sale. The complaint was that when they began to discuss a comparison of the two offers, Rosenberg J. said that he considered the 922 offer to be better than the OEL offer. Counsel said that when that comment was made, they did not think it necessary to argue further the question of the difference in value between the two offers. They complain that the finding that the 922 offer was only marginally better or slightly better than the OEL offer was made without them having had the opportunity to argue that the 922 offer was substantially better or significantly better than the OEL offer. I cannot understand how counsel could have thought that by expressing the opinion that the 922 offer was better, Rosenberg J. was saying that it was a significantly or substantially better one. Nor can I comprehend how counsel took the comment to mean that they were foreclosed from arguing that the offer was significantly or substantially better. If there was some misunderstanding on the part of counsel, it should have been raised before Rosenberg J. at the time. I am sure that if it had been, the misunderstanding would have been cleared up quickly. Nevertheless, this court permitted extensive argument dealing with the comparison of the two offers.

34 The 922 offer provided for \$6 million cash to be paid on closing with a royalty based upon a percentage of Air Toronto profits over a period of 5 years up to a maximum of \$3 million. The OEL offer provided for a payment of \$2 million on closing with a royalty paid on gross revenues over a 5-year period. In the short term, the 922 offer is obviously better because there is substantially more cash up front. The chances of future returns are substantially greater in the OEL offer because royalties are paid on gross revenues, while the royalties under the 922 offer are paid only on profits. There is an element of risk involved in each offer.

35 The receiver studied the two offers. It compared them and took into account the risks, the advantages and the disadvantages of each. It considered the appropriate contingencies. It is not necessary to outline the factors which were taken into account by the receiver because the manager of its insolvency practice filed an affidavit outlining the considerations which were weighed in its evaluation of the two offers. They seem to me to be reasonable ones. That affidavit concluded with the following paragraph:

24. On the basis of these considerations the Receiver has approved the OEL offer and has concluded that it represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for the Air Toronto division of SoundAir.

36 The court appointed the receiver to conduct the sale of Air Toronto, and entrusted it with the responsibility of deciding what is the best offer. I put great weight upon the opinion of the receiver. It swore to the court which appointed it that the OEL offer represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for Air Toronto. I have not been convinced that the receiver was wrong when he made that assessment. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the 922 offer does not demonstrate any failure upon the part of the receiver to act properly and providently.

37 It follows that if Rosenberg J. was correct when he found that the 922 offer was in fact better, I agree with him that it could only have been slightly or marginally better. The 922 offer does not lead to an inference that the disposition strategy of the receiver was inadequate, unsuccessful or improvident, nor that the price was unreasonable.

38 I am, therefore, of the opinion the the receiver made a sufficient effort to get the best price, and has not acted improvidently.

## 2. Consideration of the Interests of all Parties

39 It is well established that the primary interest is that of the creditors of the debtor: see *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, and *Re Selkirk*, supra (Saunders J.). However, as Saunders J. pointed out in *Re Beauty Counsellors*, supra at p. 244 [C.B.R.], "it is not the only or overriding consideration."

40 In my opinion, there are other persons whose interests require consideration. In an appropriate case, the interests of the debtor must be taken into account. I think also, in a case such as this, where a purchaser has bargained at some length and doubtless at considerable expense with the receiver, the interests of the purchaser ought to be taken into account. While it is not explicitly stated in such cases as *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, *Re Selkirk* (1986), supra, *Re Beauty Counsellors*, supra, *Re Selkirk* (1987), supra, and (*Cameron*), supra, I think they clearly imply that the interests of a person who has negotiated an agreement with a court-appointed receiver are very important.

41 In this case, the interests of all parties who would have an interest in the process were considered by the receiver and by Rosenberg J.

## 3. Consideration of the Efficacy and Integrity of the Process by which the Offer was Obtained

42 While it is accepted that the primary concern of a receiver is the protecting of the interests of the creditors, there is a secondary but very important consideration, and that is the integrity of the process by which the sale is effected. This is particularly so in the case of a sale of such a unique asset as an airline as a going concern.

43 The importance of a court protecting the integrity of the process has been stated in a number of cases. First, I refer to *Re Selkirk*, supra, where Saunders J. said at p. 246 [C.B.R.]:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interest of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.

In that connection I adopt the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Appeal Division) in *Cameron v. Bank of N.S.* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), where he said at p. 11:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement. On the contrary, they would know that other bids could be received and considered up until the application for court approval is heard — this would be an intolerable situation.

While those remarks may have been made in the context of a bidding situation rather than a private sale, I consider them to be equally applicable to a negotiation process leading to a private sale. Where the court is concerned with the disposition of property, the purpose of appointing a receiver is to have the receiver do the work that the court would otherwise have to do.

44 In *Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 65 A.R. 372, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473 at p. 476 [D.L.R.], the Alberta Court of Appeal said that sale by tender is not necessarily the best way to sell a business as an ongoing concern. It went on to say that when some other method is used which is provident, the court should not undermine the process by refusing to confirm the sale.

45 Finally, I refer to the reasoning of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 124 [O.R.]:

While every proper effort must always be made to assure maximum recovery consistent with the limitations inherent in the process, no method has yet been devised to entirely eliminate those limitations or to avoid their consequences. *Certainly it is not to be found in loosening the entire foundation of the system. Thus to compare the results of the process in this case with what might have been recovered in some other set of circumstances is neither logical nor practical.*

[Emphasis added.]

46 It is my opinion that the court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the asset to them.

47 Before this court, counsel for those opposing the confirmation of the sale to OEL suggested many different ways in which the receiver could have conducted the process other than the way which he did. However, the evidence does not convince me that the receiver used an improper method of attempting to sell the airline. The answer to those submissions is found in the comment of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 109 [O.R.]:

The court ought not to sit as on appeal from the decision of the Receiver, reviewing in minute detail every element of the process by which the decision is reached. To do so would be a futile and duplicitous exercise.

48 It would be a futile and duplicitous exercise for this court to examine in minute detail all of circumstances leading up to the acceptance of the OEL offer. Having considered the process adopted by the receiver, it is my opinion that the process adopted was a reasonable and prudent one.

#### **4. Was there unfairness in the process?**

49 As a general rule, I do not think it appropriate for the court to go into the minutia of the process or of the selling strategy adopted by the receiver. However, the court has a responsibility to decide whether the process was fair. The only part of this process which I could find that might give even a superficial impression of unfairness is the failure of the receiver to give an offering memorandum to those who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto.

50 I will outline the circumstances which relate to the allegation that the receiver was unfair in failing to provide an offering memorandum. In the latter part of 1990, as part of its selling strategy, the receiver was in the process of preparing an offering memorandum to give to persons who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto. The offering memorandum got as far as draft form, but was never released to anyone, although a copy of the draft eventually got into the hands of CCFL before it submitted the first 922 offer on March 7, 1991. A copy of the offering memorandum forms part of the record, and it seems to me to be little more than puffery, without any hard information which a sophisticated purchaser would require in order to make a serious bid.

51 The offering memorandum had not been completed by February 11, 1991. On that date, the receiver entered into the letter of intent to negotiate with OEL. The letter of intent contained a provision that during its currency the receiver would not negotiate with any other party. The letter of intent was renewed from time to time until the OEL offer was received on March 6, 1991.

52 The receiver did not proceed with the offering memorandum because to do so would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of its letter of intent with OEL.

53 I do not think that the conduct of the receiver shows any unfairness towards 922. When I speak of 922, I do so in the context that Air Canada and CCFL are identified with it. I start by saying that the receiver acted reasonably when it entered into exclusive negotiations with OEL. I find it strange that a company, with which Air Canada is closely and intimately involved, would say that it was unfair for the receiver to enter into a time-limited agreement to negotiate exclusively with OEL. That is precisely the arrangement which Air Canada insisted upon when it negotiated with the receiver in the spring and summer of 1990. If it was not unfair for Air Canada to have such an agreement, I do not understand why it was unfair for OEL to have a

similar one. In fact, both Air Canada and OEL in its turn were acting reasonably when they required exclusive negotiating rights to prevent their negotiations from being used as a bargaining lever with other potential purchasers. The fact that Air Canada insisted upon an exclusive negotiating right while it was negotiating with the receiver demonstrates the commercial efficacy of OEL being given the same right during its negotiations with the receiver. I see no unfairness on the part of the receiver when it honoured its letter of intent with OEL by not releasing the offering memorandum during the negotiations with OEL.

54 Moreover, I am not prepared to find that 922 was in any way prejudiced by the fact that it did not have an offering memorandum. It made an offer on March 7, 1991, which it contends to this day was a better offer than that of OEL. 922 has not convinced me that if it had an offering memorandum, its offer would have been any different or any better than it actually was. The fatal problem with the first 922 offer was that it contained a condition which was completely unacceptable to the receiver. The receiver, properly, in my opinion, rejected the offer out of hand because of that condition. That condition did not relate to any information which could have conceivably been in an offering memorandum prepared by the receiver. It was about the resolution of a dispute between CCFL and the Royal Bank, something the receiver knew nothing about.

55 Further evidence of the lack of prejudice which the absence of an offering memorandum has caused 922 is found in CCFL's stance before this court. During argument, its counsel suggested as a possible resolution of this appeal that this court should call for new bids, evaluate them and then order a sale to the party who put in the better bid. In such a case, counsel for CCFL said that 922 would be prepared to bid within 7 days of the court's decision. I would have thought that, if there were anything to CCFL's suggestion that the failure to provide an offering memorandum was unfair to 922, that it would have told the court that it needed more information before it would be able to make a bid.

56 I am satisfied that Air Canada and CCFL have, and at all times had, all of the information which they would have needed to make what to them would be a commercially viable offer to the receiver. I think that an offering memorandum was of no commercial consequence to them, but the absence of one has since become a valuable tactical weapon.

57 It is my opinion that there is no convincing proof that if an offering memorandum had been widely distributed among persons qualified to have purchased Air Toronto, a viable offer would have come forth from a party other than 922 or OEL. Therefore, the failure to provide an offering memorandum was neither unfair, nor did it prejudice the obtaining of a better price on March 8, 1991, than that contained in the OEL offer. I would not give effect to the contention that the process adopted by the receiver was an unfair one.

58 There are two statements by Anderson J. contained in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, which I adopt as my own. The first is at p. 109 [O.R.]:

The court should not proceed against the recommendations of its Receiver except in special circumstances and where the necessity and propriety of doing so are plain. Any other rule or approach would emasculate the role of the Receiver and make it almost inevitable that the final negotiation of every sale would take place on the motion for approval.

The second is at p. 111 [O.R.]:

It is equally clear, in my view, though perhaps not so clearly enunciated, that it is only in an exceptional case that the court will intervene and proceed contrary to the Receiver's recommendations if satisfied, as I am, that the Receiver has acted reasonably, prudently and fairly and not arbitrarily.

In this case the receiver acted reasonably, prudently, fairly and not arbitrarily. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the process adopted by the receiver in reaching an agreement was a just one.

59 In his reasons for judgment, after discussing the circumstances leading to the 922 offer, Rosenberg J. said this:

They created a situation as of March 8th, where the Receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was in acceptable form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The Receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

I agree.

60 The receiver made proper and sufficient efforts to get the best price that it could for the assets of Air Toronto. It adopted a reasonable and effective process to sell the airline which was fair to all persons who might be interested in purchasing it. It is my opinion, therefore, that the receiver properly carried out the mandate which was given to it by the order of O'Brien J. It follows that Rosenberg J. was correct when he confirmed the sale to OEL.

## **II. The effect of the support of the 922 offer by the two secured creditors.**

61 As I noted earlier, the 922 offer was supported before Rosenberg J., and in this court, by CCFL and by the Royal Bank, the two secured creditors. It was argued that, because the interests of the creditors are primary, the court ought to give effect to their wish that the 922 offer be accepted. I would not accede to that suggestion for two reasons.

62 The first reason is related to the fact that the creditors chose to have a receiver appointed by the court. It was open to them to appoint a private receiver pursuant to the authority of their security documents. Had they done so, then they would have had control of the process and could have sold Air Toronto to whom they wished. However, acting privately and controlling the process involves some risks. The appointment of a receiver by the court insulates the creditors from those risks. But, insulation from those risks carries with it the loss of control over the process of disposition of the assets. As I have attempted to explain in these reasons, when a receiver's sale is before the court for confirmation, the only issues are the propriety of the conduct of the receiver and whether it acted providently. The function of the court at that stage is not to step in and do the receiver's work, or change the sale strategy adopted by the receiver. Creditors who asked the court to appoint a receiver to dispose of assets should not be allowed to take over control of the process by the simple expedient of supporting another purchaser if they do not agree with the sale made by the receiver. That would take away all respect for the process of sale by a court-appointed receiver.

63 There can be no doubt that the interests of the creditor are an important consideration in determining whether the receiver has properly conducted a sale. The opinion of the creditors as to which offer ought to be accepted is something to be taken into account. But if the court decides that the receiver has acted properly and providently, those views are not necessarily determinative. Because, in this case, the receiver acted properly and providently, I do not think that the views of the creditors should override the considered judgment of the receiver.

64 The second reason is that, in the particular circumstances of this case, I do not think the support of CCFL and the Royal Bank of the 922 offer is entitled to any weight. The support given by CCFL can be dealt with summarily. It is a co-owner of 922. It is hardly surprising and not very impressive to hear that it supports the offer which it is making for the debtor's assets.

65 The support by the Royal Bank requires more consideration and involves some reference to the circumstances. On March 6, 1991, when the first 922 offer was made, there was in existence an inter-lender agreement between the Royal Bank and CCFL. That agreement dealt with the share of the proceeds of the sale of Air Toronto which each creditor would receive. At the time, a dispute between the Royal Bank and CCFL about the interpretation of that agreement was pending in the courts. The unacceptable condition in the first 922 offer related to the settlement of the inter-lender dispute. The condition required that the dispute be resolved in a way which would substantially favour CCFL. It required that CCFL receive \$3,375,000 of the \$6 million cash payment and the balance, including the royalties, if any, be paid to the Royal Bank. The Royal Bank did not agree with that split of the sale proceeds.

66 On April 5, 1991, the Royal Bank and CCFL agreed to settle the inter-lender dispute. The settlement was that if the 922 offer was accepted by the court, CCFL would receive only \$1 million, and the Royal Bank would receive \$5 million plus any royalties which might be paid. It was only in consideration of that settlement that the Royal Bank agreed to support the 922 offer.

67 The Royal Bank's support of the 922 offer is so affected by the very substantial benefit which it wanted to obtain from the settlement of the inter-lender dispute that, in my opinion, its support is devoid of any objectivity. I think it has no weight.

68 While there may be circumstances where the unanimous support by the creditors of a particular offer could conceivably override the proper and provident conduct of a sale by a receiver, I do not think that this is such a case. This is a case where the receiver has acted properly and in a provident way. It would make a mockery out of the judicial process, under which a mandate was given to this receiver to sell this airline if the support by these creditors of the 922 offer were permitted to carry the day. I give no weight to the support which they give to the 922 offer.

69 In its factum, the receiver pointed out that, because of greater liabilities imposed upon private receivers by various statutes such as the *Employment Standards Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, and the *Environmental Protection Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, it is likely that more and more the courts will be asked to appoint receivers in insolvencies. In those circumstances, I think that creditors who ask for court-appointed receivers and business people who choose to deal with those receivers should know that if those receivers act properly and providently, their decisions and judgments will be given great weight by the courts who appoint them. I have decided this appeal in the way I have in order to assure business people who deal with court-appointed receivers that they can have confidence that an agreement which they make with a court-appointed receiver will be far more than a platform upon which others may bargain at the court approval stage. I think that persons who enter into agreements with court-appointed receivers, following a disposition procedure that is appropriate given the nature of the assets involved, should expect that their bargain will be confirmed by the court.

70 The process is very important. It should be carefully protected so that the ability of court-appointed receivers to negotiate the best price possible is strengthened and supported. Because this receiver acted properly and providently in entering into the OEL agreement, I am of the opinion that Rosenberg J. was right when he approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer.

71 I would, accordingly, dismiss the appeal. I would award the receiver, OEL and Frontier Airlines Limited their costs out of the Soundair estate, those of the receiver on a solicitor-client scale. I would make no order as to the costs of any of the other parties or intervenors.

**McKinlay J.A. :**

72 I agree with Galligan J.A. in result, but wish to emphasize that I do so on the basis that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. Consequently, in all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver to determine whether it satisfies the tests set out by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.). While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case, as described by Galligan J.A., was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the assets involved, it is not a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

73 I should like to add that where there is a small number of creditors who are the only parties with a real interest in the proceeds of the sale (i.e., where it is clear that the highest price attainable would result in recovery so low that no other creditors, shareholders, guarantors, etc., could possibly benefit therefore), the wishes of the interested creditors should be very seriously considered by the receiver. It is true, as Galligan J.A. points out, that in seeking the court appointment of a receiver, the moving parties also seek the protection of the court in carrying out the receiver's functions. However, it is also true that in utilizing the court process, the moving parties have opened the whole process to detailed scrutiny by all involved, and have probably added significantly to their costs and consequent shortfall as a result of so doing. The adoption of the court process should in no way diminish the rights of any party, and most certainly not the rights of the only parties with a real interest. Where a receiver asks for court approval of a sale which is opposed by the only parties in interest, the court should scrutinize with great care the procedure followed by the receiver. I agree with Galligan J.A. that in this case that was done. I am satisfied that the rights of all parties were properly considered by the receiver, by the learned motions court judge, and by Galligan J.A.

**Goodman J.A. (dissenting):**

74 I have had the opportunity of reading the reasons for judgment herein of Galligan and McKinlay JJ.A. Respectfully, I am unable to agree with their conclusion.

75 The case at bar is an exceptional one in the sense that upon the application made for approval of the sale of the assets of Air Toronto, two competing offers were placed before Rosenberg J. Those two offers were that of OEL and that of 922, a company incorporated for the purpose of acquiring Air Toronto. Its shares were owned equally by CCFL and Air Canada. It was conceded by all parties to these proceedings that the only persons who had any interest in the proceeds of the sale were two secured creditors, viz., CCFL and the Royal Bank of Canada. Those two creditors were unanimous in their position that they desired the court to approve the sale to 922. We were not referred to, nor am I aware of, any case where a court has refused to abide by the unanimous wishes of the only interested creditors for the approval of a specific offer made in receivership proceedings.

76 In *British Columbia Developments Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Ltd.* (1977), 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28, 5 B.C.L.R. 94 (S.C.), Berger J. said at p. 30 [C.B.R.]:

Here all of those with a financial stake in the plant have joined in seeking the court's approval of the sale to Fincas. This court does not have a roving commission to decide what is best for investors and businessmen when they have agreed among themselves what course of action they should follow. It is their money.

77 I agree with that statement. It is particularly apt to this case. The two secured creditors will suffer a shortfall of approximately \$50 million. They have a tremendous interest in the sale of assets which form part of their security. I agree with the finding of Rosenberg J. that the offer of 922 is superior to that of OEL. He concluded that the 922 offer is marginally superior. If by that he meant that mathematically it was likely to provide slightly more in the way of proceeds, it is difficult to take issue with that finding. If, on the other hand, he meant that having regard to all considerations it was only marginally superior, I cannot agree. He said in his reasons:

I have come to the conclusion that knowledgeable creditors such as the Royal Bank would prefer the 922 offer even if the other factors influencing their decision were not present. No matter what adjustments had to be made, the 922 offer results in more cash immediately. Creditors facing the type of loss the Royal Bank is taking in this case would not be anxious to rely on contingencies especially in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry.

78 I agree with that statement completely. It is apparent that the difference between the two offers insofar as cash on closing is concerned amounts to approximately \$3 million to \$4 million. The bank submitted that it did not wish to gamble any further with respect to its investment, and that the acceptance and court approval of the OEL offer in effect supplanted its position as a secured creditor with respect to the amount owing over and above the down payment and placed it in the position of a joint entrepreneur, but one with no control. This results from the fact that the OEL offer did not provide for any security for any funds which might be forthcoming over and above the initial down payment on closing.

79 In *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), Hart J.A., speaking for the majority of the court, said at p. 10 [C.B.R.]:

Here we are dealing with a receiver appointed at the instance of one major creditor, who chose to insert in the contract of sale a provision making it subject to the approval of the court. This, in my opinion, shows an intention on behalf of the parties to invoke the normal equitable doctrines which place the court in the position of looking to the interests of all persons concerned before giving its blessing to a particular transaction submitted for approval. In these circumstances the court would not consider itself bound by the contract entered into in good faith by the receiver but would have to look to the broader picture to see that that contract was for the benefit of the creditors as a whole. When there was evidence that a higher price was readily available for the property the chambers judge was, in my opinion, justified in exercising his discretion as he did. Otherwise he could have deprived the creditors of a substantial sum of money.

80 This statement is apposite to the circumstances of the case at bar. I hasten to add that in my opinion it is not only price which is to be considered in the exercise of the judge's discretion. It may very well be, as I believe to be so in this case, that the

amount of cash is the most important element in determining which of the two offers is for the benefit and in the best interest of the creditors.

81 It is my view, and the statement of Hart J.A. is consistent therewith, that the fact that a creditor has requested an order of the court appointing a receiver does not in any way diminish or derogate from his right to obtain the maximum benefit to be derived from any disposition of the debtor's assets. I agree completely with the views expressed by McKinlay J.A. in that regard in her reasons.

82 It is my further view that any negotiations which took place between the only two interested creditors in deciding to support the approval of the 922 offer were not relevant to the determination by the presiding judge of the issues involved in the motion for approval of either one of the two offers, nor are they relevant in determining the outcome of this appeal. It is sufficient that the two creditors have decided unanimously what is in their best interest, and the appeal must be considered in the light of that decision. It so happens, however, that there is ample evidence to support their conclusion that the approval of the 922 offer is in their best interests.

83 I am satisfied that the interests of the creditors are the prime consideration for both the receiver and the court. In *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.) , Saunders J. said at p. 243:

This does not mean that a court should ignore a new and higher bid made after acceptance where there has been no unfairness in the process. The interests of the creditors, while not the only consideration, are the prime consideration.

84 I agree with that statement of the law. In *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.) , Saunders J. heard an application for court approval of the sale by the sheriff of real property in bankruptcy proceedings. The sheriff had been previously ordered to list the property for sale subject to approval of the court. Saunders J. said at p. 246:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interests of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.

85 I am in agreement with that statement as a matter of general principle. Saunders J. further stated that he adopted the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. in *Cameron* , supra, quoted by Galligan J.A. in his reasons. In *Cameron* , the remarks of Macdonald J.A. related to situations involving the calling of bids and fixing a time limit for the making of such bids. In those circumstances the process is so clear as a matter of commercial practice that an interference by the court in such process might have a deleterious effect on the efficacy of receivership proceedings in other cases. But Macdonald J.A. recognized that even in bid or tender cases where the offeror for whose bid approval is sought has complied with all requirements, a court might not approve the agreement of purchase and sale entered into by the receiver. He said at pp. 11-12 [C.B.R.]:

There are, of course, many reasons why a court might not approve an agreement of purchase and sale, viz., where the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; or, where the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids or that inadequate notice of sale by bid was given (where the receiver sells property by the bid method); or, where it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interest of either the creditors or the owner. Court approval must involve the delicate balancing of competing interests and not simply a consideration of the interests of the creditors.

86 The deficiency in the present case is so large that there has been no suggestion of a competing interest between the owner and the creditors.

87 I agree that the same reasoning may apply to a negotiation process leading to a private sale, but the procedure and process applicable to private sales of a wide variety of businesses and undertakings with the multiplicity of individual considerations applicable and perhaps peculiar to the particular business is not so clearly established that a departure by the court from the process adopted by the receiver in a particular case will result in commercial chaos to the detriment of future receivership

proceedings. Each case must be decided on its own merits, and it is necessary to consider the process used by the receiver in the present proceedings and to determine whether it was unfair, improvident or inadequate.

88 It is important to note at the outset that Rosenberg J. made the following statement in his reasons:

On March 8, 1991 the trustee accepted the OEL offer subject to court approval. The Receiver at that time had no other offer before it that was in final form or could possibly be accepted. The Receiver had at the time the knowledge that Air Canada with CCFL had not bargained in good faith and had not fulfilled the promise of its letter of March 1st. The Receiver was justified in assuming that Air Canada and CCFL's offer was a long way from being in an acceptable form and that Air Canada and CCFL's objective was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada.

89 In my opinion there was no evidence before him or before this court to indicate that Air Canada, with CCFL, had not bargained in good faith, and that the receiver had knowledge of such lack of good faith. Indeed, on his appeal, counsel for the receiver stated that he was not alleging Air Canada and CCFL had not bargained in good faith. Air Canada had frankly stated at the time that it had made its offer to purchase, which was eventually refused by the receiver, that it would not become involved in an "auction" to purchase the undertaking of Air Canada and that, although it would fulfil its contractual obligations to provide connecting services to Air Toronto, it would do no more than it was legally required to do insofar as facilitating the purchase of Air Toronto by any other person. In so doing, Air Canada may have been playing "hardball," as its behaviour was characterized by some of the counsel for opposing parties. It was nevertheless merely openly asserting its legal position, as it was entitled to do.

90 Furthermore, there was no evidence before Rosenberg J. or this court that the receiver had assumed that Air Canada and CCFL's objective in making an offer was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada. Indeed, there was no evidence to support such an assumption in any event, although it is clear that 922, and through it CCFL and Air Canada, were endeavouring to present an offer to purchase which would be accepted and/or approved by the court in preference to the offer made by OEL.

91 To the extent that approval of the OEL agreement by Rosenberg J. was based on the alleged lack of good faith in bargaining and improper motivation with respect to connector traffic on the part of Air Canada and CCFL, it cannot be supported.

92 I would also point out that rather than saying there was no other offer before it that was final in form, it would have been more accurate to have said that there was *no unconditional* offer before it.

93 In considering the material and evidence placed before the court, I am satisfied that the receiver was at all times acting in good faith. I have reached the conclusion, however, that the process which he used was unfair insofar as 922 is concerned, and improvident insofar as the two secured creditors are concerned.

94 Air Canada had been negotiating with Soundair Corporation for the purchase from it of Air Toronto for a considerable period of time prior to the appointment of a receiver by the court. It had given a letter of intent indicating a prospective sale price of \$18 million. After the appointment of the receiver, by agreement dated April 30, 1990, Air Canada continued its negotiations for the purchase of Air Toronto with the receiver. Although this agreement contained a clause which provided that the receiver "shall not negotiate for the sale ... of Air Toronto with any person except Air Canada," it further provided that the receiver would not be in breach of that provision merely by receiving unsolicited offers for all or any of the assets of Air Toronto. In addition, the agreement, which had a term commencing on April 30, 1990, could be terminated on the fifth business day following the delivery of a written notice of termination by one party to the other. I point out this provision merely to indicate that the exclusivity privilege extended by the receiver to Air Canada was of short duration at the receiver's option.

95 As a result of due diligence investigations carried out by Air Canada during the months of April, May and June of 1990, Air Canada reduced its offer to \$8.1 million conditional upon there being \$4 million in tangible assets. The offer was made on June 14, 1990, and was open for acceptance until June 29, 1990.

96 By amending agreement dated June 19, 1990, the receiver was released from its covenant to refrain from negotiating for the sale of the Air Toronto business and assets to any person other than Air Canada. By virtue of this amending agreement, the receiver had put itself in the position of having a firm offer in hand, with the right to negotiate and accept offers from other persons. Air Canada, in these circumstances, was in the subservient position. The receiver, in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, allowed the Air Canada offer to lapse. On July 20, 1990, Air Canada served a notice of termination of the April 30, 1990 agreement.

97 Apparently as a result of advice received from the receiver to the effect that the receiver intended to conduct an auction for the sale of the assets and business of the Air Toronto division of Soundair Corporation, the solicitors for Air Canada advised the receiver by letter dated July 20, 1990, in part as follows:

Air Canada has instructed us to advise you that it does not intend to submit a further offer in the auction process.

98 This statement, together with other statements set forth in the letter, was sufficient to indicate that Air Canada was not interested in purchasing Air Toronto in the process apparently contemplated by the receiver at that time. It did not form a proper foundation for the receiver to conclude that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto [to] Air Canada, either alone or in conjunction with some other person, in different circumstances. In June 1990, the receiver was of the opinion that the fair value of Air Toronto was between \$10 million and \$12 million.

99 In August 1990, the receiver contacted a number of interested parties. A number of offers were received which were not deemed to be satisfactory. One such offer, received on August 20, 1990, came as a joint offer from OEL and Air Ontario (an Air Canada connector). It was for the sum of \$3 million for the good will relating to certain Air Toronto routes, but did not include the purchase of any tangible assets or leasehold interests.

100 In December 1990, the receiver was approached by the management of Canadian Partner (operated by OEL) for the purpose of evaluating the benefits of an amalgamated Air Toronto/Air Partner operation. The negotiations continued from December of 1990 to February of 1991, culminating in the OEL agreement dated March 8, 1991.

101 On or before December 1990, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to make a bid for the Air Toronto assets. The receiver, in August of 1990, for the purpose of facilitating the sale of Air Toronto assets, commenced the preparation of an operating memorandum. He prepared no less than six draft operating memoranda with dates from October 1990 through March 1, 1991. None of these were distributed to any prospective bidder despite requests having been received therefor, with the exception of an early draft provided to CCFL without the receiver's knowledge.

102 During the period December 1990 to the end of January 1991, the receiver advised CCFL that the offering memorandum was in the process of being prepared and would be ready soon for distribution. He further advised CCFL that it should await the receipt of the memorandum before submitting a formal offer to purchase the Air Toronto assets.

103 By late January, CCFL had become aware that the receiver was negotiating with OEL for the sale of Air Toronto. In fact, on February 11, 1991, the receiver signed a letter of intent with OEL wherein it had specifically agreed not to negotiate with any other potential bidders or solicit any offers from others.

104 By letter dated February 25, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL made a written request to the receiver for the offering memorandum. The receiver did not reply to the letter because he felt he was precluded from so doing by the provisions of the letter of intent dated February 11, 1991. Other prospective purchasers were also unsuccessful in obtaining the promised memorandum to assist them in preparing their bids. It should be noted that, exclusivity provision of the letter of intent expired on February 20, 1991. This provision was extended on three occasions, viz., February 19, 22 and March 5, 1991. It is clear that from a legal standpoint the receiver, by refusing to extend the time, could have dealt with other prospective purchasers, and specifically with 922.

105 It was not until March 1, 1991, that CCFL had obtained sufficient information to enable it to make a bid through 922. It succeeded in so doing through its own efforts through sources other than the receiver. By that time the receiver had already entered into the letter of intent with OEL. Notwithstanding the fact that the receiver knew since December of 1990 that CCFL wished to make a bid for the assets of Air Toronto (and there is no evidence to suggest that at that time such a bid would be in conjunction with Air Canada or that Air Canada was in any way connected with CCFL), it took no steps to provide CCFL with information necessary to enable it to make an intelligent bid, and indeed suggested delaying the making of the bid until an offering memorandum had been prepared and provided. In the meantime, by entering into the letter of intent with OEL, it put itself in a position where it could not negotiate with CCFL or provide the information requested.

106 On February 28, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL telephoned the receiver and were advised for the first time that the receiver had made a business decision to negotiate solely with OEL and would not negotiate with anyone else in the interim.

107 By letter dated March 1, 1991, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to submit a bid. It set forth the essential terms of the bid and stated that it would be subject to customary commercial provisions. On March 7, 1991 CCFL and Air Canada, jointly through 922, submitted an offer to purchase Air Toronto upon the terms set forth in the letter dated March 1, 1991. It included a provision that the offer was conditional upon the interpretation of an inter-lender agreement which set out the relative distribution of proceeds as between CCFL and the Royal Bank. It is common ground that it was a condition over which the receiver had no control, and accordingly would not have been acceptable on that ground alone. The receiver did not, however, contact CCFL in order to negotiate or request the removal of the condition, although it appears that its agreement with OEL not to negotiate with any person other than OEL expired on March 6, 1991.

108 The fact of the matter is that by March 7, 1991, the receiver had received the offer from OEL which was subsequently approved by Rosenberg J. That offer was accepted by the receiver on March 8, 1991. Notwithstanding the fact that OEL had been negotiating the purchase for a period of approximately 3 months, the offer contained a provision for the sole benefit of the purchaser that it was subject to the purchaser obtaining "a financing commitment within 45 days of the date hereof in an amount not less than the Purchase Price from the Royal Bank of Canada or other financial institution upon terms and conditions acceptable to them. In the event that such a financing commitment is not obtained within such 45 day period, the purchaser or OEL shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon giving written notice of termination to the vendor on the first Business Day following the expiry of the said period." The purchaser was also given the right to waive the condition.

109 In effect, the agreement was tantamount to a 45-day option to purchase, excluding the right of any other person to purchase Air Toronto during that period of time and thereafter if the condition was fulfilled or waived. The agreement was, of course, stated to be subject to court approval.

110 In my opinion, the process and procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL. Although it was aware from December 1990 that CCFL was interested in making an offer, it effectively delayed the making of such offer by continually referring to the preparation of the offering memorandum. It did not endeavour during the period December 1990 to March 7, 1991, to negotiate with CCFL in any way the possible terms of purchase and sale agreement. In the result, no offer was sought from CCFL by the receiver prior to February 11, 1991, and thereafter it put itself in the position of being unable to negotiate with anyone other than OEL. The receiver then, on March 8, 1991, chose to accept an offer which was conditional in nature without prior consultation with CCFL (922) to see whether it was prepared to remove the condition in its offer.

111 I do not doubt that the receiver felt that it was more likely that the condition in the OEL offer would be fulfilled than the condition in the 922 offer. It may be that the receiver, having negotiated for a period of 3 months with OEL, was fearful that it might lose the offer if OEL discovered that it was negotiating with another person. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to it. The potential loss was that of an agreement which amounted to little more than an option in favour of the offeror.

112 In my opinion the procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL in that, in effect, it gave OEL the opportunity of engaging in exclusive negotiations for a period of 3 months, notwithstanding the fact that it knew CCFL was interested in making an offer. The receiver did not indicate a deadline by which offers were to be submitted, and it did not at any time indicate the structure or nature of an offer which might be acceptable to it.

113 In his reasons, Rosenberg J. stated that as of March 1, CCFL and Air Canada had all the information that they needed, and any allegations of unfairness in the negotiating process by the receiver had disappeared. He said:

They created a situation as of March 8, where the receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was acceptable in form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The Receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

If he meant by "acceptable in form" that it was acceptable to the receiver, then obviously OEL had the unfair advantage of its lengthy negotiations with the receiver to ascertain what kind of an offer would be acceptable to the receiver. If, on the other hand, he meant that the 922 offer was unacceptable in its form because it was conditional, it can hardly be said that the OEL offer was more acceptable in this regard, as it contained a condition with respect to financing terms and conditions "*acceptable to them*."

114 It should be noted that on March 13, 1991, the representatives of 922 first met with the receiver to review its offer of March 7, 1991, and at the request of the receiver, withdrew the inter-lender condition from its offer. On March 14, 1991, OEL removed the financing condition from its offer. By order of Rosenberg J. dated March 26, 1991, CCFL was given until April 5, 1991, to submit a bid, and on April 5, 1991, 922 submitted its offer with the inter-lender condition removed.

115 In my opinion, the offer accepted by the receiver is improvident and unfair insofar as the two creditors are concerned. It is not improvident in the sense that the price offered by 922 greatly exceeded that offered by OEL. In the final analysis it may not be greater at all. The salient fact is that the cash down payment in the 922 offer constitutes proximately two thirds of the contemplated sale price, whereas the cash down payment in the OEL transaction constitutes approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the contemplated sale price. In terms of absolute dollars, the down payment in the 922 offer would likely exceed that provided for in the OEL agreement by approximately \$3 million to \$4 million.

116 In *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.*, supra, Saunders J. said at p. 243 [C.B.R.]:

If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate. In such a case the proper course might be to refuse approval and to ask the trustee to recommence the process.

117 I accept that statement as being an accurate statement of the law. I would add, however, as previously indicated, that in determining what is the best price for the estate, the receiver or court should not limit its consideration to which offer provides for the greater sale price. The amount of down payment and the provision or lack thereof to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price over and above the down payment may be the most important factor to be considered, and I am of the view that is so in the present case. It is clear that that was the view of the only creditors who can benefit from the sale of Air Toronto.

118 I note that in the case at bar the 922 offer in conditional form was presented to the receiver before it accepted the OEL offer. The receiver, in good faith, although I believe mistakenly, decided that the OEL offer was the better offer. At that time the receiver did not have the benefit of the views of the two secured creditors in that regard. At the time of the application for approval before Rosenberg J., the stated preference of the two interested creditors was made quite clear. He found as fact that knowledgeable creditors would not be anxious to rely on contingencies in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry. It is reasonable to expect that a receiver would be no less knowledgeable in that regard, and it is his primary duty to protect the interests of the creditors. In my view, it was an improvident act on the part of the receiver to have accepted the conditional offer made by OEL, and Rosenberg J. erred in failing to dismiss the application of the receiver for approval of the OEL offer. It would be most inequitable to foist upon the two creditors, who have already been seriously hurt, more unnecessary contingencies.

119 Although in other circumstances it might be appropriate to ask the receiver to recommence the process, in my opinion, it would not be appropriate to do so in this case. The only two interested creditors support the acceptance of the 922 offer, and the court should so order.

120 Although I would be prepared to dispose of the case on the grounds stated above, some comment should be addressed to the question of interference by the court with the process and procedure adopted by the receiver.

121 I am in agreement with the view expressed by McKinlay J.A. in her reasons that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. As a result, the procedure adopted by the receiver was somewhat unusual. At the outset, in accordance with the terms of the receiving order, it dealt solely with Air Canada. It then appears that the receiver contemplated a sale of the assets by way of auction, and still later contemplated the preparation and distribution of an offering memorandum inviting bids. At some point, without advice to CCFL, it abandoned that idea and reverted to exclusive negotiations with one interested party. This entire process is not one which is customary or widely accepted as a general practice in the commercial world. It was somewhat unique, having regard to the circumstances of this case. In my opinion, the refusal of the court to approve the offer accepted by the receiver would not reflect on the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers, and is not the type of refusal which will have a tendency to undermine the future confidence of business persons in dealing with receivers.

122 Rosenberg J. stated that the Royal Bank was aware of the process used and tacitly approved it. He said it knew the terms of the letter of intent in February 1991, and made no comment. The Royal Bank did, however, indicate to the receiver that it was not satisfied with the contemplated price, nor the amount of the down payment. It did not, however, tell the receiver to adopt a different process in endeavouring to sell the Air Toronto assets. It is not clear from the material filed that at the time it became aware of the letter of intent that it knew that CCFL was interested in purchasing Air Toronto.

123 I am further of the opinion that a prospective purchaser who has been given an opportunity to engage in exclusive negotiations with a receiver for relatively short periods of time which are extended from time to time by the receiver, and who then makes a conditional offer, the condition of which is for his sole benefit and must be fulfilled to his satisfaction unless waived by him, and which he knows is to be subject to court approval, cannot legitimately claim to have been unfairly dealt with if the court refuses to approve the offer and approves a substantially better one.

124 In conclusion, I feel that I must comment on the statement made by Galligan J.A. in his reasons to the effect that the suggestion made by counsel for 922 constitutes evidence of lack of prejudice resulting from the absence of an offering memorandum. It should be pointed out that the court invited counsel to indicate the manner in which the problem should be resolved in the event that the court concluded that the order approving the OEL offer should be set aside. There was no evidence before the court with respect to what additional information may have been acquired by CCFL since March 8, 1991, and no inquiry was made in that regard. Accordingly, I am of the view that no adverse inference should be drawn from the proposal made as a result of the court's invitation.

125 For the above reasons I would allow the appeal one set of costs to CCFL-922, set aside the order of Rosenberg J., dismiss the receiver's motion with one set of costs to CCFL-922 and order that the assets of Air Toronto be sold to numbered corporation 922246 on the terms set forth in its offer with appropriate adjustments to provide for the delay in its execution. Costs awarded shall be payable out of the estate of Soundair Corporation. The costs incurred by the receiver in making the application and responding to the appeal shall be paid to him out of the assets of the estate of Soundair Corporation on a solicitor-client basis. I would make no order as to costs of any of the other parties or intervenors.

*Appeal dismissed.*

# TAB 3

**Most Negative Treatment:** Recently added (treatment not yet designated)

**Most Recent Recently added (treatment not yet designated):** [Arrangement relatif à 9220-7174 Québec inc.](#) | 2023 QCCS 4835, 2023 CarswellQue 19960, EYB 2023-537742 | (C.S. Qué., Aug 1, 2023)

2019 ABCA 433  
Alberta Court of Appeal

Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc v. 1905393 Alberta Ltd

2019 CarswellAlta 2418, 2019 ABCA 433, [2019] A.W.L.D. 4519,  
312 A.C.W.S. (3d) 237, 74 C.B.R. (6th) 14, 98 Alta. L.R. (6th) 1

**Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc. in its capacity as Receiver of 1905393 Alberta Ltd.  
(Respondent / Cross-Appellants / Applicant) and 1905393 Alberta Ltd., David  
Podollan and Steller One Holdings Ltd. (Appellants / Cross-Respondents /  
Respondents) and Servus Credit Union Ltd., Ducor Properties Ltd., Northern  
Electric Ltd. and Fancy Doors & Mouldings Ltd. (Respondents / Interested Parties)**

Thomas W. Wakeling, Dawn Pentelechuk, Jolaine Antonio JJ.A.

Heard: September 3, 2019

Judgment: November 14, 2019

Docket: Edmonton Appeal 1903-0134-AC

Counsel: D.M. Nowak, J.M. Lee, Q.C., for Respondent, Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc. in its capacity as receiver of 1905393 Alberta Ltd.

D.R. Peskett, C.M. Young, for Appellants

C.P. Russell, Q.C., R.T. Trainer, for Respondent, Servus Credit Union Ltd.

S.A. Wanke, for Respondent, Ducor Properties Ltd.

S.T. Fitzgerald, for Respondent, Northern Electric Ltd.

H.S. Kandola, for Respondent, Fancy Doors & Mouldings Ltd.

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XVII Practice and procedure in courts](#)

[XVII.4 Appeals](#)

[XVII.4.b Miscellaneous](#)

**Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts — Appeals — Miscellaneous

Appellants appeal Approval and Vesting Order which approved sale proposed in Asset Purchase Agreement between Receiver, PWC, and respondent, D Ltd. — Appeal dismissed — Chambers judge was keenly alive to abbreviated marketing period and appraised values of hotels — Nevertheless, having regard to unique nature of property, incomplete construction of development hotel, difficulties with prospective purchasers in branding hotels in area outside of major centre and area which was in midst of economic downturn, she concluded that receiver acted in commercially reasonable manner and obtained best price possible in circumstances — Even with abbreviated period for submission of offers, chambers judge reasonably concluded that receiver undertook extensive marketing campaign, engaged commercial realtor and construction consultant, and consulted and dialogued with owner throughout process, which process appellants took no issue with, until offers were received.

**Table of Authorities****Cases considered:**

*Bank of Montreal v. River Rentals Group Ltd.* (2010), 2010 ABCA 16, 2010 CarswellAlta 57, 18 Alta. L.R. (5th) 201, 470 W.A.C. 333, 469 A.R. 333, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 26 (Alta. C.A.) — considered

*Northstone Power Corp. v. R.J.K. Power Systems Ltd.* (2002), 2002 ABCA 201, 2002 CarswellAlta 1111, 36 C.B.R. (4th) 272, 317 A.R. 192, 284 W.A.C. 192 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

*Romspen Mortgage Corp. v. Lantzville Foothills Estates Inc.* (2013), 2013 BCSC 2222, 2013 CarswellBC 3640, 12 C.B.R. (6th) 282 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

*Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473, 65 A.R. 372, 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 1985 CarswellAlta 332 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

*Skyepharma PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.* (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 3641, 12 C.B.R. (4th) 87, [2000] B.P.I.R. 531, 96 O.T.C. 172 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*Skyepharma PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.* (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 466, 47 O.R. (3d) 234, 130 O.A.C. 273, 15 C.B.R. (4th) 298 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

*1905393 Alberta Ltd v. Servus Credit Union Ltd* (2019), 2019 ABCA 269, 2019 CarswellAlta 1342, 72 C.B.R. (6th) 20 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

**Statutes considered:**

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

- s. 193 — considered
- s. 193(a) — considered
- s. 193(a)-193(d) — referred to
- s. 193(c) — considered
- s. 193(e) — considered

APPEAL by appellants from Approval and Vesting Order which approved sale proposed in Asset Purchase Agreement between receiver, PWC, and respondent, D Ltd.

***Per curiam:***

1 The appellants appeal an Approval and Vesting Order granted on May 21, 2019 which approved a sale proposed in the May 3, 2019 Asset Purchase Agreement between the Receiver, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and the respondent, Ducor Properties Ltd ("Ducor"). The assets consist primarily of lands and buildings in Grande Prairie, Alberta described as a partially constructed 169 room full service hotel not currently open for business (the "Development Hotel") and a 63 room extended stay hotel ("Extended Stay Hotel") currently operating on the same parcel of land (collectively the "Hotels"). The Hotels are owned by the appellant, 1905393 Alberta Ltd. ("190") whose shareholder is the appellant, Stellar One Holdings Ltd, and whose president and sole director is the appellant, David Podollan.

2 The respondent, Servus Credit Union Ltd ("Servus"), is 190's largest secured creditor. Servus provided financing to 190 for construction of the Hotels. On May 16, 2018, Servus issued a demand for payment of its outstanding debt. As of June 29, 2018, 190 owed Servus approximately \$23.9 million. That debt remains outstanding and, in fact, continues to increase because of interest, property taxes and ongoing carrying costs for the Hotels incurred by the Receiver.

3 On July 20, 2018, the Receiver was appointed over all of 190's current and future assets, undertakings and properties. The appellants opposed the Receiver's appointment primarily on the basis that 190 was seeking to re-finance the Hotels. That re-financing has never materialized.

4 As a result, the Receiver sought in October 2018 to liquidate the Hotels. In typical fashion, the Receiver obtained an appraisal of the Hotels, as did the respondents. After consulting with three national real estate brokers, the Receiver engaged the services of Colliers International ("Colliers"), which recommended a structured sales process with no listing price and a fixed bid submission date. While the sales process contemplated an exposure period of approximately six weeks between market launch and offer submission deadline, Colliers had contacted over 1,290 prospective purchasers and agents using a variety of mediums in the months prior to market launch, exposing the Hotels to national hotel groups and individuals in the industry, and conducted site visits and answered inquiries posed by prospective buyers. Prospective purchasers provided feedback to Colliers but that included concerns about the quality of construction on the Development Hotel.

5 The Receiver also engaged the services of an independent construction consultant, Entuitive Corporation, to provide an estimate of the cost to complete construction on the Development Hotel and to assist in decision-making on whether to complete the Development Hotel. In addition, the Receiver contacted a major international hotel franchise brand to obtain input on prospective franchisees' views of the design and fixturing of the Development Hotel. The ability to brand the Hotels is a significant factor affecting their marketability. Moreover, some of the feedback confirmed that energy exploration and development in Grande Prairie is down, resulting in downward pressure on hotel-room demand.

6 Parties that requested further information in response to the listing were asked to execute a confidentiality agreement whereupon they were granted access to a "data-room" containing information on the Hotels and offering related documents and photos. Colliers provided confidential information regarding 190's assets to 27 interested parties.

7 The deadline for offer submission yielded only four offers, each of which was far below the appraised value of the Hotels. Three of the four offers were extremely close in respect of their stated price; the fourth offer was significantly lower than the others. As a result, the Receiver went back to the three prospective purchasers that had similar offers and asked them to re-submit better offers. None, however, varied their respective purchase prices in a meaningful manner when invited to do so. The Receiver ultimately accepted and obtained approval for Ducor's offer to purchase which, as the appellants correctly point out, is substantially less than the appraised value of the Hotels.

8 The primary thrust of the appellants' argument is that an abbreviated sale process resulted in an offer which is unreasonably low having regard to the appraisals. They argue that the Receiver was improvident in accepting such an offer and the chambers judge erred by approving it. Approving the sale, they argue, would eliminate the substantial equity in the property evidenced by the appraised value and that the "massive prejudice" caused to them as a result materially outweighs any further time and cost associated with requiring the Receiver to re-market the Hotels with a longer exposure time. Mr. Podollan joins in this argument as he is potentially liable for any shortfall under personal guarantees to Servus for all amounts owed to Servus by 190. The other respondents, Fancy Doors & Mouldings Ltd and Northern Electric Ltd, similarly echo the appellants' arguments as the shortfall may deprive them both from collecting on their builders' liens which, collectively, total approximately \$340,000.

9 The appellants obtained both a stay of the Approval and Vesting Order and leave to appeal pursuant to s 193 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c B-3: *1905393 Alberta Ltd v. Servus Credit Union Ltd*, [2019] A.J. No. 895, 2019 ABCA 269 (Alta. C.A.). The issues around which leave was granted generally coalesce around two questions. First, whether the chambers judge applied the correct test in deciding whether to approve of the Receiver recommended sale; and second, whether the chambers judge erred in her application of the legal test to the facts in deciding whether to approve the sale and, in particular, erred in her exercise of discretion by failing to consider or provide sufficient weight to a relevant factor. The standard of review is correctness on the first question and palpable and overriding error on the second: *Northstone Power Corp. v. R.J.K. Power Systems Ltd.*, 2002 ABCA 201 (Alta. C.A.) at para 4, (2002), 317 A.R. 192 (Alta. C.A.).

10 As regards the first question, the parties agree that Court approval requires the Receiver to satisfy the well-known test in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*, [1991] O.J. No. 1137 (Ont. C.A.) at para 16, (1991), 46 O.A.C. 321 (Ont. C.A.) ("*Soundair*"). That test requires the Court to consider four factors: (i) whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently; (ii) whether the interests of all parties have been considered, not just the interests of the creditors of

the debtor; (iii) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; and (iv) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

11 The appellants suggest that *Soundair* has been modified by our Court in *Bank of Montreal v. River Rentals Group Ltd.*, 2010 ABCA 16 (Alta. C.A.) at para 13, (2010), 469 A.R. 333 (Alta. C.A.), to require an additional four factors in assessing whether a receiver has complied with its duties: (a) whether the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; (b) whether the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids; (c) whether inadequate notice of sale by bid was given; and (d) whether it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interests of either the creditor or the owner. The appellants argue that, although the chambers judge considered the *Soundair* factors, she erred by failing to consider the additional *River Rentals* factors and, in so doing, in effect applied the "wrong law".

12 We disagree. The chambers judge expressly referred to the *River Rentals* case. *River Rentals*, it must be recalled, simply identified a subset of factors that a Court might also consider when considering the first prong of the *Soundair* test as to whether a receiver failed to get the best price and has not acted providently. Moreover, the type of factors that might be considered is by no means a closed category and there may be other relevant factors that might lead a court to refuse to approve a sale: *Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 65 A.R. 372 (Alta. C.A.) at paras 12-13. At its core, *River Rentals* highlights the need for a Court to balance several factors in determining whether a receiver complied with its duties and to confirm a sale. It did not purport to modify the *Soundair* test, establish a hierarchy of factors, nor limit the types of things that a Court might consider. The chambers judge applied the correct test. This ground of appeal is dismissed.

13 At its core, then, the appellants challenge how the chambers judge applied and weighed the relevant factors in this case. The appellants suggest that the failure to obtain a price at or close to the appraised value of the Hotels is an overriding factor that trumps all the others in assessing whether the Receiver acted improvidently. That is not the test. A reviewing Court's function is not to consider whether a Receiver has failed to get the best price. Rather, a Receiver's duty is to act in a commercially reasonable manner in the circumstances with a view to obtaining the best price having regard to the competing interests of the interested parties: *Skyepharm PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.* (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para 4, [1999] O.J. No. 4300 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), aff'd on appeal (2000), 15 C.B.R. (4th) 298 (Ont. C.A.).

14 Nor is it the Court's function to substitute its view of how a marketing process should proceed. The appellants suggest that if the Hotels were re-marketed with an exposure period closer to that which the appraisals were based on, then a better offer might be obtained. Again, that is not the test. The Receiver's decision to enter into an agreement for sale must be assessed under the circumstances then existing. The chambers judge was aware that the Receiver considered the risk of not accepting the approved offer to be significant. There was no assurance that a longer marketing period would generate a better offer and, in the interim, the Receiver was incurring significant carrying costs. To ignore these circumstances would improperly call into question a receiver's expertise and authority in the receivership process and thereby compromise the integrity of a sales process and would undermine the commercial certainty upon which court-supervised insolvency sales are based: *Soundair* at para 43. In such a case, chaos in the commercial world would result and "receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement": *Soundair* at para 22.

15 The fact that three of the four offers came in so close together in terms of amount, with the fourth one being even lower, is significant. Absent evidence of impropriety or collusion in the preparation of those confidential offers — of which there is absolutely none — the fact that those offers were all substantially lower than the appraised value speaks loudly to the existing hotel market in Grande Prairie. Moreover, the appellants have not brought any fresh evidence application to admit cogent evidence that a better offer might materialize if the Hotels were re-marketed. Indeed, the appellants have indicated that they do not rely on what the leave judge described as a "fairly continuous flow of material", the scent of which was to suggest that there were better offers waiting in the wings but were prevented from bidding because of the Receiver's abbreviated marketing process. Clearly the impression meant to be created by that late flow of material was an important factor in the leave judge's decision to grant a stay and leave to appeal: 2019 ABCA 269 (Alta. C.A.) at para 13.

16 Nor, as stated previously, have the appellants been able to re-finance the Hotels notwithstanding their assessment that there is still substantial equity in the Hotels based on the appraisals. At a certain point, however, it is the market that sets the value

of property and appraisals simply become "relegated to not much more than well-meant but inaccurate predictions": *Romspen Mortgage Corp. v. Lantzville Foothills Estates Inc.*, 2013 BCSC 2222 (B.C. S.C.) at para 20.

17 The chambers judge was keenly alive to the abbreviated marketing period and the appraised values of the Hotels. Nevertheless, having regard to the unique nature of the property, the incomplete construction of the Development Hotel, the difficulties with prospective purchasers in branding the Hotels in an area outside of a major centre and an area which is in the midst of an economic downturn, she concluded that the Receiver acted in a commercially reasonable manner and obtained the best price possible in the circumstances. Even with an abbreviated period for submission of offers, the chambers judge reasonably concluded that the Receiver undertook an extensive marketing campaign, engaged a commercial realtor and construction consultant, and consulted and dialogued with the owner throughout the process, which process the appellants took no issue with, until the offers were received.

18 We see no reviewable error. This ground of appeal is also dismissed.

19 Finally, leave to appeal was also granted on whether s 193 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, and specifically s 193(a) or (c) of the Act, creates a leave to appeal as of right in these circumstances or whether leave to appeal is required pursuant to s 193(e). As the appeal was also authorized under s 193(e), we find it unnecessary to address whether this case meets the criteria for leave as of right in s 193(a)-(d) of the Act.

*Appeal dismissed.*

# TAB 4

2011 ABQB 726  
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Computershare Trust Co. of Canada v. Venti Investments Corp.

2011 CarswellAlta 2304, 2011 ABQB 726, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 203, 86 C.B.R. (5th) 71

**Computershare Trust Company of Canada (Plaintiff) and Venti Investments Corporation,  
Shariff Chandran and Qualia Real Estate Investment Fund VI Limited Partnership (Defendants)**

B.E. Romaine J.

Judgment: November 25, 2011

Docket: Calgary 1101-03154

Counsel: Kevin E. Barr for MNP Ltd. in its capacity as Court-appointed Receiver  
Ryan P. Pelletier, Richard Billington, Q.C. for Venti Investment Corporation  
David Wood, Jared Spindel for Computershare Trust Company of Canada  
Terry L. Czechowskyj for Proposed Purchaser  
Michael B. Niven, Q.C. for Durum Real Estate Holdings Inc.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Debtors and creditors

VII Receivers

VII.6 Conduct and liability of receiver

VII.6.a General conduct of receiver

**Headnote**

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Conduct and liability of receiver — General conduct of receiver

Receiver brought application to approve sale of property — V Corp. brought cross-application for order rejecting any agreement of sale, directing that it was entitled to redeem arrears on mortgage on property in question or make such payments as were necessary to bring mortgage back into good standing, directing hearing to set amount of arrears, and discharging receiver — Application granted; cross-application dismissed — Receiver made more than sufficient effort to get best price for property and had not acted improvidently — Sale price was not low in relation to appraised value, there was plenty of time for bids and adequate notice of sale process — As to interests of parties, sale was supported by major creditor — It was also important and appropriate to note interests of proposed purchaser, which tendered its bid in good faith and presumably at some expense and which opposed V Corp.'s cross-application — No issue with respect to efficacy and integrity of process by which offers were obtained — Certain objection of V Corp. concerning possibility of unfairness in working out of process had to be viewed in context — There was nothing in history in issue that cast doubt on fairness of process or role of receiver — To accept V Corp.'s proposal would be unfair to parties who participated in bidding process in good faith, and proposed purchaser who entered bona fide into agreement with receiver — It would lead to kind of chaos referred to in certain case law and would be unwarranted interference with properly-run process conducted by receiver — V Corp. had plenty of time in last 21 months to bring arrears up to date and avoid sale, and what it offered now was too little and too late — Submission that there was no urgency about application was not accepted.

**Table of Authorities**

**Cases considered by B.E. Romaine J.:**

*Bank of Montreal v. River Rentals Group Ltd.* (2010), 18 Alta. L.R. (5th) 201, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 26, 470 W.A.C. 333, 469 A.R. 333, 2010 ABCA 16, 2010 CarswellAlta 57 (Alta. C.A.) — considered

*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

APPLICATION by receiver to approve sale of property; CROSS-APPLICATION by company for order rejecting any agreement of sale, directing that it was entitled to redeem arrears on mortgage on property in question or make such payments as were necessary to bring mortgage back into good standing, directing hearing to set amount of arrears, and discharging receiver.

**B.E. Romaine J.:**

1 This was an application to approve a sale of property brought by the Receiver of the assets and property of Venti Investment Corporation and Qualia Real Estate Investment Fund VI Limited Partnership. Venti cross-applied for an order rejecting any agreement of sale, directing that it is entitled to redeem the arrears on a mortgage on the property in question or make such payments as are necessary to bring the mortgage back into good standing, directing a hearing to set the amount of the arrears and discharging the Receiver.

2 Despite efforts to characterize the application as a sale in foreclosure proceedings, this was a sale within a receivership that resulted from a consent order granted on March 4, 2011. I find that the consent order is correctly characterized as a liquidating order. This order first appointed MNP Ltd. as a Monitor to oversee the sale of the property under an existing agreement of sale and purchase. When the proposed sale terminated in April, 2011, MNP became the Receiver under the order, authorized by its terms to complete the sale of the property and to enter into a replacement agreement of purchase and sale. It has now done so.

3 The criteria to be applied when considering the approval of a sale recommended by a receiver were first set out by the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.). The *Soundair* principles have been applied many times by this Court.

4 When deciding whether a receiver who has sold a property has acted properly, a court is to consider and determine:

- (a) whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;
- (b) the interests of all parties;
- (c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers were obtained; and
- (d) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

5 In considering whether the Receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price, I note that there has been a thorough and extensive process undertaken to sell the property, and the agreement of purchase and sale finally executed by the Receiver represents a sale at or above fair market value. However, Venti submits in essence that the Receiver acted improvidently on the basis of information Mr. Chandran, the principle of Venti, says was obtained from the sale and leasing agent retained by the Receiver that the Receiver's report in support of the application failed to include material information. Mr. Chandran submits through his counsel that there have been two undisclosed written offers to lease the property in question that would affect approximately half of the vacant space in the building and that could dramatically affect its appraised value.

6 Given the nature of the application, its urgency and the allegations made, I took the unusual step of inviting counsel for the Receiver to respond to this allegation by having the Receiver testify and be subject to cross-examination on this limited issue. I accept the Receiver's testimony, corroborated by that of the Receiver's leasing agent, that he was informed the morning of the application that an existing tenant was expressing some unwritten, informal interest in leasing approximately 2,000 to 4,000 additional square feet. This is not material information that either should have been disclosed in the report or that would affect fair market value. At any rate, the Receiver's conduct is to be examined in light of the information the Receiver had at the time it agreed to accept the offer, which was November 8, 2011. I find that the Receiver made more than a sufficient effort to get the best price for the property and has not acted improvidently. The sale price is not low in relation to the appraised value, there was plenty of time for bids and adequate notice of the sale process.

7 With respect to the interests of the parties, the sale is supported by the major creditor, Computershare Trust Company of Canada. Venti submits that it should not matter to Computershare if a sale of the property is the result of this application or if

Venti is able to bring the mortgage into good standing, but Computershare has made it clear that it has lost faith in Venti and that it has a reasonable and valid preference for a sale rather than merely allowing Venti to extinguish the arrears. It points out that the cash flow from the property is insufficient to cover the monthly mortgage payments, and Venti has offered no more than to bring the arrears up to date and cover future mortgage payments for an indeterminate period.

8 It is also important and appropriate to note the interests of the proposed purchaser of the property, which tendered its bid in good faith and presumably at some expense and which opposes Venti's cross-application: *Soundair* at para. 40.

9 There is no issue with respect to the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers were obtained.

10 With respect to the possibility of unfairness in the working out of the process, Venti suggests that the Receiver was deficient in failing to control or intervene with respect to what it characterizes as unfair behaviour by Computershare in communicating to Venti the amount it would cost to bring the arrears up to date.

11 This objection must be viewed in context. This became a receivership on April 12, 2011. On August 31, 2011, Venti enquired of the Receiver through counsel as to amount necessary to bring the mortgage back into good standing, and "*in theory*" discharge the Receiver.

12 On September 2, 2011, the Receiver's counsel advised of a figure of about \$850,000, subject to adjustment, additional interest, additional legal and other expenses, implementation of a realty tax reserve and payment of all receivership costs.

13 On September 29, 2011, in anticipation of a meeting requested by Venti to discuss a possible reorganization, Computershare notified Venti that the amount required to bring the mortgage into good standing would be \$1.07 million, plus certain processing and assumption fees, plus additional costs with respect to the receivership, the listing of the property, the property manager and the lender's counsel and subject to additional interest, the implementation of a monthly tax escrow amount and payment of the Silvercrest lease obligation.

14 It was only on October 24, 2011, having received the September 29, 2011 estimate (which was clearly characterized as an estimate) and advice from the Receiver on that date that the Receiver was dealing with interested parties and expected a binding agreement of sale shortly, that Venti's counsel expressed the intention of bringing the mortgage up to date "this week". This email from Venti's counsel repeats the September 29, 2011 estimate, with its references to additional costs.

15 On October 26, 2011, Computershare provided its revised estimate, which incorporated the items that had previously been referenced, including the costs of the receivership, the Silvercrest lease obligation, the costs of the listing and leasing agent, the immediate amount of tax escrow and updated payments due.

16 Computershare advised that Venti should confirm that it would pay these amounts that week. Instead, on October 27, 2011, Venti disputed the amount payable. On November 3, 2011, Computershare provided its explanation of the amounts owing, and reduced the previous amount said to be immediately owing by \$65,000.

17 On November 7, 2011, the Receiver received a reorganization proposal from a third party which included the concept of bringing the mortgage into good standing, and considered this proposal together with the two other proposals it had received. On November 8, 2011, the Receiver executed a purchase and sale agreement with the proposed Purchaser.

18 It was not until November 10, 2011 that Venti sent Computershare's counsel \$1 million towards the arrears, and then only under unacceptable trust conditions. While another \$700,000 was promised to be available during the course of the hearing, it did not materialize.

19 There is nothing in this history that casts doubt on the fairness of the process or the role of the Receiver. The first estimate of payout cost was clearly subject to upward adjustment, and subsequent estimates identified why the payout figure increased over time. Venti had the opportunity to payout the mortgage prior to the Receiver entering into a binding offer subject only to court approval on November 8, 2011, and plenty of warning that the sales process was unfolding and nearing completion.

20 At page 19 of *Soundair*, McKinlay J.A. emphasized the importance of protecting the integrity of the procedures followed by a court-appointed receiver "in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers". That concern for the integrity of the process has been expressed in many cases in Alberta, including by our Court of Appeal: *Bank of Montreal v. River Rentals Group Ltd.*, [2010] A.J. No. 12 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 18.

21 While the concern for the integrity of the process is often expressed in terms of whether it is appropriate to consider a last-minute higher offer to purchase, it is equally important here, where the debtor is not offering a higher amount for the property, nor even to redeem the entire debt, but only to bring the arrears up to date. Venti does not even accept the amount of arrears set by the mortgagee, but asks that there be a subsequent hearing to establish that amount. To accept Venti's proposal would be unfair to the parties who participated in the bidding process in good faith, and the Proposed Purchaser who entered *bona fide* into an agreement with the Receiver. It would lead to the kind of chaos referred to in *Soundair* at para. 30 and would be an unwarranted interference with a properly-run process conducted by the Receiver. Venti had plenty of time in the last 21 months to bring the arrears up to date and avoid the sale, and what it offers now is too little and too late.

22 Venti submits that there is no urgency about this application. I must disagree. As I indicated when I refused an adjournment, I agree with Computershare that there is no reason to delay the application, and considerable prejudice in terms of mounting arrears, a limited recourse loan and little or no equity.

23 Given the decision I have reached, it is not necessary that I consider whether Venti is in effect seeking relief from forfeiture, and if so, whether it is entitled to such relief.

24 The Receiver's application is granted and Venti's cross-application is dismissed.

25 This decision was originally scheduled to be delivered orally the day after the application was heard. At that time, counsel for Venti indicated that his client had changed his position and was prepared to consent to the application. I advised the parties that I would grant an order of sale and would issue subsequent written reasons.

26 If the parties are unable to agree on costs, they may make submissions on that issue.

*Application granted; cross-application dismissed.*

# **TAB 5**

2010 ABCA 16  
Alberta Court of Appeal

Bank of Montreal v. River Rentals Group Ltd.

2010 CarswellAlta 57, 2010 ABCA 16, [2010] A.J. No. 12, 184 A.C.W.S. (3d)  
686, 18 Alta. L.R. (5th) 201, 469 A.R. 333, 470 W.A.C. 333, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 26

**Bank of Montreal (Not a Party To the Appeal / Plaintiff) and River Rentals Group Ltd., Taves Contractors Ltd. and McTaves Inc. (Respondent / Defendant) and Hutterian Brethren Church of Codesa (Appellant / Other) and Bill McCulloch and Associates Inc. (Respondent / Other) and Don Warkentin (Respondent / Other)**

Ronald Berger, Patricia Rowbotham JJ.A., R. Paul Belzil J. (ad hoc)

Heard: January 7, 2010

Judgment: January 18, 2010

Docket: Edmonton Appeal 0903-0191-AC, 0903-0236-AC

Counsel: D.R. Bieganek for Respondent, River Rentals Group, Taves Contractors Ltd., McTaves Inc., Bill McCulloch and Associates Inc.

G.D. Chrenek for Appellant, Hutterian Brethren Church of Codesa

T.M. Warner for Respondent, Don Warkentin

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Debtors and creditors

VII Receivers

VII.6 Conduct and liability of receiver

VII.6.a General conduct of receiver

**Headnote**

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Conduct and liability of receiver — General conduct of receiver

Court-appointed receiver of group of companies called for offers to purchase property — Tender closing date was May 7 — H offered \$2,205,000 — W tendered offer of \$2,100,000 on understanding that he would receive possession of property in fall — On May 21, W learned that he would get possession of property earlier and increased bid to \$2,300,000 — Receiver brought application to approve sale of property to H — Chambers judge granted order extending deadline to submit revised offers to purchase property, with submissions restricted to H and W — During extension period, W submitted highest bid — Chambers judge granted order directing that property be sold to W — H appealed — Appeal allowed — Chambers judge erred in principle and on insufficient evidence ordered that property be subject of extended re-tendering process — Chambers judge made no finding that price in H's offer was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that receiver was improvident in accepting it — Chambers judge did not consider interests of H as highest bidder nor interests of others who made compliant bids — There was no cogent evidence before chambers judge of any unfairness to W — Chambers judge's order conferred advantage upon W who then knew price that had previously been offered by H.

**Table of Authorities**

**Cases considered:**

*Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303, 1981 CarswellNS 47 (N.S. C.A.) — followed

*Royal Bank v. Fracmaster Ltd.* (1999), (sub nom. *UTI Energy Corp. v. Fracmaster Ltd.*) 244 A.R. 93, (sub nom. *UTI Energy Corp. v. Fracmaster Ltd.*) 209 W.A.C. 93, 11 C.B.R. (4th) 230, 1999 CarswellAlta 539, 1999 ABCA 178 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

*Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473, 65 A.R. 372, 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 1985 CarswellAlta 332 (Alta. C.A.) — followed

APPEAL by bidder from orders extending deadline to submit revised offers to purchase property and approving sale of property to another bidder.

***Per curiam:***

1 At the hearing of this appeal, we announced that the appeal is allowed with reasons to follow.

2 Bill McCulloch and Associates Inc. is the court-appointed Interim Receiver and/or Receiver Manager of the corporate Respondents ("the Taves Group") by order dated March 5, 2009. Prior to that date, the Receiver had become Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Taves Group.

3 The Receiver issued an information package and called for offers to purchase the assets of the Taves Group which included a property known as the Birch Hills Lands. The call for offers was dated April 17, 2009. The deadline for submission of offers was on or before May 7, 2009 (the tender closing date).

4 On June 2, 2009, the Receiver brought an application before Wachowich C.J.Q.B. to approve the sale of the Birch Hills Lands to the Appellant. The Appellant's offer was \$2,205,000. An appraisal concluded that the most probable sale price was \$1,560,000. Counsel for the Receiver explained that "the Receiver did effect wide advertizing in local and national newspapers. Sent out 160 tender packages and made the tender package available on the Receiver's website." (A.B. Record Digest, 3/30-33)

5 Fifteen offers were received on the Birch Hills Lands, six of which were for the entirety of the parcel.

6 In his submission to the Chief Justice, counsel for the Receiver stated:

Now, what we have advised the party that we're looking to accept is that we can't put them in possession yet until the Court approves the offer. That has caused some angst given the time of year and it is agricultural land, but we're not in a position to put people on the land before we get court approval to do so. So — and that's fine, they're still — they're still at the table so we're good with that.

The offer that the Receiver is recommending acceptance of is — was from the Hutterite Church of Codesa. That offer was for \$2,205,000 ... the offer is very significant ... it was an excellent offer.

(A.B. Record Digest, 5/46 -6/19)

7 In considering other tenders with respect to other portions of the property of the Taves Group, the Chief Justice expressed his views regarding the importance of adhering to the integrity of the tender process:

You know, we ran a tender process, tender process is meant to be — there are certain rules. It is like, you do not change the rules of baseball or football during the middle of the game. This is the same thing except in this particular case the Court is prepared to exercise the — its inherent jurisdiction to extend the time in Mr. Taves' position. But I — you know, I could be the person who says no, Mr. Taves, you were late, I am sorry. Next time use Fed Ex. (Appeal Record Digest, 12/11-19)

And further:

We could be coming back right and left. I am inclined, you know, to grant the applications as submitted on these tenders because the tender process was followed properly. That was the market at the time, this is the people that — this is how they bid. You know, circumstances change and when circumstances change, somebody is the beneficiary of it, some — somebody is the loser on this. But the rules were adhered to and having the rules adhered to if, you know — if you want

to — if you want to go to the Court of Appeal after the order is entered and say to the Court of Appeal, guess what, oil is now at \$90, we want this one resubmitted. And if those five people are wise enough to accept that argument, then good luck to you but — but you know, I am inclined to say we follow a process, the law has to be certain. The law has to be definite. This is what we did and we complied.(Appeal Record Digest, 12/40-13/8)

8 One of the persons who had tendered an offer to purchase the Birch Hills Lands was the Respondent Don Warkentin. Counsel for the guarantor, Mr. Orrin Toews, addressed the Court. He explained that Mr. Warkentin had submitted an offer of \$2.1 million "on the understanding that he would be receiving possession of the property sometime in the fall." Counsel further explained that "I believe it was the Receiver while during the initial auction, that it was brought to his attention on May 21<sup>st</sup> that he would in fact get possession of the property much earlier than he was anticipating. And on that basis he increased his bid by 200,000 which brings his offer to 2.3 million dollars cash." (A.B. Record Digest, 13/27-36) He submitted that Mr. Warkentin's offer be accepted.

9 In response, counsel for the Receiver advised the Court that he had been in written communication with counsel for Mr. Warkentin "and there was no indication in that correspondence that he thought he would get [possession of the lands] in the fall." (Appeal Record Digest, 14/18-20) He added: "I think the tender package is clear that the way it was supposed to close is after the appeal periods on any order has expired. ... So how anybody could reasonably conceive that possession wouldn't be granted until the fall based on that escapes me." (Appeal Record Digest, 14/20-25) He further added: "But the bottom line was at the time tenders closed, Mr. [Warkentin]'s offer was found wanting." (Appeal Record Digest, 14/36-38)

10 On the basis of that information, the Court ruled as follows:

Well, you know, rather than adjourning it to hear from Mr. Carter, what I am — what I am inclined to do with that piece of property, because of — is — because of an uncertainty as to occupation, dates of occupation or potential lease or whatever it may be, it is too late to put in the crop right now anyway so — ... Retender on this one and make it clear in the tender.

(Appeal Record Digest, 15/7-19)

11 Wachowich, C.J. then granted an order extending the deadline to submit revised offers to purchase the Birch Hills Lands; with submissions restricted to the Appellant and Warkentin. During this extension period, Warkentin submitted a bid higher than the Appellant's. The Appellant did not increase its original offer. Subsequently, on June 17, 2009, Wachowich, C.J. granted an order directing that the Birch Hills Lands be sold to Warkentin. An application by the Appellant to reconsider the June 17, 2009 order was dismissed. The Court also granted a stay order for parts of the June 2 order and the entirety of its June 17 order, pending the determination of the appeal of the June 2 order. The Appellant appealed the June 2 order on July 22, 2009; and appealed the June 17 order on August 13, 2009 (the appeals were consolidated on August 20, 2009).

12 On applications by a Receiver for approval of a sale, the Court should consider whether the Receiver has acted properly. Specifically, the Court should consider the following:

- (a) whether the Receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;
- (b) the interests of all parties;
- (c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; and
- (d) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16

13 The Court should consider the following factors to determine if the Receiver has acted improvidently or failed to get the best price:

- (a) whether the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic;

- (b) whether the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids;
- (c) whether inadequate notice of sale by bid was given; or
- (d) whether it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interest of either the creditors or the owner.

*Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303 (N.S. C.A.)

*Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 65 A.R. 372 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 12.

14 The central issue in this appeal is whether the chambers judge, mindful of the record before him, should have permitted rebidding and whether he should have thereafter entertained and accepted the higher offer of \$2.51 million plus GST tendered by Mr. Warkentin during the extension period.

15 The relevance of higher offers after the close of process was considered by the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*, *supra*. Upon review of the jurisprudence, the Court stated at para. 30:

What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. ...

16 The chambers judge made no such finding. Indeed, he made no assessment whatever of the conduct of the Receiver. The only evidence before the Court at the June 2, 2009 application was the Receiver's fifth report and the affidavit of Orrin Toews who proffered no evidence that the Receiver acted improvidently in accepting the offer of the Appellant.

17 Moreover, the June 2, 2009 order neither considers the interests of the Appellant as the highest bidder nor the interests of others who made compliant, but unsuccessful, bids to purchase the Birch Hills Lands pursuant to the call for offers.

18 This Court has consistently favoured an approach that preserves the integrity of the process. See *Salima Investments Ltd.*, *supra*, and *Royal Bank v. Fracmaster Ltd.*, 1999 ABCA 178, 244 A.R. 93 (Alta. C.A.).

19 That was also the view of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Appeal Division) in *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia*, *supra*, at para. 35:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and a higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement. On the contrary, they would know that other bids could be received and considered up until the application for court approval is heard - this would be an intolerable situation. ...

20 In addition, there was no cogent evidence before the chambers judge of any unfairness to Warkentin. On the contrary, the impugned order of June 2 conferred an advantage upon Warkentin who then knew the price that had previously been offered by the Appellant when re-tendering his offer.

21 In cases involving the Court's consideration of the approval of the sale of assets by a court-appointed Receiver, decisions made by a chambers judge involve a measure of discretion and "are owed considerable deference". The Court will interfere only if it concludes that the chambers judge acted unreasonably, erred in principle, or made a manifest error.

22 In our opinion, the chambers judge erred in principle and on insufficient evidence ordered that the property in question be the subject of an extended re-tendering process. The appeal is allowed. An order will go setting aside paras. 26 through 32 of the June 2, 2009 and the June 17, 2009 orders, and approving the tender of the Appellant on the terms and conditions upon which the Receiver originally sought approval.

*Appeal allowed.*

**End of Document**

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# TAB 6

2018 ABQB 75  
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Sydco Energy Inc (Re)

2018 CarswellAlta 157, 2018 ABQB 75, [2018] A.W.L.D. 1029,  
289 A.C.W.S. (3d) 13, 57 C.B.R. (6th) 73, 64 Alta. L.R. (6th) 156

### **In the Matter of the Receivership of Sydco Energy Inc.**

MNP Ltd, in its capacity as the Court-appointed Receiver and Manager of Sydco Energy Inc (Applicant)

B.E. Romaine J.

Judgment: January 31, 2018

Docket: Calgary 1701-02520

Counsel: Tom Cumming, Anthony Mersich, for Receiver MNP Ltd.  
Patrick Fitzpatrick, for Rothwell Development Corporation  
Jeffrey Oliver, for Wormwood Resources  
Patricia M. Johnston, Q.C., Keely R. Cameron, for Alberta Energy Regulator  
Ryan Algar, for Trican Partnership & Trican Well Service Ltd.  
Gregory Plester, for Clear Hills County

Subject: Estates and Trusts; Insolvency; Natural Resources

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIV Administration of estate](#)

[XIV.3 Trustee's possession of assets](#)

#### **Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Administration of estate — Trustee's possession of assets — Miscellaneous  
Insolvent oil company (S) went into receivership in February 2017 and court approved sale process — S's major shareholder RD sent Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) proposed sales process order — AER added condition that successful bidder be at arm's length to S to which RD opposed with concern it would improperly fetter receiver's ability to conduct sales process in commercially reasonable manner for benefit of all creditors and stakeholders and also that "at arm's length" was vague term — AER refused to allow second company 203 with virtually same principals as S to transfer some of S's wells to itself and refused to allow third company WR to assume S's well licences unless it could prove it was not related — Receiver applied for court order approving sale of assets and vesting order to WR and based on AER history, sought specifics from Redwater order to be incorporated respecting AER authority — Application granted — Portions of Redwater order incorporated into application properly interpreted, did not give AER authority to take into account in exercising its authority to approve, deny or place conditions upon any transfer of the debtor's licenses the compliance record of the debtor, its directors, officers, employees, security holders and agents as such record relates to debts discharged or assets renounced in insolvency — While AER had discretion to review transfer applications, it must do so within provincial law in force — In deciding whether or not concerns expressed by third parties during 30-day review process warrant further delay in approval process, AER could not take into account any prohibited factors expressed by such third parties in exercising its discretion on whether to require hearing — AER failed to establish their concern that WR Ltd bid was example of unfairness of allowing insolvent entity to voluntarily place itself into insolvency in order to preserve assets for itself and avoid costs of public obligations — With respect to court's jurisdiction to restrain AER from exercising its discretion regarding licence transfer applications, Supreme Court in *AbitibiBowater* made it clear that, while regulatory body has discretion on how best to ensure that regulatory obligations were met, and court should avoid interfering, "the action of a regulatory body is nevertheless subject to scrutiny in insolvency proceedings" — In most

recent amendments to insolvency legislation, decisions of AbitibiBowater and Redwater tried to delineate boundary between creditor and regulatory claims in environmental sphere, but difficult issues remain that must be determined.

### Table of Authorities

#### Cases considered by *B.E. Romaine J.*:

*AbitibiBowater Inc., Re* (2012), 2012 SCC 67, 2012 CarswellQue 12490, 2012 CarswellQue 12491, 352 D.L.R. (4th) 399, 71 C.E.L.R. (3d) 1, 95 C.B.R. (5th) 200, (sub nom. *Newfoundland and Labrador v. AbitibiBowater Inc.*) 438 N.R. 134, (sub nom. *Newfoundland and Labrador v. AbitibiBowater Inc.*) [2012] 3 S.C.R. 443 (S.C.C.) — considered

*Alberta (Attorney General) v. Moloney* (2015), 2015 SCC 51, 2015 CSC 51, 2015 CarswellAlta 2091, 2015 CarswellAlta 2092, [2015] 12 W.W.R. 1, 29 C.B.R. (6th) 173, (sub nom. *Moloney v. Administrator, Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act (Alta.)*) 476 N.R. 318, 85 M.V.R. (6th) 37, 22 Alta. L.R. (6th) 287, 391 D.L.R. (4th) 189, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 327, (sub nom. *Moloney v. Administrator, Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act (Alta.)*) 606 A.R. 123, (sub nom. *Moloney v. Administrator, Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act (Alta.)*) 652 W.A.C. 123 (S.C.C.) — considered

*Alberta Energy Regulator v. Grant Thornton Limited* (2017), 2017 ABCA 278, 2017 CarswellAlta 1568, 57 Alta. L.R. (6th) 37, 52 C.B.R. (6th) 1, 9 C.P.C. (8th) 238 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

*Alberta Treasury Branches v. COGI Limited Partnership* (2016), 2016 ABQB 43, 2016 CarswellAlta 73, 33 C.B.R. (6th) 22 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

*Bank of Montreal v. River Rentals Group Ltd.* (2010), 2010 ABCA 16, 2010 CarswellAlta 57, 18 Alta. L.R. (5th) 201, 470 W.A.C. 333, 469 A.R. 333, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 26 (Alta. C.A.) — considered

*Cansearch Resources Ltd v. Regent Resources Ltd* (2017), 2017 ABQB 535, 2017 CarswellAlta 1601, 52 C.B.R. (6th) 114, 60 Alta. L.R. (6th) 373, 7 P.P.S.A.C. (4th) 278 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

*Grant Thornton Ltd. v. Alberta Energy Regulator* (2016), 2016 ABQB 278, 2016 CarswellAlta 994, 37 C.B.R. (6th) 88, 33 Alta. L.R. (6th) 221, [2016] 11 W.W.R. 716 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

*Orphan Well Assn. v. Grant Thornton Ltd.* (2017), 2017 ABCA 124, 2017 CarswellAlta 695, 8 C.E.L.R. (4th) 1, [2017] 6 W.W.R. 301, 50 Alta. L.R. (6th) 1, 47 C.B.R. (6th) 171 (Alta. C.A.) — considered

*Orphan Well Assn. v. Grant Thornton Ltd.* (2017), 2017 CarswellAlta 2352, 2017 CarswellAlta 2353 (S.C.C.) — referred to  
*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

#### Statutes considered:

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

s. 14.06(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 15] — considered

s. 14.06(4)(c) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 15] — considered

*Oil and Gas Conservation Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. O-6

Generally — referred to

s. 24(1) — referred to

s. 24(2) — referred to

s. 106(1) — considered

s. 106(3) — referred to

s. 108 — referred to

*Pipeline Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-15

Generally — referred to

s. 18(1) — referred to

s. 18(3) — referred to

s. 51 — referred to

s. 52 — considered

*Responsible Energy Development Act*, S.A. 2012, c. R-17.3

Generally — referred to

*Securities Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-4

s. 1(l) "control person" — referred to

*Traffic Safety Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6

Generally — referred to

**Rules considered:**

*Alberta Energy Regulator Rules of Practice*, Alta. Reg. 99/2013

Generally — referred to

APPLICATION by receiver of insolvent company for order approving sale of insolvent's assets.

**B.E. Romaine J.:**

**I. Introduction**

1 In this application, the Receiver of Sydco Energy Inc sought an order approving a sale of assets. The approval and vesting order proposed by the Receiver departed from the usual order of its kind by specifically including certain declarations relating to the Alberta Energy Regulator ("AER") arising from the decisions in *Re Redwater Energy Corporation* and the Receiver's experiences and communications with the AER leading up to the application. I approved the sale of assets, and allowed the order to include the specific provisions sought by the Receiver, given the conduct of the AER leading up to the sale application, the evidence of AER's intentions with respect to the sale and its view of the scope of its regulatory authority. These are my reasons.

**II. Facts**

2 The history of this receivership is relevant to the issues that were before me.

3 Rothwell Development Corporation is a major shareholder of Sydco Energy Inc, holding, in combination with the principals of Rothwell, about 65% of its shares. It is also Sydco's major secured creditor. As at February 10, 2017, Sydco owed Rothwell in excess of \$15.9 million.

4 In 2016, it had been apparent for some time to Rothwell that Sydco was in financial difficulty. In October 2016, Rothwell engaged James Catherwood and Warren Coles to become employees of Sydco in order to perform an operational review and to determine whether Sydco could be continued as a long-term going concern business. Mr. Catherwood and Mr. Coles had not had any relationship with Sydco prior to this and were not shareholders of Sydco. They were retained because of their knowledge of and experience in the oil and gas industry. In early February 2017, Rothwell, in consultation with its legal and financial advisors, Mr. Catherwood and Mr. Coles, determined that Sydco was no longer viable as a going concern. Rothwell obtained an order putting Sydco into receivership on February 23, 2017. At the time, Sydco had 443 wells, 108 producing, 117 suspended, 143 abandoned, and the remaining shut-in or special status.

5 Mr. Catherwood and Mr. Coles were engaged by the Receiver to continue managing Sydco's business under the Receiver's direction, and to assist with the sale of Sydco's assets. The Court approved a sales process on February 23, 2017.

6 In advance of the receivership application, Rothwell's counsel communicated with Patricia Johnston Q.C., the Executive Vice President and General Counsel of the AER. He sent her a draft of the proposed sales process order, which included a provision permitting the submission of a credit bid. Ms. Johnston advised that she required a condition in the order that the successful bidder be at arm's length to Sydco. Rothwell's counsel did not agree to the proposed condition, indicating that the proposed Receiver was concerned that it would be "an improper fetter on the ability of the Receiver to conduct a sales process in a commercially reasonable manner for the benefit of all creditors and stakeholders" and also that the term "arm's length" was vague. Ms. Johnston responded that:

... the AER will typically not approve the transfer of assets from a Licensee to a Purchaser that is non-arm's length in insolvency situations unless both parties have zero non-compliances.

If this caveat is not included in the sales process ... prospective non-arm's length purchasers of Sydco AER licensed assets might be in store for an ugly surprise when they come to the AER for approval of related AER licenses if Sydco has any non-compliances.

7 Ms. Johnston followed this email with the advice that:

... if the seller (Sydco) has a liability management rating of less than 1.0 before or after the transaction, it is considered to be non-compliant with AER requirements. In that scenario, it is extremely unlikely the AER would permit a transfer of licenses to a non-arm's length transferee.

8 Five parties submitted bids in response to the sales process, which was thorough and conducted through an experienced sales agent. Unfortunately, none of the bids were for the purchase of all of the assets. The best bid by far was a credit bid submitted by Rothwell through 2032951 Alberta Ltd, a company incorporated for the purpose by Wayne Hekle, the President and one of the principals of Rothwell (the "203 bid").

9 The Receiver determined that the 203 bid provided the best possible recovery for the receivership estate of Sydco for, among others, the following reasons:

a) the bid submitted by 203 included many more petroleum and natural gas assets of Sydco than any of the competing bids, with the result that:

- i. the impact on the Orphan Well Fund would be significantly less as a result of the proposed sale to 203; and
- ii. a larger portion of Sydco's arrears of pre-receivership municipal realty taxes would be assumed by 203 than by the competing bidders;

b) the consideration offered by 203 exceeded that offered by any other bidder; and

c) 203 represented that it would be able to obtain a BA Code, which is necessary for a corporation to hold AER issued licences to operate wells, facilities and pipelines, from the AER, and that, upon completion of the purchase and sale transaction, would have a liability management rating in excess of 2.0 as required by AER Bulletin Nos. 2016-16 and 2016-21. 203 had applied for a BA Code on April 13, 2017, before its bid was accepted by the Receiver.

10 After 203 was selected as the successful bidder, the Receiver renounced those Sydco assets for which no bids had been submitted, including over 300 non-producing wells. Based on the decisions in *Grant Thornton Ltd. v. Alberta Energy Regulator*, 2016 ABQB 278 (Alta. Q.B.) ("*Redwater Trial Decision*") and *Orphan Well Assn. v. Grant Thornton Ltd.*, 2017 ABCA 124 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC granted, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 231 (S.C.C.) ("*Redwater Appeal Decision*"), which upheld the *Redwater Trial Decision*, the Receiver excluded the renounced assets from its calculation of Sydco's liability management rating, leaving Sydco with a rating of 2.02. Thus, Sydco met the requirement of AER Bulletin 2016-21, which requires that as a condition for obtaining the AER's approval to transfers of licenses, both the transferee and the transferor must have a liability management ratio of 2.0 or higher immediately following the transfer.

11 There is little dispute that, in the normal course, the AER would inform an applicant for a BA Code of its decision on an application within 30 days. However, in this case, it took 109 days for 203 to receive a decision.

12 In the meantime, since the AER had indicated that at least one officer of 203 had to be resident in Alberta, Mr. Catherwood became President and CEO of 203. The AER was informed that Rothwell was the sole shareholder of 203 and that Mr. Hekle was the only director.

13 Mr. Catherwood's affidavit details a record of 203's frequent inquiries of the AER as to the status of its application for a BA Code in the months that followed, with only one response on June 20, 2017, indicating that:

[a]s set out in Bulletin 2016-21, the AER will consider and process all applications for license eligibility under Directive 067 as non-routine. Non-routine applications require a minimum of 30 days to complete our review and are subject to longer timelines depending on the complexity of the application. ... Please be advised that we are experiencing an unusually high volume of applications and endeavor to process within the 30 days.

14 The next day, Mr. Hekle received a letter from an "Insolvency Management Specialist" at the AER indicating the following:

James Catherwood and yourself are listed as directors in Section D of *Directive 067 - Schedule 1 AER Business Associate Code License Eligibility Type* and/or the Alberta Corporate Registry for 2032951 AB. Further to this, you and Mr. Catherwood have been associated with another company, namely Sydco Energy Inc. (Sydco) that is currently in receivership proceedings and has disclaimed assets. Please submit a written explanation detailing why Sydco failed to meet its end-of-life obligations while under your control and direction, and why it would be appropriate for the AER to consider approval of this application.

AER may request additional security as deemed appropriate in order to offset the estimated costs of suspending, abandoning or reclaiming a well, facility, well site or facility site and as otherwise provided for in [Part 1.1 of the Oil and Gas Conservation Rules](#).

Failure to provide the required information by July 7, 2017 will result in the application being closed without further notice.

15 Mr. Catherwood responded on June 27, 2017, advising the AER that Mr. Hekle was the sole director of 203. Mr. Catherwood also attached a lengthy chronology of events from Sydco's incorporation to its receivership. This chronology included the following details:

a) In September 2012, Grant and Wayne Hekle, together with their corporation Rothwell, owned in excess of 83% of the shares of Sydco. The Hekles reside in Manitoba. The principals of Sydco were Bruce Curlock and Ron Gerlitz, who managed the company.

b) In November 2012, the Canadian Western Bank called Sydco's operating loan of approximately \$6.25 million.

c) In December 2012, Rothwell acquired \$4 million of the Sydco debt from the Canadian Western Bank. In 2013, Rothwell bought out the remainder of the debt and advanced additional funds to Sydco in 2013 and 2014.

d) In March, 2016, Rothwell commissioned a forensic financial audit of Sydco. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP recommended that Mr. Coles, as an experienced chief financial officer in the oil and gas business, perform the audit.

e) In July 2016, upon completion of the audit, Rothwell removed Mr. Curlock as a director and officer of Sydco, and asked the remaining directors to resign.

16 Mr. Catherwood advised the AER that neither he nor Mr. Hekle had control or direction over Sydco prior to the fall of 2016, and thus were not responsible for Sydco's insolvency or its failure to meet its end-of-life obligations.

17 With respect to the AER's reference to "additional security" in the June 21, 2017 letter, Mr. Catherwood wrote:

With respect, any arbitrary and unlimited additional security deposit to the AER pursuant to AER Bulletin 2016-21 is not reasonable under the circumstances, as is the AER's request that the Corporation agree in advance to whatever presently unknown security deposit may in future be requested by the AER. The Corporation does not yet have any oil and gas assets and it would be unreasonable to expect the Corporation to agree to such terms given that it would be highly prejudicial and put the Corporation at a competitive disadvantage to the rest of industry. Furthermore, given the experience of the

management team of the Corporation and that they did not control or direct Sydco at the relevant time, there should be no requirement for any additional security deposit.

18 On July 11, 2017, Mr. Catherwood, Mr. Coles, and their counsel met with Ms. Johnston and two other AER employees. Mr. Catherwood described the meeting in his affidavit. According to this affidavit, one of the AER employees confirmed that the AER tries to achieve a 30-day turnaround on Directive 067 applications and that the employee had no explanation for the delay with respect to 203's application.

19 Mr. Catherwood deposes that he explained the involvement of the Hekles and Rothwell with Sydco in detail, including how Rothwell had bought the Canadian Western Bank debt in an attempt to avoid a receivership. He also explained the Hekles' reliance on Sydco's former management until the fall of 2016.

20 According to Mr. Catherwood's affidavit, Ms. Johnston advised the 203 delegation that:

a) because Mr. Coles and Mr. Catherwood had become part of Sydco, the AER would use its discretion to refuse to issue BA Codes to any company in which either of them were involved in future; and

b) the situation was different from a situation where the lender was a traditional lender, like the ATB, because traditional lenders do not apply for BA Codes.

21 Mr. Catherwood was not cross-examined on his affidavit. At the hearing, Ms. Johnston stated that she did not believe she would have said this.

22 In response to his comment at the meeting that, if a credit bid did not proceed, there may be unintended consequences that would be worse for the Orphan Well Fund, Mr. Catherwood deposes that Ms. Johnston said that the AER "would not give second chances to principals who were associated with entities that have disclaimed assets to the Orphan Well Association."

23 On July 31, 2017, the AER granted 203's application for a BA Code with the following conditions:

a) 203 would only be permitted to acquire AER licensed assets "from arm's length transferors"; and

b) 203 "must post full security for all liabilities associated with any AER licenses it acquires regardless of [203's] post transaction liability management rating".

24 The decision letter states that the conditions imposed were directly related to the fact that the principals of 203 and Sydco were virtually the same and to Sydco's outstanding non-compliances. The AER in its brief states that the "fact that the outstanding non-compliances related to unpaid levies and outstanding end of life liabilities" is irrelevant.

25 As Mr. Catherwood notes, these conditions made the BA Code approval useless to 203. The security requirement would require 203 to post security of about \$19.4 million, which is far more than the amount of the credit bid, and the requirement that such a full security provision would apply to future licenses would leave 203 unable to compete in the oil and gas industry in Alberta. 203 advised the Receiver that it could not meet the condition that it obtain a BA Code that would allow it to purchase the Sydco assets.

26 On August 11, 2017, counsel for Rothwell and 203 advised the Receiver's counsel that Wormwood Resources Ltd, a corporation wholly owned by Fred Rumak, might be willing to step into the shoes of 203 and complete the purchase, provided that the 203 purchase and sale agreement was amended to make Wormwood the purchaser, reduce the purchase price slightly, exclude certain assets that Wormwood was not interested in purchasing, and make certain other inconsequential amendments. Wormwood is a newly incorporated corporation that had been seeking acquisition opportunities. It holds an unconditional BA Code.

27 On August 22, 2017, Wormwood, by assignment agreement, agreed to purchase a portion of the Rothwell secured debt equivalent to the agreed purchase price for the Sydco assets, an interest in the Rothwell loan agreement and the security to

govern and secure such purchased debt. 203 assigned its interest in the purchase and sale agreement for the Sydco assets to Wormwood with the Receiver's consent. Rothwell financed Wormwood's acquisition of the Rothwell debt security and the purchase and sale agreement in return for a debenture from Wormwood.

### III. Positions of the Parties

28 The Receiver recommended the Wormwood transaction for, among others, the following reasons:

- a) all other bids submitted in the sale process had expired;
- b) the amendment to the purchase price was relatively minor and the amended purchase price was still greater than the purchase prices offered in the bids submitted by any of the bidders other than 203;
- c) Wormwood has a BA Code that is not subject to conditions imposed by the AER that would have the effect of preventing the completion of the transaction;
- d) based on the calculations of the Receiver's consultants, the post-closing liability management rating of Wormwood, excluding the assets that have been renounced by the Receiver, would be 2.27, and therefore Wormwood would be in compliance with the requirements of AER Bulletin 2016-21;
- e) the proposed transaction results in a significantly larger proportion of the assets being sold than any of the competing bids;
- f) the negative impact of Sydco's insolvency upon the Orphan Well Fund and the municipalities in which the assets are located is less as a result of the completion of the Wormwood transaction than it would have been had the Receiver accepted any of the bids submitted by the parties other than 203 in the sale process;
- g) it is not known whether, had the Receiver accepted any of the competing bids, the AER would have approved an application to transfer licenses in respect thereof; and
- h) given that Rothwell only assigned a portion of the Rothwell debt to Wormwood, after the completion of the Wormwood transaction, it would still be Sydco's only primary secured creditor. Although Rothwell will suffer a significant shortfall in recovery of the indebtedness owing to it, it supports the transaction.

29 However, given the history of the matter, and the fear that the AER would delay or place conditions upon an application by the Receiver requesting a transfer of the licenses, the Receiver requested an approval and vesting order that departs from the usual form of order, in that it includes the following specific paragraphs taken in large part from the May 19, 2016 Order issued as a result of the *Redwater Trial Decision*

18. The Court declares that the Receiver is not required to comply with or perform and is not liable for abandonment, reclamation and remediation obligations in relation to those PNG Assets that were renounced by the Receiver, ... (the "**Renounced PNG Assets**").

19. The Court declares that the AER, in exercising its authority to approve, deny or impose conditions upon any transfer of Sydco's AER licenses... shall not consider the deemed asset values and deemed liabilities associated with the Renounced PNG Assets for the purpose of calculating the liability management rating ("**LMR**") of Sydco either before or after the transfer, and shall not consider any of the following:

- (a) any obligation of Sydco to pay a security deposit...;
- (b) any failure of Sydco, or the Receiver to fail to comply with orders, including abandonment orders, issued from time to time by the AER with respect to the Renounced PNG Assets or provide security deposits therefor;

(c) the renunciation by the Receiver of the Renounced PNG Assets, or any other renunciation by the Receiver of the assets of Sydco pursuant to section 14.06(4) of the *BIA*;

(d) the compliance record of Sydco, its directors, officers, employees, security holders and agents, prior to the pronouncement of the Receivership Order;

(e) Sydco's status under the AER's *Directive 019 - Compliance Assurance* or any successor thereof, prior to the pronouncement of the Receivership Order;

(f) any outstanding debt owed by Sydco to the Crown, the AER, or to the AER to the account of the "orphan fund"... including but not limited to any administrative fees, any orphan well fund levy, the costs of suspension, abandonment or reclamation, or any other fee, levy, deposit, find, penalty or charge of any kind whatsoever (collectively, the "Sydco Characteristics"); or

(g) the imposition of any condition to approving such transfer requiring the payment or rectification of any of the above.

20. The Court directs the AER to not deny applications to transfer licenses based on the Sydco Characteristics, and to not impose conditions on such transfer requiring the posting of security for any and all liabilities associated with those licenses.

21. The Court declares that the provisions of the *OGCA [Oil and Gas Conservation Act]*, the *Pipeline Act* and Directive 006 are inapplicable to the extent they require or permit the AER to deny applications by the Receiver to transfer licenses based on the Sydco Characteristics or impose conditions on such transfer requiring that they be paid or complied with.

22. The Court directs that, in determining whether to approve or deny any application to transfer licenses under the *OGCA* and/or *Pipeline Act*, the AER shall not consider or take into account the Sydco Characteristics or any other factors that are similar in form and/or substance to them, or impose as a condition to any approval of said applications an obligation that Sydco or the Receiver make payments or take actions to rectify the Sydco Characteristics, or any conditions similar in form or substance to them.

23. The Court directs that the AER shall make a determination on any application for license transfers pursuant to the Sales Process (provided the purchaser meets all of the requirements of the AER to hold the applicable licenses) promptly after receipt of a duly accepted electronic license transfer request from the Receiver or Purchaser and in any event within thirty (30) days of the submission of the application by the Receiver or the Purchaser.

24. The Court directs that any refusal by AER to process or approve a license transfer request pursuant to the Sales Process shall be accompanied by written reasons, explaining in reasonable detail the basis for such refusal.

30 The AER responded to the application materials on August 28, 2017 by indicating that these paragraphs were unnecessary and inappropriate, in that the AER was well aware of the *Redwater* decisions, and that:

Should the Receiver and Wormwood submit license transfer applications, the AER will consider same in accordance with the laws in effect without the need of a court order. In considering license transfer applications, the AER would primarily focus its review on the compliance history of Wormwood as transferee of licenses and its directors and officers and ensuring that Wormwood satisfies AER requirements at the time of the license transfer going forward. This is consistent with the AER's current and past practice in reviewing license transfer applications both before and since the issuance of the *Redwater* decision [emphasis added]

In specific response to proposed paragraph 23 of the draft [approval and vesting order], the AER advises that as per section 31 of the *Responsible Energy Development Act*, section 5.2 of the *AER Rules of Practice*... and AER Bulletin No. 2017-13, the AER now publishes notice of license transfers applications for a minimum period of 30 days. Accordingly, the AER cannot disposition license transfer applications prior to 30 days following publication, or later if the AER receives

statements of concern relating to the application. However, the AER can advise that it will make best efforts to issue a decision as soon as possible following expiry of the 30 day period and would encourage the receiver to submit the applicable transfer applications as soon as possible in order to commence the notice period and address any timing concerns. However, it bears reiterating that, if the AER receives any statements of concern in response to the applications, it must consider and follow its process regarding same. Should you choose to submit a license transfer application now, the AER can confirm it will not issue a decision on the matter until such time as it receives an order confirming court approval of the proposed sale.

31 The Receiver's counsel attempted to reach agreement with the AER on a time period in which the AER would respond to an application to transfer, and attempted to explain its concerns about whether the AER was respecting the *Redwater* decisions, citing issues that have arisen with the AER in connection with various receivership proceedings since the release of the decision. The Receiver also questioned why the AER continued to include renounced assets in its monthly calculation of Sydco's liability management ratings. In response, the AER indicated that "in each and every case where the AER has appeared before the court to object to the various matters outlined in your letter, it has done so in a manner consistent with its position in its current and outstanding appeal in the *Redwater* proceedings."

32 Ms. Johnston attempted to explain why the AER continued to include renounced assets in the calculation of Sydco's liability management rating, and indicated that the AER was prepared to agree to language requiring it to dispose of an application within five business days of the expiration of the 30-day public notice period of any application for transfer of AER licenses held by Sydco, provided the AER is not in receipt of any statements of concern in response to such application. She noted, however, that in the event that the AER received one or more statements of concern, it would process the applications and related statements as per its normal process.

33 The AER continued to take the position that paragraphs 18 through 24 were "self serving and completely irrelevant to the proposed transferee" and requested their deletion. Ms. Johnston noted, however, that "based and in reliance on representations by counsel for Wormwood", the AER was prepared to confirm that Wormwood was arm's length with respect to 203.

34 The representation referred to by Ms. Johnston was an e-mail from Wormwood's counsel that stated that "Fred Rumak owns 100% of the issued and outstanding shares in Wormwood Resources, and that he is the sole director of that company." That e-mail also confirmed that the only legal relationship as between [203] and Wormwood relates to the assignment of the purchase and sale agreement to Wormwood by 203 and ancillary matters necessary to implement the asset purchase.

35 In a letter dated August 30, 2017, the Receiver repeated its concerns about the AER's interpretation of the *Redwater* decisions, and asked for guidance on how the AER interprets "arm's length". The Receiver advised that, in its view, paragraphs 18 to 24 of the draft order were consistent with the *Redwater* decisions.

36 Ms. Johnston responded on August 31, 2017 that

... the AER considers a party to be non-arm's length if it has common directors, officers, insiders or controlling shareholders, consistent with the *Securities Act Multi-lateral Instrument 61-101*, [the "Securities Instrument definition"]... the definition of "related party" in that instrument excludes a person that is "solely a bona fide lender" from the definition.

37 She also indicated that, if the AER receives a response to a public notice of application, it must determine whether an objecting party may be directly and adversely affected by the application and, if so, may decide that a hearing is appropriate.

38 The Receiver submitted that the AER's opposition to the proposed form of order was of concern and added force to its submission that the paragraphs are necessary and would avoid the necessity for further applications to deal with rejections of, or conditions placed upon, transfer applications that are inconsistent with the *Redwater* decisions. The Receiver also submitted that the AER's insistence that it will only approve license transfers to parties that are arm's length to Sydco is contrary to the *Redwater* decisions, and was further evidence of a need to include the special provisions in the order.

39 The Receiver noted that Wormwood is not a related party to Rothwell, Sydco or 203 under the Securities Instrument definition of control. However, the Receiver remained concerned that the arm's length requirement was an attempt to force the

payment of abandonment obligations with respect to assets that have been renounced under section 14.06(4) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, C B-3 (*BIA*), for the following reasons:

- a) although none of the officers, directors or shareholders of Sydco have been named under section 106(1) of the *Oil and Gas Conservation Act*, RSA 2000, C 0-6 ["*OGCA*"], or charged with or convicted of offences under section 108 of the *OGCA* or section 52 of the *Pipeline Act*, RSA 2000, cP-15, the AER appears to be intent on "piercing the corporate veil" of Sydco;
- b) in justifying its decision, the AER referred to the unpaid abandonment liabilities of Sydco and therefore, the "contravention" of these officers, directors and shareholders is simply that they were officers, directors and shareholders of an entity that, as a result of its insolvency, had insufficient funds to pay all of its abandonment, reclamation and remediation liabilities;
- c) the AER's conduct in imposing conditions on the grant of a BA Code as it did with 203 has the appearance of contravening the single proceeding model of insolvency legislation by essentially preventing such officers, directors and shareholders from investing in other oil and gas producers in Alberta if abandonment, reclamation and remediation obligations remain unpaid;
- d) in these proceedings, the direct effect of the AER's actions was to prevent the completion of a purchase and sale transaction between the Receiver and 203, notwithstanding that the transaction was clearly to the benefit of the creditors and other stakeholders of Sydco; and
- e) it stretches credulity to suggest there is any reason for the AER's actions other than to ensure the abandonment, reclamation and remediation obligations of Sydco are repaid, notwithstanding that there are insufficient funds in the estate to do so in accordance with the AER's priority ranking under the *BIA*.

40 The Receiver described a number of recent receivership applications where it submits that the AER took positions contrary to the *Redwater Trial Decision*, including *Re Verity Energy Ltd.* (Action No 1501-04191); *Nordegg Resources Inc.* (Action No. 1601-07435); *Cansearch Resources Ltd v. Regent Resources Ltd* (Action No. 1601-16147); and *Alberta Treasury Branches v. COGI Limited Partnership* [2016 CarswellAlta 73 (Alta. Q.B.)] (Action No. 1501-12220).

41 The Receiver also noted that, after the *Redwater Appeal Decision*, the AER changed its decision process for transfer applications to provide for a longer standardized review period of 30 days, and to provide that, if within that 30-day period, a statement of concern is filed, the AER has the discretion to require a hearing, all of which has the potential of being an impediment to transactions.

42 The AER in its brief submitted that an application for court approval of a sales and vesting order is not the appropriate forum to challenge the AER's legislation and potential exercise of discretion should a license transfer application be submitted. The AER conceded that it took positions inconsistent with the *Redwater Trial Decision* in previous applications, but said that its positions in the *Verity*, *Regent*, *Nordegg* and *COGI* matters were consistent with its position on the *Redwater* appeal, on the basis that, since it had an outstanding appeal and a stay application, it "must act consistent with its position in those proceedings and take steps to mitigate the harm arising from [the *Redwater Trial Decision*]."

43 The AER noted that the order arising from the *Redwater Trial Decision* provides the AER with discretion to deny a transfer where a shareholder of Redwater has control of the transferee of such license or licenses, but it did not refer to the entirety of the provision in question, which reads:

11. The Court declares that the AER, in exercising its authority to approve, deny or impose conditions upon any transfer of Redwater's AER licenses... shall not consider any of the following:

(d) The compliance record of Redwater. its directors. officers, employees, security holders and agents, prior to the pronouncement of the Receivership Order (but not including any legitimate health, safety and environmental matters

associated with the specific Retained Licensed Assets ... that are the subject of a particular license transfer application) provided that the AER shall have the discretion to deny a transfer where a shareholder of Redwater has control of the transferee of such license or licenses, as the term "control" is defined in the *Securities Act* RSA 2000, c S-4.

[emphasis added]

44 The AER submitted that, to the extent that Wormwood is not arm's length to Sydco, the AER was entitled to consider that fact "as it goes to the risk associated with permitting Wormwood to be a licensee", and should be allowed to condition approval accordingly "to mitigate such harm". It submitted that if Wormwood is arm's length, the Receiver should not have a problem amending the approval order to achieve the AER's objective, which it describes as follows:

The Receiver has refused to amend the [approval order] to address the AER's concerns that the amendments prohibit the AER from considering the non-compliance of Sydco, its directors, officers, security holders and agents where those parties are non-arm's length to the proposed transfer of Sydco's licenses ...

45 The AER made it clear at the hearing that it seeks continuing discretion with respect to license transfers, including the right to deny or approve with conditions a license transfer where the AER has concerns regarding the past conduct of the principals of the holder of a current AER license. In other words, the AER takes the position that, despite the wording of section 11(d) of the *Redwater* order, which prohibits the AER from considering the compliance record of directors, officers, employees, security holders and agents of the debtor company in approving a transfer of a license, the language at the end of section 11(d) allows the AER to do so where the transferee is non-arm's length to any of those parties that are caught by the definition of non-arm's length adopted by the AER.

46 The AER submitted that this case was the type of situation described in the dissent of Martin, J.A. in the *Redwater Appeal Decision*, where she commented on the unfairness of allowing an insolvent entity to preserve any assets and avoid the costs of public obligations. It submitted that "(p)arties should not be permitted to place themselves into insolvency proceedings voluntarily and shed their obligations and then reacquire their assets at the expense of the environment, the public and the orphan fund."

47 The AER also submitted that, by asking the Court to find that the AER does not have the jurisdiction to consider whether the proposed purchaser is arm's length, the Receiver and 203 were attempting to collaterally attack the AER's license eligibility decision regarding 203. It asserted that, if 203 wished to contest the conditions on its approval, its remedy was to avail itself of the appeal mechanisms under the *Responsible Energy Development Act*, SA 2012, c R-17.3.

48 The AER submitted that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to restrain the AER from exercising its discretion regarding license transfer application except with respect to certain provisions that were found to be inoperative by the *Redwater* decisions.

49 It submitted that its statutorily conferred discretion to consider the compliance history of the transferee and its principals needs to be preserved. The AER noted that Directive 006, with an effective date of February 17, 2016 (promulgated shortly after the release of the *Redwater Trial Decisions* specifically provides that the AER may determine that it is not in the public interest to approve a license transfer application based on the compliance history of one or both parties or their directors, officers or security holders. It stated in its brief that "[p]rincipals of AER licencees who leave outstanding non-compliances (regardless of the nature and type of the non-compliance) will receive additional scrutiny from the AER if they seek to continue to engage or re-engage in activities that are regulated by the AER".

#### IV. Analysis

##### A. Approval of the Wormwood Transaction

50 The four factors a court should consider in approving a proposed sale of assets by a Receiver, as set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at 6, and endorsed in *Bank of Montreal v. River Rentals Group Ltd.*, 2010 ABCA 16 (Alta. C.A.) at para 12, are as follows:

- a) whether the Receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;
- b) the interests of all parties;
- c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; and
- d) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

51 The only issue with respect to the whether the Wormwood transaction meets the *Soundair* principles is whether the Receiver acted prudently in accepting the Wormwood transaction after being faced with the AER's position on the 203 bid. I am satisfied that the Receiver acted appropriately. A thorough sales process failed to give rise to any bids that would be better than the Wormwood bid; there was no realistic possibility of selling the assets that Wormwood refused to accept to any other party; and the Wormwood transaction includes many more assets than did other bids, with the result that the impact on the Orphan Well Fund is significantly less burdensome and more arrears of pre-insolvency municipal taxes will be assumed. I also note the absence of any viable alternatives and the delay of six months since the sales process order was granted.

### ***B. Precedential Value of the Redwater Order***

52 Counsel for the Receiver, who was involved in the *Redwater* decisions and in the drafting of the order that arose from the trial decision, submits that the *Redwater* order, which was consensual, does not have precedential effect. He argues that the Respondents in *Redwater* consented to the exception set out in section 11(d) of the order because it was unlikely to be a factor in the *Redwater* situation. However, I must consider the wording of the order on its face, interpreted in context and in accordance with the *Redwater* decisions, which have precedential effect.

### ***C. Should the Approval Order Include the Redwater Provisions?***

53 Given the history of this matter, I find that it is both reasonable and prudent for the Receiver to seek to include the specific declarations set out in the *Redwater* order in this approval and vesting order.

54 The original winning bidder, 203, chosen by the Receiver as being in the best interests of stakeholders, encountered lengthy and inexplicable delay in the consideration of its application for a BA Code. Inquiries were left unanswered, meetings with AER staff were tense and confrontational and the conditions attached to the approval of 203's application prevented it from completing its credit bid.

55 The relationship between the AER, the Receiver and Wormwood, the new bidder, has also been fraught with conflict and uncertainty over the AER's position and its stated intentions.

56 It is no secret that the AER disagrees with the *Redwater* decisions, and its conduct in this receivership illustrates its resistance to the principles set out in these decisions. However, as noted by Wakeling, J.A. in refusing the AER's application for a stay of enforcement of the *Redwater Appeal Decision* pending appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, 2017 ABCA 278 (Alta. C.A.) at paras 11 and 121:

A Court of Appeal judgment resolves not only the dispute that the parties presented to a court for resolution but the basis for resolution provides a principle that governs all future similar disputes. I cannot stay the precedential effect of a Court of Appeal opinion and create a new legal regime that affects other receivers and trustees in bankruptcy and other secured creditors who pursue their rights in different and future debt enforcement proceedings. To do so would mean that similar cases are adjudged differently. This [is] not an attribute of the legal system committed to the rule of law ...

The rights of receivers and bankruptcy trustees, secured creditors and the Alberta Energy Regulator whose interests are juxtaposed will in the future be adjudged according to the principles set out in *Grant Thornton Ltd v Alberta Energy Regulator* unless the Supreme Court of Canada grants leave to appeal and allows the appeal. It is inconsequential what the law was three, five or twenty-five years ago.

57 The AER naturally has concerns about the impact of orphaned and abandoned wells on the public purse, but it must, in insolvency situations as in all others, act in accordance with the law of Alberta, which now includes the principles and declarations set out in the *Redwater* decisions.

58 This receivership has already encountered many obstacles, from the lack of a market for most of Sydco's assets to the delay caused by the now-abandoned 203 bid, and it is reasonable for the Receiver to attempt to control further delay and cost by having the *Redwater* provisions spelled out in the vesting and approval order.

59 Eventually, the parties were able to agree to some minor modifications in the order requested by the Receiver. The final order provisions that refer to the AER are set out in Appendix A to this decision.

#### ***D. What Do Sections 11(d) of the Redwater Order and Section 19(d) of the Sydco Order Mean?***

60 Does [section 11\(d\)](#) of the *Redwater* order, now included as [section 19\(d\)](#) in the Sydco order, allow the AER to take the compliance record of a debtor's directors, officers, employees, security holders and agents into account when exercising its authority to approve, deny or impose conditions upon any transfer of a debtor's AER licenses?

61 The AER clearly takes the position that it can do so if a shareholder of a debtor has control of the transferee of such license within the meaning of "control" under the *Securities Act* definition. In fact, it submits that it has the power to do so with respect to a debtor's directors and officers as well. This interpretation of [Section 11 \(d\)](#) would mean that, although the AER could not take the compliance record of such individuals or entities into account when considering the granting or transfer of licences to an arm's length entity, it could do so if the transferee is non-arm's length. In other words, the AER takes the position that the exception that ends the declaration in [section 11\(d\)](#) of the order allows it to take into account the prohibited factor of what occurred as a result of the receivership if the transferee is a non-arm's length party. This position is set out clearly in the AER's August 28, 2017 letter and in its stated objective in argument that it should be allowed to consider the non-compliance of Sydco, its directors, officers, security holders and agents where those parties are non-arm's length to a proposed transferee.

62 This interpretation of [section 11 \(d\)](#) cannot succeed.

63 First, it is inconsistent with and contrary to the *Redwater* decisions and the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in *Alberta (Attorney General) v. Moloney*, 2015 SCC 51 (S.C.C.), and contrary to the rehabilitation goals of insolvency legislation. Second, the AER's interpretation of [section 11\(d\)](#) of the *Redwater* provisions would preclude receivers from accepting credit bids from parties who fall within the AER's definition of non-arm's length, and thus interfere with a valid tool in insolvency that enables the Receiver to obtain the best outcome for stakeholders and creditors.

64 With respect to the inconsistency of the AER's interpretation of [Section 11\(d\)](#) with the *Redwater* decisions, the Court of Appeal in *Redwater* recognized that the purpose of the BIA includes providing the bankrupt with a "fresh start", free of the burden of crushing debt: para 42. It noted that the fresh start is subject to some limits, including that any regulatory or environmental obligations that are not provable in bankruptcy will continue to bind the bankrupt. However, with respect to whether such obligations can be transferred to third parties, Slatter, J.A. commented that, while the fresh start concept does not apply to corporations that cease to exist after a bankruptcy, "(a)ny regulatory or environmental obligations that were not provable in bankruptcy may exist in theory, but there is no entity against which they could be enforced:" para 44. Even if any of the AER claims could be considered to have survived the bankruptcy, they cannot be enforced against the directors, officers, security holders or agents of Sydco when it ceases to exist. However, it is clear that the claims of the AER at issue in this proceeding are all claims provable in bankruptcy. Thus, they cannot be revived and enforced against a third party, even if that third party is non-arm's length to the debtor. What the AER is attempting to do by considering the compliance record of officers,

directors, shareholders and agents of insolvent companies before granting them, or corporations associated with them, new licences is to seek to enforce the claims against third parties, rather than the debtor who was responsible for the abandonment. This is contrary to the polluter-pay principle endorsed by the Supreme Court in *AbitibiBowater Inc., Re*, 2012 SCC 67 (S.C.C.) at para 40, contrary to the fresh start objective of the *BIA* and contrary to the single proceeding model of insolvency legislation.

65 The Court of Appeal also described what the AER was trying to do in the *Redwater Appeal Decision* at para 82:

Therefore, what the Regulator is attempting to do is attach conditions on the 20 AER licences that might be transferred, which really relate to the 107 wells that have been disclaimed by the Trustee and are not being transferred. The effect is to transfer economic value from the producing wells to the non-producing wells in order to enforce the environmental obligations attached to the latter. This clearly has the effect of disrupting the distribution scheme under the *BIA*. Even if the Trustee must take the licences "warts and all", there is no justification for the Regulator transferring warts from one licence to another.

[emphasis added]

66 Any attempt to connect eligibility for future licences to environmental obligations provable in a bankruptcy, or assets renounced as part of an insolvency proceeding, is another attempt to transfer "warts from one licence to another," again with the effect of frustrating the rehabilitative objectives of the *BIA* and disrupting the distribution scheme.

67 The Court of Appeal's position on the AER's submission that it is entitled to consider the compliance record of individuals associated with an insolvent corporation is made clear in para 88 of the *Redwater Appeal Decision*

In this appeal, the regulatory regime controlling the transfer of AER licences is also premised on the assumption that there is no obligation outstanding. That obligation is the actual or potential cost of abandoning the well. However, if the environmental obligation is provable in bankruptcy, it cannot be enforced indirectly outside the bankruptcy regime under the Regulator's licensing scheme: *Moloney*; 407 ETR. The Alberta Energy Regulator's licensing scheme depends on the enforcement of environmental liabilities outside the bankruptcy regime, in violation of the "single proceeding" model. The Regulator cannot sidestep the problem by artificially distinguishing between "managing obligations" and "recovering claims". The Regulator cannot establish a parallel process to collect claims.

[emphasis added]

68 Slatter, JA conceded at paragraph 84 that the Regulator can control the transfer of AER licenses of bankrupt companies, but, he said, not by placing financial conditions on transfer that disrupt priorities under the *BIA*. He noted that the Regulator can limit transfers to qualified transferees, but cannot, however, indirectly interfere with the disposition of the value of the assets in bankruptcy by placing financial preconditions on the transfer of permissive AER licenses.

69 It could be argued that this is what the AER in effect did by placing draconian financial conditions on 203's application for a BA Code. As Slatter, J A commented at para 76 of the *Redwater Appeal Decision* "the reality of the Regulator's position should prevail over any narrow and technical interpretation". As a result of these restrictions, the AER stymied a credit bid by a related party that would have been better for both creditors and the Orphan Well Fund. That issue, however, is not before me. Rather than appealing the 203 decision, the bidder found an acceptable way to credit bid through an arm's length third party.

70 However, the reality of the AER's stated intention to consider the compliance record of principals, directors, employees and agents of insolvent companies in making decisions with respect to the transfer of licences is that it is an impermissible, after-the-fact method of attempting to collect debts discharged in bankruptcy not from the debts but from third parties associated with the debtor.

71 The AER's position that it remains free to exercise its discretion to deny BA Codes or the transfer of licenses to the directors, officers, controlling shareholders or "agents" of a debtor that, as a result of its insolvency, had insufficient funds to pay all of its abandonment and remediation liabilities is doing exactly what the Court of Appeal in *Redwater* said it could not

do: indirectly enforcing outside the bankruptcy regime an environmental obligation that has been, or will be, compromised in the bankruptcy and can no longer be enforced.

72 In *Moloney*, Gascon, J noted at para 28:

Assessing the effect of the provincial law requires looking at the substance of the law, rather than its form. The province cannot do indirectly what it is precluded from doing directly ...

73 In *Moloney*, a provision of the *Alberta Traffic Safety Act* allowed the Registrar to suspend the debtor's driver's license and vehicle permits until a judgment debt that had been released in bankruptcy was paid. The Province submitted that this was not a debt enforcement scheme, but merely an additional monetary condition to obtain the privilege of driving, that it was "inherently regulatory in nature". The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the distinction Alberta sought to make was irrelevant, that the section was clearly aimed at the repayment of a judgment debt, and that "even if it were aimed at recovering of the resulting regulatory charge, such charge would nonetheless be a claim provable in bankruptcy, and as such, it would remain a debt subject to the bankruptcy process": para 50.

74 Gascon, J. noted at para 56:

Therefore, whether one considers the province's claim as a judgment debt or as the resulting regulatory charge, it is still provable in bankruptcy. It follows that the effect of s. 102 is to allow a judgment creditor to deprive the debtor of his or her driving privileges until the debt is paid. In the end, the provision thus compels the payment of a provable claim. Driving is unlike other activities. For many, it is necessary to function meaningfully in society. As such, driving often cannot be seen as a genuine "choice": *R. v White*, [1999], 2 S.C.R. 417, at para. 55. The effect of the provincial scheme undoubtedly amounts to coercion in that regard.

75 The enhanced scrutiny proposed by the AER has equally severe consequences for its subjects: a serious interference with their ability to work or invest in the oil and gas industry. Mr. Catherwood justifiably describes this in his affidavit as "blackballing". The effect is coercive and intimidating. It is also a tool that is focused not on the debtor but on individuals who were involved with the debtor, whether or not they had any personal responsibility for the debtor's insolvency. In this case it is clear that Mr. Catherwood and Mr. Coles could have had no such responsibility, yet it appears that they would be caught by the policy. Rothwell, as a shareholder of Sydco attempted by assuming the Canadian Western Bank debt and investing more money in Sydco to prevent an insolvency, yet it would appear to be caught by the policy.

76 The Supreme Court in *Moloney* found that the impugned provision of the *Traffic Safety Act* created an operational conflict between the provincial and federal provisions, and thus was constitutionally inoperative by reason of the doctrine of federal paramountcy. However, Gascon, J went further to consider whether the provision fell within the frustration of federal purpose category, noting at para 77 that the effect of the provision directly contradicted and defeated the financial rehabilitation of the debtor, and that the province's use of the provision undermined that purpose. He cited *Houlden, LW, B Morawetz and Janis Sarra, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed (rev), Toronto: Carswell, 2013 as follows:

The *BIA* permits an honest but unfortunate debtor to obtain a discharge from debts subject to reasonable conditions. The *Act* is designed to permit a bankrupt to receive, after a specified period a complete discharge of all his or her debts in order that he or she may be able to integrate into business life of the country as a useful citizen free from the crushing burden of debts ...

77 He commented further at para 82 on the Province's submission that Parliament's power over bankruptcy does not extend to the regulation of driving privileges:

The financial responsibility of drivers is a valid matter of provincial concern and jurisdiction, and the province can set the conditions for driving privileges with this consideration in mind. Nonetheless, when the province denies a person's driving privileges on the sole basis that he or she refuses to pay a debt that was discharged in bankruptcy, the province's condition conflicts with s. 178(2) of the *BIA* and is, to that extent, inoperative. To so conclude does not transfer the power to regulate

driving privileges to Parliament. The obligation to grant those privileges flows from the provisions of the provincial law that remain operative.

78 Thus, section 11(d) of the *Redwater* order and section 19(d) of the Sydco order, read in context and in accordance with the law as established in the *Redwater* decisions and by the Supreme Court in *Moloney*, does not entitle the AER to refuse to grant a BA Code or to transfer licenses on the basis of the compliance record of Sydco, its directors, officers, employees, security holders and agents as such compliance record relates to claims provable in bankruptcy, or on the basis of the Receiver's renouncement of Sydco assets during the course of the receivership, as this would be an indirect method of enforcing a debt discharged on bankruptcy.

79 Second, the AER's interpretation of section 11(d) of the *Redwater* provisions and section 19(d) of the Sydco order would preclude receivers from allowing credit bids from parties who fall within the AER's definition of non-arm's length.

80 In addition to being an interference with one of the ways in which the Receiver can fulfil its duties to maximize the return to creditors of the estate, the policy would discourage any efforts made by non-arm's length parties, such as occurred here with Rothwell, to invest further in a debtor in an attempt to save the debtor from insolvency, to preserve employment and to continue to pay unsecured creditors. This is contrary to the goals of the insolvency regime and crosses the boundary between legitimate regulatory function and interference in the insolvency process. This presumably unintended consequence creates a trap for the unwary, and eliminates a common-sense solution that preserves value that is in frequent use in receiverships and reorganizations.

81 In summary section 11(d) of the *Redwater* order and section 19(d) of the Sydco order, properly interpreted, do not give the AER the authority to take into account in exercising its authority to approve, deny or place conditions upon any transfer of the debtor's licenses the compliance record of the debtor, its directors, officers, employees, security holders and agents as such record relates to debts discharged or assets renounced in an insolvency. Likewise, the AER may not consider the compliance record of the debtor, its directors, officers, employees, security holders and agents in determining their eligibility for future license grants or transfers if such compliance record refers to debts discharged or assets renounced through bankruptcy. Thus, the provisions of Directive 006 that appear to allow the AER to do so are inoperative by reason of the *Redwater* and *Moloney* decisions. While the AER continues to have discretion to review transfer applications, it must exercise that discretion in accordance with the law in force in this Province. This does not prevent the AER from reviewing such applications in accordance with non-prohibited factors.

82 It follows that, in deciding whether or not concerns expressed by third parties during the 30 day review process warrant any further delay in the approval process, the AER cannot take into account any prohibited factors expressed by such third parties in exercising its discretion on whether to require a hearing.

## V. Conclusion

83 The AER submits that it is concerned that the Wormwood bid is an example of the unfairness of allowing an insolvent entity to voluntarily place itself into insolvency in order to preserve assets for itself and avoid the costs of public obligations. There is no evidence that this is a valid concern in this case: the evidence is to the contrary. Rothwell purchased the bank debt of Sydco in an attempt to rescue the company. It sent in new management to determine whether a receivership could be avoided. None of the individuals or entities that are the subject of the AER's focus in this proceeding can be said to have been responsible for Sydco's insolvency. Rothwell may have been acting in its own interests in attempting to salvage Sydco, but it still stands to lose a substantial amount of its investment.

84 If this was one of those proceedings where receivership was a voluntary step to avoid environmental liabilities, which, as the Court of Appeal notes in *Redwater* is not an easy solution to financial problems, "there is enough judicial discretion in the insolvency regime to prevent abuses": para 105. It is the Court's responsibility to deal with this type of abuse of the insolvency regime. The AER has the power to object to a sale by the Receiver to a control party in a situation where it alleges that this kind of abuse is present, and the Court has the authority to consider the possibility of abuse in determining whether to grant orders in

the process. Much of the relief that may be granted to insolvent entities under the *BIA* or the *CCAA* is dependent upon evidence of good faith or fairness in the process and can be denied upon evidence of abuse.

85 With respect to whether this Court has the jurisdiction to restrain the AER from exercising its discretion regarding licence transfer applications, the Supreme Court in *AbitibiBowater* made it clear that, while generally a regulatory body has discretion to decide how best to ensure that regulatory obligations are met, and the court should avoid interfering with that discretion, "the action of a regulatory body is nevertheless subject to scrutiny in insolvency proceedings": *AbitibiBowater* at para 48.

86 The current environmental regulatory regime in Alberta allows oil and gas companies to defer the financial consequences of addressing environmental liabilities relating to individual wells as long as their portfolio of assets is able to achieve a positive liability management rating. It is clear that, while this may not have caused difficulties when energy prices were high, in this period of economic downturn in Alberta caused primarily by the substantial and sustained drop in energy prices, the result has been a greatly increased number of abandoned and orphaned wells. There are hard choices to make at the intersection of insolvency law with environmental, pension and employment law, and attempting to balance competing public interest objectives is a difficult task for an insolvency court. The pain of insolvency trickles down to many stakeholders, including unresolved environmental conditions, unfunded or underfunded pension plans, terminated employees, affected trades-people and small businesses, shareholders large and small and even entire communities that may rely on an insolvent industry for their financial welfare.

87 There are compelling arguments for super priority for many of these stakeholder groups, but, as pointed out in the *Redwater Appeal Decision*, Parliament considered the competing policies and "undoubtedly was concerned that giving environmental claims a super priority would drive away lenders, and deprive highly leverage industries (like the oil and gas industry) of necessary financing": para 96.

88 Parliament in the most recent amendments to insolvency legislation, the Supreme Court in its decision in *AbitibiBowater* and now the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench and the Court of Appeal in *Redwater* have tried to delineate the boundary between creditor and regulatory claims in the environmental sphere, but there are still difficult issues that must be determined. This decision attempts to address one of them.

*Application granted.*

## Appendix A

### LICENSE TRANSFER PROCESS

1. The Court declares that the Receiver is not required to comply with or perform and is not liable for abandonment, reclamation and remediation obligations under the *Oil and Gas Conservation Act*, RSA 200, c 0-6 ("*OGCA*") or the *Pipeline Act*, RSA 2000, c P-15 in relation to any wells, pipelines, facilities and sites in which Sydco has an interest that were renounced by the Receiver pursuant to section 14.06(4)(c) of the *BIA* the ("*Renounced PNG Assets*")

2. The Court declares that the AER, in exercising its authority to approve, deny or impose conditions upon any transfer of Sydco's AER licenses pursuant to sections 24(1), 24(2), and 106(3) of the *OGCA*, sections 18(1), 18(3) and 51 of the *Pipeline Act*, Article 6 of *Directive 006: Licence Liability Rating (LLR) Program and License Transfer Process* ("*Directive 006*"), and Articles 4, 8 and 10 of *Directive 006*, shall not consider the deemed asset values and deemed liabilities associated with the Renounced PNG Assets for the purposes of calculating the liability management rating ("*LMR*") of Sydco either before or after the transfer, and shall not consider any of the following:

(a) any obligation of Sydco to pay a security deposit under section 5 of *Directive 006* or section 8 of Appendix II to *Directive 006* or under the *OGCA* or *Pipeline Act*;

(b) any failure of Sydco, or the Receiver to fail to comply with orders, including abandonment orders, issued from time to time by the AER with respect to the Renounced PNG Assets or provide security deposits therefor;

(c) the renunciation by the Receiver pursuant to [section 14.06\(4\) of the BIA](#) of Renounced PNG Assets;

(d) the compliance record of Sydco, its directors, officers, employees, security holders and agents, prior to the pronouncement of the Receivership Order, other than with respect to any legitimate health, safety and environmental matters associated with the Purchased Assets licensed under the *OGCA* or *Pipeline Act* that are subject to a license transfer application by the Receiver and/or Purchaser pursuant to the Sale Agreement, provided that nothing herein shall prevent the AER from exercising a discretion to deny, or to place conditions on any approval of, an application to transfer licenses in respect of Purchased Assets where, as of the effective date of transfer, a control person (as such term is defined in [section 1\(1\) of the Securities Act, RSA 2000, Chapter S-4](#)) of Sydco is also a control person of the Purchaser;

(e) Sydco's status under the AER's *Directive 019 - Compliance Assurance* or any successor thereof, including whether or not Sydco is in a "Global Refer" or "Refer" status; or

(f) any outstanding debt owed by Sydco to the Crown, the AER, or to the AER to the account of the "orphan fund" (as that term is defined in the *OCGA*), including but not limited to any administrative fees, any orphan well fund levy, the costs of suspension, abandonment or reclamation, or any other fee, levy, deposit, fine, penalty or charge of any kind whatsoever

(collectively, the "Sydco Characteristics"), provided that [section 19\(d\)](#) shall not have precedential effect on or bind this Court with respect to any application by the Receiver for an approval and vesting order other than with respect to the Transaction.

3. The Court directs that, in determining whether to approve or deny any application to transfer licenses under the *OGCA* and/or *Pipeline Act*, the AER shall not consider or take into account the Sydco Characteristics or any other factors that are similar in form and/or substance to them, or impose as a condition to any approval of said applications an obligation that Sydco or the Receiver make payments or take actions to rectify the Sydco Characteristics, or any conditions similar in form or substance to them.

4. The Court directs that the AER shall make a determination on any application to it to approve transfers of licenses by the Receiver or the Purchaser in connection with the Transaction (a "*License Transfer Application*") within five (5) business days following the expiry of the thirty (30) day notice of application period in respect of such License Transfer Application, provided that in the event that a party files a statement of concern in respect of such License Transfer Application, then the AER will communicate to the Receiver and Purchaser within five (5) business days following a final determination by the AER or any other body contemplated by the *Alberta Energy Regulator Rules of Practice*, AR 99/2013 of the determination on the License Transfer Application

5. The Court directs that any refusal by the AER to process or approve a license transfer request pursuant to the Sales Process shall be accompanied by written reasons, explaining in reasonable detail the basis for such refusal.

# TAB 7

2012 ONSC 1750

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

CCM Master Qualified Fund Ltd. v. blutip Power Technologies Ltd.

2012 CarswellOnt 3158, 2012 ONSC 1750, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 12, 90 C.B.R. (5th) 74

**CCM Master Qualified Fund, Ltd. (Applicant) and blutip Power Technologies Ltd. (Respondent)**

D.M. Brown J.

Heard: March 15, 2012

Judgment: March 15, 2012

Docket: CV-12-9622-00CL

Counsel: L. Rogers, C. Burr for Receiver, Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc.  
A. Cobb, A. Lockhart for Applicant

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

IV Receivers

IV.4 Miscellaneous

**Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Receivers — Miscellaneous

Receiver was appointed over debtor company — Debtor was in development phase with no significant sources of revenue and was dependant on external sources of equity and debt funding to operate — Receiver brought motion for orders approving sales process and bidding procedures, including use of stalking horse credit bid; priority of Receiver's Charge and Receiver's Borrowings Charge; and activities reported in Receiver's First Report — Motion granted — Receiver lacked access to sufficient funding to support debtor's operations during lengthy sales process — Quick sales process was required — Marketing, bid solicitation and bidding procedures proposed by Receiver would result in fair, transparent and commercially efficacious process, and were approved — Stalking horse agreement was approved for purposes requested by Receiver — Receiver was granted priority over existing perfected security interests and statutory encumbrances — Debtor did not maintain any pension plans — Activities in Receiver's First Report were approved.

**Table of Authorities**

**Cases considered by D.M. Brown J.:**

*Brainhunter Inc., Re* (2009), 62 C.B.R. (5th) 41, 2009 CarswellOnt 8207 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to  
*First Leaside Wealth Management Inc., Re* (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 2559, 2012 ONSC 1299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed  
*Graceway Canada Co., Re* (2011), 2011 ONSC 6403, 2011 CarswellOnt 11687, 85 C.B.R. (5th) 252 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to  
*Indalex Ltd., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4262, 79 C.C.P.B. 101 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to  
*Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to  
*Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 56 C.B.R. (5th) 74, 2009 CarswellOnt 4839 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to  
*Parlay Entertainment Inc., Re* (2011), 81 C.B.R. (5th) 58, 2011 ONSC 3492, 2011 CarswellOnt 5929 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to  
*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

*White Birch Paper Holding Co., Re* (2010), 2010 QCCS 4382, 2010 CarswellQue 9720 (C.S. Que.) — referred to  
*White Birch Paper Holding Co., Re* (2010), 2010 CarswellQue 10954, 2010 QCCS 4915, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 49 (C.S. Que.)  
— referred to

**Statutes considered:**

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 243(6) — considered

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

*Criminal Code*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46

Generally — referred to

*Personal Property Security Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10

Generally — referred to

MOTION by receiver for orders approving sales process and bidding procedures, including use of stalking horse credit bid; priority of Receiver's Charge and Receiver's Borrowings Charge; and activities reported in its First Report.

**D.M. Brown J.:**

**I. Receiver's motion for directions: sales/auction process & priority of receiver's charges**

1 By Appointment Order made February 28, 2012, Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc. ("D&P") was appointed receiver of blutip Power Technologies Ltd. ("Blutip"), a publicly listed technology company based in Mississauga which engages in the research, development and sale of hydrogen generating systems and combustion controls. Blutip employs 10 people and, as the Receiver stressed several times in its materials, the company does not maintain any pension plans.

2 D&P moves for orders approving (i) a sales process and bidding procedures, including the use of a stalking horse credit bid, (ii) the priority of a Receiver's Charge and Receiver's Borrowings Charge, and (iii) the activities reported in its First Report. Notice of this motion was given to affected persons. No one appeared to oppose the order sought. At the hearing today I granted the requested Bidding Procedures Order; these are my Reasons for so doing.

**II. Background to this motion**

3 The Applicant, CCM Master Qualified Fund, Ltd. ("CCM"), is the senior secured lender to Blutip. At present Blutip owes CCM approximately \$3.7 million consisting of (i) two convertible senior secured promissory notes (October 21, 2011: \$2.6 million and December 29, 2011: \$800,000), (ii) \$65,000 advanced last month pursuant to a Receiver's Certificate, and (iii) \$47,500 on account of costs of appointing the Receiver (as per para. 30 of the Appointment Order). Receiver's counsel has opined that the security granted by Blutip in favour of CCM creates a valid and perfected security interest in the company's business and assets.

4 At the time of the appointment of the Receiver Blutip was in a development phase with no significant sources of revenue and was dependant on external sources of equity and debt funding to operate. As noted by Morawetz J. in his February 28, 2012 endorsement:

In making this determination [to appoint a receiver] I have taken into account that there is no liquidity in the debtor and that it is unable to make payroll and it currently has no board. Stability in the circumstances is required and this can be accomplished by the appointment of a receiver.

5 As the Receiver reported, it does not have access to sufficient funding to support the company's operations during a lengthy sales process.

**III. Sales process/bidding procedures**

## **A. General principles**

6 Although the decision to approve a particular form of sales process is distinct from the approval of a proposed sale, the reasonableness and adequacy of any sales process proposed by a court-appointed receiver must be assessed in light of the factors which a court will take into account when considering the approval of a proposed sale. Those factors were identified by the Court of Appeal in its decision in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*: (i) whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently; (ii) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; (iii) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process; and, (iv) the interests of all parties.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, when reviewing a sales and marketing process proposed by a receiver a court should assess:

(i) the fairness, transparency and integrity of the proposed process;

(ii) the commercial efficacy of the proposed process in light of the specific circumstances facing the receiver; and,

(iii) whether the sales process will optimize the chances, in the particular circumstances, of securing the best possible price for the assets up for sale.

7 The use of stalking horse bids to set a baseline for the bidding process, including credit bid stalking horses, has been recognized by Canadian courts as a reasonable and useful element of a sales process. Stalking horse bids have been approved for use in other receivership proceedings,<sup>2</sup> BIA proposals,<sup>3</sup> and CCAA proceedings.<sup>4</sup>

8 Perhaps the most well-known recent example of the use of a stalking horse credit bid was that employed in the Canwest Publishing Corp. CCAA proceedings where, as part of a sale and investor solicitation process, Canwest's senior lenders put forward a stalking horse credit bid. Ultimately a superior offer was approved by the court. I accept, as an apt description of the considerations which a court should take into account when deciding whether to approve the use of a stalking horse credit bid, the following observations made by one set of commentators on the Canwest CCAA process:

To be effective for such stakeholders, the credit bid had to be put forward in a process that would allow a sufficient opportunity for interested parties to come forward with a superior offer, recognizing that a timetable for the sale of a business in distress is a fast track ride that requires interested parties to move quickly or miss the opportunity. The court has to balance the need to move quickly, to address the real or perceived deterioration of value of the business during a sale process or the limited availability of restructuring financing, with a realistic timetable that encourages and does not chill the auction process.<sup>5</sup>

## **B. The proposed bidding process**

### **B.1 The bid solicitation/auction process**

9 The bidding process proposed by the Receiver would use a Stalking Horse Offer submitted by CCM to the Receiver, and subsequently amended pursuant to negotiations, as a baseline offer and a qualified bid in an auction process. D&P intends to distribute to prospective purchasers an interest solicitation letter, make available a confidential information memorandum to those who sign a confidentiality agreement, allow due diligence, and provide interested parties with a copy of the Stalking Horse Offer.

10 Bids filed by the April 16, 2012 deadline which meet certain qualifications stipulated by the Receiver may participate in an auction scheduled for April 20, 2012. One qualification is that the minimum consideration in a bid must be an overbid of \$100,000 as compared to the Stalking Horse Offer. The proposed auction process is a standard, multi-round one designed to result in a Successful Bid and a Back-Up Bid. The rounds will be conducted using minimum incremental overbids of \$100,000, subject to reduction at the discretion of the Receiver.

### **B.2 Stalking horse credit bid**

11 The CCM Stalking Horse Offer, or Agreement, negotiated with the Receiver contemplates the acquisition of substantially all the company's business and assets on an "as is where is" basis. The purchase price is equal to: (i) Assumed Liabilities, as defined in the Stalking Horse Offer, plus (ii) a credit bid of CCM's secured debt outstanding under the two Notes, the Appointment Costs and the advance under the Receiver's Certificate. The purchase price is estimated to be approximately \$3.744 million before the value of Assumed Liabilities which will include the continuation of the employment of employees, if the offer is accepted.

12 The Receiver reviewed at length, in its Report and in counsel's factum, the calculation of the value of the credit bid. Interest under both Notes was fixed at 15% per annum and was prepaid in full. The Receiver reported that if both Notes were repaid on May 3, 2012, the anticipated closing date, the effective annual rate of interest (taking into account all costs which could be categorized as "interest") would be significantly higher than 15% per annum - 57.6% on the October Note and 97.4% on the December Note. In order that the interest on the Notes considered for purposes of calculating the value of the credit bid complied with the interest rate provisions of the *Criminal Code*, the Receiver informed CCM that the amount of the secured indebtedness under the Notes eligible for the credit bid would have to be \$103,500 less than the face value of the Notes. As explained in detail in paragraphs 32 through to 39 of its factum, the Receiver is of the view that such a reduction would result in a permissible effective annual interest rate under the December Note. The resulting Stalking Horse Agreement reflected such a reduction.

13 The Stalking Horse Offer does not contain a break-fee, but it does contain a term that in the event the credit bid is not the Successful Bid, then CCM will be entitled to reimbursement of its expenses up to a maximum of \$75,000, or approximately 2% of the value of the estimated purchase price. Such an amount, according to the Receiver, would fall within the range of reasonable break fees and expense reimbursements approved in other cases, which have ranged from 1.8% to 5% of the value of the bid.<sup>6</sup>

### ***C. Analysis***

14 Given the financial circumstances of Blutip and the lack of funding available to the Receiver to support the company's operations during a lengthy sales process, I accept the Receiver's recommendation that a quick sales process is required in order to optimize the prospects of securing the best price for the assets. Accordingly, the timeframe proposed by the Receiver for the submission of qualifying bids and the conduct of the auction is reasonable. The marketing, bid solicitation and bidding procedures proposed by the Receiver are likely to result in a fair, transparent and commercially efficacious process in the circumstances.

15 In light of the reduction in the face value of the Notes required by the Receiver for the purposes of calculating the value of the credit bid and the reasonable amount of the Expense Reimbursement, I approved the Stalking Horse Agreement for the purposes requested by the Receiver. I accept the Receiver's assessment that in the circumstances the terms of the Stalking Horse Offer, including the Expense Reimbursement, will not discourage a third party from submitting an offer superior to the Stalking Horse Offer.

16 Also, as made clear in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Bidding Procedures Order, the Stalking Horse Agreement is deemed to be a Qualified Bid and is accepted solely for the purposes of CCM's right to participate in the auction. My order did not approve the sale of Blutip's assets on the terms set out in the Stalking Horse Agreement. As the Receiver indicated, the approval of the sale of Blutip's assets, whether to CCM or some other successful bidder, will be the subject of a future motion to this Court. Such an approach is consistent with the practice of this Court.<sup>7</sup>

17 For those reasons I approved the bidding procedures recommended by the Receiver.

### **IV. Priority of receiver's charges**

18 Paragraphs 17 and 20 of the Appointment Order granted some priority for the Receiver's Charge and Receiver's Borrowings Charge. However, as noted by the Receiver in section 3.1 of its First Report, because that hearing was brought on an urgent,

*ex parte* basis, priority over existing perfected security interests and statutory encumbrances was not sought at that time. The Receiver now seeks such priority.

19 As previously noted, the Receiver reported that Blutip does not maintain any pension plans. In section 3.1 of its Report the Receiver identified the persons served with notice of this motion: (i) parties with registered security interests pursuant to the *PPSA*; (ii) those who have commenced legal proceedings against the Company; (iii) those who have asserted claims in respect of intellectual property against the Company; (iv) the Company's landlord, and (v) standard government agencies. Proof of such service was filed with the motion record. No person appeared on the return of the motion to oppose the priority sought by the Receiver for its charges.

20 Although the Receiver gave notice to affected parties six days in advance of this motion, not seven days as specified in paragraph 31 of the Appointment Order, I was satisfied that secured creditors who would be materially affected by the order had been given reasonable notice and an opportunity to make representations, as required by section 243(6) of the *BIA*, that abridging the notice period by one day, as permitted by paragraph 31 of the Appointment Order, was appropriate and fair in the circumstances, and I granted the priority charges sought by the Receiver.

21 I should note that the Appointment Order contains a standard "come-back clause" (para. 31). Recently, in *First Leaside Wealth Management Inc., Re*, a proceeding under the *CCAA*, I wrote:

[49] In his recent decision in *Timminco Limited (Re)* ("Timminco I") Morawetz J. described the commercial reality underpinning requests for Administration and D&O Charges in *CCAA* proceedings:

In my view, in the absence of the court granting the requested super priority and protection, the objectives of the *CCAA* would be frustrated. It is not reasonable to expect that professionals will take the risk of not being paid for their services, and that directors and officers will remain if placed in a compromised position should the Timminco Entities continue *CCAA* proceedings without the requested protection. The outcome of the failure to provide these respective groups with the requested protection would, in my view, result in the overwhelming likelihood that the *CCAA* proceedings would come to an abrupt halt, followed, in all likelihood, by bankruptcy proceedings.

...

[51] In my view, absent an express order to the contrary by the initial order applications judge, the issue of the priorities enjoyed by administration, D&O and DIP lending charges should be finalized at the commencement of a *CCAA* proceeding. Professional services are provided, and DIP funding is advanced, in reliance on super-priorities contained in initial orders. To ensure the integrity, predictability and fairness of the *CCAA* process, certainty must accompany the granting of such super-priority charges. When those important objectives of the *CCAA* process are coupled with the Court of Appeal's holding that parties affected by such priority orders be given an opportunity to raise any paramouncy issue, it strikes me that a judge hearing an initial order application should directly raise with the parties the issue of the priority of the charges sought, including any possible issue of paramouncy in respect of competing claims on the debtor's property based on provincial legislation.<sup>8</sup>

22 In my view those comments regarding the need for certainty about the priority of charges for professional fees or borrowings apply, with equal force, to priority charges sought by a receiver pursuant to section 243(6) of the *BIA*. Certainty regarding the priority of administrative and borrowing charges is required as much in a receivership as in proceedings under the *CCAA* or the proposal provisions of the *BIA*.

23 In the present case the issues of the priority of the Receiver's Charge and Receiver's Borrowings Charge were deferred from the return of the initial application until notice could be given to affected parties. I have noted that Blutip did not maintain pension plans. I have found that reasonable notice now has been given and no affected person appeared to oppose the granting of the priority charges. Consequently, it is my intention that the Bidding Procedures Order constitutes a final disposition of the issue of the priority of those charges (subject, of course, to any rights to appeal the Bidding Procedures Order). I do not

regard the presence of a "come-back clause" in the Appointment Order as leaving the door open a crack for some subsequent challenge to the priorities granted by this order.

#### V. Approval of the Receiver's activities

24 The activities described by the Receiver in its First Report were reasonable and fell within its mandate, so I approved them.

25 May I conclude by thanking Receiver's counsel for a most helpful factum.

*Motion granted.*

#### Footnotes

- 1 (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
- 2 *Graceway Canada Co., Re*, 2011 ONSC 6403 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), para. 2.
- 3 *Parlay Entertainment Inc., Re*, 2011 ONSC 3492 (Ont. S.C.J.), para. 15.
- 4 *Brainhunter Inc., Re* (2009), 62 C.B.R. (5th) 41 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), para. 13; *White Birch Paper Holding Co., Re*, 2010 QCCS 4382 (C.S. Que.), para. 3; *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), para. 2, and *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 56 C.B.R. (5th) 74 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Indalex Ltd., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4262 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- 5 Pamela Huff, Linc Rogers, Douglas Bartner and Craig Culbert, "Credit Bidding — Recent Canadian and U.S. Themes", in Janis P. Sarra (ed.), *2010 Annual Review of Insolvency Law* (Toronto: Carswell, 2011), p. 16.
- 6 *Parlay Entertainment Inc., Re*, 2011 ONSC 3492 (Ont. S.C.J.), para. 12; *White Birch Paper Holding Co., Re*, 2010 QCCS 4915 (C.S. Que.), paras. 4 to 7; *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 56 C.B.R. (5th) 74 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), para. 12.
- 7 *Indalex Ltd., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4262 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), para. 7; *Graceway Canada Co., Re*, 2011 ONSC 6403 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), para. 5; *Parlay Entertainment Inc., Re*, 2011 ONSC 3492 (Ont. S.C.J.), para. 58.
- 8 2012 ONSC 1299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) (CanLII).

# TAB 8

2016 ABQB 257  
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Sanjel Corp., Re

2016 CarswellAlta 900, 2016 ABQB 257, [2016] A.W.L.D. 2474, 266 A.C.W.S. (3d) 542, 36 C.B.R. (6th) 239

## **In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended**

In the Matter of the Compromise or Arrangement of Sanjel Corporation, Sanjel Canada Ltd., Terracor Group Ltd., Suretech Group Ltd., Suretech Completions Canada Ltd., Sanjel Energy Services (USA) Inc., Sanjel (USA) Inc., Suretech Completions (USA) Inc., Sanjel Capital (USA) Inc., Terracor (USA) Inc., Terracor Resources (USA) Inc., Terracor Logistics (USA) Inc., Sanjel Middle East Ltd., Sanjel Latin America Limited and Sanjel Energy Services DMCC

B.E. Romaine J.

Heard: April 28, 2016

Judgment: May 16, 2016

Docket: Calgary 1601-03143

Counsel: Chris Simard, Alexis Teasdale, for Sanjel Group

Subject: Insolvency

### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.4 Liquidation or sale of assets](#)

### **Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous

Sale of assets — Debtor companies were severely impacted by economic downturn, and breached covenants under credit agreement with secured creditors — Debtors agreed with secured creditors to implement Sales and Investment Solicitation Process (SISP), which resulted in proposed asset sales that would provide no recovery for unsecured creditors — Debtors were granted Initial Order under [Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#) — Debtors brought application for order approving sales transactions generated through SISP — Trustee of bonds brought application for order dismissing debtors' application, and allowing bondholders to propose plan of arrangement, among other relief — Debtors' application granted; trustee's application dismissed — As result of enactment of s. 36 of Act, there was no jurisdictional impediment to sale of assets where such sales met requisite tests, even in absence of plan of arrangement — Fact that SISP occurred before seeking protection under Act did not amount to abuse of Act — Despite speed and economic environment, SISP was reasonable, competitive and robust, and generated range of bids significantly above liquidation value — Allegations of bad faith were not supported by evidence — Bondholders were aware of SISP and intention to obtain protection under Act, and were not improperly denied access to information — Factors in s. 36(3) of Act favoured approval of proposed sales — Further allegations raised after hearing were duly investigated by monitor and shown to be groundless [Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s 36](#).

### **Table of Authorities**

#### **Cases considered by B.E. Romaine J.:**

*AbitibiBowater inc., Re* (2010), 2010 QCCS 1742, 2010 CarswellQue 4082, 71 C.B.R. (5th) 220 (C.S. Que.) — considered  
*Algoma Steel Inc., Re* (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 1742, 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194, 147 O.A.C. 291 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to  
*Bloom Lake, g.p.l., Re* (2015), 2015 QCCS 1920, 2015 CarswellQue 4072, 27 C.B.R. (6th) 1 (C.S. Que.) — considered  
*Nelson Education Ltd., Re* (2015), 2015 ONSC 5557, 2015 CarswellOnt 13576, 29 C.B.R. (6th) 140 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed  
*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed  
*SemCanada Crude Co., Re* (2009), 2009 ABQB 490, 2009 CarswellAlta 1269, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 205, 479 A.R. 318 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to  
*Target Canada Co., Re* (2015), 2015 ONSC 303, 2015 CarswellOnt 620, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered  
*Windsor Machine & Stamping Ltd., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4471, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 241 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

**Statutes considered:**

*Bankruptcy Code*, 11 U.S.C.

Chapter 11 — referred to

Chapter 15 — referred to

*Business Corporations Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. B-9

Generally — referred to

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 6 — considered

s. 36 — considered

s. 36(3) — considered

s. 36(4) — referred to

s. 36(5) — considered

**Proceeding:** Motion/Application to Dismiss.

APPLICATION by debtor companies for orders approving sales of assets generated through Sales and Investment Solicitation Process; APPLICATION by trustee of the bonds for order dismissing debtors' application, allowing bondholders to propose plan of arrangement, and other relief.

**B.E. Romaine J.:**

**I. Introduction**

1 The Sanjel debtors seek orders approving certain sales of assets generated through a SISF that was conducted prior to the debtors filing under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*. The proceeds of the sales will be insufficient to fully payout the secured creditor, and will generate no return to unsecured creditors, including the holders of unsecured Bonds.

2 The Trustee of the Bonds challenged the process under which the SISF was conducted, and the use of what he characterized as a liquidating CCAA in this situation. He alleged that the use of the CCAA to effect a pre-packaged sale of the debtors' assets for the benefit of the secured creditor was an abuse of the letter and spirit of the CCAA. He also alleged that bad faith and collusion tainted the integrity of the SISF.

3 After reviewing extensive evidence and hearing submissions from interested parties, I decided to allow the application to approve the sales, and dismiss the application of the Trustee. These are my reasons.

**II. Facts**

4 On April 4, 2016, the Sanjel Corporation and its affiliates were granted an Initial Order under the [Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36](#), as amended. PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc., ("PWC") was appointed as Monitor of the applicants.

5 Sanjel and its affiliates (the "Sanjel Group" or "Sanjel") provide fracturing, cementing, coiled tubing and reservoir services to the oil and gas industry in Canada, the United States and Saudi Arabia. Sanjel Corporation, the parent company, is a private corporation, the shares of which are owned by the MacDonald Group Ltd. It was incorporated under the Alberta Business Corporations Act in 1980, and its principal executive and registered office is located in Calgary. Four of the other members of the group were incorporated in Alberta, seven in various American states and three in offshore jurisdictions.

6 The sole director of all Canadian and US Sanjel companies resides in Calgary, as do all of the officers of these companies. The affidavit in support of the Initial Order sets out a number of factors relevant to the Sanjel Group's ability to file under the [CCAA](#) and that would be relevant to a determination of a Centre of Main Interest ("COMI") of the Sanjel Group. In subsequent Chapter 15 proceedings in the United States, the US Court declared COMI to be located in Canada and the [CCAA](#) proceedings to be a "foreign main proceeding." It is clear that the Sanjel Group is a fully integrated business centralized in Calgary.

7 Sanjel Corporation and Sanjel (USA) Inc. are borrowers under a credit agreement (the "Bank Credit Facility") dated April 21, 2015 with a banking syndicate (the "Syndicate") led by Alberta Treasury Branches as agent. The total amount outstanding under the Bank Credit Facility at the time of the [CCAA](#) filing was approximately \$415.5 million. The Syndicate has perfected security interests over substantially all of the assets of the Sanjel Group, and is the principal secured creditor of the Sanjel Group in these [CCAA](#) proceedings.

8 On June 18, 2014, Sanjel Corporation issued US \$300 million 7.5% Callable Bonds due June 19, 2019. Interest is payable on the Bonds semi-annually on June 19 and December 19. The Bonds are unsecured. Nordic Trust ASA (the "Trustee") is the trustee under the Bond Agreement.

9 The Sanjel Group has been severely impacted by the catastrophic drop in global oil and gas prices since mid-2014. Over the last 18 months, the Sanjel Group has taken aggressive steps to cut costs, including by reducing staffing levels by more than half. However, by late October, 2015, Sanjel Corporation was in breach of certain covenants under the Bank Credit Facility. By late December, 2016, the Syndicate was in a position to exercise enforcement rights. In addition, an interest payment of USD \$11,250,000 was due on the Bonds on December 19, 2015. Since late 2015, the Sanjel Group has been in negotiations with both the Syndicate and two bondholders, Ascribe Capital LLC and Clearlake Capital Group L.P., (the "Ad Hoc Bondholders"). The Ad Hoc Bondholders hold over 45% of the Bonds.

10 In the fall of 2015, Sanjel Corporation engaged Bank of America Merrill Lynch ("BAML") to identify strategic partners and attempt to raise additional capital for the Sanjel Group. BAML contacted 28 private equity firms; 19 non-disclosure agreements were executed and 9 management presentations were made. However, the BAML process did not result in a successful transaction.

11 In December, 2015, the Ad Hoc Bondholders retained a New York law firm, Fried Frank, as their legal advisor and Moelis & Company as their financial advisor.

12 On December 10, 2015, Fried Frank conveyed a proposal from the Ad Hoc Bondholders to Sanjel. Under this proposal, Sanjel would be required to pay the USD \$11,250,000 interest payment. Provided that the interest payment was made, the bondholders would agree to a standstill agreement for the same period as may be agreed with the Syndicate. In return, the Ad Hoc Bondholders would lend back their pro rata share of that interest payment to Sanjel in return for secured notes ranking *pari passu* with the Bank Credit Facility, bearing interest at the same rate as the Bank Credit Facility plus 2%. The new notes would not be repaid until the Bank Credit Facility was repaid.

13 The Ad Hoc Bondholders indicated that they would consider acting as standby lenders to Sanjel for the remainder of the interest payment and would offer the other bondholders the option of lending back their pro-rata share to Sanjel on the same

basis. If they agreed to be standby lenders, the Ad Hoc Bondholders would receive a commitment fee equal to 10% of their standby commitment, payable in new notes.

14 The proposal letter indicated that the Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware that Sanjel had been engaged in a process to address liquidity and leverage issues over the past few months, including attempting to raise equity to sell assets. In their view, Sanjel had exhausted those efforts, and the only remaining option was a deal negotiated with the bondholders. However, the Ad Hoc Bondholders would only embark on such a process if the December 19, 2015 interest payment was made.

15 Sanjel rejected the proposal on December 14, 2015. It is noteworthy that the Bank Credit Facility includes a negative covenant prohibiting Sanjel from granting a security interest over its assets. The Syndicate advised Sanjel that the Ad Hoc Bondholders' proposal to have their existing unsecured position elevated to rank *pari passu* with the Bank Credit Facility was unacceptable, and that it would not provide its consent.

16 On December 15, 2015, the Ad Hoc Bondholders advised counsel to the Syndicate that they wished to work towards a restructuring, which they envisaged would involve paying down a portion of the Syndicate's debt "in an amount to be mutually agreed on". They also suggested that Sanjel would implement a rights offering to holders of Bonds and then to existing equity, with a conversion of the Bonds into new debt and equity.

17 On or about December 15, 2015, the Ad Hoc Bondholders sent Sanjel a draft waiver and standstill agreement, which required the payment of part of the December 19 interest payment by December 23, 2015 and the payment of the fees and disbursements of Fried Frank and Moelis in return for arranging for a bondholder meeting to be called to consider a period of forbearance to March 31, 2016.

18 Fried Frank and Moelis executed Non-Disclosure Agreements ("NDAs") on December 24, 2015, but the Ad Hoc Bondholders did not, thus not restricting their right to trade the Bonds. Fried Frank and Moelis were granted access to a Sanjel virtual database ("VDR") on January 9, 2016.

19 By January, 2016, given the prolonged downturn in oil and gas prices, Sanjel's liquidity was limited. Events of default under the Bank Credit Facility that had occurred as of October 31, 2015 were exacerbated by a cross-default based on the non-payment of interest under the Bond Agreement. As of January 31, 2016, the Sanjel Group had total consolidated liabilities of approximately \$1.064 billion.

20 Sanjel was facing very significant negative cash flow projections over the next few months. As of early January, 2016, Sanjel's projected cash flows showed that its cash position would deteriorate by more than half as of the first week of April, 2016, and would be further reduced by anticipated forbearance payments.

21 In the circumstances, Sanjel agreed with the Syndicate to implement a Sales and Investment Solicitation Process ("SISP"). Sanjel states that it hoped that if a SISP was implemented, it might find a transaction that preserved the business as a going concern, which would maximize stakeholder value and preserve goodwill and jobs.

22 In mid-January, 2016, Sanjel engaged PWC as a proposed Monitor in the event it would become necessary to file under the [CCAA](#).

23 The SISP was commenced on behalf of Sanjel by its financial advisors, PJT Partners Inc. ("PJT") and Credit Suisse Securities (CANADA), Inc. ("CS") on January 17, 2016. The advisors contacted prospective bidders, many of whom had already been identified through the BAML process of late 2015.

24 The process of soliciting non-bidding indications of interest ran from January 17, 2016 to February 22, 2016. On January 26, 2016, the advisers updated and opened a VDR available to anyone who had signed a NDA. A teaser letter was distributed and meetings and conference calls were held with bidders. A process letter was distributed on January 28, 2016. Nine indications of interest were submitted on or about February 22, 2016.

25 Before and during the SISP process, Sanjel was negotiating with both the Syndicate and the Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to separate forbearance agreements, and with the Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to NDAs to be signed by the Ad Hoc Bondholders. The Ad Hoc Bondholders complain that there was a delay of almost a month before Sanjel's counsel responded to a mark-up of a NDA provided by Fried Frank, but negotiations were stymied by the Ad Hoc Bondholders' insistence that the December interest payment be paid. Until this issue was settled, there was no reason to finalize the NDAs. In addition, it was not until January 29, 2016 that representatives of the Ad Hoc Bondholders advised Sanjel that they were prepared to be restricted from trading and therefore able to receive confidential information. During this period of time, the Ad Hoc Bondholders refused to meet with Sanjel management when they travelled to New York on January 20, 2016.

26 On February 1, 2016, counsel to Sanjel sent counsel to the Ad Hoc Bondholders a copy of the draft forbearance agreement between the Syndicate and Sanjel, which set out the key dates of the SISP, including the completion of definitive purchase and sales agreements by March 24, 2016. It would have been clear to the Ad Hoc Bondholders from this draft that Sanjel was proceeding on a dual track basis, considering both a potential stand-alone restructuring of the company and a sales process.

27 The Ad Hoc Bondholders made a second proposal to Sanjel on February 2, 2016, very shortly after the NDAs were signed. This proposal involved the Syndicate recovering a portion of its loan from Sanjel's existing cash reserves and a rights offering backstopped by the Ad Hoc Bondholders. A portion of the Bonds would be converted into equity. The December interest payment would have to be paid. Sanjel's management team met with the Ad Hoc Bondholders and their advisors in New York on February 3, 2016 and Sanjel's team, the Syndicate and its advisors and the Ad Hoc Bondholders met on February 8, 2016.

28 Sanjel delivered an indicative restructuring term sheet to the Ad Hoc Bondholders on February 12, 2016, as required by the forbearance agreement that the parties were negotiating. The restructuring term sheet emphasized that a bondholder-led restructuring would require significant new money, a significant capital commitment and ongoing capital, with a significant pay-down of the Syndicate's debt.

29 Commencing on February 15, 2016, Sanjel allowed representatives of Alvarez and Marsal ("A&M"), advisors to the Ad Hoc Bondholders, to attend in Calgary and conduct due diligence.

30 On February 18, 2016, Sanjel uploaded to its VDR the final, unsigned versions of the Syndicate Amending and Forbearance Agreement and the Bondholders Forbearance Agreement.

31 Under the SISP, preliminary, non-binding indications of interest were delivered to the advisors and the company by February 22, 2016. Six such indications of interest were received, all of which were materially superior to the Ad Hoc Bondholders proposal of February 2, 2016. The Ad Hoc Bondholders have admitted that they were aware of the milestones under the SISP and the Bank Forbearance Agreement by mid-February, 2016, although it is clear that their advisors would have been aware of these milestones from February 1, 2016.

32 As part of finalizing the form of Bond Forbearance Agreement, counsel for Sanjel and for the Ad Hoc Bondholders had negotiated a form of summons that would be used to call a bondholder meeting to consider the agreement. The only item for consideration to be considered at the meeting was to be the Bond Forbearance Agreement. The plan was to have 2/3 of the bondholders approve and execute the Bond Forbearance Agreement, and then to hold a bondholders meeting.

33 Instead, on February 25, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders caused the Trustee to issue a summons for a meeting on March 10, 2016 to consider and vote on a) whether to declare the Bonds in default, accelerate them and exercise remedies, including commencing involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against Sanjel under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, including claims against the MacDonald family and MacBain Properties Ltd., which owns the business premises that are leased by the Sanjel Group or b) approve the Bond Forbearance Agreement.

34 On March 2, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders submitted a restructuring proposal to Sanjel. This proposal provided no cash recovery to the Syndicate. Instead, a portion of the debt owed to the Syndicate would be converted to a new loan and the remainder extinguished, with the Syndicate receiving warrants in a reorganized company. There would be a Chapter 11

filing and the bondholders would provide a debtor-in-possession ("DIP") facility to rank *pari passu* with the Syndicate debt. Bondholders who contributed to the DIP would receive new 2<sup>nd</sup> lien notes for part of their previous notes, the remainder being extinguished. The DIP facility would be converted into 100% of the equity of the reorganized company. Sanjel would be required to appoint a Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO") designated by the Ad Hoc Bondholders.

35 On March 4, 2016, in a follow-up letter to a telephone meeting on March 3, 2016, US counsel to the Syndicate wrote to Fried Frank requesting that the March 10 bondholders meeting be adjourned to March 31, 2016. Canadian counsel to Sanjel made the same request of the Trustee.

36 Also on March 4, 2016, a template Asset Purchase Agreement ("APA") for SISP bidders was posted on the VDRs, which disclosed a CCAA/Chapter 15 filing with PWC as designated Monitor. This template agreement was available to the Ad Hoc Bondholders and their advisors.

37 Counsel for the Ad Hoc Bondholders replied on March 5, 2016 that they would advise the Trustee to postpone the March 10 meeting subject to:

- a) a response to their March 2 proposal by March 10, 2016;
- b) full disclosure of company records for A&M's representative, "so that [that representative] is ready and best positioned to commence his duties as Chief Restructuring Officer for the Company".
- c) payment by March 7, 2016 of roughly USD \$2.2 million in fees and disbursements for the Ad Hoc Bondholders' legal and financial advisors.

38 After some negotiation, Sanjel agreed to these terms for an adjournment, other than with respect to a small deduction in fees and disbursements. Sanjel made it clear that it reserved all rights with respect to the appointment of a CRO and a filing under Chapter 11, which it would not agree to at that time. On March 8, 2016 the Trustee confirmed that the meeting would be postponed to March 31.

39 On March 9, 2016, second round bids under the SISP were received. Five bids were received, all of which were materially superior to the Ad Hoc Bondholders' March 2, 2016 proposal in terms of cash recovery for the Syndicate.

40 An information update conference for bondholders was scheduled to be held on March 11, 2016, at which Sanjel, the Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders would provide an update to any bondholder that wished to call in. This was rescheduled by the Trustee to March 31, 2016.

41 On March 11, 2016, the Syndicate sent the counter-offer required by the postponement of meeting agreement to the Ad Hoc Bondholders. This counter-proposal made it clear that there would be a CCAA/Chapter 15 process, rather than a Chapter 11 process. While this counter-proposal is confidential, it is fair to say that the parties were far apart in their negotiations, particularly with respect to treatment of the Syndicate indebtedness.

42 Also on March 11, 2016, a representative of Sanjel met with A&M's representative and discussed Sanjel's intention to disclaim certain leases in the anticipated CCAA proceedings.

43 Following receipt of the second round bids, Sanjel and its advisors identified the top three bidders and began negotiations with them with the goal of finalizing due diligence and being in a position to execute final APAs on March 24, 2016, as indicated in the Bank Forbearance Agreement.

44 In the meantime, Sanjel continued meetings with the A&M representative, who asked for, and was provided with:

- a) access to the newly created VDR for second stage bidders/investors in the SISP on March 12, 2016.

b) draft materials relating to the CCAA filing, including current drafts of cash flow projections and drafts of stakeholder communication regarding the CCAA, on March 21, 2016.

45 On March 20, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders provided Sanjel and the Syndicate with a third restructuring proposal. This one provided for some paydown of the Syndicate's debt, but involved less than half of that recovery in new money, about the same amount in debt secured by accounts receivable and a substantial amount of bank debt rolled over into a new loan. It also provided for a DIP facility to rank *pari passu* with a new bank credit facility in the event of a liquidation and the conversion of some bondholder debt into secured notes.

46 On March 23, 2016, counsel for Sanjel requested that the Trustee postpone the bondholder meeting scheduled for March 31, 2016 to April 14, 2016. He also proposed to set up the requested informational update on March 31, 2016. On March 25, 2016, counsel for the Trustee consented to this request.

47 In the SISF, final bids were received from the three top bidders on March 24, 2016, with negotiations to continue on final APAs. On the same day, Sanjel and its advisors hosted a call with A&M and Moelis, during which they walked through a 13 week cash forecast.

48 On March 31, 2016 the Syndicate and the Ad Hoc Bondholders had discussions with respect to the Ad Hoc Bondholders' March 20 proposal. In previous correspondence, the Syndicate's counsel had questioned the adequacy of the proposed DIP financing in the proposal and noted Sanjel's significant cash needs following exit from an insolvency proceeding, as opposed to the proposal's assumption that there would be better cash flow. At the conclusion of the call, the Ad Hoc Bondholders indicated that they would provide further modelling with respect to their proposal.

49 On April 3, 2016, Sanjel entered into final APAs with the proposed purchasers, STEP and Liberty. On April 4, 2016, the Sanjel Group filed for CCAA protection. Counsel for Sanjel Group disclosed that the application was made without notice to the Ad Hoc Bondholders. He submitted that notice would imperil the CCAA proceedings as the bondholders may, with notice, have pre-empted the CCAA filing by an involuntary filing under Chapter 11. There is no requirement to give notice to unsecured creditors of a CCAA filing. There are circumstances, and this was one of them, where it is appropriate to seek an initial order on an ex parte basis:

This may be an appropriate — even necessary — step in order to prevent "creditors from moving to realize on their claims, essentially a 'stampede to the assets' once creditors learn of the debtor's financial distress": J.P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at p. 55 ("Rescue!"); see also *Algoma Steel Inc., Re* (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 7

50 On April 11, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders presented their fourth proposal for restructuring, not to Sanjel but to the Syndicate. This proposal increases the amount the bondholders would contribute to Sanjel for new equity, which would be used to repay a portion of the Syndicate's loan.

51 According to Fried Frank, the Syndicate's counsel responded on April 13, 2016 advising that while they appreciated the work done by the Ad Hoc Bondholders, the Syndicate preferred the sale route. The Syndicate proposed alternatives that it might consider involving a higher pay-out of the Syndicate's debt than offered by the April 11, 2016 proposal. The Ad Hoc Bondholders have not responded.

52 The Sanjel Group apply for an order approving the sales transactions generated through the SISF, being a sales agreement between Sanjel and STEP Energy Services Ltd., including an assignment of the sale of the debtor's cementing assets in favour of 1961531 Alberta Ltd., and a sales agreement between Sanjel and Liberty.

53 The Trustee applied for an order dismissing the application for approval of these transactions, allowing the Ad Hoc Bondholders to propose a plan of arrangement, lifting the stay to allow the Trustee to commence a Chapter 11 filing and directing a new Court-monitored SISF, among other applications

### III. Applicable Law

54 Section 36(3) of the CCAA sets out six non-exhaustive factors that must be considered in approving a sale by a CCAA debtor of assets outside the ordinary course of business. They are:

- (a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale was reasonable in the circumstances;
- (b) whether the Monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale;
- (c) whether the Monitor filed with the court a report stating that in its opinion the sale would be more beneficial to creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
- (d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
- (e) the effects of the proposed sale on creditors and other interested parties; and
- (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

55 In this case, the Monitor was not in place at the time of the process leading to the proposed sales, nor at the time the SISF was commenced. However, the Monitor has given an opinion on the process, which I will consider as part of my review.

56 Prior to the enactment of section 36, CCAA courts considered what are known as the Soundair principles in considering approval application, and they are still useful guidelines:

- a) Was there a sufficient effort made to get the price at issue? Did the debtor company act improvidently?
- b) Were the interests of all parties considered?
- c) Are there any questions about the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers were obtained?
- d) Was there unfairness in the working out of the process?

*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) at para 20.

57 Gascon, J. (as he then was) suggested in *AbitibiBowater inc.*, Re, 2010 QCCS 1742 (C.S. Que.) at paras 70-72 that a court should give due consideration to two further factors:

- a) the business judgment rule, in that a court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of the commercial and business judgment of the debtor company and the monitor in the context of an asset sale where the marketing and sale process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient; and
- b) the weight to be given to the recommendation of the monitor.

58 As noted by Gascon, J., it is not desirable for a bidder to wait to the last minute, even up to a court approval stage, to submit its best offer. However, a court can consider such an offer, if it is evidence that the debtor company did not properly carry out its duty to obtain the best price for creditors.

### IV. Analysis

59 The Trustee has raised a number of objections to the proposed sales, many of which relate to the factors and principles set out in section 36 of the CCAA, the Soundair principles and the AbitibiBowater factors:

A. The Trustee submits that the [CCAA](#) can only be used to liquidate the assets of a debtor company and distribute the proceeds where such use is uncontested or where there is clear evidence that the [CCAA](#) provides scope for greater recoveries than would be available on a bankruptcy.

60 Most of the cases relied upon by the Trustee with respect to this submission predate the 2009 enactment of [section 36 of the CCAA](#). While prior to this change to the [CCAA](#), there was some authority that questioned whether the [CCAA](#) should be used to carry out a liquidation of a debtors' assets, there was also authority that accepted this as a proper use of the statute.

61 An analysis of the pre-section 36 state of the law on this issue, and support for the latter view, is well summarized in *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 3169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). As noted by Morawetz, J. at para 28 of that decision, the [CCAA](#) is a flexible statute, particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and myriad interests. This is such a case.

62 [Section 36](#) now provides that a [CCAA](#) court may authorize the sale or disposition of assets outside the ordinary course of business if authorized to do so by court order. There is thus no jurisdictional impediment to the sale of assets where such sales meet the requisite tests, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement.

63 Morawetz, J in *Target Canada Co., Re*, 2015 ONSC 303 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras 32 and 33, describes the change brought about by [section 36](#):

Prior to the 2009 amendments to the [CCAA](#), Canadian courts accepted that, in appropriate circumstances, debtor companies were entitled to seek the protection of the [CCAA](#) where the outcome was not going to be a going concern restructuring, but instead, a "liquidation" or wind-down of the debtor companies' assets or business.

The 2009 amendments did not expressly address whether the [CCAA](#) could be used generally to wind-down the business of a debtor company. However, I am satisfied that the enactment of [section 36 of the CCAA](#), which establishes a process for a debtor company to sell assets outside the ordinary course of business while under [CCAA](#) protection, is consistent with the principle that the [CCAA](#) can be a vehicle to downsize or wind-down a debtor company's business.

See also *Re Brainhunter Inc.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 8207 at para 15.

64 Whether before or after the enactment of [section 36](#), Canadian courts have approved en bloc sales of a debtor company, recognizing that such sales are consistent with the broad remedial purpose and flexibility of the [CCAA](#).

65 What the provisions of the [CCAA](#) can provide in situations such as those facing the Sanjel Group is a court-supervised process of the execution of the sales, with provision for liquidity and the continuation of the business through the process provided by interim financing, a Key Employee Retention Plan that attempts to ensure that key employees are given an incentive to ensure a seamless transition, critical supplier relief that keeps operations functioning pending the closing of the sales and a process whereby a company with operations in Canada, the United States and internationally is able to invoke the aid of both Canadian and US courts during the process. It is true that the actual SISP process preceded the [CCAA](#) filing, and I will address that factor later in this decision.

66 As counsel to the Sanjel Group notes, this type of insolvency proceeding is well-suited to the current catastrophic downturn of the economy in Alberta, with companies at the limit of their liquidity. It allows a business to be kept together and sold as a going concern to the extent possible. There have been a number of recent similar filings in this jurisdiction: the filing in Southern Pacific and Quicksilver are examples.

67 The Monitor supports the sales, and is of the view, supported by investigation into the likely range of forced sale liquidation recoveries with financial advisors and others with industry knowledge, that a liquidation of assets would not generate a better result than the consideration contemplated by the proposed sales. The Monitor's investigations were hampered by the lack of recent sales of similar businesses, but I am satisfied by its thorough report that the Monitor's investigation of likely recoveries

is the best estimate available. A CS estimate provided a different analysis, but I am satisfied by the evidence that it has little probative value.

68 In summary, this is not an inappropriate use of the [CCAA](#) arising from the nature of the proposed sales.

B. The Trustee submits that the proposed sales are the product of a defective SISP conducted outside of the [CCAA](#).

69 It is true that the SISP, and the restructuring negotiations with the Ad Hoc Bondholders, took place prior to the filing under the [CCAA](#), that this was a "pre-pack" filing.

70 A pre-filing SISP is not of itself abusive of the [CCAA](#). Nothing in the statute precludes it. Of course, a pre-filing SISP must meet the principles and requirements of [section 36 of the CCAA](#) and must be considered against the Soundair principles. The Trustee submits that such a SISP should be subject to heightened scrutiny. It may well be correct that a pre-filing SISP will be subject to greater challenges from stakeholders, and that it may be more difficult for the debtor company to establish that it was conducted in a fair and effective manner, given the lack of supervision by the Court and the Monitor, who as a court officer has statutory duties.

71 Without prior court approval of the process, conducting a SISP outside of the [CCAA](#) means that both the procedure and the execution of the SISP are open to attack by aggrieved stakeholders and bitter bidders, as has been the case here. Any evidence or reasonable allegations of impropriety would have to be investigated carefully, whereas in a court-approved process, comfort can be obtained through the Monitor's review and the Court's approval of the process in advance. However, in the end, it is the specific details of the SISP as conducted that will be scrutinized.

72 Similar issues were considered in *Nelson Education Ltd., Re*, [2015 ONSC 5557](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras 31-32, and in *Bloom Lake, g.p.l., Re*, [2015 QCCS 1920](#) (C.S. Que.) at para 21.

73 The Trustee submits that the SISP was defective in that its timelines were truncated and that it was destined not to generate offers that maximized value for all stakeholders. The Trustee filed an affidavit of a representative of Moelis indicating that it would be typical in a SISP to establish a deadline for non-binding offers one or two months following commencement of the process, while in this SISP, participants had only 12 to 25 days to evaluate the business and provide non-binding indications of interest. This opinion did not address the previous BAML process that identified likely purchasers and thus lengthened the review process for these parties who participated in the first process. The Trustee's advisor was also critical that the SISP provided only 16 days for final offers, suggesting that it is more typical to provide two months.

74 While likely correct for normal-course SISP's, this analysis does not take into account the high cash burn situation of these debtors, nor the deteriorating market. The Moelis opinion suggests that potential purchaser would have a heightened diligence requirement in the current unfavourable market conditions, requiring extra time for due diligence. However, despite the speed of the SISP, it appears to have generated a range of bids significantly above liquidation value. The process was not limited to the SISP, but included the previous BAML process and the negotiations with the Ad Hoc Bondholders.

75 The evidence discloses a thorough and comprehensive canvassing of the relevant markets for the debtors and their assets despite the aggressive timelines. The BAML process identified some interested parties and Sanjel's financial advisors built on that process by re-engaging with 28 private equity firms that had already expressed interest in these unique assets as well as identifying new potential purchasers, reaching out to 85 potential buyers.

76 Of those 85 parties, 37 executed NDAs, 25 conducted due diligence and 17 met with the management team. Eight submitted non-binding indications of interest, five were invited to submit second-round bids and finally the top three were chosen for the continuation of negotiations to final agreements.

77 While some interested parties may have found the time limits challenging, a reasonable number were able to meet them and submit bids. I am satisfied from the evidence that, despite a challenging economic environment, the process was competitive and robust.

78 I also note the comments of the Monitor in its First Report dated April 12, 2016. While it was not directly involved in the SISP, the Monitor reports that the financial advisors advised the Monitor, that given the size and complexity of the Sanjel Group's operations and the time frames involved, all strategic and financial sponsors known to the advisors were contacted during the SISP and that it is unlikely that extending the SISP time frames in the current market would have resulted in materially better offers.

79 Based on this advice and the Monitor's observations since its involvement in the SISP from mid-February 2016, the Monitor is of the opinion that it is highly improbable that another post-filing sales process would yield offers materially in excess of those received.

80 Finally, I note that the Ad Hoc Bondholders' own March 20 proposal envisaged a pre-packaged CCAA proceedings. A sales process is only required to be reasonable, not perfect. I am satisfied that this SISP was run appropriately and reasonably, and that it adequately canvassed the relevant market for the Sanjel Group and its assets.

C. The Ad Hoc Bondholders submit that negotiations among them, the Sanjel Group and the Syndicate were a sham conducted by Sanjel to delay the Ad Hoc Bondholders from taking action under Chapter 11 while it finalized the APAs. The Trustee alleges that the SISP has been conducted and the CCAA filing occurred in an atmosphere tainted by manoeuvring for advantage, bad faith, deception, secrecy, artificial haste and excessive deference by the Sanjel Group to the Syndicate.

81 These are serious allegations, but they are not supported by the evidence.

82 As the somewhat lengthy history of negotiations establishes, the Ad Hoc Bondholders had almost three months to present and negotiate restructuring proposals, with access to confidential information afforded to their advisors from January 9, 2016, weeks before the SISP participants. They presented four proposals, the last one after final bids had been received in the SISP. Although the final proposal breached the timelines of the SISP process, and could potentially raise an issue with respect to the integrity of the SISP process, Sanjel, the Syndicate and the prospective purchasers are not pressing that argument, as they take the position that the final offer is inferior at any rate.

83 These proposals received responses from Sanjel and the Syndicate, and counter proposals were received. The evidence discloses that, in all proposals and counter proposals, the parties were far apart on a major issue: the extent to which the Syndicate's debt was to be paid down and how far it was willing to allow a portion to remain at risk.

84 The Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware of the SISP from its commencement, and aware of the timing of the process. Throughout the SISP, the financial advisors had regular contact with Moelis and Fried Frank and directly with the Ad Hoc Bondholders. Michael Genereux, the lead partner at PJT with respect to the SISP, has sworn that he believes the Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware of the SISP and that it was progressing at a rapid pace. He says that he urged the Ad Hoc Bondholders to accelerate the pace at which they were advancing their restructuring negotiations.

85 The Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware, or should have been aware, that the Sanjel Group intended a CCAA/Chapter 15 process from at the latest mid-March, 2016. Their representative from A&M was aware of the possibility of a CCAA filing from March 4, 2016. Reference to PWC as Monitor under the CCAA was available through the template APAs from March 4, 2016

86 The Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders submit that the Ad Hoc Bondholders' April 11, 2016 proposal provides superior recovery to the proposed sales generated by the SISP, that it "implies" a purchase price significantly in excess of the values generated by the APAs. The proposal, which was made directly to the Syndicate, was rejected by the Syndicate. It provides less immediate recovery to the Syndicate, and leaves a substantial portion of the Syndicate debt outstanding in a difficult and highly uncertain economic environment. It fails to address previously-expressed concerns about the need for capital going forward. The implied value of the proposal appears to rest on assumptions about improved economic recovery that the Syndicate does not accept or share.

87 In addition, the proposal would require at least six months to execute and leaves a number of questions outstanding, not the least being whether a plan that raises some and not all unsecured debt to secured status would pass muster. The proposal was rejected by the Syndicate for reasonable and defensible justifications.

88 The Ad Hoc Bondholders describe their proposal as a "germ" of a viable plan. While a germ of a viable plan may be sufficient to justify the commencement of a CCAA proceeding, it is not comparable to the proposed sales generated by a reasonably-run and thorough SISP.

89 The Trustee also submits that the Court should not be deterred by the Syndicate's rejection of the proposal, insisting on its value and citing cases where a creditor's stated intention not to accept a plan did not prevent a CCAA filing from proceeding. This is a different situation: the Ad Hoc Bondholder's proposals are specific proposals with clear risks of timing and certainty. It is not up to this Court to second guess the Syndicate's rejection of such a plan, even if inclined to do so.

90 The Trustee submits that Sanjel did not act in good faith towards the Ad Hoc Bondholders in the period leading up to the filing. The Trustee notes that, contrary to the terms of the Bond Agreement, Sanjel failed to disclose to the bondholders that the Syndicate had issued a demand for payment acceleration and a notice of intention to enforce security pursuant to the terms of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the "Demand Acceleration and NOI") on March 18, 2016. While this was a contractual breach, the Ad Hoc Bondholders were well aware that Sanjel was in breach of the Bank Credit Facility, and that the Syndicate was taking steps to enforce its rights in negotiations with Sanjel and the Ad Hoc Bondholders. The Syndicate, and the Ad Hoc Bondholders, were both careful to preserve their rights of enforcement in proposals and counter-proposals. In fact, the Syndicate did not exercise its right to set-off, and has allowed Sanjel to continue to have access to liquidity going into the CCAA process.

91 This failure by Sanjel to advise the Trustee, (and other unsecured creditors that had similar provisions in their contracts), of this further step by the Syndicate does not constitute a reason to refuse to approve that APAs.

92 The Trustee submits that Sanjel failed to make full and plain disclosure during the initial hearing because it failed to disclose that in 2015, 62 % of the Sanjel Group's revenue was generated in the United States. Sanjel made extensive disclosure of its corporate structure and the integration of its business in its initial filing, including the fact that the Sanjel Group's "nerve centre", management team and treasury and financial functions are largely based in Calgary. The factors disclosed were more than sufficient to establish jurisdiction for a CCAA filing. The US Court in the Chapter 15 filing found the Sanjel Group's COMI to be in Calgary. The single statistic of 2015 revenue would not have changed the outcome of the Initial Order.

93 The Trustee's most serious allegation, given its implications for the professional reputations of those involved, is that Sanjel and its counsel and the Syndicate and its counsel misled the Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders in their requests for adjournment of the bondholders' meeting, that the correspondence relating to the requests for adjournment created an obligation to negotiate in good faith, and that Sanjel and the Syndicate failed to do so. The Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders allege that Sanjel and the Syndicate were negotiating with the Ad Hoc Bondholders only to gain time to finalize the APAs and file under the CCAA.

94 Again, this serious allegation is not supported by the evidence. The correspondence relating to the adjournment requests discloses no promises to hold off proceedings. The letter of request for the first adjournment for counsel to the Syndicate, while it refers to engaging with the Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to the March 2, 2016 proposal, stipulates that in requesting the postponement of the meeting, counsel is not promising any course of action and reserves all rights.

95 The request from counsel to Sanjel refers to the dual track of negotiating a financial restructuring and/or sale of assets. It speaks of focusing on negotiations for the balance of the month, instead of "prospective enforcement action as proposed for consideration at the scheduled bondholders meeting," as was threatened by the notice of meeting. The Ad Hoc Bondholders were well-compensated financially for this adjournment.

96 The second request to adjourn the meeting to April 14, 2016 was similarly without any promise to forbear and the acceptance of the request by the Trustee did not impose any conditions nor give any reasons for the acceptance. The

representatives of the Ad Hoc Bondholders are knowledgeable and sophisticated with respect to financing and insolvency matters. They cannot be said to have been misled by the language used in the adjournment requests.

97 The Trustee submits that the [CCAA](#) process to date has been engineered to effect a foreclosure in favour of the Syndicate "to the serious and material prejudice of the Bondholders" and other unsecured creditors.

98 The SISP did not disclose any possibility that, in the current economic climate, the disposition of the assets would generate even enough to cover the debt owed to the secured creditors. The proposals made by the Ad Hoc Bondholders did not offer nearly enough to pay out that debt.

99 The views of the Syndicate and its priority rights must be given due consideration: *Windsor Machine & Stamping Ltd., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4471 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para 43.

100 [Section 6 of the CCAA](#) requires that any compromise of creditors' rights must be supported by a double majority of the affected creditors. The Syndicate (as the principal secured creditor group) and the Ad Hoc Bondholders (as unsecured creditors with other unsecured creditors) would form separate voting classes for the purposes of a vote on any plan of arrangement. Each class must have a double majority of creditors, representing both two-thirds in value and a majority of number, voting in support of the plan as a condition precedent to court approval. Thus, the Syndicate holds an effective "veto" over the approval of any plan proposed by the Ad Hoc Bondholders: *SemCanada Crude Co., Re*, 2009 ABQB 490 (Alta. Q.B.) at para 22.

101 As noted by the Syndicate, the Ad Hoc Bondholders proposals, including the April 11, 2016 proposal, pose substantial risk to the Syndicate, and it is under no obligation to support them. There is no evidence that the Syndicate is acting unreasonably or unfairly in asserting that it would exercise the statutory protection afforded to a secured creditor under the [CCAA](#); in fact, the evidence is that the Syndicate was willing to consider a less than 100% payout in negotiations with the Ad Hoc Bondholders. There was however no agreement as to the extent of the payout and the extent to which the Syndicate would agree to remain at risk.

102 The prejudice to the bondholders is that they were unable to persuade the secured creditors to compromise or put its financial interests at risk in order to provide the bondholders with some chance that an improved economic climate may save this enterprise. As noted, the Syndicate had doubts that the Ad Hoc Bondholder's proposals would even provide sufficient operating capital to keep the Sanjel Group operating for the months it would take to implement their proposals.

103 The prejudice, if any, to the Ad Hoc Bondholders is that they were not able to pre-empt the [CCAA](#) filing with a filing under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, with an automatic stay that, according to US bankruptcy law, has worldwide effect. A subsequent [CCAA](#) filing could be considered a breach of the stay, and provoke a jurisdictional issue that would delay proceedings and prove expensive to the Syndicate, improving the Ad Hoc Bondholders' bargaining position.

104 While there is only hearsay opinion before me with respect to the advantages of a Chapter 11 filing, the Trustee suggests that under such a filing:

- (a) the Liberty and Step APAs would have been subject to market test and to higher and better offers;
- (b) Sanjel could confirm a plan without the consent of the Syndicate; and
- (c) parties in interest and estate fiduciaries could pursue claims and causes of action against Sanjel, the Syndicate, Sanjel's equity holders and MacBain.

105 Sanjel cites academic commentary that the cram-down provisions of Chapter 11 require strict compliance so as not to override the protections and elections available to secured creditors in opposition to a plan that they do not support. Specifically, if a class of creditors is impaired, the plan must be fair and equitable with respect to that class.

106 This is an issue for the US Courts. However, even if the Chapter 15 filing was replaced by a Chapter 11 filing, the current [CCAA](#) proceedings would not be terminated and any restructuring in the United States would necessarily have to be coordinated

with these CCAA proceedings. Accordingly, the voting requirements for any plan of arrangement or the requirements for approval of a sale under the CCAA could not be avoided.

D. The Ad Hoc Bondholders were prejudiced in that they were not provided with information regarding the process and the bids received.

107 The Ad Hoc Bondholders had access to the same information afforded to bidders under the SISP and more. They were able to make proposals both before and after that process. Their financial advisors were afforded an opportunity for due diligence, and exercised it.

108 What they did not receive was disclosure of the details of the bids. There was a dispute about whether or not the Ad Hoc Bondholders could be considered "bidders". While they were not part of the SISP, they certainly had interests in conflict with the SISP bidders. Had the bids been disclosed to them, there would indeed have been concern over the integrity of the process, as such disclosure would allow them to tailor their proposals in such a way as to undermine the bids.

109 The Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware that they would not be given copies of the bids by mid-February, 2016 when the Bondholders Forbearance Agreement was settled, as it included a provision clarifying that they were not entitled to any pricing or bidder information from the SISP.

110 The Bond Forbearance Agreement also recognized that, while Sanjel would negotiate in good faith with the Ad Hoc Bondholders, nothing restricted its ability to enter into or conduct negotiations with respect to potential sales or other transactions. It was only on March 14, 2016 that the Ad Hoc Bondholders requested third party bid information.

111 The Ad Hoc Bondholders were not improperly denied access to information, and would not have been entitled to know details of the third party bids.

## V. Conclusion

112 I am satisfied by the evidence before me that the factors set out in section 36(3) of the CCAA and Soundair favour the approval of the proposed sales. Specifically:

(a) the process, while not conducted under the CCAA, was nevertheless reasonable in the circumstances, as established by the evidence. It was brief, but not unreasonably brief, given the previous BAML process, current economic climate and the deteriorating financial position of the Sanjel Group;

(b) while the Monitor was not directly involved and did not actively participate in the SISP process prior to February 24, 2016, the Monitor has reviewed the process and is of the opinion that the SISP was a robust process run fairly and reasonably, and that sufficient efforts were made to obtain the best price possible for the Sanjel Group's assets in that process. I agree with the Monitor's assessment from my review of the evidence.

It is the Monitor's view, based on (i) the advice of CS and PJT, (ii) the nature of the Sanjel Group's operations and assets, (iii) the market conditions over the past year, (iv) the proposals received in the context of the SISP and from the Ad Hoc Bondholders, (v) the current ongoing depressed condition of the market and (vi) the underlying value of the Sanjel Group's assets, it is highly improbable that another post-filing sales process would yield offers for the Canadian and U.S. operations materially in excess of the values contained in the STEP and Liberty APAs.

I accept the Monitor's opinion in that regard, and nothing in my review of the evidence and the submissions of interested parties causes me to doubt that opinion.

(c) The Monitor has provided an opinion that the proposed sales are more beneficial to creditors than a sale or disposition under bankruptcy.

(d) Creditors, other than trade creditors, were consulted and involved in the process.

(e) While the sales provide no return to any creditor other than the Syndicate, I am satisfied that all other viable or reasonable options were considered. While there is no guarantee of further employment arising from the sale, there is the prospect that since the business will continue to operate until the sale, there will be an opportunity for employment for Sanjel employees with the new enterprises, and an opportunity for suppliers to continue to supply them.

(f) I am satisfied from the evidence that the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair.

I therefore approve the sale approval and vesting orders sought by the Sanjel Group.

## VI. Postscript

113 On May 9, 2016, before these reasons were released, I received a copy of a letter dated May 5, 2016 from Fried Frank on behalf of the Ad Hoc Bondholders addressed to Canadian and US counsel for the Sanjel Group, the Monitor, the Syndicate and the prospective purchasers. In extravagant language, the Ad Hoc Bondholders state that they have become aware of information that the addressees are "duty bound" to bring to the attention of the Courts as officers of the Courts. That information is that Shane Hooker has been designated to lead the Canadian cementing operations when the STEP sale closes, according to a STEP press release. Evidently, Mr. Hooker is married to the daughter of Dan MacDonald, the chairman of Sanjel's board, and is the sister of Darin MacDonald, who was Chief Executive Officer of Sanjel and head of the restructuring committee.

114 The letter asserts the following:

a) There are "substantial and material" connections between STEP and the MacDonald family. It appears that the basis for this statement is that Mr. Hooker is married to Mr. MacDonald's daughter and an employee and "executive in residence" of ARC Financial Corp., STEP's financial sponsor in the sale;

b) Mr. Hooker is "an intimate beneficiary of all that is and all that belongs to the MacDonald family." In subsequent correspondence with the Monitor, it appears that the Ad Hoc Bondholders have no evidence to support this allegation;

c) Mr. Hooker is "the loyal son-in-law and brother-in-law" of the MacDonald family. Again, the Ad Hoc Bondholders admit that they have no information to support this allegation;

d) By reason of Mr. Hooker's relationship with the "MacDonald family", the proposed STEP transaction and the entirety of the SISP process "is tainted and worse". "(O)ur clients have every reason to believe the substance, of self-dealing and deception of the highest order";

e) "Mr. Hooker's personal and professional ties to the MacDonald family raise the spectre that all at hand is and has been a thinly-veiled scheme between the Company and the Syndicate and their advisors to deliver, on the one hand, an adequate recovery to the Syndicate and, on the other hand, Sanjel's Canadian assets back into the hands of the MacDonald family thereby working a substantial forfeiture of value to the Bondholders and all other unsecured creditors of the Company".

115 The letter repeats previous allegations that the SISP was "driven by self-interest and self-dealing", "riddled with conflicts of interest", "inappropriate and flawed in every respect", "chilled, inadequate" and "not conducted in good faith and efforts were undertaken to mislead and misdirect the company's stakeholders". It alleges:

a) "That none of this has been brought to the attention of the Courts and all parties in interest is reprehensible at best and has all indicia of fraudulent intent and purpose."

b) "Be advised that with respect to each and all of you and each and all of your respective clients as well as with respect to STEP, Liberty and any and all funding sources and sponsors for each, our clients hereby reserve all of their rights and remedies with respect to any and all claims and causes of action of every kind and nature whatsoever whether such claims and causes of action are grounded in contract, tort, equity, statute and otherwise including, but not limited to, any and all breach of fiduciary duties, civil conspiracy, tortious interference and lender liability."

c) "... the efforts to continue with malfeasance wrapped in the cloak of SISP and CCAA by each and all of you and your clients must stop now. As above, the Courts and others should and must be informed, the failure to do so is and will be a misrepresentation and fraud on the Courts."

116 The letter comments that "(w)hen Justice Romaine is in receipt of the information, she will have reason and basis and we believe that Her Ladyship will be constrained, to vacate the order."

117 The Monitor took immediate action to investigate these serious allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, conspiracy and collusion, requesting urgent responses from counsel for Sanjel, the Syndicate, Mr. MacDonald, PJT and CS. Relevant witnesses were contacted and follow-up questions directed. The Monitor was also in contact with Fried Frank to determine the source of the allegations, and what investigation had been undertaken by Fried Frank or the Ad Hoc Bondholders to verify or support their allegations.

118 On Saturday, May 7, 2016, Fried Frank made the further allegation that potential bidders in the SISP were provided with forecasts that were far worse than actual results in order to facilitate the alleged fraud and conspiracy. The Monitor added this allegation to its investigation.

119 The Monitor was satisfied by its rapid but thorough investigations that:

a) Mr. Hooker and Mr. MacDonald have been estranged for the last two and a half-years, and have had no communication on any personal or business matters;

b) Mr. Hooker left Sanjel in March, 2014 and began working for ARC Financial in the fall of 2015 to assist ARC in an unrelated transaction. ARC is a large private investor focussed on energy, which provides financing through a number of funds financed by from third party investors. ARC is the primary financial stakeholder in the STEP acquisition. No one from the MacDonald family has an ownership position in ARC, nor are any of them investors in any ARC funds. Mr. Hooker has no involvement in ARC's fundraising efforts or fund deployment and he has no ownership interest in ARC;

c) Mr. MacDonald had no involvement in the negotiation of the STEP APA, other than attendance as a Sanjel representative at three meetings between November 2015 and January 2016, before the SISP was commenced;

d) Mr. Crilly as CFO of Sanjel (and later CRO) led the SISP process for Sanjel, while Mr. MacDonald concentrated on attempting to find a buyer for the whole company;

e) The senior Mr. MacDonald has not had an active role in Sanjel's management for years, was not involved in the SISP and does not own shares in STEP or ARC;

f) Mr. Hooker's involvement with the SISP and negotiations with STEP was limited to conducting on-site diligence on behalf of STEP;

g) Sanjel has no direct or indirect ownership interest or other financial interest in ARC, STEP, the newly formed company that will be purchasing the cementing assets or any other entity owned or controlled by ARC;

h) No consideration was provided to Mr. Hooker or either Mr. MacDonald in connection with the STEP APA;

i) In the opinion of many of those who provided responses, the relationship between Mr. Hooker and Mr. MacDonald had an adverse effect, if anything, on the merits of the STEP bid. The advisors and the Syndicate repeat their previous position that the STEP offer, in combination with the Liberty offer, was materially superior to any en bloc bid or combination of bids, and was supported on the basis of its economic merits.

120 This information was largely confirmed by a number of sources. The Monitor did not obtain sworn statements, nor conduct any kind of discovery process. It did not present the information in its Sixth Report to the Court as evidence, but as a report on its investigation to determine whether there was any probative value to the Ad Hoc Bondholders' allegations.

121 When the Monitor was unable to find any real evidence to support the allegations, other than the bare fact that Mr. Hooker is an employee of ARC and is married to Mr. MacDonald's sister, it asked the Ad Hoc Bondholders if they had any supporting evidence. The substance of counsel to the Ad Hoc Bondholders' response is that there is an appearance of inappropriate dealing (arising from the relationship), and that it was up to the Monitor to investigate this.

122 The Ad Hoc Bondholders instead provided the Monitor with a list of additional questions that they wish the Monitor to investigate through sworn statements subject to cross-examination. These questions appear designed to elicit some evidence that may support the Ad Hoc Bondholder's speculations.

123 The Monitor cannot be faulted for failing to obtain sworn evidence from relevant parties. The allegations were made after approval of the APAs in the context of tight timelines to the closing of the transactions and the risk of losing the recommended sales transactions. If the Monitor had discovered anything that would give any legitimacy to the allegations, or raise any doubt about the integrity of the SISP, it may have been appropriate to direct further investigation, including sworn evidence. However, mere speculation resting on a family relationship is insufficient to require the Monitor to undertake further expensive investigation or to conduct a fishing expedition. This is particularly the case as there is no real evidence that Mr. Hooker's prospective employment will benefit either Mr. MacDonald or Sanjel in any way, or Mr. Hooker himself, other than the offer of employment.

124 This is not a case where evidence that should be presented in affidavit form has been incorporated improperly into a Monitor's report. The Monitor decided, quite properly, that at this stage of the process, a quick investigation to determine whether there was any real basis for the Ad Hoc Bondholders complaint was warranted. This investigation has satisfied the Monitor that, other than the fact that Mr. Hooker is indeed Mr. MacDonald's brother-in-law, there is no evidence of collusion between them, Mr. MacDonald was not involved in the STEP APA, Mr. Hooker was in no position to influence that STEP APA and no evidence that Mr. Hooker or the "MacDonald family" will profit in any way from the STEP APA, other than Mr. Hooker's offer of employment.

125 Given the lack of any indicia that there is any basis for the Ad Hoc Bondholders' speculations of fraud or conspiracy, there is no reason for this Court to require the Monitor to take further steps to investigate the allegations, which appear to be thinly veiled and reckless attempts to delay and obfuscate the process.

126 With respect to the allegations that potential bidders were provided with forecasts far worse than actual results in order to facilitate the alleged fraud and conspiracy, the Monitor has reviewed the forecasts and the variances from the forecasts provided during the SISP to actuals. The Monitor reports that these relate to collection of accounts receivable and payment of accounts payable. The actual collection of receivables was better than forecasted for the months of March and April. However, the Monitor understands that is a temporary timing variance based on earlier collection of receivables and does not represent a permanent improvement in Sanjel's actual cash position.

127 Thus, the Monitor is of the view that the allegations by the Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to forecasts being far worse than actual results lack merit.

128 I accept the Monitor's advice on this issue.

129 With respect to disclosure, the Monitor was not aware of the connection between STEP and the company alleged in the Fried Frank letter. The Monitor has reported that it did not become aware of anything that would support or substantiate the allegations since its involvement in the SISP process after February 24, 2016.

130 The Ad Hoc Bondholders' allegations are in essence that the SISP was structured to achieve a preferential outcome for the MacDonald family through the familial connections between Mr. Hooker and the MacDonald family. If a sale of assets of a debtor company is to be made to a person related to the debtor, the Court may only approve the sale if it is satisfied that:

(a) good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose of the assets to persons who are not related to the debtor company; and

(b) the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be received under any other offer made in accordance with the process leading to the proposed sale: [CCAA section 36\(4\)](#).

131 A related party pursuant to [section 36\(5\)](#) is defined to include certain categories of persons, and neither Mr. Hooker, his wife or either Mr. MacDonald fall into these categories.

132 There is no evidence or indication that any member of the "MacDonald family" will benefit from the STEP APA, other than Mr. Hooker's offer of employment. I am therefore satisfied that [section 36\(3\)](#) is not applicable to the STEP or the Liberty transactions and that no disclosure of any relationship was necessary before the APAs were approved.

133 Even if disclosure had been made, given the evidence before me with respect to the SISP process and the offers received, I would have been satisfied the requirements of [section 36\(3\)](#) were met.

134 In conclusion, the allegations of the Ad Hoc Bondholders do not change my decision with respect to approval of the APAs. I see no reason why the Monitor should continue its investigation.

135 The issue of who should bear the cost of the investigation into these allegations is reserved.

*Debtors' application granted; trustee's application dismissed.*

# TAB 9

**Most Negative Treatment:** Recently added (treatment not yet designated)

**Most Recent Recently added (treatment not yet designated):** [CWB Maxium Financial Inc v. 2026998 Alberta Ltd](#) | 2021 ABQB 137, 2021 CarswellAlta 392, 88 C.B.R. (6th) 196, [2021] A.W.L.D. 2089, [2021] A.W.L.D. 2090, [2021] A.W.L.D. 2091, [2021] A.W.L.D. 2092, [2021] A.W.L.D. 2093, [2021] A.W.L.D. 2126, [2021] A.W.L.D. 2127, [2021] A.W.L.D. 2128, [2021] A.W.L.D. 2135, [2021] A.W.L.D. 2152, 331 A.C.W.S. (3d) 229, [2021] 7 W.W.R. 299, 25 Alta. L.R. (7th) 3 | (Alta. Q.B., Feb 23, 2021)

2000 ABQB 766

Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Cobrico Developments Inc. v. Tucker Industries Inc.

2000 CarswellAlta 1211, 2000 ABQB 766, [2000] A.J. No. 1295, [2001] A.W.L.D. 349, 273 A.R. 297

**Cobrico Developments Inc., Plaintiff and Tucker Industries Inc. and Tucker Enterprises Corp., Defendants**

Lee J.

Heard: October 25, 2000

Judgment: November 1, 2000

Docket: Edmonton 0003-17053

Proceedings: additional reasons at [2000 ABQB 817 \(Alta. Q.B.\)](#)

Counsel: *Richard N. Billington*, for Receiver/Manager.

*Barry M. King* and *Kevin Ozubko*, for Unnamed party, Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers (Canada) Ltd.

*Thomas R. Benson*, for Unnamed party, All Peace Auctions Ltd.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Civil practice and procedure

[XXIV](#) Costs

[XXIV.5](#) Persons entitled to or liable for costs

[XXIV.5.g](#) Intervenor

Debtors and creditors

[VII](#) Receivers

[VII.6](#) Conduct and liability of receiver

[VII.6.a](#) General conduct of receiver

Personal property security

[VI](#) Remedies

[VI.4](#) Sale or realization

[VI.4.d](#) Miscellaneous

Personal property security

[VII](#) Practice and procedure

[VII.6](#) Costs

**Headnote**

Personal property security --- Remedies — Sale or realization — Miscellaneous issues

Receiver was appointed with respect to property and assets of T Inc. and T Corp. — Receiver approached three auction houses to submit proposals for public sale of assets — R Ltd. was unsuccessful and A Ltd. was chosen — Receiver brought application for

order permitting disposition of T Inc. and T Corp.'s assets by way of public sale — R Ltd. objected to bid process and receiver's conclusions — Application granted — Receiver's discretion should not be lightly interfered with without strong evidence — R. Ltd. did not bring forward anything that would vitiate or interfere with wide powers granted to receiver — Receiver acted in good faith and in commercially reasonable manner — Creditor who held General Security Agreement and PMSI holders supported auction and receiver's recommendation of A Ltd. — A Ltd. guaranteed that it would recover amount at least sufficient to pay out PMSI indebtedness and R Ltd. did not — R Ltd. was not creditor of T Inc. or T Corp. and did not have standing to object to receiver's exercise of discretion.

Receivers --- Conduct and liability of receiver — General conduct of receiver

Receiver was appointed with respect to property and assets of T Inc. and T Corp. — Receiver approached three auction houses to submit proposals for public sale of assets — R Ltd. was unsuccessful and A Ltd. was chosen — Receiver brought application for order permitting disposition of T Inc. and T Corp.'s assets by way of public sale — R Ltd. objected to bid process and receiver's conclusions — Application granted — Receiver's discretion should not be lightly interfered with without strong evidence — R. Ltd. did not bring forward anything that would vitiate or interfere with wide powers granted to receiver — Receiver acted in good faith and in commercially reasonable manner — Creditor who held General Security Agreement and PMSI holders supported auction and receiver's recommendation of A Ltd. — A Ltd. guaranteed that it would recover amount at least sufficient to pay out PMSI indebtedness and R Ltd. did not — R Ltd. was not creditor of T Inc. or T Corp. and did not have standing to object to receiver's exercise of discretion.

#### Table of Authorities

##### Cases considered by *Lee J.*:

*Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (N.S. C.A.) — distinguished  
*Royal Bank v. Fracmaster Ltd.* (1999), 245 A.R. 138, 11 C.B.R. (4th) 217 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to  
*Royal Bank v. Fracmaster Ltd.* (1999), (sub nom. *UTI Energy Corp. v. Fracmaster Ltd.*) 244 A.R. 93, (sub nom. *UTI Energy Corp. v. Fracmaster Ltd.*) 209 W.A.C. 93, 11 C.B.R. (4th) 230 (Alta. C.A.) — applied  
*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to  
*Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473, 65 A.R. 372, 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242 (Alta. C.A.) — considered  
*Skyepharma PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.* (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — applied  
*Skyepharma PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.* (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 234, 130 O.A.C. 273, 15 C.B.R. (4th) 298 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

##### Statutes considered:

*Personal Property Security Act*, S.A. 1988, c. P-4.05

Generally — referred to

s. 60 — pursuant to

s. 60(15) — pursuant to

s. 66(1) — considered

APPLICATION by receiver for order permitting disposition of assets by public sale.

##### *Lee J.*:

1 On September 7, 2000, my colleague, Lefsrud, J., appointed Myers Norris & Penny Limited (hereinafter referred to as the "Receiver") to be the Receiver and Manager with respect to the property and assets of the Defendants Tucker Industries Inc. and Tucker Enterprises Corp. (hereinafter referred to as ("Tucker").

2 On Wednesday, October 25, 2000, the Receiver made an Application before me for an Order pursuant to s. 60 of the *Personal Property Security Act* (hereinafter referred to as the "PPSA") permitting the disposition by public sale of assets of the

Defendants, and for an Order pursuant to s. 60(15) of the *Act* permitting the disposition of collaterals secured by a charge under the *Act* without notice to the debtor, or to any person with an interest in the collateral.

3 Cobrico Developments Inc. ("Cobrico") was the petitioning creditor in this matter

4 Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers (Canada) Ltd. [hereinafter referred to as "Ritchie Bros."] was one of the three auction houses that had been approached by the Receiver/Manager to submit a proposal with respect to Tucker on approximately October 13, 2000. Their proposal with respect to Tucker, dated October 17, 2000, provides for a gross guarantee of two million dollars, a 12% commission of \$240,000.00, for a net of \$1.76 million dollars. With respect to proceeds over two million dollars, 88% would go to the debtor's estate, and 12% would be retained by Ritchie Bros.

5 Ritchie Bros. and Century Sales Inc. were the unsuccessful public auction houses not chosen to dispose of the debtor's estate. All Peace Auctions Ltd. [hereinafter referred to as "All Peace"] based in Grande Prairie was the successful auction house chosen by the Receiver/Manager.

6 Ritchie Bros. now comes before this Court and objects to both the bid process used by the Receiver/Manager and to the conclusions it reached, and wishes to submit a revised bid based on a fair process that it submits was not present in the first place.

7 Ritchie Bros. alleges that certain material information was not supplied to it (that was supplied to All Peace), and submits that as a result of this, the creditors of Tucker will not benefit as much as they could if the present proposed Order sought by the Receiver/Manager is granted. Ritchie Bros. also argues that the Receiver's Grande Prairie office provides accounting and audit services over many years to All Peace constituting a real or apparent conflict of interest on the part of the Receiver/Manager.

8 The Receiver/Manager strongly objects to Ritchie Bros.'s intervention, describing it as nothing more than "vexatious intermeddler", for the purposes which include determining essentially what the competing auction house bids were. The Receiver/Manager submits that Ritchie Bros. has absolutely no standing in this matter and should not be heard.

9 The General Manager of All Peace, Kevin Tink, disputed many of Ritchie Bros.'s claims with respect to the bidding process, and described their state of preparedness for the proposed mid-November, 2000 public auction in an Affidavit filed October 27, 2000. Further, Mr. Tink claimed that Ritchie Bros. was also involved in a similar last-minute intervention, or inter-meddling, with respect to a Calgary matter that was similar to the present Application before me, in the matter of Serval Corporation.

10 The Receiver/Manager argues that any delay in this matter would be very prejudicial to all parties involved (with the possible exception of Ritchie Bros.) because of the fact that the equipment of Tucker essentially is oil and gas drilling equipment for which there is primarily a market before drilling season commences. Therefore, the mid-November auction of this equipment is essential. It is estimated that approximately ten million dollars will be received from this auction.

### The Law

11 Ritchie Bros. submits *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1 (N.S. C.A.) to support its argument that it has standing before me. At paragraph 18, Hart JA indicates that there is no merit to the suggestion that the unsuccessful bidders have no standing:-

A preliminary question was raised as to whether Mr. Treby or Mr. Cameron had any right to appear at the original hearing before Burchell, J., or any status which would enable them to appeal from his decision, but, in my opinion, there is no merit in such a suggestion. Both parties were persons to be affected directly by the decision of the court and, in my opinion, were proper parties to the proceedings.

12 *Cameron*, supra, was followed by the Alberta Court of Appeal in *Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473 (Alta. C.A.). *Salima* involved an appeal of an Order approving the sale of property by a receiver. The appellant had submitted the highest tender and, subject to court approval, the receiver had agreed to convey the property to the appellant. A higher offer was submitted; by another party prior to the motion for approval. The motion was adjourned and

the appellant and two other parties submitted bids. The chambers judge directed the receiver to complete the sale to the party that submitted the highest offer.

13 Kerans, J.A. concluded that the Court had jurisdiction to consider other offers on the motion to approve the sale, and could conduct what was, in essence, a judicial auction. No issue was raised as to the standing of Salima Investments Ltd., as an unsuccessful bidder, to appeal.

14 Ritchie Bros. submits that the *Salima* case makes it clear that the Court has jurisdiction to exercise judicial discretion and consider other offers as well as to direct an alternative process. In *Salima*, Kerans J.A. states the following at pages 466-467:-

We think that the proper exercise of judicial discretion in these circumstances should be limited, in the first instance, to an inquiry whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and not acted improvidently. In examining that question, there are many factors which the court may consider. As Macdonald J.A. said in the *Cameron* case at pp. 11-2:

There are, of course, many reasons why a court might not approve an agreement of purchase and sale, viz., where the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; or, where the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids or that inadequate notice of sale by bid was given (where the receiver sells property by the bid method); or, where it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interest of either the creditors or the owner.

15 It is submitted that this is not a total catalogue of those factors which might lead a court to refuse to approve a sale. In *Salima*, supra, the Court concluded the following at page 477:-

We do not have the benefit of the recorded reasons by the learned chambers judge. We assume that he came to the conclusion that the efforts of the receiver - while always in good faith - had not been adequate. In our view, there was evidence before him to support that finding, and we cannot say that this conclusion is so unreasonable as to warrant interference. Nor can we criticize his decision to conduct a summary court-supervised sale in the urgent circumstances which then arose.

16 The factors in the case at bar that Ritchie Bros. object to as against the Receiver/Manager include:-

(a) The longstanding accountant/client relationship between the Receiver/Manager and All Peace raises an appearance or potential of conflict on the part of the Receiver;

(b) All Peace had an advantage in terms of access to information, the assets and to the Receiver/Manager;

(c) The Receiver/Manager may have made the decision to engage All Peace prior to receipt of the proposal of Ritchie Bros.;

(d) The asset and equipment list used by the Receiver/Manager to request proposals appears to have varied from case to case and has not yet been finalized; and

(e) The instructions by the Receiver/Manager to All Peace and Ritchie Bros. with respect to preparation of proposals appear to have been inconsistent and were capable of multiple interpretations which effected the integrity of the proposals and the process.

17 The Receiver/Manager rely on the case of *Skyepharmaceutical PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp. (1999)*, 12 C.B.R. (4th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), a decision of Farley, J. of the Commercial List of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice which deals with a fact situation that is somewhat similar to the case at bar.

18 In *Skyepharmaceutical*, supra PWC as Court appointed receiver of Hyal made a motion on October 15, 1999 for an Order approving and authorizing the Receiver's acceptance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale with Skye designated as Plan C. Ground, J. expressed some doubt in Oral Reasons as to the activity of the Receiver.

19 Certain confidential information was not available to Ground, J., as it is not available to me in the case at bar.

20 In *Skyepharma*, Farley, J. concluded that as a result of that confidential information and the complexity of what was available for sale by the receiver, there were various other potentially important considerations surrounding the asset sale and/or sale of shares.

21 Eventually the confidential lists were distributed, and one of the arguments for re-opening the bid auction process would be to put all potential bidders on an equal footing, knowing what everyone else's present position was. It was argued in *Skyepharma* that the best offer would, therefore, be improved, and whatever procedural defects existed would be remedied.

22 Farley, J. concluded as follows:-

3 Through its activities as authorized by the court, the Receiver has significantly increased the initial indications from the various interested persons. **In a motion to approve a sale by a receiver, the court should place a great deal of confidence in the receiver's expert business judgement particularly where the assets (as here) are "unusual" and the process used to sell these is complex. In order to support the role of any receiver and to avoid commercial chaos in receivership sales, it is extremely desirable that perspective participants in the sale process know that a court will not likely interfere with a receiver's dealings to sell to the selected participant and that the selected participant have the confidence that it will not be back doored in some way. See *Soundair* at pp. 5, 9-10, 12 and *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg et al.* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87 (H.C.J.). The court should assume that the receiver has acted properly unless the contrary is clearly demonstrated:** see *Soundair* of pp. 5 and 11. Specifically the court's duty is to consider as per *Soundair* at p. 6:

(a) whether the receiver made a sufficient effort to obtain the best price and did not act improvidently;

(b) the interests of all parties;

(c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which the receiver obtained offers; and

(d) whether the working out of the process was unfair.

4 As to the providence of the sale, a receiver's conduct is to be reviewed in light of the (objective) information a receiver had and not with the benefit of hindsight: *Soundair* at p. 7. A receiver's duty is not to obtain the best possible price but to do everything reasonable possible in the circumstances with a view to obtaining the best price: see *Greyvest Leasing Inc. v. Merkur*, [1994] O.J. No. 2465 (Gen. Div.) at para. 45. Other offers are irrelevant unless they demonstrate that the price in the proposed sale was so unreasonable low that it shows the receiver as acting improvidently in accepting it. It is the receiver's sale not the sale by the court: *Soundair* at pp. 9-10.

5 In deciding to accept an offer, a receiver is entitled to prefer a bird in the hand to two in the bush. The receiver, after a reasonable analysis of the risks, advantages and disadvantages of each offer (or indication of interest if only advanced that far) may accept an unconditional offer rather than risk delay or jeopardize closing due to conditions which are beyond the receiver's control. Furthermore, the receiver is obviously reasonable in preferring any unconditional offer to a conditional offer: See *Crown Trust* at p. 107 where Anderson, J. stated:

The proposition that conditional offers would be considered equally with unconditional offers is so palpably ridiculous commercially that it is difficult to credit that any sensible businessman would say it, or if said, that any sensible businessman would accept it.

See also *Soundair* at p. 8. Obviously if there are conditions in offers, they must be analysed by the receiver to determine whether they are within the receiver's control or if they appear to be in the circumstances as minor or very likely to be fulfilled. This involves the game theory known as mini-max where the alternatives are gridded with a view to maximizing the reward at the same time as minimizing the risk. Size and certainty does matter.

**6 Although the interests of the debtor and purchaser are also relevant, on a sale of assets, the receiver's primary concern is to protect the interests of the debtor's creditors. Where the debtor cannot meet statutory solvency requirements, then in accord with the Plimsoll line philosophy, the shareholders are not entitled to receive payments in priority or partial priority to the creditors. Shareholders are not creditors and in a liquidation, shareholders rank below the creditors. See *Soundair* at p. 12 and *Re Central Capital Corporation* (1996), 38 C.B.R. (3d) 1 at pp. 31-41 (per Weiler, JA) and pp. 50-53 (Laskin, JA).**

**7 Provided a receiver has acted reasonably, prudently and not arbitrarily, a court should not sit as in an appeal from a receiver's decision, reviewed in detail every element of the procedure by which the receiver made the decision (so long as that procedure fits with the authorized process specified by the court if a specific order to that effect has been issued). To do so would be futile and duplicative. It would emasculate the role of the receiver and make it almost inevitable that the final negotiation of every sale would take place on the motion for approval. See *Soundair* at p. 14 and *Crown Trust* at p. 109.**

**8 Unsuccessful bidders have no standing to challenge a receiver's motion to approve the sale to another candidate. They have no legal or proprietary right as technically they are not affected by the order. They have no interest in the fundamental question of whether the court's approval is in the best interest of the parties directly involved. See *Crown Trust* at pp. 114-119 and *British Columbia Development Corporation v. Spun Cast Industries Ltd.* (1977), 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28 (B.C.S.C.) at p. 30-31. The corollary of this is that no weight should be given to the support offered by a creditor qua creditor as to its offer to purchase the assets. [Emphasis Added]**

23 *Skyepharma* was taken to the Ontario Court of Appeal and their Reasons are reported at (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 234 (Ont. C.A.). The Ontario Court of Appeal's Reasons, issued on February 18, 2000, dealt with the appeal by BP plc with respect to the Approved Sale Order made by Farley, J., which appeal the Receiver moved to have quashed on the ground that the Court did not have jurisdiction. The Receiver submitted that a potential purchaser does not have any legal or any proprietary right that is affected by the Court's approval of a sale and accordingly the potential purchaser does not have standing to challenge the Order approving the sale.

24 The Ontario Court of Appeal held:-

...the question raised by the receiver's motion to quash was whether BP plc had a right that was finally disposed of by the sale approval order.

25 The Ontario Court of Appeal held that there was no such right for two reasons:-

First, a prospective purchaser has no legal or proprietary right in the property being sold. There is no right in a party who submits an offer to have the offer, even if the highest, accepted by either the receiver or the court. Second, the fundamental purpose of the sale approval motion is to consider the best interests of the parties with a direct interest in the proceeds of the sale, primarily the creditors, and an unsuccessful purchaser has no interest in that issue.

26 Continuing on, the Ontario Court of Appeal then stated as follows:

[8] On October 13, the receiver reported to the court on the results of the negotiations with Skyepharma and Cangene. The parties had been unable to structure the transaction to take advantage of Hal's tax loss positions. Nevertheless, the receiver recommended approval for an agreement to sell the assets of Hal to Skyepharma. In its report, the receiver pointed out that the agreement it was recommending did not necessarily maximize the realization for the assets but that it did minimize the risk of not closing and also the risk of liabilities increasing in the interim period up to closing, which risks arose from the provisions and time-frames contained in other offers. The receiver said that these risks were not immaterial.

[9] At the same time that the receiver filed its report it brought a motion for approval of the agreement with Skyepharma. The motion was heard by Farley J. on October 20, 1999. Counsel for Skyepharma, Cangene and Bioglan appeared and

were permitted to make submissions. Skyepharma, which was both a creditor of Hal and the purchaser under the agreement for which approval was being sought, supported the motion. Cangene and Bioglan, which in addition to being unsuccessful prospective purchasers, were also creditors of the company, opposed the motion.

[10] It is apparent that the motions judge heard the submissions of Cangene and Bioglan in their capacities as creditors of Hal and not in their role as unsuccessful bidders for the assets being sold. In his endorsement made on October 24 he said:

Unsuccessful bidders have no standing to challenge a receiver's motion to approve the sale to another candidate. They have no legal or proprietary right as technically they are not affected by the order. They have no interest in the fundamental question of whether the court's approval is in the best interests of the parties directly involved.

The motions judge continued by saying that he would "take into account the objections of Bioglan and Cangene as they have shoehorned into the approval motion". This latter comment, as it applied to Bioglan, appears to refer to the fact that Bioglan only became a creditor after the receiver was appointed and then only by acquiring a small debt of Hal in the amount of \$40,000.

[11] The motions judge approved the agreement for the sale of the assets to Skyepharma. In his endorsement, he noted that the assets involved were "unusual" and that the process to sell these assets was complex. He attached significant weight to the recommendation of the receiver who, he pointed out, had the expertise to deal with matters of this nature. The motions judge noted that the receiver's primary concern was to protect the interests of the creditors of Hal. He recognized the advantages of avoiding risks that may result from the delay or uncertainty inherent in offers containing conditional provisions. The certainty and timeliness of the Skyepharma agreement were important factors in both the recommendation of the receiver and in the reasons of the court for approving the sale.

.....

[22]I adopt both his reasoning and his conclusion. At p. 118, he said:

**The motion brought by Clarkson to approve the sales is one upon which the fundamental question for consideration is whether that approval is in the best interests of the parties to the action as being the approval of sales which will be most beneficial to them. In that fundamental question Larco has no interest at all. Its' only interest is in seeking to have its offer accepted with whatever advantages will accrue to it as a result. That interest is purely incidental and collateral to the central issue in the substantive motion and, in my view, would not justify an exercise of the discretion given by the rule.**

**Nor, in my view, can Larco resort successfully to cl. (b) of rule 13.01(1)-which raises the question whether it may be adversely affected by a judgment in the proceeding. For these purposes I leave aside the technical difficulties with respect to the word "judgment". In my view, Larco will not be adversely affected in respect of any legal or proprietary right. It has no such right to be adversely affected. The most it will lose as a result of an order approving the sales as recommended, thereby excluding it, is a potential economic advantage only.**

## Conclusion

27 The *Skyepharma* case was cited with approval in *Sonoma, Re*, decided by Lovecchio, J. on October 6, 2000 in Calgary (Action No. 0001-06953).

28 Further, the Alberta Court of Appeal has favoured preserving the integrity of the process and allowing the Receiver to exercise its discretion without fetter from the Court in the case of *Royal Bank v. Fracmaster Ltd.* (1999), 209 W.A.C. 93 (Alta. C.A.) approving (1999), 245 A.R. 138 (Alta. Q.B.). Paperny J. wrote at paragraph 58:-

This court appointed the Receiver based on its experience and expertise. It is the Receiver's function to do the business analysis necessary to develop a disposition strategy, to analyse the proposed offers and to make a recommendation to the Court. As Anderson, J. stated in *Crown Trustco v. Rosenberg* (Supra) the Court ought not: "enter into the marketplace" ... the Court out not to sit as on appeal from the decision of the Receiver, reviewing in minute detail every element of the

process by which the decision is reached. To do so would be a futile and duplicitous exercise... The Court should not proceed against the recommendations of its Receiver except in special circumstances and where the necessity and propriety of doing so are plain. Any other rule or approach would emasculate the role of the Receiver and make it almost inevitable that the final negotiation of every sale would take place on the motion for approval.

29 Paperny J.'s decision was expressly upheld by the Court of Appeal. At paragraph 32 the Alberta Court of Appeal considered the *Salima* decision, but reiterated the provisions of the *Soundair* [*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.)] decision which were quoted by Farley, J., in the *Skyepharma* case, supra at page 4. At paragraph 33 they deferred to the recommendation of the Receiver/Manager.

30 The *Salima* case specifically did not deal with the standing issue of Salima Investments, as an unsuccessful bidder, to appeal.

31 The *Cameron* decision referred to in *Salima* dealt with a Nova Scotia rule which permits intervenor status [paragraph 12 of *Cameron*] which does not exist here.

32 Based on the Reasons as discussed in the two *Skyepharma* [*Skyepharma*, *Skyepharma*] decisions and *Royal Bank v. Fracmaster Ltd.*, I conclude that:-

(a) wide latitude is afforded to the Receiver;

(b) disappointed bidders generally have no standing; and

(c) the Court does not wish to sanction a process that will result in chaos and confusion at the approval motion.

33 The Receiver/Manager set out a bid process in this matter, and its discretion should not be lightly interfered with without strong evidence. Here the allegations by Ritchie Bros. are disputed, and some of the allegations do not appear to be that serious in any event.

34 If there was strong evidence of serious problems in the bid process the Court would exercise its inherent jurisdiction and discretion. I would be prepared to allow Ritchie Bros. to put forward another proposal for the potential benefit of the creditors. The Court's supervisory jurisdiction requires this in the appropriate clear-cut case otherwise it would just be a rubber stamp for the Receiver/Manager.

35 The Court also must ensure generally that the Receiver/Manager acts in accordance with its enabling Order, and carries out these functions properly under the provision of S. 66(1) of the *PPSA* which reads:-

66(1) All rights, duties or obligations arising under a security agreement, under this Act or under any other applicable law shall be exercised or discharged **in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner.**

[Emphasis added]

36 In the result however, I conclude that Ritchie Bros. has not brought forward anything that would vitiate or interfere with the wide powers that were granted by this Court to the Receiver/Manager on September 7, 2000 which include:-

**At paragraph 1**

The Receiver is given authority to "manage and operate the businesses and undertakings";

**At paragraph 2**

It is hereby acknowledged and declared that the Receiver is an officer of this Honourable Court and is assisting in the preservation and, as appropriate, the orderly sale and realization of the property, undertaking and assets of the Defendant for the benefit of all creditors and claimants, including the Plaintiff, as a secured creditor.

**At paragraph 7**

The Receiver shall be at liberty to employ such assistants, agents, employees, auditors, advisers and counsel, including legal counsel as it may consider necessary for the purpose ... of realizing the undertaking, property and assets of the Defendants...

**At paragraph 8**

The Receiver be and is hereby granted leave to take such steps as in its judgement are necessary or desirable for the preservation, protection and realization of the business...

**At paragraph 9**

The Receiver is authorized to sell, on credit or otherwise, the undertaking, assets and property of each of the Defendants ... or any part or parts thereof out of the ordinary course of business, at public auction, by public tender or by private sale on such terms and conditions as it deems appropriate, provided any such sales over \$100,000.00 shall be subject to approval of this Court.

37 While Ritchie Bros. submits that the Receiver/Manager made some errors in its process and procedures, I conclude that it has acted "in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner."

38 In the initial Order appointing the Receiver/Manager, Lefsrud J. gave Meyers Norris & Penny Limited wide latitude to dispose of the assets of the Defendants, on behalf of the creditors of the Defendants. That latitude provides the Receiver/Manager with a variety of options, including that the Receiver/Manager may choose to sell some or all of the assets by public auction. The Receiver/Manager may choose to sell none by auction, and proceed with other methods of realization.

39 In this case, Cobrico holds General Security Agreements over the Defendants, who are both insolvent. The Defendants will be unable to fully pay the indebtedness owed to the Plaintiff. It is therefore clear that there will be no recovery for unsecured creditors.

40 Certain secured parties hold purchase money security interests ("PMSI") which afford them with priority security over certain of the chattels of the Defendants. Of those chattels, some have an equity sufficient to fully redeem the PMSI secured indebtedness, while other chattels will have insufficient value to fully repay the indebtedness owed to the PMSI holder. In the latter case, it is the desire of the Receiver/Manager to recognize that the decision to be made as to how best to realize on that particular chattel should be left to the PMSI holder, and the Receiver/Manager has no-wish to engage in the sale of that chattel, unless specifically instructed to do so by the holder of the PMSI.

41 The Receiver/Manager knows that certain of the chattels have sufficient equity to fully pay out the secured party who holds a PMSI with respect to each such chattel. The Receiver/Manager, however, is not qualified to assess the value of the chattels, or to determine if they have such equity. For that reason the Receiver/Manager submitted the same list of equipment to three auction houses and asked them to appraise each item so that a determination could then be made of the value of that equipment, and if that value exceeded the indebtedness owed to the respective PMSI holder for each such chattel.

42 Three auction houses were requested to submit proposals and valuations. All Peace Auctions and Century Sales Inc. did so. Ritchie Bros. did not submit valuations on each individual piece.

43 With respect to the alleged conflict of interest, the commercial reality of receiverships is that trustees in bankruptcy, who will act as receivers, receiver/managers, monitors, trustees or as privately appointed receivers, are often affiliated with chartered accountancy practices which engage in accounting, audit, consulting, tax planning and a variety of other functions. Trustees in bankruptcy are regulated professionals who in the course of the realization on assets may be employing the services of experts, or who may be selling assets to persons, any of whom may have affiliation with the receiver.

44 However, generally that does not constitute a conflict of interest, nor generally does the marketplace of potential advisers or of potential purchasers have any legal standing to interfere with the performance of the receiver. That standing is generally reserved by law to those persons whose indebtedness is being protected by the receivership.

45 In the case at bar, those persons are the secured parties, being the PMSI holders and the Plaintiff. Indeed it is the Plaintiff whose interest is most immediately affected by the realization process. Any act which increases the value of the assets (at least those assets whose value is sufficient to satisfy the PMSI indebtedness) will be to the benefit of the Plaintiff. Any act which decreases the value of the assets will be at the Plaintiff's cost.

46 In this case the Plaintiff and the PMSI holders have been given notice of the list of assets which the Receiver/Manager proposes to sell by public auction. They support that auction and the recommendation of the Receiver/Manager to sell the chattels at the November 15, 2000 All Peace auction because of its strategic advantages of size and timing. They support it because All Peace complied with the request to provide an appraisal of each asset, and has guaranteed that it will pay to the Receiver/Manager an amount sufficient to pay off the PMSI indebtedness on each asset which eliminates risk and uncertainty. They support the decision to not select Century Sales Inc. which complied with the Receiver/Manager's stated requirements, and they support the decision to not select Ritchie Bros. which did not comply with the Receiver/Manager's stated requirements.

47 Ritchie Bros. now complains that it has not received the same "Final List" of assets from the Receiver/Manager as did the other auction houses. The "Final List" of assets never existed in the form contemplated by Ritchie Bros.. The Receiver/Manager gave the three auction houses the same inventory list of assets which was compiled by the Receiver/Manager, which exceeds 100 pages, and asked them to provide an appraisal for each of the assets, and a bid amount for the assets which each auction house *in their own discretion and judgement* considered to have an equity sufficient to pay off the PMSI indebtedness. The same statement of pay out amounts (the "Master List") was given to each auction house, and that has not changed. It listed the items secured by PMSI. It was up to the auction houses to each assess how successful they could be at recovering equity on each item. Any items which increase the total bid submitted by All Peace over the total bid submitted by Ritchie Bros. are not significant because they increase the total bid. Rather, they are significant because All Peace has guaranteed the Receiver that it will recover at least an amount sufficient to pay out the PMSI indebtedness secured by that chattel, whereas Ritchie Bros. have been unable or unwilling to do so.

48 The auction houses were each given access to the equipment to inspect the same. The Receiver/Manager's decision to proceed in this fashion is commercially reasonable and prudent (unlike the sale in *Salima*) and is supported by the creditors.

49 Further Ritchie Bros. have given no notice to the secured creditors, most particularly the Plaintiff, and are not supported by any of the secured creditors. They engage in a move to effectively enjoin the sale at the APA auction by the Receiver/Manager, but have not complied with any of the tripartite test for an injunction, nor have they posted an undertaking in damages.

50 The motion by the Receiver/Manager is to permit it to dispose of the assets listed in the proposed Order by public auction. Even by granting Ritchie Bros. status and standing, there is no serious reason to upset the Receiver/Manager's discretion, which is supported by the various secured creditors whose interests are of greater importance.

51 Further, there are certain procedural requirements imposed upon a person wishing to take action against the companies or by extension, the Receiver/Manager which Ritchie Bros. has not complied with Paragraph 6 of the initial Order states:-

That no legal actions, administrative proceedings, self-help remedies or other acts or proceedings shall be taken or continued against the Receiver of either of the Defendants' assets without leave of this Court first had and obtained upon 2 days prior notice to the Receiver....

52 The Receiver/Manager may therefore exercise its authority in any way it considers to be commercially reasonable, subject only to the requirement imposed by paragraph 9 to obtain Court approval for sales over \$100,000.00.

53 Ritchie Brothers are not creditors of either Tucker Industries Inc. or Tucker Enterprises Corp.. While the Receiver/Manager has extended contractually the time in which Ritchie Brothers was entitled to make its bid for auction rights, Ritchie Brothers has no standing to object to the exercise of discretion by the Receiver/Manager. Ritchie Bros. has also not established conclusively that anyone, other than themselves would benefit from the Court's intervention in this case.

54 The Receiver/Manager is authorized to dispose of the assets by public auction conducted by All Peace. Notice of Intention to dispose of the assets as required by the *PPSA* is dispensed with upon the debtor since there will be no remaining assets left for its benefit in any event.

*Application granted.*

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# **TAB 10**

2014 ABQB 350

Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Alberta Treasury Branches v. Elaborate Homes Ltd.

2014 CarswellAlta 921, 2014 ABQB 350, [2014] A.W.L.D. 3322, [2014] A.W.L.D. 3353, 14 C.B.R. (6th) 199, 243 A.C.W.S. (3d) 80, 590 A.R. 156

## **In the Matter of the Insolvency of Elaborate Homes Ltd. and Elaborate Developments Inc.**

Alberta Treasury Branches, Plaintiff and Elaborate Homes Ltd., Elaborate Developments Inc., Manjit (John) Nagra, Jaswinder Nagra, Defendants

K.G. Nielsen J.

Heard: May 14, 2014

Judgment: June 11, 2014 \*

Docket: Edmonton 1103-02937

Counsel: Robert M. Curtis, Q.C. for Alco Industrial Inc.  
Michael J. McCabe, Q.C. for PriceWaterhouseCoopers Inc.

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XVI Effect of bankruptcy on other proceedings

XVI.1 Proceedings against bankrupt

XVI.1.a Before discharge of trustee

Debtors and creditors

VII Receivers

VII.6 Conduct and liability of receiver

VII.6.c Duties

VII.6.c.i General principles

### **Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Effect of bankruptcy on other proceedings — Proceedings against bankrupt — Before discharge of trustee — Granting of leave

Company E went into receivership, with P being appointed as receiver — Corporation A held second mortgage on condominium property owned by E, before bankruptcy — Secured creditor held first mortgage on this property — P accepted bid from numbered company, to purchase assets of E — P submitted this bid for court approval, as they were required to do — Approval was given by court — However, A claimed they were not properly notified of this proceeding — A claimed that had they known, they would have raised issue that property was being sold for less than market value, against their interests — A brought motion for leave to file action against P — Motion dismissed — Threshold was low to allow for leave — However, A did not demonstrate that service was improper — Service by e-mail was proper and should have come to attention of A and its principal — It was principal's actions that caused A to be unaware of proceeding, not any misconduct on part of P — P followed necessary steps in sale of assets — P made best efforts to obtain best price, and did not act improvidently — A did not have evidence to show that P acted against its interests in sale of assets — Action would not have sufficient merit to proceed, so not granting leave was appropriate remedy.

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Conduct and liability of receiver — Duties — General principles

Company E went into receivership, with P being appointed as receiver — Corporation A held second mortgage on condominium property owned by E, before bankruptcy — Secured creditor held first mortgage on this property — P accepted bid from

numbered company, to purchase assets of E — P submitted this bid for court approval, as they were required to do — Approval was given by court — However, A claimed they were not properly notified of this proceeding — A claimed that had they known, they would have raised issue that property was being sold for less than market value, against their interests — A brought motion for leave to file action against P — Motion dismissed — Threshold was low to allow for leave — However, A did not demonstrate that service was improper — Service by e-mail was proper and should have come to attention of A and its principal — It was principal's actions that caused A to be unaware of proceeding, not any misconduct on part of P — P followed necessary steps in sale of assets — P made best efforts to obtain best price, and did not act improvidently — A did not have evidence to show that P acted against its interests in sale of assets — Action would not have sufficient merit to proceed, so not granting leave was appropriate remedy.

#### Table of Authorities

##### Cases considered by *K.G. Nielsen J.*:

*GMAC Commercial Credit Corp. - Canada v. TCT Logistics Inc.* (2006), 51 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 22 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 53 C.C.P.B. 167, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 123, 215 O.A.C. 313, 2006 CarswellOnt 4621, 2006 CarswellOnt 4622, 2006 SCC 35, 351 N.R. 326, (sub nom. *Industrial Wood & Allied Workers of Canada, Local 700 v. GMAC Commercial Credit Corporation*) 2006 C.L.L.C. 220-045, (sub nom. *GMAC Commercial Credit Corp. v. TCT Logistics Inc.*) 271 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.) — followed

*Look Communications Inc. v. Look Mobile Corp.* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 7952 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

*McCulloch v. Murray* (1942), [1942] S.C.R. 141, 1942 CarswellNS 15, [1942] 2 D.L.R. 179 (S.C.C.) — considered

*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

*RoyNat Inc. v. Omni Drilling Rig Partnership No. 1 (Receiver of)* (1988), (sub nom. *Roynat Inc. v. Allan*) 61 Alta. L.R. (2d) 165, (sub nom. *Roynat Inc. v. Allan*) [1988] 6 W.W.R. 156, (sub nom. *RoyNat Inc. v. Omni Drilling Rig Partnership No. 1 (Receivership)*) 90 A.R. 173, 1988 CarswellAlta 299, (sub nom. *Roynat Inc. v. Allan*) 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

*Scanwood Canada Ltd., Re* (2011), 2011 NSSC 189, 2011 CarswellNS 564, 966 A.P.R. 34, 305 N.S.R. (2d) 34, 84 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (N.S. S.C.) — considered

*Skyepharma PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.* (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 3641, 12 C.B.R. (4th) 87, [2000] B.P.I.R. 531 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

*Société Telus Communications v. Peracom Inc.* (2014), 369 D.L.R. (4th) 622, 2014 CarswellNat 1118, 2014 CarswellNat 1119, 2014 SCC 29, 2014 CSC 29 (S.C.C.) — considered

##### Statutes considered:

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 14.06 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 9(1)] — considered

s. 81.4(5) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 67] — considered

s. 81.6(3) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 67] — considered

s. 243(1) — referred to

s. 244(1) — considered

s. 245 — considered

s. 246 — referred to

*Business Corporations Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. B-9

s. 99(a) — referred to

*Judicature Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2

s. 13(2) — referred to

*Personal Property Security Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-7

s. 65(7) — referred to

*Wage Earner Protection Program Act*, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 1

Generally — referred to

**Rules considered:**

*Alberta Rules of Court*, Alta. Reg. 124/2010

Generally — referred to

R. 9.15 — considered

R. 9.15(1) — considered

R. 9.15(2) — considered

R. 11.21 — considered

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency General Rules*, C.R.C. 1978, c. 368

Generally — referred to

R. 3 — considered

R. 6(1) — considered

R. 124 — considered

MOTION by corporation for leave to file action against receiver, in bankruptcy matter.

**K.G. Nielsen J.:**

**I. Introduction**

1 PriceWaterhouseCoopers Inc. (PWC) was appointed as receiver of all current and future assets and property of Elaborate Homes Ltd. and Elaborate Developments Inc. (collectively referred to as Elaborate).

2 Alco Industrial Inc. (Alco) seeks leave to commence proceedings against PWC in relation to matters arising in the receivership.

**II. Background**

3 Alco held a second mortgage (the Mortgage) in the amount of \$1,075,000 on, *inter alia*, property (the Condo) owned by Elaborate Homes Ltd., legally described as:

Condominium Plan 0520263 Unit 4 and 905 undivided 1/10,000 shares in the common property Excepting thereout all mines and minerals.

4 Alberta Treasury Branches was a secured creditor of Elaborate. It held, *inter alia*, a first mortgage on the Condo.

5 PWC was appointed as the receiver of Elaborate Homes Ltd. pursuant to a Consent Receivership Order dated February 22, 2011 (the Receivership Order). Pursuant to a separate Receivership Order, also dated February 22, 2011, PWC was named as receiver of Elaborate Developments Inc., a company related to Elaborate Homes Ltd.

6 On March 3, 2011, PWC sent notice to Alco, pursuant to *ss. 245 and 246 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC, 1985, c B-3 (BIA)* of the receivership of Elaborate. This was sent by regular mail to the address indicated on the registration of

the Mortgage on the Certificate of Title to the Condo. In the Brief filed in this application on behalf of Alco, it is acknowledged that Alco was served with a copy of the Receivership Order.

7 On or about April 5, 2011, an assistant with legal counsel for PWC (not the counsel for PWC on this application) obtained certain contact information with respect to Alco. While the assistant could not recall with whom she spoke at Alco or the exact conversation, she deposed that she believed she followed her typical practice when speaking to creditors which was as follows:

- (a) she identified herself to the creditor and advised that she was calling from counsel for the receiver with respect to the receivership of the debtor company;
- (b) she advised the creditor that the receiver required certain information from the creditor with respect to the receivership; and
- (c) she requested contact information for the individual within the creditor's organization who would be best suited to receive correspondence with respect to the receivership.

8 In the discussions that ensued with the individual at Alco following this typical practice, she was advised that the owner of Alco was Bob Taubner and she was given his email address. This information is confirmed in a handwritten note made by the assistant. At all material times, Mr. Taubner was the President of Alco.

9 PWC took steps to market Elaborate's assets and property pursuant to the provisions of the Receivership Order. As a result of the marketing efforts, a number of offers were received for individual assets of Elaborate. PWC also received a number of "*en bloc* offers" to purchase all of Elaborate's assets. One of those *en bloc* offers was received from 1601812 Alberta Ltd. (the 160 Offer).

10 In accordance with its obligations, PWC reported to the Court with respect to the offers received in its Second Report, filed May 26, 2011. The Second Report contained a Bid Summary of all of the offers. PWC wished to keep the information in the Bid Summary confidential, and to release it to the public only after the Court had approved a sale. However, parties could obtain a copy of the Bid Summary on signing and sending to PWC a Confidentiality Letter, which provided that anyone signing it would be provided with the Bid Summary, but would be barred from acting as a purchaser in any way in respect of Elaborate's assets.

11 As outlined in the Second Report, PWC was of the opinion that the 160 Offer would lead to the highest net recovery for the creditors of Elaborate, as opposed to accepting other offers for specified or individual assets. PWC formed this view based on the combined value of the cash and assumption of liabilities components of the 160 Offer.

12 PWC accepted the 160 Offer subject to Court approval. PWC recommended to the Court that the 160 Offer be approved on the basis that it was higher than other offers and was preferable from the perspective of all of the creditors of Elaborate as a whole. Compared to all of the other *en bloc* offers, the 160 Offer would produce the highest net recovery on the Condo. Based on its analysis of the 160 Offer, PWC concluded that accepting the 160 Offer would allow for recovery of all of the indebtedness of Elaborate to Alberta Treasury Branches, but would not allow for the full recovery of the indebtedness of Elaborate to another secured creditor, Servus Credit Union. Following discussions with PWC, Servus Credit Union agreed with PWC's recommendation to accept the 160 Offer. PWC had no discussions with Alco with respect to the offers received.

13 The 160 Offer required Court approval by June 3, 2011. By an email dated May 26, 2011, counsel for PWC forwarded to Elaborate's creditors, including Alco, copies of the following:

- (a) the Application for an Order Approving Sale and Vesting Order returnable June 3, 2011 (the Application);
- (b) the Second Report;
- (c) a copy of a letter directed to the Court; and
- (d) a copy of the Confidentiality Letter.

14 On June 3, 2011, Belzil J. heard the application for approval of the sale of Elaborate's assets and property pursuant to the 160 Offer. Belzil J. granted a Sale Approval and Vesting Order approving the acceptance of the 160 Offer by PWC (the Sale Order). Belzil J. also granted a Sealing Order which sealed the Bid Summary until such time as the sale transaction had closed and a letter had been filed with the Clerk of the Court confirming that fact (the Sealing Order).

15 On June 3, 2011, counsel for PWC served the Sale Order and the Sealing Order by email on the listed creditors, including Alco.

16 Mr. Taubner, the President of Alco, has deposed that while he received the email of May 26, 2011 enclosing the Application, and 19 other emails with respect to this receivership, he did not use the email address which had been given to counsel for PWC or any other email address at the material time. He deposed that he was unfamiliar with computers and he did not anticipate that he might receive communications from PWC in such a fashion.

17 On cross-examination on his Affidavit, Mr. Taubner testified that he would occasionally request email communications, some of his employees would communicate with him by email, he would read such emails, and the group accountant for Alco had access to his emails. There is no evidence that any of the emails forwarded to Alco with respect to the Elaborate receivership at the address given, were rejected or returned as undeliverable.

18 The sale of Elaborate's assets and property proceeded pursuant to the 160 Offer, and Alco ultimately received the sum of \$90,553.09 net of costs in relation to the security which it held on the Condo. This recovery was insufficient to pay out the Mortgage.

19 PWC reported in its First Report, filed April 20, 2011, that an appraisal of the Condo had been conducted in August 2010, reflecting a market value of \$785,000. The Bid Summary indicated that the appraised value of the Condo on a forced liquidation was \$505,750. The value assigned to the Condo pursuant to the 160 Offer was \$432,000. This was the highest value assigned to the Condo in any of the *en bloc* offers. An offer had been received on the Condo only. This offer was in the amount of \$529,444.

20 The value assigned to the Condo in the 160 Offer represented 85% of the forced liquidation valuation. Only two other assets had higher returns compared to their valuations. The lowest allocation to an asset in the offers received was 24% of that asset's valuation.

21 Andrew Burnett, Vice President of PWC, was involved in this receivership. He filed an Affidavit in response to Alco's Application and was examined on it. With respect to the 160 Offer, Mr. Burnett deposed as follows:

Page 30, lines 17 to 22:

Q Was there ever any conversation with the offeror about modifying its offer in respect of the office condo [the Condo] because of the position of Alco?

A No, there was never discussion with them about changing their position on any of the other pieces of property other than the Althen One [unrelated to the Condo].

Page 33, lines 25 to 27 and Page 34, lines 1 to 11:

Q One of the bids that PWC did receive for the office condo alone was over \$500,000, correct?

A Correct.

Q When that bid came in, do I take it that the sole consideration was that it was a standalone bid whereas you wanted to have *en bloc* bids?

A No.

Q What consideration was given to possibly accepting that bid?

A We went back to all the purchasers that had more than one item on there and asked them whether we could carve out pieces, saying okay, you're the highest on this, but you're lower on this, can we just take that?

Page 36, lines 15 to 20:

Q What did Studio Homes [formerly 1601812 Alberta Ltd.] specifically advise with respect to their position on the office condo at the time, not in January of 2014, but at the time?

A At the time, and I won't say it's just on the office condo, we asked whether they would pull any of their other parcels out and they advised no.

### III. Terms of the Orders

#### A. Receivership Order

22 The following provisions of the Receivership Order are relevant to this application:

...2. Pursuant to sections 243(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c. B-03 (the "*BIA*"), 13(2) of the *Judicature Act*, RSA 2000, c. J-2, 99(a) of the *Business Corporations Act*, RSA 2000, c. B-9 and 65(7) of the *Personal Property Security Act*, RSA 2000, c. P-7, PriceWaterhouseCoopers Inc. is hereby appointed Receiver (the "Receiver"), without security, of all of the Debtor current and future assets, undertakings and properties real and personal of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situate, including all proceeds thereof ("the Property").

3. The Receiver is hereby empowered and authorized, but not obligated, to act at once in respect of the property and, without in any way limiting the generality of the foregoing, the Receiver is hereby expressly empowered and authorized to do any of the following where the Receiver considers it necessary or desirable:

...(k) to market any or all of the Property, including advertising and soliciting offers in respect of the Property or any part or parts thereof and negotiating such terms and conditions of sale as the Receiver in its discretion may deem appropriate.

(l) To sell, convey, transfer, lease or assign the Property (the "Disposition") or any part or parts thereof: ...

7. No proceeding or enforcement process in any court or tribunal (each, a "Proceeding") shall be commenced or continued against the Receiver except with the written consent of the Receiver or with leave of this Court.

...

16. The Receiver shall incur no liability or obligation as a result of its appointment or carrying out the provisions of this Order, save and except for any gross negligence or wilful misconduct on its part, or in respect of its obligations under sections 81.4(5) or 81.6(3) of the *BIA* or under the WEPPA. Nothing in this order shall derogate from the protection afforded to the Receiver by s. 14.06 of the *BIA* or any other applicable legislation.

#### B. Sale Order

23 The following provisions of the Sale Order are relevant to this application:

1. Service of the notice of this application and supporting materials is hereby declared to be good and sufficient, and no other person is required to have been served with notice of this application, and time for service is abridged to that actually given.

2. The Receiver's acceptance of the Purchaser's offer to purchase the Lands and Personal Property dated May 6th, 2011 as clarified and extended by the letter from the Receiver dated May 13, 2011, the e-mail from the Purchaser's legal counsel to the Receiver's legal counsel dated May 19, 2011, the letter from legal counsel for the Receiver to legal counsel for the Purchaser dated May 20, 2011, the letter from legal counsel for the Purchaser to legal counsel for the Receiver dated May 24, 2011, the letter from legal counsel for the Purchaser to legal counsel for the Receiver dated May 25, 2011, and the letter from the Receiver to the Purchaser dated May 26, 2011 (the "Offer"), which Offer is summarized at paragraphs 20 to 32 of the Receiver's Second Report, and [sic] is hereby approved and ratified.

...

15. Service of this Order may be effected upon those persons (directly or through legal counsel) on the Service List by facsimile or electronic mail, and such service shall constitute good and sufficient service. Service on any person other than as specified in the Service List is hereby dispensed with.

### **C. Sealing Order**

24 The following provision of the Sealing Order is relevant to this application:

1. ... the Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to seal the Bid Summary (the "Confidential Documents") on the Court file until the sale of the Lands and Personal Property to 1601812 Alberta Ltd. has been closed in accordance with the Offer Terms and the filing of a letter with the Clerk of the Court from PriceWaterhouseCoopers Inc. confirming the sale of the Lands and Personal Property has been closed. ...

### **IV. Positions of the Parties**

25 Alco argues that leave should be granted to file the Statement of Claim appended to its Application. Alco submits that it has a claim against PWC for gross negligence or wilful misconduct in serving the Application by email on May 26, 2011, and selling the Condo for less than its appraised value, thereby preferring the interests of other creditors to those of Alco.

26 PWC argues that there is no basis for a claim against it, as all documents were properly served on Alco by email, and all steps taken by it were in accordance with its obligations to act in the best interests of the creditors of Elaborate as a whole. Therefore, it was neither grossly negligent, nor did it wilfully misconduct itself.

### **V. Issue**

27 The sole issue before the Court is whether Alco should be granted leave to file the Statement of Claim against PWC.

### **VI. Applicable Rules**

#### **A. Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010**

28 The following Rules of the *Alberta Rules of Court* are relevant to this application:

**9.15(1)** On application, the Court may set aside, vary or discharge a judgment or an order, whether final or interlocutory, that was made

(a) without notice to one or more affected persons, or

(b) following a trial or hearing at which an affected person did not appear because of an accident or mistake or because of insufficient notice of the trial or hearing.

**(2)** Unless the Court otherwise orders, the application must be made within 20 days after the earlier of

- (a) the service of the judgment or order on the applicant, and
- (b) the date the judgment or order first came to the applicant's attention.

...

**11.21(1)** A document, other than a commencement document, may be served by electronic method on a person who has specifically provided an address to which information or data in respect of an action may be transmitted, if the document is sent to the person at the specified address, and

- (a) the electronic agent receiving the document at that address receives the document in a form that is usable for subsequent reference, and
- (b) the sending electronic agent obtains or receives a confirmation that the transmission to the address of the person to be served was successfully completed.

**(2)** Service is effected under subrule (1) when the sending electronic agent obtains or receives confirmation of the successfully completed transmission.

**(3)** In this rule, "electronic" and "electronic agent" have the same meanings as they have in the *Electronic Transactions Act*.

#### **B. Bankruptcy and Insolvency General Rules, CRC, c 368**

29 The following *BIA* Rules are relevant to this application:

**3.** In cases not provided for in the Act or these Rules, the courts shall apply, within their respective jurisdictions, their ordinary procedure to the extent that that procedure is not inconsistent with the Act or these Rules.

...

**6.(1)** Unless otherwise provided in the Act or these Rules, every notice or other document given or sent pursuant to the Act or these Rules must be served, delivered personally, or sent by mail, courier, facsimile or electronic transmission.

### **VII. Law**

#### **A. Threshold Test for Leave**

30 The Supreme Court of Canada in *GMAC Commercial Credit Corp. - Canada v. TCT Logistics Inc.*, 2006 SCC 35, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 123 (S.C.C.) confirmed that the threshold is low on an application for leave to commence an action against a receiver or trustee:

55 For almost 150 years, courts and commentators have been universally of the view that the threshold for granting leave to commence an action against a receiver or trustee is not a high one, and is designed to protect the receiver or trustee against only frivolous or vexatious actions, or actions which have no basis in fact...

...

57 In the leading case of *Mancini*, the Court of Appeal summarized the accepted principles as being the following:

- 1. Leave to sue a trustee should not be granted if the action is frivolous or vexatious. Manifestly unmeritorious claims should not be permitted to proceed.

2. An action should not be allowed to proceed if the evidence filed in support of the motion, including the intended action as pleaded in draft form, does not disclose a cause of action against the trustee. The evidence typically will be presented by way of affidavit and must supply facts to support the claim sought to be asserted.

3. The court is not required to make a final assessment of the merits of the claim before granting leave. [Citations omitted; para. 7.]

31 Conrad J. (as she then was) considered this issue in her decision in *RoyNat Inc. v. Omni Drilling Rig Partnership No. 1 (Receiver of)* (1988), 90 A.R. 173 (Alta. Q.B.), at 177 -78, [1988] 6 W.W.R. 156 (Alta. Q.B.):

...In *Royal Bank of Canada v. Vista Homes Ltd. et al* (1985) 63 B.C.L.R. 366 (B.C.S.C.), Mr. Justice MacDonald stated at p. 374:

...the obtaining of an order to sue should not be a perfunctory process... The court should examine with some care the foundation of the alleged claim with a bias against exposing its appointed officer to unnecessary or unwarranted litigation. On the other hand, there is not an onus on the applicant to prove its case against the receiver-manager at this stage.

...

I am satisfied the test to be applied by this court is to determine whether it is perfectly clear that there is no foundation for the claim or whether the action is frivolous or vexatious. It is not for this court to deal with the merits of either party's position or to gauge the probability of success should the action proceed to trial. Leave should be granted if the evidence presented discloses that there is some foundation for the claim and that the claim is not merely frivolous nor vexatious.

Indeed, while the Court may by its order want to protect its appointed officer from unnecessary and unwarranted litigation, I do not take that to mean they are entitled to protection against proper actions simply because they are court appointed.

32 Therefore, the proposed plaintiff must have supplied "facts to support the claim sought to be asserted", or "some foundation for the claim". Both of these cases make it clear that there must be some factual basis for the claim, a court should not grant leave for frivolous, vexatious or unmeritorious claims, and it is not appropriate at the leave stage for the court to make a final assessment of the merits of the claim or possible defences to the claim.

33 While the threshold for granting leave is low, the process of reviewing the proposed claim is not to be perfunctory. Therefore, I will analyze in some detail the basis for the claims alleged by Alco against PWC.

### **B. Gross Negligence and Willful Misconduct**

34 Clause 16 of the Receivership Order provides that PWC will incur liability only in circumstances of "gross negligence or willful misconduct on its part". The starting point, therefore, is to consider what constitutes gross negligence or willful misconduct.

35 *Black's Law Dictionary*, 9th ed (St Paul, MN: West, 2009) defines gross negligence as, *inter alia*:

A conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of a legal duty and of the consequences to another party, who may typically recover exemplary damages.

...As it originally appeared, this was very great negligence, or the want of even slight or scant care. It has been described as a failure to exercise even that care which a careless person would use. Several courts, however, dissatisfied with a term so nebulous...have construed gross negligence as requiring willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct, or such utter lack of all care as will be evidence thereof...But it is still true that most courts consider that 'gross negligence' falls short of a reckless disregard of the consequences, and differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind...

36 The *Dictionary of Canadian Law*, 4th ed (Scarborough, Ont: Thomson Carswell, 2011) provides the following definition:

Conduct in which if there is not conscious wrongdoing, there is a very marked departure from the standard by which responsible and competent people...habitually govern themselves...a high or serious degree of negligence...

37 The Supreme Court of Canada has considered these terms in the context of tort litigation. In *McCulloch v. Murray*, [1942] S.C.R. 141 (S.C.C.), at 145, [1942] S.C.J. No. 7 (S.C.C.), Duff C.J. observed:

... All these phrases, gross negligence, wilful misconduct, wanton misconduct, imply conduct in which, if there is not conscious wrong doing, there is a very marked departure from the standards by which responsible and competent people in charge of motor cars habitually govern themselves. ...

38 In *Société Telus Communications v. Peracomo Inc.*, 2014 SCC 29, [2014] S.C.J. No. 29 (S.C.C.), Cromwell J. for the majority commented on "wilful misconduct":

57 In other contexts, "wilful misconduct" has been defined as "doing something which is wrong knowing it to be wrong or with reckless indifference"; "recklessness" in this context means "an awareness of the duty to act or a subjective recklessness as to the existence of the duty": *R. v. Boulanger*, 2006 SCC 32, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 49, at para. 27, citing *Attorney General's Reference (No. 3 of 2003)*, 2004 EWCA Crim 868, [2005] Q.B. 73. Similarly, in an insightful article, Peter Cane states that "[a] person is reckless in relation to a particular consequence of their conduct if they realize that their conduct may have that consequence, but go ahead anyway. The risk must have been an unreasonable one to take": "Mens Rea in Tort Law" (2000), 20 *Oxford J. Legal Stud.* 533, at p. 535.

58 These formulations capture the essence of wilful misconduct as including not only intentional wrongdoing but also conduct exhibiting reckless indifference in the face of a duty to know...

39 Therefore, in order for Alco to establish PWC's liability arising from the receivership at an eventual trial, it must show that PWC demonstrated a very marked departure from the standards by which responsible and competent people in such circumstances would have acted or conducted themselves, or in a manner such that it knew what it was doing was wrong or was recklessly indifferent in its conduct.

40 Against this backdrop, I will consider Alco's complaints regarding PWC's conduct.

## VIII. Analysis

### A. Email Service

41 Alco argues that service of the Application was not effective, as Alco had not specifically provided an address to which information or data in respect of the receivership action might be transmitted to it.

42 Nothing in the material before the Court supports this allegation. Clearly, the assistant for counsel at PWC contacted a representative of Alco who provided an email address for the president of Alco. It is reasonable to infer that whoever provided the email address to the assistant for counsel at PWC was not aware that Mr. Taubner would not access his email account. PWC cannot be deemed to have known this. Indeed, it appears from Mr. Taubner's testimony that he did access the email account when he wished to do so. It is also reasonable to infer that Mr. Taubner would not have had an email account if he been totally computer illiterate, and if he was, that fact, presumably, would have been well known within the company.

43 PWC derived its authority from the Receivership Order which specifically references the *BIA*. Rule 6(1) of the *BIA Rules* requires that every notice or other document pursuant to the *BIA* or the *BIA Rules* be "served, delivered personally or sent by mail, courier, facsimile or electronic transmission". Both the Application and the Sale Order were sent by electronic transmission to an email address provided by Alco. There is nothing in the material before the Court to suggest that service was not effected in compliance with Rule 6(1) of the *BIA Rules*.

44 In contrast, *BIA* Rule 124 provides that a notice pursuant to s. 244(1) of the *BIA* by a secured creditor who intends to enforce a security on all or substantially all property of an insolvent may be "sent, *if agreed to by the parties*, by electronic transmission". Neither s. 245 regarding the initial notice of the receiver, nor general Rule 6(1) imposes a similar requirement.

45 The *Alberta Rules of Court* supplement the *BIA Rules* to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the *BIA* or the *BIA Rules*. Rule 11.21 requires that the recipient has specifically provided an address. Arguably, this is more onerous than Rule 6(1), and therefore inconsistent with it. However, even if Rule 11.21 of the *Alberta Rules of Court* applies, there is nothing in the material before the Court to suggest that the requirements of Rule 11.21 were not met in this case.

46 I also note that if Alco wished to pursue the position that the Sale Order had been obtained without notice to it, it could have availed itself of Rule 9.15 of the *Alberta Rules of Court* which provides a mechanism to seek to vary or discharge a judgment or order on that basis. Such an application must be made within 20 days after the earlier of service of the order on the applicant, or the date the order first came to the applicant's attention.

47 The Sale Order was, of course, also served by email on Alco. Therefore, Alco would argue that the Sale Order was not properly served upon it. However, on the record before me it is clear that Alco was aware of the Sale Order by January 11, 2012 at the latest, when it resisted the apportionment of receivership costs as against the proceeds from the sale of the Condo. Alco took no timely steps to set aside the Sale Order for lack of service upon becoming aware of it.

48 Further, the Sale Order makes it clear that service of the Application was declared to be good and sufficient and that service of the Sale Order could be effected upon all affected persons by way of facsimile or electronic mail, and such service was constituted to be good and sufficient. Therefore, it appears that Belzil J. considered the matter of both service of the Application and the Sale Order. Again, Alco could have either appealed the Sale Order, or sought to set it aside on the basis of a lack of notice. It took neither of these steps.

49 I would add that in today's world, electronic service is a reflection of practical realities. The *Alberta Rules of Court* and the *BIA Rules* recognize this reality. Perhaps there is no area of practice where electronic service of documents is more appropriate than the bankruptcy and insolvency area. I say this because of the volume of documents that are often produced in such matters, and the need for receivers, trustees, monitors and counsel to act expeditiously and often in the face of very short deadlines. Given the commercial and legal realities of bankruptcy and insolvency matters, there is an obvious need to exchange documents electronically. In my view, a party involved in such matters cannot ignore these realities by refusing to move effectively into the electronic age.

50 In summary, I find nothing in the material before the Court to suggest that PWC through its counsel did not properly effect service of both the Application and the Sale Order on Alco by emailing those documents to Mr. Taubner at Alco. There is no factual basis to suggest that PWC was either grossly negligent, or that it wilfully misconducted itself, in effecting service of the documents by email.

### ***B. Sale Transaction***

51 Alco also alleges that PWC breached its duties to Alco in the manner in which it conducted the sale of Elaborate's assets. Specifically, Alco alleges that PWC concealed the Bid Summary, and sold the Condo for an amount which was below its appraised value.

52 The Second Report indicated that PWC preferred that the Bid Summary remain confidential until such time as the sale transaction had closed. Upon signing the Confidentiality Letter, the Bid Summary would be disclosed to the signatory on the basis that the information disclosed in the Bid Summary would not later be used by the signatory as a potential purchaser of Elaborate assets.

53 Alco argues that PWC should not have required it to give up any right to make an offer on the Condo. Alco submits that its rights "ought not to have been extorted away under threat that otherwise the information necessary for it to respond to a court application would be kept hidden from view".

54 It is common practice in the insolvency context for information in relation to the sale of the assets of an insolvent corporation to be kept confidential until after the sale is completed pursuant to a Court order. In *Look Communications Inc. v. Look Mobile Corp.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 7952, [2009] O.J. No. 5440 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), Newbould J. explained the reasons for such confidentiality:

17 It is common when assets are being sold pursuant to a court process to seal the Monitor's report disclosing all of the various bids in case a further bidding process is required if the transaction being approved falls through. Invariably, no one comes back asking that the sealing order be set aside. That is because ordinarily all of the assets that were bid on during the court sale process end up being sold and approved by court order, and so long as the sale transaction or transactions closed, no one has any further interest in the information. In *8857574 Ontario Inc. v. Pizza Pizza Ltd.*, (1994), 23 B.L.R. (2nd) 239, Farley J. discussed the fact that valuations submitted by a Receiver for the purpose of obtaining court approval are normally sealed. He pointed out that the purpose of that was to maintain fair play so that competitors or potential bidders do not obtain an unfair advantage by obtaining such information while others have to rely on their own resources. In that context, he stated that he thought the most appropriate sealing order in a court approval sale situation would be that the supporting valuation materials remain sealed until such time as the sale transaction had closed.

55 Alco alleges that PWC and its counsel ignored Alco, hid the Bid Summary and cloaked their activities in the receivership with secrecy. However, there is nothing in the material before the Court to suggest that PWC's preference to keep the Bid Summary confidential until the sale transaction had been approved and closed was for any purpose other than to ensure the integrity of the marketing process, and to avoid misuse of the information in the Bid Summary by a subsequent bidder to obtain an unfair advantage in the event it was necessary to remarket Elaborate's assets. Further, there is nothing to suggest that Belzil J. granted the Sealing Order for any other reason.

56 Alco may have been in a unique position given that it held a second mortgage on the Condo. Given that unique position, it may very well have been entitled to receive information with respect to the offers received in relation to the Condo and, therefore, could have suggested revised terms to any required confidentiality agreement. However, Alco's position does not render PWC's actions inappropriate. There is nothing to suggest that PWC's actions in this regard were not in accordance with common, prudent and reasonable practice in receiverships, or that they reflect or resulted from gross negligence or wilful misconduct on the part of PWC.

57 With respect to the manner in which the sale of the Condo was conducted, Alco submits that PWC breached a "fundamental duty of Receivers" in that it failed to act with an even hand towards classes of creditors and in accordance with recognised lawful priorities. Again, the law and the material before the Court do not support this contention.

58 The obligations of a receiver in carrying out a sales transaction have been considered in numerous cases. In *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, [1991] O.J. No. 1137 (Ont. C.A.) at paras 27-29, Galligan J.A. cited with approval case law for the proposition that if a receiver's decision to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time, it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. Otherwise, chaos would result in the commercial world, and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement. Galligan J.A. concluded:

30 What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. I am of the opinion, therefore, that if they do not tend to show that the receiver was improvident, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If they were, the process would be changed from a sale by a receiver, subject to court approval, into an auction conducted by the court at the time approval

is sought. In my opinion, the latter course is unfair to the person who has entered *bona fide* into an agreement with the receiver, can only lead to chaos, and must be discouraged.

59 Galligan J.A. recognized that in considering a sale by a receiver, a court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by the receiver, and should assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. He summarized the duties of the court when deciding whether a receiver who has sold property acted properly as follows (at para 17):

1. It should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;
2. It should consider the interests of all parties;
3. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained;
4. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

60 In *Skyepharmaceutical PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.* (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 87, [1999] O.J. No. 4300 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para 4, Farley J. cited *Soundair* with approval, holding that a receiver's conduct is to be reviewed in light of the objective information the receiver had and not with the benefit of hindsight. Other offers are irrelevant unless they demonstrate that the price in the proposed sale was so unreasonably low that it shows the receiver acted improvidently in accepting it.

61 In *Scanwood Canada Ltd., Re*, 2011 NSSC 189, 305 N.S.R. (2d) 34 (N.S. S.C.), the receiver was of the view that the best realization of the assets in question would come from a sale *en bloc*. Hood J. held that the receiver's duty to act in the interests of the general body of creditors does not necessarily mean that the majority rules. Rather, the receiver must consider the interests of all creditors and then act for the benefit of the general body.

62 PWC accepted the 160 Offer and recommended that the acceptance be approved by the Court on the basis that it was higher than other *en bloc* offers and was preferable from the overall perspective of Elaborate's creditors. The 160 Offer provided for the highest net recovery on the Condo of all of the *en bloc* offers and represented a recovery of 85% of the forced liquidation valuation of the Condo. Only one other offer in the marketing process undertaken by PWC assigned a purchase price for the Condo which was higher than the price assigned in the 160 Offer. This was an offer with respect to the Condo only.

63 The law is clear to the effect that the receiver must not consider the interests of only one creditor, but must act for the benefit of the general body of creditors. PWC was under a duty to act in the interests of the general body of creditors and to conduct a fair and efficient marketing process.

64 The excerpts from the cross-examination of Mr. Burnett on his Affidavit indicate that PWC did attempt to maximize the recovery on all of Elaborate's assets as it conducted negotiations with the various bidders in this regard.

65 There is nothing before the Court to suggest that PWC did not make sufficient efforts to obtain the best price for the assets, nor that it acted improvidently. Alco has not put forward any factual foundation to support an inference that PWC did not act for the benefit of the general body of creditors.

66 Alco submits that had it attended the hearing on June 3, 2011 before Belzil J., it would have been successful in arguing that Alco was deprived of a statutory right to recover its secured debt against the Condo. However, the contents of the Second Report undermine the argument that PWC's acceptance of the 160 Offer would not have been approved in the circumstances as known when the matter proceeded before Belzil J. Further, given my findings on the email service issue, PWC cannot be blamed for Alco's non-attendance at the hearing on June 3, 2011.

67 Therefore, I conclude that Alco has not established a factual basis for the claim that PWC was either grossly negligent or wilfully misconducted itself in the manner that it marketed Elaborate's assets or in its reporting to the Court.

## IX. Conclusion

68 The threshold test for leave in this case is low. However, PWC would only be liable if it acted with gross negligence or wilful misconduct. I have found no factual basis to suggest that PWC was either grossly negligent or wilfully misconducted itself as alleged by Alco.

69 PWC is not entitled to protection against proper actions simply because it was court appointed. However, I am mindful of the bias against exposing a court appointed officer to unnecessary or unwarranted litigation. In my view, granting leave to Alco to proceed with the claim against PWC would expose it to a manifestly unmeritorious action.

70 Therefore, Alco's application for leave to file the Statement of Claim against PWC is dismissed.

## X. Costs

71 If the parties cannot otherwise agree on costs, they may appear before me within 60 days of the filing of these Reasons for Judgment.

*Motion dismissed.*

## Footnotes

\* A corrigendum issued by the court on June 23, 2014 has been incorporated herein.

# TAB 11

2011 NSSC 189  
Nova Scotia Supreme Court

Scanwood Canada Ltd., Re

2011 CarswellNS 564, 2011 NSSC 189, 206 A.C.W.S. (3d) 263, 305 N.S.R. (2d) 34, 84 C.B.R. (5th) 57, 966 A.P.R. 34

**In the Matter of: The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1985, c. C-36, as amended**

In the Matter of: A Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Scanwood Canada  
Limited, a body corporate under the laws of the Province of Nova Scotia

Suzanne M. Hood J.

Heard: June 1, 2011

Oral reasons: June 2, 2011

Written reasons: July 27, 2011

Docket: Hfx. 342377

Counsel: Carl Holm, Q.C. for Homag Canada Inc.  
James MacNeil, Tracy Smith (AC) for Royal Bank of Canada  
Stephen Kingston, Q.C., John Stringer, Q.C. for Green Hunt Wedlake  
Joseph Pettigrew for Province of Nova Scotia  
Tim Hill for TCE Capital Corp.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XVII Practice and procedure in courts](#)

[XVII.1 Stay of proceedings](#)

**Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts — Stay of proceedings

Lifting of stay — Secured creditor sold production machinery to debtor company — Debtor's debt to creditor was secured by Purchase Money Security Interest (PMSI) — Receiver was appointed after [Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#) proceedings were unsuccessful — Receivership order provided for stay suspending all rights and remedies against debtor, Receiver or property — Creditor brought motion to lift stay, seeking declaration that it had first ranking PMSI pursuant to [Personal Property Security Act \(PPSA\)](#) and seeking order granting leave to creditor to exercise its enforcement rights as holder of PMSI pursuant to [PPSA](#) — Motion dismissed — Discretion to lift stay should not be exercised — There was no evidence of material prejudice to creditor if stay was not lifted — Mere supposition or speculation is not sufficient to warrant lifting of stay — When benefit of en bloc sale was considered against removal of integral part of production capability, it was not established that any possible prejudice to creditor outweighed benefit to general body of creditors of en bloc sale — Scheme of receivership is to allow for orderly disposition of assets of company in receivership — To allow one secured creditor to have stay lifted would be unfair to remaining creditors — If creditor's assets were removed, it would make it virtually impossible to have sale en bloc.

**Table of Authorities**

**Cases considered by *Suzanne M. Hood*:**

*Cumberland Trading Inc., Re* (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 225, 1994 CarswellOnt 255 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Ford Credit Canada Ltd. v. Welcome Ford Sales Ltd.* (2010), 2010 ABQB 199, 2010 CarswellAlta 2518 (Alta. Q.B.) — followed

*Village Green Lifestyle Community Corp., Re* (2007), 45 C.C.L.I. (4th) 302, 27 C.B.R. (5th) 199, 2007 CarswellOnt 654 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

**Statutes considered:**

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3  
ss. 13-69.4 — referred to

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36  
Generally — referred to

*Personal Property Security Act*, S.N.S. 1995-96, c. 13  
Generally — referred to

MOTION by secured creditor to lift stay provided for in receivership order.

**Suzanne M. Hood:**

1 The motion is dismissed. My reasons are as follows.

2 Homag Canada Inc. ("Homag") seeks to have the stay ordered in the Receivership Order lifted against certain assets. Its debt is approximately \$611,000.00 secured by a Purchase Money Security Interest. In the Notice of Motion filed, Homag asks, among other things, for a Declaration that the applicant "has a first ranking Purchase Money Security Interest pursuant to the provisions of the *Personal Property Security Act*, S.N.S., 1995-96, c. 13" and lists specific goods. It also requests an order "Notwithstanding the provisions of a Receivership Order issued herein on the 18<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2011, giving leave to the applicant, Homag Canada Inc., to exercise its enforcement rights as a holder of a Purchase Money Security Interest in the Goods pursuant to the provisions of the *PPSA* without any interference by the Receiver or any other secured creditor of or person claiming an interest in the assets of Scanwood Canada Ltd."

3 Homag's request is opposed by the Receiver, the Province (the Minister of Economic and Rural Development and Tourism), the DIP lender, TCE Captial Corp., and the Royal Bank of Canada.

4 For the purposes of its submissions, Homag agreed that the burden is on it to show that it will suffer prejudice if the stay is not lifted. The other parties say that there must be evidence of material prejudice to Homag for Homag to meet its burden.

5 The Receivership Order of April 18, 2011 says in part in paragraph 9:

9. All rights and remedies against Scanwood, the Receiver or affecting the Property, are hereby stayed and suspended except with the written consent of the Receiver or leave of this court. ...

6 The February 23, 2011 order providing for the DIP financing provides for priorities as follows in para. 28:

28. The DIP charge, the Administration Charge and the Director's Charge have relative priority as follows:

- a) Firstly, the Administration Charge
- b) Secondly, the DIP Charge; and
- c) Thirdly, the Director's Charge.

7 When the Receiver was the monitor pursuant to the *CCAA*, he filed a Schedule of Relative Order of Priority based upon independent legal advice.

8 The affidavit of Christian Vollmers was filed in support of Homag's motion. Mr. Vollmers is the President of Homag Canada Inc. The critical parts of his affidavit, in my view, are paras. 22-24 where he says:

22. If Homag is not permitted to act on its security, its ability to maximize its recovery and minimize its costs will be prejudiced.

23. Homag as manufacturer and worldwide distributor of woodworking equipment of the nature and kind on which it has a first ranking PMSI security charge believes it is best able, through its networks, to maximize, whether in the short or longer term realization on the Goods against which it holds security.

24. Homag does not believe it will maximize its realization on the Goods if they are included in an en bloc package and Homag is required to accept a portion of the purchase price bid by an en bloc bidder, if in fact such a bidder, materializes.

9 The Receiver has filed his first Receiver's Report dated May 30. He also provided some additional information to the court when he took the witness stand as an officer of the court. One of the things he said was that the reason why he refused Homag's offer to leave the equipment but have Homag not subject to a costs allocation was because it would be unfair to the other creditors to have one creditor exempted from those costs.

10 In his report, the Receiver gives his opinion that the best realization of the assets of Scanwood would come from a sale of the assets en bloc. He says in para. 5.9:

5.9 The Receiver's experience is that an en bloc tender will typically result in greater realizations to the creditors than a breakup of the assets. The Receiver and the secured creditors (other than Homag) believe this would likely be the case with Scanwood's Fixed Assets, although only a market test will determine whether this is the case.

11 He continued:

6.9 The Receiver has received a verbal indication from one interested party that it intends to submit a tender to acquire the Fixed Assets en bloc with a view to operating the facility as a going concern.

6.10 The Receiver has received an email from another interested party indicating that it is interested in the complete factory.

6.11 These parties now are awaiting the information package and Conditions of Sale. Additionally, we have received requests for the information package from other parties including liquidation/auction firms. While some parties have expressed an interest in certain assets, others have been silent on the extent of their interest.

12 He put his proposal to try to sell the assets en bloc to a meeting to which all secured creditors were invited. All those who participated except Homag agreed. Those creditors also requested that there be an opportunity to bid on individual parcels. A tender package has been prepared and Conditions of Sale (Exhibits 2 and 3 to the Receiver's Report) and plans have been made to advertise as set out in Exhibit 4 to the report.

13 The report in paras. 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 refer to these advertising plans. In addition, the Receiver proposes to ask for individual bids on various parcels including the subject assets. The tenders will close on July 22 and the sale of any assets is subject to court approval. At that court hearing, all creditors will have an opportunity to make submissions about the recommendation of the Receiver and about the costs allocation.

14 The Receiver has specifically addressed Mr. Vollmer's comments on the fifth Monitor's Report with respect to Scanwood's unsuccessful efforts to sell on a going-concern basis. He says in paras. 7.3 and 7.4:

7.3 The Receiver notes that the Monitor was not directly involved in any efforts by Mr. Thorn or others to market Scanwood's assets during the CCAA process, and that the Monitor's comments were based solely on information provided to it by representatives of Scanwood.

7.4 The Monitor's comments in the Fifth Report were made in the context of a possible sale by Scanwood during the course of the CCAA proceedings. This is distinct from the orderly administration of a sale process by a Court-Appointed Receiver for the benefit of the general body of creditors.

He then concludes in para. 7.5:

7.5 It is the opinion of the Receiver that any buyer interested in operating the Facility will require all of the Fixed Assets that Scanwood had been using until it discontinued operations on April 15, 2011.

15 He then goes on in para. 7.14 to refer to feedback he received from Scanwood's former Director of Operations, Mr. Robert Moore, in which Mr. Moore said in part:

7.14 ... In my opinion, the removal of the 330 line or pieces of the line would seriously impede the chance of receiving a viable en bloc offer. These items make the 330 line unique in its function and therefore more desirable. It would cost approximately 1.2m to replace, perhaps even more after installation costs.

16 The Receiver concludes in paras. 7.15 and 7.16:

7.15 It is the Receiver's opinion that selling the Fixed Assets without the New Machinery will seriously impair and impede the Receiver's ability to attract an en bloc buyer.

7.16 The Receiver accordingly opposes the Homag Motion and has declined to consent to Homag's request to remove the New Machinery, as it believes this would impair the Receiver's ability to maximize recovery for the general benefit of creditors

17 Homag says there is only a faint hope that the assets will be sold en bloc. Homag also says that the price attributed in such a bid to the subject assets may be less than Homag could achieve if it were to market them pursuant to its security. Homag also says that, if there are individual bids on parcels, the bid on the subject assets may be less than it could achieve if Homag sold them. The bid could also be lower than the amount attributed to those assets in an en bloc bid. In these cases, Homag says it would suffer prejudice, although the other secured creditors might benefit from an en bloc sale. Homag says it is unfair to it to require it to leave the equipment in place with the result that Homag will be required to contribute to the costs of the receivership and the other priority costs.

18 The powers of the Receiver are set out in para. 3 of the Receivership Order and include the following: "to receive, preserve, protect and maintain control of the Property or any part or parts thereof ...; to market any or all of the Property..." The Receiver submits that the intent of the receivership was to prevent a "free for all" by the secured creditors and, instead, provide for an orderly realization of the assets of Scanwood so as to benefit the general body of creditors.

19 In *Ford Credit Canada Ltd. v. Welcome Ford Sales Ltd.*, 2010 ABQB 199 (Alta. Q.B.), the Court said in para. 14:

14. In deciding whether the stays contained in the Receivership Order ought to be lifted, I note that the Courts in Canada have considered the totality of the circumstances and the relative prejudice to both sides. ...

20 In *Village Green Lifestyle Community Corp., Re*, 2007 CarswellOnt 654 (Ont. S.C.J.), the Court referred in para. 13 to s. 69.4 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S., 1985, c. B-3 saying:

13. ... I also note that, although not strictly applicable, guidance may be drawn from the provisions of section 69.4 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* wherein a person affected by the operation of a statutory stay may apply to the court to request that the stay be inoperative. The court may make such a declaration if it is satisfied that the person is likely to be materially prejudiced by the stay or if the court is satisfied that it is equitable on other grounds. ...

21 Furthermore, in *Cumberland Trading Inc., Re*, 1994 CarswellOnt 255 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), Justice Farley referred to the type of evidence which would satisfy the test of material prejudice. He said in para. 11:

11. Is Skyview entitled to the benefit of s. 69.4 (a) of the BIA? I am of the view that the material prejudice referred to therein is an objective prejudice as opposed to a subjective one, i.e., it refers to the degree of prejudice suffered *vis-a-vis* the indebtedness and the attendant security and not to the extent that such prejudice may affect the creditor, qua person, organization or entity.

He continued in that para.:

... However, Skyview does not go the additional step of making any quantitative (or possibly qualitative) analysis as to the extent of such prejudice so that the court has an idea of the magnitude of materiality. ...

22 The Province and the Royal Bank support the position of the Receiver. TCE does as well. It says that, if the Order were granted, it would put Homag ahead of TCE, contrary to the DIP financing Order as well as exempting it from the priority given to the Administration and Director's charges. The allocation of those charges will be the subject of a subsequent hearing and it is unknown now what the proposal for allocation will be. The Receiver said there are so many possibilities that it is impossible to speculate at this time. In addition, there will be the Receiver's costs to be allocated in the future.

23 During his oral submissions, Mr. Holm made two alternate proposals. He proposed that the equipment be left so an en bloc sale could occur but with no cost allocation against Homag or that cash collateral be posted towards a future costs allocation. In my view, these issues are not encompassed in the Notice of Motion and are not properly before the Court.

24 The Affidavit of Mr. Vollmers does not contain evidence of material prejudice to Homag if the stay is not lifted. Mr. Vollmers says that, in his opinion, a greater realization can be achieved if Homag sells the subject assets. The Receiver has a different opinion.

25 There is nothing in Mr. Vollmers Affidavit to establish that it has offers or what efforts have been made to market the assets. As Mr. MacNeil put it, it is a bald assertion of prejudice.

26 The case law, in my view, makes it clear that mere supposition or speculation is not sufficient to warrant lifting of the stay. The Receiver's duty is to act in the interests of the general body of creditors. This does not, in my view, necessarily mean that the majority rules. The Receiver must consider the interests of all creditors and then act for the benefit of the general body of creditors. The Court must weigh the benefits and disadvantages to each against the general good and consider the totality of the circumstances.

27 The scheme of the receivership is to allow for the orderly disposition of the assets of the company in receivership. To allow one secured creditor to have the stay lifted would be unfair to the remaining creditors. If the assets were removed, it would make it virtually impossible to have a sale en bloc. In my view, the situation is not dissimilar to that in the *Ford Credit*, *supra*, case where Justice Thomas, said in para. 28:

That evidence of prejudice must be weighed against the interest of all of the other parties and creditors who assert that an en bloc sale should be conducted to maximize recovery. Clearly, that opportunity would be gone if the inventory claimed by Ford Credit is removed from the en bloc sale.

28 The opinion of Mr. Vollmers with respect to maximizing the realization on the equipment is an opinion only and is not proof. When I consider the benefit of an en bloc sale against the removal of an integral part of the production capability, I cannot conclude that any possible prejudice to Homag outweighs the benefit to the general body of creditors of an en bloc sale.

29 Considering all the circumstances as set out in the Receiver's Report and the Affidavit of Mr. Vollmers, I cannot conclude that I should exercise my discretion to lift the stay.

30 On the issue of costs, TCE says it is important that Homag pay its costs of the unsuccessful motion. This is so because all TCE's expenses have priority according to the DIP financing Order. If TCE's costs are not paid, there will be an adverse effect upon the remaining creditors who must bear that cost. The Province and RBC also seek their costs as does the Receiver.

31 I conclude these parties are entitled to their costs. I can hear from counsel now or leave it to counsel to try to agree, failing which written submissions can be made to me within 30 days.

*Motion dismissed.*

# TAB 12

**Most Negative Treatment:** Distinguished

**Most Recent Distinguished:** [Ontario Federation of Anglers & Hunters v. Ontario \(Ministry of Natural Resources\)](#) | 1999 CarswellOnt 1444, [1999] O.J. No. 1690, 13 Admin. L.R. (3d) 208, 62 C.R.R. (2d) 303, 98 O.T.C. 341, 43 O.R. (3d) 760 | (Ont. S.C.J., Apr 28, 1999)

1986 CarswellOnt 235  
Ontario Supreme Court, High Court of Justice

Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg

1986 CarswellOnt 235, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526, 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320 (note)

**CROWN TRUST COMPANY, SEAWAY TRUST COMPANY  
and GREYMAC TRUST COMPANY v. ROSENBERG et al.**

Anderson J.

Judgment: November 6, 1986

Docket: No. 1380/83

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Civil practice and procedure

**III Parties**

**III.8 Intervenors**

**III.8.a General principles**

Debtors and creditors

**VII Receivers**

**VII.6 Conduct and liability of receiver**

**VII.6.a General conduct of receiver**

Debtors and creditors

**VII Receivers**

**VII.6 Conduct and liability of receiver**

**VII.6.b Rights**

Debtors and creditors

**VII Receivers**

**VII.7 Actions involving receiver**

**VII.7.a Actions by receiver**

**Headnote**

Receivers — Sale of debtor's assets — Approval by court — Court discussing obligations in determining whether to approve sale.

On a motion by a court appointed receiver and manager to approve the sale of certain properties, the duties of the court are to consider: whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and ensure he has not acted improvidently; the interests of all parties; the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers have been obtained; and whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

The court has the power and responsibility to disregard the recommendation of the receiver and to approve another offer or offers. On the other hand, the court ought not to enter into the market place or sit as on appeal from the decision of the receiver, reviewing in minute detail every element of the process by which his decision has been reached. Furthermore, the court ought not to embark on a process analogous to the trial of a claim by an unsuccessful bidder for something in the nature of specific

performance or proceed against the recommendations of its receiver except in special circumstances or where the necessity and propriety of doing so are plain. It is only in exceptional circumstances that a court will intervene and proceed contrary to the receiver's recommendations if satisfied that the receiver has acted reasonably, prudently and fairly, and not arbitrarily.

It is necessary to keep in mind not only the function of the court but the function of the receiver. The receiver is selected and appointed having regard for experience and expertise in the duties which are involved. It is the function of the receiver to conduct negotiations and to assess the practical business aspects of the problems involved in the disposition of the assets. However, the court is not to apply an automatic stamp of approval to the decision of the receiver. The court has power to come to a different decision and a discretion to exercise which must be exercised judicially.

The courts have recognized that they are not making a decision in a vacuum; that they are concerned with the process not only as it affects the case at bar, but as it stands to affect situations of a similar nature in the future. The delicate balance of competing interests is relevant and material.

***Anderson J., (orally):***

1 This is a motion to approve the sale of certain properties, the subject-matter of the action in which the motion is brought. The moving party is the receiver and manager appointed by the court. The respondents are parties to the action. The properties are of considerable value and the motion, therefore, is one of some importance to the receiver and to the parties. The events giving rise to the action have a measure of local notoriety, but those colourful happenings have no direct bearing on the matters which I must resolve. The disposition of the motion may be of some general interest of a legal nature, involving as it does a consideration of the nature of the function to be discharged by the court upon such a motion, and also of the nature and extent of the duties of a court-appointed receiver.

2 A brief chronological narrative of facts which are not in dispute and of the history of the proceedings will be useful background. In February of 1983 an order was made by the Associate Chief Justice of the High Court appointing Clarkson Gordon Inc. as interim receiver and manager of the Cadillac Fairview Properties. Where throughout these reasons I say "Clarkson", I mean Clarkson in its capacity as receiver and manager, and when I say "Receiver", I refer to Clarkson in that capacity.

3 In July of 1983 an order was made by Catzman J. with respect to marketing the properties pursuant to a process which has been designated the "Disposition Strategy". Clarkson implemented the strategy report and the details of that implementation are in the motion record at pp. 10-15 and from pp. 23-6.

4 In many cases where portions of the record are painfully familiar to the counsel and participants I propose not to read them during the course of my reasons, although they will form part of the reasons should they be transcribed.

5 On September 3, 1986, Larco Enterprises submitted four draft letters. The Receiver pursuant to the Disposition Strategy had received some 200 offers from some 70 odd offerors and after the deadline fixed for such offers an additional 60 odd. On September 8, 1986, the Larco offers were acknowledged and certain comments made by the Receiver with respect to them.

6 On September 10th, Larco submitted four sealed bids. Clarkson received in all some 230 odd bids from 76 offerors.

7 On September 25th, Clarkson selected certain offers, 26 in all by some 14 offerors, and it is those offers that are recommended for the approval of the court.

8 This motion was launched and the material served on October 10, 1986. The motion was returnable on October 20th. October 20th and 21st were taken up with some preliminary or interlocutory matters and evidence and argument were heard for the balance of two weeks.

9 Of the offers submitted by Larco, three were rejected and a fourth was extended and held open pending the hearing and disposition of this motion. Clarkson does not recommend the acceptance of that offer despite the fact that it produces a higher return to the Receiver than the aggregate amount of the offers recommended. To over-simplify somewhat, Larco is the highest

bidder. The extent of the difference I will discuss in a moment and I will also discuss the reasons advanced by Clarkson for not recommending it.

10 On the return of the motion Larco moved to be added as an intervenor under rule 13.01. I dismissed that application on the following day. The reasons for that ruling are an appendix to these reasons. (See App. I [not reproduced]).

11 On Wednesday, October 27th, Larco presented during the hearing of the motion an entirely new offer in a still higher amount. On Thursday, October 23rd, I made a ruling that I would not consider that offer. My reasons for that ruling are likewise an appendix to these reasons. (See App. II [not reproduced]). On the argument of the motion no criticism was advanced of any of the offers recommended by the Receiver. The only criticism that was advanced on behalf of some defendants was that the Larco bid should have been recommended and in any event should be approved by the court. The plaintiffs in the action supported the recommendation of the Receiver.

12 Before dealing with the elements of the ensuing dispute, I turn to a consideration of the nature of the motion which is before me and of the duty of the court in the disposition of such a motion. The duties of the court I conceive to be the following, and I do not put them in any order of priority:

I. It is to consider whether the Receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently. Authority for that proposition is to be found in a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal, *Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal et al.* (1985), 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473, 65 A.R. 372, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58. The [D.L.R.] headnote is of assistance, as is the judgment delivered by Kerans J.A. and particularly that portion which appears at p. 476. The questions with which the court was dealing were similar to those with which I am now concerned.

The real issue, in our view, is the appropriate exercise of the admitted discretion of the court when "looking to the interests of all persons concerned". It certainly does not follow, for example, that the court in an application for approval of a sale is bound to conduct a judicial auction or even to accept a higher last-minute bid. There are, however, binding policy considerations. In *Canada Permanent Trust Co. v. King Art Developments Ltd. et al.* (1984), 12 D.L.R. (4th) 161, [1984] 4 W.W.R. 587, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 1, we said that receivers (and masters on foreclosure) should look for new and imaginative ways to get the highest possible price in these cases. Sale by tender is not necessarily the best method for a commercial property which involves also the sale of an ongoing business. The receiver here accepted the challenge offered by this court, and combined a call for tenders with subsequent negotiations. In order to encourage this technique, which we understand has met with some success, the court should not undermine it. It is undermined by a judicial auction, because all negotiators must then keep something in reserve. Worse, the person who successfully negotiates with the receiver will suffer a disadvantage because his bargain will become known to others.

We think that the proper exercise of judicial discretion in these circumstances should be limited, in the first instance, to an inquiry whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and not acted improvidently.

II. The court should consider the interests of all parties, plaintiffs and defendants alike.

That is made apparent by the judgment of this court in *Ostrander v. Niagara Helicopters Ltd. et al.* (1973), 1 O.R. (2d) 281, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 161, 19 C.B.R. (N.S.) 5, although the conclusion appears rather by indirection and as a statement *obiter* to judgment.

III. The court must consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which the offers are obtained.

The first authority which is of assistance in that regard is the judgment of Saunders J. in *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C. Bkcy.). There, in dealing with the question of approval, he has this to say in his reasons at p. 246:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interest of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.

In that connection I adopt the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Appeal Division) in *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia et al.* (1981), 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303 at p. 314, 86 A.P.R. 303, 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1 at p. 11 (C.A.), where he said:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement. On the contrary, they would know that other bids could be received and considered up until the application for court approval is heard — this would be an intolerable situation.

While those remarks may have been made in the context of a bidding situation rather than a private sale, I consider them to be equally applicable to a negotiation process leading to a private sale. Where the court is concerned with the disposition of property, the purpose of appointing a receiver is to have the receiver do the work that the court would otherwise have to do.

The submissions on behalf of Leung and the creditors who are opposing approval boil down to this: that if, subsequent to a court-appointed receiver making a contract subject to court approval, a higher and better offer is submitted, the court should not approve what the receiver has done. There may be circumstances where the court would give effect to such a submission. If, for example, in this case there had been a second offer of a substantially higher amount, then the court would have to take that offer into consideration in assessing whether the receiver had properly carried out his function of endeavouring to obtain the best price for the property. Also, if there were circumstances which indicated a defect in the sale process as ordered by the court, such as unfairness to a potential purchaser, that might be a reason for withholding approval of the sale.

A further authority for that proposition is to be found in *Bank of Montreal v. Maitland Seafoods Ltd. et al.* (1983), 57 N.S.R. (2d) 20 at p. 23, 46 C.B.R. (N.S.) 75 (N.S.S.C.):

If any efficacy is to be given to the tender system, then it requires that ... a person, whether insider or guarantor, who obtains full information of the amounts of the tender ought not, at the last moment, be entitled to make a somewhat higher offer and obtain the property. To permit this would create "chaos in the commercial world". Not only would there be uncertainty ... but it could lead to the situation where there might be no bidders.

IV. The court should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working" out of the process.

The authority for that is the case to which reference was made by Saunders J., *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia et al.* (1981), 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303, 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1. The [C.B.R.] headnote again is useful as is, in this connection, the language at the concluding portion of the judgment where this is said:

Misleading a bidder, even unintentionally, by a receiver must always be a sufficient ground for a court to refuse to approve an agreement of purchase and sale.

That case is also authority, if authority were needed for the proposition that in a proper case the court has the power to disregard the recommendation of the Receiver and to approve another offer.

13 It is with those areas of responsibility in mind that I proceed to deal with the motion. I have already said that no criticism is made of the offers which are recommended. Likewise no criticism has been made of the process by which the offers were obtained.

14 Attention has focused on the different economic returns which it is anticipated would flow from the recommended offers on the one hand and the Larco offer on the other. Depending upon whose data and calculations are accepted, that difference may be as high as \$7 million odd, or as low as \$1 million odd. I do not propose to analyze the data or the calculations which have been advanced, because in the view which I take of the matter they are not material.

15 The central issue is whether the court should disregard the recommendations of the Receiver and approve the higher bid. Indeed at the end of the day that is the only real issue. This requires first some review of the reasons advanced by the Receiver for rejecting or at any rate not recommending the Larco bid. This is dealt with in the motion record in the Receiver's report in para. 38, at pp. 51-67 of the record:

38. Clarkson did not accept Enterprises'<sup>1</sup> Offer, and does not recommend its acceptance and approval by this Court, for the following reasons:

(a) Clarkson's concern to maintain the integrity and fairness of the tender process embodied in the Invitation to Tender, and Clarkson's conviction that the evident success of the marketing and tender process as reflected both in the quantity and quality of the offers which were received was due in large measure to the faith and trust of prospective purchasers that they would each be afforded a fair and equal opportunity to purchase, have been discussed at length above. Clarkson and Cogan were advised on August 14, 1986 by representatives of Enterprises that Enterprises shared those concerns as a result of an unsuccessful tender recently made by Enterprises in respect of certain other properties, and particular emphasis was placed by the said representatives of Enterprises on their need to understand the tender rules, that the rules not be changed, and that they expected everyone to adhere to such rules.

Nevertheless, Clarkson does not believe that Enterprises' Offer as supplemented by the letters delivered after the Bid Deadline was in acceptable form or in accordance with the rules of the tender process established by and embodied in the Invitation to Tender in that, inter alia,

(i) the above-mentioned mechanism for determining the price at which Clarkson would be required to sell the Note might be said to have afforded Enterprises the opportunity to change the cash purchase price offered for the subject Properties, after the Bid Deadline, although no objection could be raised to a change in such cash purchase price if the percentage to be stipulated by one of the designated financial institutions was determined by such financial institution solely on the basis of objective market interest rate criteria; Clarkson and Fraser & Beatty, following the Bid Deadline, therefore repeatedly requested confirmation from The Royal Bank of Canada that the percentage set out in its said letter dated September 15, 1986 was determined by such bank based upon objective market interest rate criteria alone, but no such confirmation was received by Clarkson;

(ii) Enterprises or persons acting on its behalf changed or attempted to change or might have changed, after the Bid Deadline, material terms and conditions of Enterprises' Offer; namely

(A) price by means of the Note purchase mechanism;

(B) the financing condition in Enterprises' Sealed Bid referred to in paragraph 34 above was included in such sealed bid despite repeated statements by Clarkson, Cogan and Fraser & Beatty to representatives of and to the solicitors for Enterprises prior to the Bid Deadline that this would represent a serious negative feature of any offer submitted; by letter dated September 18, 1986 from Enterprises' solicitors addressed to Clarkson (a copy of which is annexed hereto as Schedule H (Appendix III [not reproduced]) and received by Clarkson the following day, nine days after the Bid Deadline, this condition was purportedly waived;

(C) as mentioned in paragraph 36 above, Clarkson did not receive, on or before September 17, 1986, the purchase undertaking from one of the designated financial institutions in accordance with Enterprises' Sealed Bid, and in lieu thereof the solicitors for Enterprises, by means of the aforesaid letter dated September 18, 1986, a copy of which is annexed hereto as Schedule H, purported to amend Enterprises' Offer to provide that Enterprises would cause the Note to be purchased on closing "on the same terms and conditions as contemplated in [Sealed Bid Schedule 3] paragraph 8";

(D) Clarkson and Eraser & Beatty had indicated to Enterprises and its solicitors following the Bid Deadline that Clarkson had difficulty in properly evaluating Enterprises' Offer until it knew what mortgages

Enterprises intended to require be discharged. While the amount payable by Enterprises would increase dollar for dollar for each dollar spent to obtain a mortgage discharge, the effect of the aforesaid Note purchase mechanism would be to satisfy such amount (including dollars expended to obtain mortgage discharges) at 81.2 cents per dollar. Fraser & Beatty therefore asked Enterprises' solicitors to confirm in writing to Clarkson what mortgages Enterprises' solicitors believed Enterprises was entitled to request a discharge of under the terms of Enterprises' Offer, it being a fair assumption that a request for a discharge of as many mortgages as possible would be received by Clarkson given the aforesaid discount achieved by means of the Note purchase mechanism. Instead, by letter dated September 21, 1986, a copy of which is annexed hereto as Schedule I, (Appendix IV [not reproduced]) Enterprises' solicitors purported to further amend Enterprises' Offer in this regard; and

(E) notwithstanding the clear provisions of the Invitation to Tender, as late as September 17, 1986 and again on September 18, 1986 a representative of Enterprises requested that Clarkson agree to negotiate a reduction in the amount of the required deposits, which request was denied, and then requested that Clarkson agree to a reduction in the amount of the further deposit to be provided within 5 days of acceptance of any offer, which further request was also denied by Clarkson;

(b) despite repeated requests by Clarkson and Fraser & Beatty for an explanation of the commercial reason for the use of the Note purchase mechanism (which on its face only serves to reduce the purchase price for the subject Properties from a high nominal value to a lower real value), in the view of Clarkson and Fraser & Beatty no clear and consistent reasons were given. Accordingly, a written explanation was requested and a reason was cited in the letter annexed hereto as Schedule I, but Clarkson did not and does not regard the explanations received as satisfactory;

(c) Clarkson was concerned and remains concerned, particularly given the history of the subject Properties and the attention they have attracted in federal, provincial and municipal political circles and with the tenants thereof and those representing such tenants, with the appearance of the proposed transaction in the minds of the tenants, the media, the politicians and the public at large, some of whom might be expected to question seriously whether the inflated nominal purchase price was being used to raise mortgage money without adequate security, or to lay the groundwork for an application for an excessive rent increase. In the absence of definitive evidence to the contrary, Clarkson believes that this aspect raises perceptible risks of intervention of some kind which might imperil a successful closing of the proposed transaction with Enterprises;

(d) as was mentioned above, Enterprises failed to cause the Note purchase undertaking from Citibank to be delivered to Clarkson on or before September 17, 1986 as provided in Enterprises' Sealed Bid, and Clarkson was concerned and remains concerned with the acceptance of any offer in respect of which the offeror, before Clarkson has even had a reasonable opportunity to accept the same, has already failed to perform a material term thereof; and

(e) Clarkson was not satisfied, notwithstanding all of the foregoing, that Enterprises' Offer was capable of acceptance, and believed that certain aspects thereof would have to be successfully negotiated prior to any such acceptance, including in particular:

(i) the waiver of the financing condition which, as noted above, was purportedly effected by letter dated September 18, 1986 from Enterprises' solicitors addressed to Clarkson despite the relevant provisions of Enterprises' Offer in respect of amendments and despite the statement of Enterprises' solicitors, with which Fraser & Beatty agreed, in a telephone conversation between such solicitors that this and any other matter pertaining to the terms of Enterprises' Offer should be in the name of and executed by Enterprises;

(ii) the substitution of Enterprises' agreement to cause the Note to be purchased on closing "on the same terms and conditions as contemplated in paragraph 8", which again was purportedly effected by the letter dated September 18, 1986 and therefore suffered from the same difficulties as the purported waiver plus the additional difficulty that it is unclear what such "same terms and conditions" are; in Clarkson's view, it is totally unsatisfactory for

a transaction of this magnitude, which contemplates an unsecured note in the order of \$375,000,000, to hinge on such vague and uncertain wording;

(iii) in connection with the aforesaid purchase of the Note on closing, reference was made in paragraph 34 above to the provision in Enterprises' Sealed Bid that the Note was to be purchased "at the closing at the said [price] as part of the escrow arrangements herein provided", but in view of the uncertainty as to the intent and effect of these words, clarification would be required to ensure that there was no misunderstanding in this respect; and

(iv) the amendment to Enterprises' Offer purportedly effected by the aforesaid letter dated September 21, 1986 from Enterprises' solicitors addressed to Clarkson in respect of the mortgages to be discharged on closing and the effect thereof on the ultimate purchase price realized by Clarkson, which at the very least suffers from the same difficulties as the aforesaid purported waiver.

Apart altogether from its concern to maintain the integrity and fairness of the tender process, Clarkson concluded that, even if it were prepared to attempt such negotiations in an effort to put Enterprises' Offer into acceptable form, the time constraints imposed by the tender rules and the fact that all offers would expire on September 25, 1986 and the difficulties encountered in resolving outstanding questions to date raised a serious question as to the successful outcome of such negotiations. In view of the risks to the entire sales process if that had happened, Clarkson decided not to attempt such negotiations but to accept the offers in hand that were capable of acceptance as they stood.

16 The motion was brought on in the usual way on a written report of the Receiver signed by Mr. S.R. Shaver, a vice-president of Clarkson, and unsworn.

17 Counsel for the Receiver submitted at the opening of the motion that for reasons pertaining to the importance of the matter and its public interest, he proposed to lead the evidence of Mr. Shaver *viva voce* although it is something of an exception in the disposition of a motion of this kind. I acceded to that submission. I confess to having had moments during the subsequent proceedings when I doubted the wisdom of that decision. The inevitable result was that evidence was called by the defendants who were advancing a different position, and a considerable amount of time was spent. Notwithstanding my doubts, I think that for the reasons advanced by the Receiver, and because an element of catharsis is involved, perhaps the hearing of *viva voce* evidence was appropriate in all the circumstances.

18 I have made references to the Disposition Strategy Report which lay behind the negotiations which produced the offers which are now before the court for consideration. It is a voluminous and detailed document comprising, without its various appendices and schedules, some 98 pages. It was pursuant to that strategy report that the order of Catzman J. in July of this year set in motion the sequence of events leading to the report and motion which are now before me.

19 Throughout that sequence of events, the Receiver has had the benefit and assistance of the advice of eminent solicitors and counsel and of an eminent real estate consultant appointed for the purpose.

20 In the motion which is before me some 15 counsel appeared at various times, eight for most of the time, representing various interests. The evidence consumed seven full days and final argument a further day. Most of the principal participants in the sequence of events made their appearance in the witness-box. The ponderous chain of happenings which followed the order of Catzman J. and culminating in the motion and the nature and extent of that motion are both matters of consequence to which I will refer subsequently.

21 Events were set in train by a letter written by Clarkson to potential purchasers which is dated July 28, 1986. It is found in the motion record at p. 124:

On July 25, 1986 Mr. Justice Catzman approved the final stages of the disposition process which include the following:

1. A negotiation stage culminating on September 3, 1986 with an offer as between the Interim Receiver and Manager and prospective purchasers wherein all terms and conditions respecting the transaction, exclusive of the final offering price, are settled ("Approved Offers").
2. After the Approved Offers are settled prospective purchasers wishing to bid on individual Properties, groups of Properties or all of the Properties are directed to forward Sealed Bids to the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Ontario addressed to the Interim Receiver and Manager. The Sealed Bids must be submitted to the Registrar on or by 3:00 p.m. September 10, 1986 (Bid Deadline Date).
3. After reviewing and analyzing the Sealed Bids, in context with the Approved Offers, bidders will be notified whether or not their offers are accepted within 15 days of the Bid Deadline Date.
4. The Standard Form of Offer and the Invitation to Tender stipulate that offerors must submit with their Sealed Bids deposits amounting to the greater of \$100,000 or 2 <sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>% of the price offered in the Sealed Bid in the form of a certified cheque or bank draft.

For greater certainty and clarity we request that you carefully review the Invitation to Tender, Sealed Bid form and Standard Form of Offer in order that all aspects of the above outlined disposition process are understood and, more importantly, closely adhered to so that no one is disadvantaged throughout this process.

We urge each of you to convene meetings with us at the earliest possible date to ensure that all of your queries and concerns are adequately addressed. These meetings should assist you in preparing and submitting an Approved Offer on or by September 3, 1986. To this end, we have prepared all of the schedule for each Property to be affixed to the offer(s) including financial information and rent rolls as of June 30 and July 1, 1986 respectively.

There will be one and only one opportunity to bid. Because of the nature of the process, prospective purchasers will be automatically encouraged to submit their highest and best offers. Please be cognizant of the fact that all offers will be evaluated on a "cash equivalent" basis to ensure a fair and equitable evaluation process.

A prospective purchaser's chance to be the successful bidder will be enhanced relative to another purchaser, assuming equal "cash equivalent" offers are received, if:

1. the Approved Offer contains fewer onerous and time consuming conditions.
2. the prospective purchaser establishes his "credit worthiness". This aspect can best be established if conclusive third party evidence of the purchaser's ability to arrange the necessary financing to close the transaction is provided; and
3. Property inspections are completed in advance of the final Bid Deadline Date, September 10, 1986.

22 The invitation to tender is an exhibit on these proceedings. Again, its contents are material. I do not intend to read them but they will be included in the reasons. (See App. V [not reproduced])

23 I said when referring to the portion of the report which set out the reasons by the Receiver for not recommending the Larco offer that I did not propose to deal in detail with each of the points raised. The objections upon which emphasis was particularly placed were the following:

1. the use of the promissory note and the related problems of the discount rate and the sale and purchase of that note;
2. the inclusion in the sealed bid of a financing condition which had not been provided in Larco's formal offer;
3. the identification and amount of the mortgages which Larco would require to be discharged upon closing, and
4. relating to the financing condition, the ultimate waiver of that condition.

24 The uncontentious history of the Larco offer is that prior to its being made there was a meeting in August of 1986 attended by representatives of Larco and representatives of Clarkson when the prospective offering and bidding procedure were discussed.

25 On September 3rd offers were submitted. On September 8th Clarkson replied in writing with certain comments. Between September 3rd and September 9th there were meetings and telephone conversations between the representatives of Larco and representatives of the Receiver. On September 10th there were consultations and there was a subsequent exchange of correspondence. When the final decision of the Receiver was announced September 25th the Larco offers were not recommended.

26 I have already indicated that the difference between the competing offers figured largely in the hearing and blow-by-blow accounts were given by the various participants of the exchanges between representatives of Larco and representatives of the Receiver. These exchanges must be explored to some extent, though not with the attention to detail which they received during the hearing.

27 I do not intend to deal *seriatim* with each of the Receiver's objections as was done by counsel for the defendants, Green Door and Walton, and I trust that he will not feel that his argument was slighted or not considered because I do not do so. I do intend to mention some of the major points.

28 The first of those was the note mechanism. In the preliminary discussions between representatives of Larco and the Receiver there had been some mention of the use of a note or debenture to finance a portion of the price. I think nothing turns on the contents of those precise discussions. The actual mechanism was not fully disclosed until the bid deadline and the submission of the sealed bid.

29 It is appropriate I think to consider that, in the offer which was submitted on September 3rd, para. 3 dealing with payment, after setting out provisions with respect to deposit and the taking back of mortgages, concluded with the following subparagraph:

30 And the balance of the price for the Properties shall be paid subject to adjustments to the Interim Receiver on the Escrow Closing by certified cheque or bank draft payable to the Interim Receiver drawn on or by a Canadian chartered bank or by another Canadian financial institution acceptable to the Interim Receiver.

31 When the sealed bid was submitted the note mechanism, a phrase which I shall adopt although it is not in all respects a happy one, was in the form which appears at p. 136 of the record, this by way of amendment to the offer to which I have just referred:

8. Paragraph 3 of the Form of Offer shall be amended by adding thereto the following paragraphs:

The balance of the price referred to in paragraph 3 of the Form of Offer shall be paid by Offeror to the Interim Receiver by Offeror's delivering to the Interim Receiver a promissory note ("Citibank Guaranteed Note") in that amount, which note shall be unsecured by any charge against the Properties, but which shall be absolutely and unconditionally guaranteed by one of Citibank Canada, Royal Bank of Canada or another financial institution reasonably acceptable to the Interim Receiver (which financial institution is herein referred to as "Citibank"). The said promissory note shall require equal monthly payments of principal and interest sufficient to fully amortize the said sum at the rate of 8.222% per annum over a term of thirty (30) years. Offeror shall arrange a conventional mortgage loan with Citibank or its designee (which party is herein called ("Lender") which shall be secured by a charge against the Properties which shall be subject and subordinate in all respects to the existing loans which are assumed by Offeror on the date of Closing.

The Interim Receiver shall sell the Citibank Guaranteed Note on the date of Closing to Lender for cash purchase price determined as follows:

on or before Monday, September 15th Citibank shall report in writing to the Interim Receiver stating the cash price (the "Cash Purchase Price") for the Citibank Guaranteed Note as of Wednesday, September 10, 1986. On or before

Wednesday, September 17, 1986 the Interim Receiver shall have received in form satisfactory to Interim Receiver acting reasonably an undertaking from Citibank to purchase or cause to be purchased the Citibank Guaranteed Note at the Closing at the said Cash Purchase Price as part of the escrow arrangements herein provided, subject only to the acceptance of this Offer and such reasonable warranties and representations from the Interim Receiver that he has not encumbered or accepted payment on the said note as Citibank may require. Any such sale of the Citibank Guaranteed Note by the Interim Receiver will be on a nonrecourse basis.

Any Court approval of this Agreement to be effective and acceptable to the Offeror shall also include approval of the sale by the Interim Receiver of the Citibank Guaranteed Note as herein provided.

32 The concerns of the Receiver to which this aspect of the transaction gave rise are set out, as I have indicated, in para. 38 of the report. It was, I think it is fair to say, a complicated mechanism and had some elements of novelty. In its very nature it gave rise to questions, particularly perhaps having regard for the history of these properties in the recent past. It gave rise to questions as to the reasons for its use and also as to its possible effect on the price. In my view, the questions raised by the Receiver were reasonable questions and they were not answered promptly, frankly or fully.

33 The position of Larco, in part made explicit and in part to be inferred from conduct and from the evidence, was that this was largely none of the Receiver's business. Larco was perfectly entitled to take that position. I should say by way of digression that if in any previous ruling or in these reasons I appear to be critical of what was done by Larco, it is within the limited framework of the process with which I am concerned and not otherwise. Larco is not a charitable organization. It is a commercial corporation entitled, within the limits of the law, to carry on its commercial affairs as those having the charge of those affairs deem appropriate. But if in some respects it produced adverse reactions in the Receiver, and adverse consequences for the reception of its offer, it cannot be heard to complain.

34 The next contentious item to which I propose to make reference was what has been called in the evidence the "Financing Condition". This was not part of the draft offer but was contained in the sealed bid and was set out in the following terms by way of amendment to that offer:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Offer, the obligation of the Offeror to proceed with this transaction shall be conditional upon the Offeror's obtaining written commitments, reasonably acceptable to Offeror, for the Citibank Guaranteed Note and the conventional mortgage loan from the Lender no later than twenty (20) days after Acceptance of this Offer. If Offeror does not obtain the written commitments from Citibank and the Lender within the time period of twenty (20) days, Offeror may terminate this Agreement, in which case, the Interim Receiver shall return the deposits and interest thereon to Offeror promptly following demand.

35 In my view, such a provision given the mechanism and procedure, the process which was being followed, ought to have been part of the Larco offer and subject to negotiation at the proper time and not at the 11th hour.

36 The evidence of Mr. Shiraz Lalji was to the effect that he considered the offer as merely a format for the transaction and that the real substance was to be in the sealed bid. He also testified that he had been led to believe that conditional offers would be at no disadvantage. I find it difficult to accept that evidence. The financing condition was a provision so material and of such obvious advantage to the purchaser and a commensurate disadvantage to the vendor that it went to the very root of the transaction. Indeed, as the apprehension of the Receiver indicated, it converted what purported to be an offer into what was in substance an option. I shall have to discuss further in a moment the reasons that I cannot accept Mr. Lalji's evidence in that regard. I can only say for the present that if he entertained the view which he expressed with respect to the form of offer it was a mistaken view and should have been recognized as mistaken having regard particularly for the form of the invitation to tender and of the converting letter with which that invitation went out. Whether this deferral of a term so critical was deliberate or inadvertent, I need express no conclusion. It operated, however, to the detriment of Larco in the consideration of its offer by the Receiver.

37 Eventually it was recognised by Larco that the financing condition was likely to be seriously prejudicial, if not fatal. Steps were set in train to address its removal. That removal entailed a financial cost and risk to Larco which it had sought to avoid. Approval of its board of directors was required and that approval was obtained early on the morning of September 18th, 10 days after the bid deadline. Written confirmation of that waiver is found in sch. 8 to the report, at p. 179, in a letter from Messrs. Weir & Foulds, Solicitors to Clarkson Gordon Inc. which says after some reference of a preliminary nature to the sealed bids: "Our client has instructed us to waive, and we hereby waive, the benefit of paragraph 10 to Schedule 3."

38 The evidence indicated that Mr. Carthy apparently wanted some assurances from Larco before writing that letter; an apprehension which is not difficult to understand. The Receiver has taken the position that the waiver should have come direct from Larco and not from its solicitors. I do not propose to determine as a matter of law whether the purported waiver was effectual or not, although invited in argument to do so. I do not consider it any necessary part of my function on this motion. What is to be considered is the reaction of the Receiver.

39 In a transaction of such magnitude and pertaining to a condition so material, I do not consider it in any way unreasonable that the Receiver looked upon it as one of the unfavourable elements which ultimately tipped the scales against the Larco bid. Solicitors, of course, have certain general and accepted authority to bind their clients. But the annals of law are not wanting in cases where the authority and its exercise have become a topic of litigation. And there is a maxim well-known among businessmen that no one wants to buy a lawsuit. All of this dealing with the form of the waiver I say, without any reflection upon or lack of respect for the eminently capable and reliable firm of solicitors who offered it.

40 I turn now to the question of the mortgages to be discharged which proved to be a bone of contention. In view of the mechanism of the promissory note, which was to be sold at a discount, it was essential for the Receiver to know the mortgages to be discharged in order to know the real price. The final position of Larco in this regard is contained in a letter dated September 21st from Weir & Foulds which is contained at p. 181 of the record:

#### **4. Assumed Mortgages**

By letter dated September 16, 1986, provided you with a letter explaining the "Estimated Assumed Loans" in connection with 's bids. As you may know, we have not had the opportunity to fully review all of the existing mortgages which affect the properties and make a final decision as to which existing mortgages will be assumed at closing by hereby agrees that the "Reconciled Contract Price" set forth in 's letter for each of 's bids shall be the exact cash equivalent price which the Receiver shall receive at closing from . For example, if the actual assumed mortgages are less than the amount stated by in his letter, the shortfall shall be paid by in cash at closing in order to maintain the "Reconciled Contract Price" as stated in 's letter. On the other hand, if the actual assumed mortgages are more than the amount stated by in his letter, the "Face Value of Vendor Note at Closing" will be adjusted downward in such a manner as to maintain the stated "Reconciled Contract Price" as stated by in his letter.

If further clarifications of the offers are required, please advise the undersigned.

41 It does not respond in exactly the terms in which the Receiver had put its inquiries but instead provided a mechanism for possible adjustment with respect to the mortgages assumed. Again, I do not propose to consider whether this was a satisfactory response or not. It was another complication, another blemish on the Larco offer, another factor which the Receiver not unreasonably considered to be adverse and to weigh against approval.

42 There is a further matter dealing with the utilization of the note. As I have indicated, the precise mechanism made its appearance in the sealed bid and I have already read the relevant paragraph. I do not propose to review all of the evidence, which was considerable, bearing on this topic. It is sufficient to say that the final solution unilaterally proposed by Larco is as found in the record at p. 179 in the letter from Weir & Foulds of September 18th to which I have already referred in another context. The concluding paragraph of that letter reads:

Enterprises Inc. hereby agrees to cause the Citibank Guaranteed Note to be purchased on closing on the same terms and conditions as contemplated in paragraph 8.

No reference is made to the Royal Bank who at one time had been proposed as a potential purchaser or to any other purchaser. The covenant of Larco has been substituted for that of Citibank, and as I have indicated, no purchaser has been provided or even proposed.

43 It is the position of Larco, as put in argument and in evidence, that from a commercial standpoint the purchase of the note became irrelevant once Larco had demonstrated credit capacity adequate for the transaction, as it did by a letter from Citibank dated September 9th. Larco was then, it is said, in the same position as other tenderers, obliged to pay on closing or otherwise make good. Ignoring any frailties which may be inherent in that argument, it is undeniable that it did not put the Receiver in the position which it had originally been proposed of having a bank liable to make good.

44 It has been submitted by counsel supporting the Larco offer that the requirement for a purchaser of the note had been waived by the Receiver. Again, I do not propose to dispose of waiver or estoppel as matters of law. I refer to the episode as yet another problem for the Receiver and its counsel and a problem which militated against the Larco offer.

45 In outlining initially the obligations of the court on a motion of this kind, I adverted to the question of whether the Receiver has in any way misled a bidder. It is clear that if a bidder has been misled that may constitute a circumstance upon which the court will intervene upon the motion for approval. Though it was not passed in argument, there was clear indication in the evidence, particularly that of Mr. Shiraz Lalji, that Larco had been misled as to the acceptability of a conditional offer. This was relevant to the much discussed financing condition.

46 Any suggestion that Larco was misled in this respect must be approached with a measure of skepticism. Larco is apparently a large sophisticated enterprise and those charged with its affairs appear expert in matters of contract negotiation and finance. It was advised in and about this transaction not only by members of its own board of directors but by an attorney of Seattle, Washington, Mr. Thaddas Alston. Mr. Alston testified and was quite evidently an able and experienced lawyer with a connection of some duration with the affairs of Larco. Larco was also advised by eminently capable solicitors in Toronto. It had every advantage to review and consider every aspect of the transaction.

47 Mr. Lalji testified that early in the discussions Shaver indicated that conditional offers would be considered on a par with unconditional offers. This Shaver denies and says that all he ever said was to the effect that: "We will look at all offers." The evidence of other representatives of the Receiver was that Larco was repeatedly told that a condition would be to its disadvantage.

48 It is always difficult and distasteful to a judge to have to resolve a direct conflict of evidence between what are apparently respectable and reliable witnesses. But sometimes the duty is one which cannot be avoided, and in this instance I find myself compelled to accept the evidence of Shaver and to reject that of Lalji. I do so chiefly on what is most probable. The proposition that conditional offers would be considered equally with unconditional offers is so palpably ridiculous commercially that it is difficult to credit that any sensible businessman would say it, or if said, that any sensible businessman would accept it. Indeed it is a clear inference from Mr. Lalji's evidence that he recognized that it was bizarre and had it been said I doubt very much that he would have taken it seriously.

49 It was also suggested that Larco was misled into concluding at the last stages that the Receiver was not insisting on the undertaking of the bank to purchase the note. I have already made brief reference to this. It was said that Mr. Cogan, a representative of the real estate consultant advising the Receiver, had either said so or had plainly inferred it. This Cogan denies. Cogan was responsible for the real estate aspects of the transaction and not for the legal or financial ones. If Larco received such an impression from Cogan, prudence would have dictated that the matter be verified either with Mr. Shaver or with the solicitors advising the Receiver. So much Mr. Alston conceded in his evidence. It would appear that Mr. Carthy of Weir & Foulds recognized that there was a deficiency in that regard.

50 The evidence of Mr. Zimmerman, a member of the firm of solicitors advising the Receiver, confirmed by the uncontradicted evidence of Shaver, was that on September 16th Carthy and Alson were advised during a telephone conversation that the note purchase undertaking was expected by the Receiver on the following day. It was never received.

51 Taking the evidence as a whole, I am not at all persuaded that Larco was misled in any material respect.

52 In criticism of the conduct of the Receiver, criticism which I may say has been very limited in extent, it was submitted that the Receiver negotiated with other parties after the bid deadline. Specifically reference was made to the Ivordale-Maisonettes property where a discrepancy had appeared between the words and the numerals in the offer. I am not persuaded that the resolution of the problem involved negotiation, nor that if it did it offended the process or was prejudicial to Larco.

53 There was likewise some criticism upon the undertaking of the recommended bidders to improve the offer in one respect made during the hearing. That was in respect of the equity participation. That is a matter which I must have in mind when I make my final disposition.

54 A special and somewhat peculiar position in the matter was put on behalf of the defendant Maysfield Property Management Inc. Maysfield is a corporation whose shares are effectively held by receivers appointed for two other corporations. Maysfield managed and operated the subject properties before Clarkson was appointed Receiver, and by arrangement with Clarkson continued to perform that function after the receivership commenced. It employs something over 200 persons. It has substantial worth and it has substantial revenues.

55 By letter dated October 16, 1986, Larco offered to purchase the outstanding shares in Maysfield for net book value, an offer conditional upon approval of the Larco offer by the court. If the offers recommended by the Receiver are approved, there appears to be no certainty and perhaps not even any probability of the continued viability of Maysfield.

56 In a secondary submission counsel for Maysfield asked that if an order were made as sought by the Receiver, that that order should be stayed for some period of time to enable Maysfield to negotiate with the purchaser.

57 I observe by looking at the clock that I have been going for something well over an hour at the moment, and I regret to tell everyone that I am not finished yet. I propose to take 10 minutes for my benefit and perhaps for yours as well.

58 [Court recessed 11.07 a.m. and resumed 11.19 a.m.]

59 I propose now to express some factual conclusions with respect to the matter.

60 The Larco offer is the highest bid. The difference between it and the recommended offers is substantial in absolute amount but not material in proportion or relation to the over-all amounts involved in the transaction. The difference is not such as to create any inference that the Disposition Strategy and its application by the Receiver was inadequate or unsuccessful. Indeed my conclusion would be quite to the contrary. Larco was not misled or unfairly treated by the Receiver in any material regard. The Larco offer was presented in a form and negotiated in a manner which gave the Receiver legitimate and reasonable cause for concern as to the advisability of accepting it.

61 Mr. Zimmerman very fairly conceded in his evidence that probably none of those causes was in itself fatal. I think that probably is so. They were, however, considered cumulatively by the Receiver and it was in my view legitimate and reasonable to do so.

62 In essence the position of the Receiver was this: having before it the Larco offer with the concerns about it which it entertained, having before it the offers which it now recommends which occasioned no such concerns, considering that in relative terms the difference in return was not material, the Receiver elected to recommend the somewhat lower offers which were not attended by troublesome concerns against the higher one which was. In my view the Receiver acted reasonably in doing so.

63 Unfortunately, that is not the end of the matter. The question remains in the light of the factual conclusions which I have reached and expressed, how should my discretion be exercised in the final result? Perhaps it is useful to review very briefly the propositions governing the duties of the court which I outlined earlier in my reasons. I must consider whether the Receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improperly. I must consider the interests of all parties to the action, plaintiffs and defendants alike. I must consider the efficacy and the integrity of the process by which the offers were obtained. I should consider whether there has been any unfairness in the working out of the process and in a proper case I have the power and the responsibility to disregard the recommendation of the Receiver and to approve another offer or offers.

64 Those propositions I have put in positive terms. I think some help in measuring the ambit of the court's discretion is to be had from putting certain negative propositions which are not so explicit in the cases but which I think are fairly to be inferred from them.

65 The court ought not to enter into the market-place. In this case it ought not to become involved in the implementation of the Disposition Strategy and the attendant negotiations. The court ought not to sit as on appeal from the decision of the Receiver, reviewing in minute detail every element of the process by which the decision is reached. To do so would be a futile and duplicitous exercise. The court ought not to embark on a process analogous to the trial of a claim by an unsuccessful bidder for something in the nature of specific performance. The court should not proceed against the recommendations of its Receiver except in special circumstances and where the necessity and propriety of doing so are plain. Any other rule or approach would emasculate the role of the Receiver and make it almost inevitable that the final negotiation of every sale would take place on the motion for approval.

66 In all of this it is necessary to keep in mind not only the function of the court but the function of the Receiver. The Receiver is selected and appointed having regard for experience and expertise in the duties which are involved. It is the function of the Receiver to conduct negotiations and to assess the practical business aspects of the problems involved in the disposition of the assets.

67 To put the alternative positions briefly they are these. The submission on behalf of the Receiver is that if the conclusion is that it has acted reasonably and fairly, and I would add not arbitrarily, in the best interests of the parties, I should make the order asked.

68 The submission of the objecting defendants reduced to its narrowest compass is along these lines. The Larco offer is or could by terms of the court's order be made legally susceptible of acceptance. It will produce the most money and it should be approved.

69 It is clear that to accede to the Receiver's submission will probably result in a lower return to the estate. I say "probably" because there are no certainties in this life except the classic ones often referred to. The approval of the recommended offer will clearly and plainly be detrimental to the position of Maysfield.

70 Reviewing these positions I have concluded that to accede to the position advanced by the defendants involves ignoring or at any rate acting contrary to the recommendation of the Receiver appointed by the court. It would involve me in making what is essentially a business decision, though one with some legal components: A decision of which the consequences are not in all respects predictable.

71 I am not, as I said earlier, deciding an action for breach of contract or trying a claim for specific performance. It is because of that view that I have not responded in these reasons to all of the legal arguments advanced with much force and clarity by Mr. Falby. In my view of the function which I must discharge the decision of such technical legal matters is not involved.

72 Reference was made in argument to *The Queen in right of Ontario et al. v. Ron Engineering & Construction Eastern Ltd.* (1981), 119 D.L.R. (3d) 267, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 111, 13 B.L.R. 72 (S.C.C.). In that case there were contractual rights at issue as is made clear by the reasons of Estey J. referred to at p. 274 of the report. No such contractual issues arise here. At most there are some legal questions raised as being among the concerns that led to rejection of the Larco bid.

73 The decision made by the Receiver was one to which it brought its experience and expertise for the position to which it was appointed. It was a decision upon which the Receiver had the advice of solicitors and counsel and of an expert real estate consultant retained for the purpose. It was a decision from which the Receiver did not resile at the conclusion of two weeks of hearing.

74 It is clear on the one hand that the court is not to apply an automatic stamp of approval to the decision of the Receiver. Plainly, the court has power to decide differently and a discretion to exercise which must be exercised judicially.

75 The court no doubt has power to enter into the process to any extent which appears proper in the circumstances. In *Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal et al.* (1985), 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473, 65 A.R. 372, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, to which I have referred, the judge in chambers actually received bids.

76 In this case it was suggested by counsel for some of the objecting defendants that the court conduct a run-off or direct the Receiver to do so between the Larco and the recommended offerors. I have no doubt that I have the power to do so. To exercise it would, in my view, exhibit very little judgment. It would be to open a Pandora's box, the contents of which might be more unruly and unpredictable than the consequences which followed my decision to hear *viva voce* evidence in this case.

77 It is equally clear, in my view, though perhaps not so clearly enunciated, that it is only in an exceptional case that the court will intervene and proceed contrary to the Receiver's recommendations if satisfied, as I am, that the Receiver has acted reasonably, prudently and fairly and not arbitrarily.

78 Much was said during the hearing about the integrity of the process, that is, the process carried through by the Receiver pursuant to the July order made by Catzman J., and whether Larco had abused or evaded or sought to abuse or evade it. The Receiver perceived, not unreasonably in my view, that that was so. Certainly it must be said that Larco fell somewhat short of coming forward promptly, openly, forthrightly and unequivocally with its best offer, an objective at which the process was directed.

79 In the arguments of counsel for the objecting defendants, particularly for the defendant Prousky, the process was very narrowly defined; virtually confined to the precise provisions of the plan approved by the court. I do not consider it appropriate to view it so narrowly or that the ambit of the Receiver's discretion should be so narrowly limited.

80 In addition to the regard which must be had for the process in this case, there is another similar factor for which I must have regard. It was adverted to by Saunders J. in the two cases of *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245, and *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237, which have been referred to in the argument. It was also reflected in the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decision in *Cameron*. In all of those cases the courts have recognized that they are not making a decision in a vacuum; that they were concerned with the process not only as it affected the case at bar, but as it stood to be effected in situations of a similar nature in the future. In what was called by MacDonald J. A. in *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia et al.* (1981), 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 86 A.P.R. 303, "the delicate balance of competing interests", that is a relevant and material one.

81 In this case I am reviewing the recommendations of the Receiver. I have had the benefit of two weeks of hearing and the assistance of a dozen learned counsel, advantages which were denied to the Receiver.

82 If I were persuaded, and I am not, to conclude that as a result of this hearing the objections of the Receiver had been fully and satisfactorily met, I should still have much hesitation in rejecting the Receiver's recommendation.

83 Its decision was made as a matter of business judgment on the elements then available to it. It is of the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them to act seriously and responsibly so as to be prepared to stand behind them.

84 If the court were to reject the recommendation of the Receiver in any but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception of receivers and in the perception

of any others who might have occasion to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by court-appointed receivers.

85 Plainly, each case must be decided upon its own facts, and with a view to producing a proper result within the legal framework to which I have made reference. Such policy considerations as I have just enunciated are, as they were said to be by Saunders J., secondary, but they are none the less relevant and material.

86 During the time which I have spent considering this matter, I have asked myself many times what the situation would have been had we been dealing with hundreds of thousands of dollars, rather than hundreds of millions, and a potential difference in the result potentially reduced accordingly. I have asked myself whether I would have had any difficulty in arriving at a conclusion and have found myself forced to answer that question in the negative. It is a well-worn adage among lawyers and judges that hard cases make bad law. Perhaps there is a corollary proposition that large cases have a tendency to do the same sort of thing.

87 The actual difference between the offers under consideration, I am repeating myself, is substantial. It is that alone which has really created the issue before me. While the actual difference is a factor of much weight, it must also be viewed in its relative relation to the size of the transaction. No doubt, as the cases have indicated, situations might arise where the disparity was so great as to call in question the adequacy of the mechanism which had produced the offers. It is not so here, and in my view that is substantially an end of the matter.

88 The importance of this motion, and the measure of interest which it has for the parties and for the public, might have made desirable a period under reserve of sufficient duration to permit the writing of formal reasons for judgment. The circumstances related to the prospective sales were such that prompt disposition of the motion seemed more important than elegance of expression. The worst grammatical solecisms will be massaged out in the editorial process. As to the substance of the reasons, I feel as much confidence as is possible when one is dealing with matters of difficulty, of importance and of some notoriety.

89 There will be orders as asked upon the motion approving the sales. I presume that there will be some mechanical matters to be dealt with before we all part and I invite counsel, I guess first of all Mr. Lamek, to suggest whether it would be appropriate that I adjourn for a few moments while those matters be considered and discussed, or whether I should proceed to deal with them immediately.

MR. LAMEK: I suggest a short adjournment might be useful, My Lord. On the possibility that your lordship would take the view of this matter that you have expressed this morning a revised draft order was prepared to take into account the matters that occurred during the course of the hearing. We have not been so bold as to distribute that to other counsel in advance. Having not seen the revised draft, and of course neither has your lordship, it might be helpful if we do and until your lordship has a good look at the draft.

HIS LORDSHIP: Does it make any disposition as to costs, Mr. Lamek.

MR. LAMEK: I did not, my lord.

HIS LORDSHIP: If you will be kind enough to send my copy of it through the Registrar, I will recess now for what, 15 minutes?

MR. LAMEK: I think that should be sufficient, my lord, yes. If it is not perhaps ...

HIS LORDSHIP: You can let me know?

MR. LAMEK: Thank you, my lord.

90 [Court recessed 11.45 a.m. and resumed 12.07 p.m. Counsel made submissions as to costs.]

HIS LORDSHIP: There will be no order as to costs. Mr. Strosberg's argument, as usual, makes good sense and I would be hard put to disagree that a measure of benefit has flowed from the proceedings.

91 At the same time, I think it fair to observe that the objecting defendants were not proceeding *pro bono publico*, and I see no sufficient reason that their participation should be other than at their own expense.

92 Before I depart from the matter I should, which I normally do at the outset before anybody knows whether they have won or lost, record my gratitude to counsel for their assistance in dealing with the matter and for the orderly conduct of the proceedings throughout.

93 *Motion granted.*

#### Footnotes

1 Enterprises was the initial name used for Larco Enterprises Inc.

# TAB 13

Alberta Rules

Alta. Reg. 124/2010 — Alberta Rules of Court

Part 6 — Resolving Issues and Preserving Rights

Division 4 — Restriction on Media Reporting and Public Access to Court Proceedings

**Most Recently Cited in:** *Dyck v. Dyck*, 2023 ABKB 405, 2023 CarswellAlta 1785, [2023] A.W.L.D. 2817 | (Alta. K.B., Jul 5, 2023)

Alta. Reg. 124/2010, s. 6.28

## s 6.28 Application of this Division

### Currency

#### **6.28 Application of this Division**

Unless an enactment otherwise provides or the Court otherwise orders, this Division applies to an application for an order

- (a) to ban publication of court proceedings,
- (b) to seal or partially seal a court file,
- (c) permitting a person to give evidence in a way that prevents that person or another person from being identified,
- (d) for a hearing from which the public is excluded, or
- (e) for use of a pseudonym.

#### **Currency**

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Alberta Rules

Alta. Reg. 124/2010 — Alberta Rules of Court

Part 6 — Resolving Issues and Preserving Rights

Division 4 — Restriction on Media Reporting and Public Access to Court Proceedings

**Most Recently Cited in:** [Dyck v. Dyck](#), 2023 ABKB 405, 2023 CarswellAlta 1785, [2023] A.W.L.D. 2817 | (Alta. K.B., Jul 5, 2023)

Alta. Reg. 124/2010, s. 6.29

## s 6.29 Restricted court access applications and orders

### Currency

#### **6.29 Restricted court access applications and orders**

An application under this Division is to be known as a restricted court access application and an order made under this Division is to be known as a restricted court access order.

#### **Currency**

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Alberta Rules

Alta. Reg. 124/2010 — Alberta Rules of Court

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Division 4 — Restriction on Media Reporting and Public Access to Court Proceedings

**Most Recently Cited in:** [Dyck v. Dyck](#), 2023 ABKB 405, 2023 CarswellAlta 1785, [2023] A.W.L.D. 2817 | (Alta. K.B., Jul 5, 2023)

Alta. Reg. 124/2010, s. 6.30

## s 6.30 When restricted court access application may be filed

### Currency

#### **6.30 When restricted court access application may be filed**

A person may file a restricted court access application only if the Court has authority to make a restricted court access order under an enactment or at common law.

#### **Amendment History**

Alta. Reg. 194/2020, s. 2

#### **Currency**

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Alberta Rules

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**Most Recently Cited in:** [Dyck v. Dyck](#), 2023 ABKB 405, 2023 CarswellAlta 1785, [2023] A.W.L.D. 2817 | (Alta. K.B., Jul 5, 2023)

Alta. Reg. 124/2010, s. 6.31

## s 6.31 Timing of application and service

### Currency

#### **6.31 Timing of application and service**

An applicant for a restricted court access order must, 5 days or more before the date scheduled for the hearing, trial or proceeding in respect of which the order is sought,

- (a) file the application in Form 32, and
- (b) unless the Court otherwise orders, serve every party and any other person named or described by the Court.

#### **Currency**

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Alta. Reg. 124/2010 — Alberta Rules of Court

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Division 4 — Restriction on Media Reporting and Public Access to Court Proceedings

**Most Recently Cited in:** [Dyck v. Dyck](#), 2023 ABKB 405, 2023 CarswellAlta 1785, [2023] A.W.L.D. 2817 | (Alta. K.B., Jul 5, 2023)

Alta. Reg. 124/2010, s. 6.32

s 6.32 Notice to media

[Currency](#)

**6.32 Notice to media**

When a restricted court access application is filed, a copy of it must be served on the court clerk, who must, in accordance with the direction of the Chief Justice, give notice of the application to

- (a) the electronic and print media identified or described by the Chief Justice, and
- (b) any other person named by the Court.

**Amendment History**

Alta. Reg. 163/2010, s. 3

**Currency**

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**Most Recently Cited in:** [Dyck v. Dyck](#), 2023 ABKB 405, 2023 CarswellAlta 1785, [2023] A.W.L.D. 2817 | (Alta. K.B., Jul 5, 2023)

Alta. Reg. 124/2010, s. 6.33

## s 6.33 Judge or applications judge assigned to application

### Currency

#### **6.33 Judge or applications judge assigned to application**

A restricted court access application must be heard and decided by

- (a) the judge or applications judge assigned to hear the application, trial or other proceeding in respect of which the restricted court access order is sought,
- (b) if the assigned judge or applications judge is not available or no judge or applications judge has been assigned, the case management judge for the action, or
- (c) if there is no judge or applications judge available to hear the application as set out in clause (a) or (b), the Chief Justice or a judge designated for the purpose by the Chief Justice.

#### **Amendment History**

Alta. Reg. 194/2020, s. 3; 136/2022, s. 1(5)

#### **Currency**

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Alta. Reg. 124/2010, s. 6.34

## s 6.34 Application to seal or unseal court files

### Currency

#### **6.34 Application to seal or unseal court files**

**6.34(1)** An application to seal an entire court file or an application to set aside all or any part of an order to seal a court file must be filed.

**6.34(2)** The application must be made to

- (a) the Chief Justice, or
- (b) a judge designated to hear applications under subrule (1) by the Chief Justice.

**6.34(3)** The Court may direct

- (a) on whom the application must be served and when,
- (b) how the application is to be served, and
- (c) any other matter that the circumstances require.

#### **Currency**

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Alta. Reg. 124/2010 — Alberta Rules of Court

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Alta. Reg. 124/2010, s. 6.35

## s 6.35 Persons having standing at application

### Currency

#### **6.35 Persons having standing at application**

The following persons have standing to be heard when a restricted court access application is considered

- (a) a person who was served or given notice of the application;
- (b) any other person recognized by the Court who claims to have an interest in the application, trial or proceeding and whom the Court permits to be heard.

#### **Currency**

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Alberta Rules

Alta. Reg. 124/2010 — Alberta Rules of Court

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Alta. Reg. 124/2010, s. 6.36

## s 6.36 Confidentiality of information

### Currency

#### **6.36 Confidentiality of information**

Information that is the subject of the initial restricted court access application must not be published without the Court's permission.

#### **Currency**

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# TAB 14

**Most Negative Treatment:** Distinguished

**Most Recent Distinguished:** [Party A v. The Law Society of British Columbia](#) | 2021 BCCA 130, 2021 CarswellBC 872, 48 B.C.L.R. (6th) 238, 83 Admin. L.R. (6th) 250, [2021] 9 W.W.R. 379, 329 A.C.W.S. (3d) 457, 458 D.L.R. (4th) 77 | (B.C. C.A., Mar 29, 2021)

2002 SCC 41, 2002 CSC 41  
Supreme Court of Canada

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)

2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CSC 41, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, [2002] S.C.J. No. 42, 113 A.C.W.S. (3d) 36, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 287 N.R. 203, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, J.E. 2002-803, REJB 2002-30902

**Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Appellant v. Sierra Club of Canada, Respondent and The Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada, Respondents**

McLachlin C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel JJ.

Heard: November 6, 2001  
Judgment: April 26, 2002  
Docket: 28020

Proceedings: reversing (2000), 2000 CarswellNat 970, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note), 2000 CarswellNat 3271, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732 (Fed. C.A.); affirming (1999), 1999 CarswellNat 2187, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 1999 CarswellNat 3038, 179 F.T.R. 283, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1633 (Fed. T.D.)

Counsel: *J. Brett Ledger* and *Peter Chapin*, for appellant

*Timothy J. Howard* and *Franklin S. Gertler*, for respondent Sierra Club of Canada

*Graham Garton, Q.C.*, and *J. Sanderson Graham*, for respondents Minister of Finance of Canada, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Minister of International Trade of Canada, and Attorney General of Canada

Subject: Intellectual Property; Property; Civil Practice and Procedure; Evidence; Environmental

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Civil practice and procedure

XII Discovery

XII.2 Discovery of documents

XII.2.h Privileged document

XII.2.h.xiii Miscellaneous

Civil practice and procedure

XII Discovery

XII.4 Examination for discovery

XII.4.h Range of examination

XII.4.h.ix Privilege

XII.4.h.ix.F Miscellaneous

Evidence

XIV Privilege

XIV.8 Public interest immunity

#### XIV.8.a Crown privilege

##### Headnote

Evidence --- Documentary evidence — Privilege as to documents — Miscellaneous documents

Confidentiality order was necessary in this case because disclosure of confidential documents would impose serious risk on important commercial interest of Crown corporation and there were no reasonable alternative measures to granting of order — Confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on Crown corporation's right to fair trial and on freedom of expression — Deleterious effects of confidentiality order on open court principle and freedom of expression would be minimal — Salutary effects of order outweighed deleterious effects — Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, s. 5(1)(b) — [Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, R. 151, 312.](#)

Practice --- Discovery — Discovery of documents — Privileged document — Miscellaneous privileges

Confidentiality order was necessary in this case because disclosure of confidential documents would impose serious risk on important commercial interest of Crown corporation and there were no reasonable alternative measures to granting of order — Confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on Crown corporation's right to fair trial and on freedom of expression — Deleterious effects of confidentiality order on open court principle and freedom of expression would be minimal — Salutary effects of order outweighed deleterious effects — Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, s. 5(1)(b) — [Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, R. 151, 312.](#)

Practice --- Discovery — Examination for discovery — Range of examination — Privilege — Miscellaneous privileges

Confidentiality order was necessary in this case because disclosure of confidential documents would impose serious risk on important commercial interest of Crown corporation and there were no reasonable alternative measures to granting of order — Confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on Crown corporation's right to fair trial and on freedom of expression — Deleterious effects of confidentiality order on open court principle and freedom of expression would be minimal — Salutary effects of order outweighed deleterious effects — Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, s. 5(1)(b) — [Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, R. 151, 312.](#)

Preuve --- Preuve documentaire — Confidentialité en ce qui concerne les documents — Documents divers

Ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels menacerait gravement l'intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'y avait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance — Ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression — Ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression — Effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables — Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 5(1)(b) — Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106, r. 151, 312.

Procédure --- Communication de la preuve — Communication des documents — Documents confidentiels — Divers types de confidentialité

Ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels menacerait gravement l'intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'y avait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance — Ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression — Ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression — Effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables — Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 5(1)(b) — Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106, r. 151, 312.

Procédure --- Communication de la preuve — Interrogatoire préalable — Étendue de l'interrogatoire — Confidentialité — Divers types de confidentialité

Ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels menacerait gravement l'intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'y avait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance — Ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression — Ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression — Effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables — Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 5(1)(b) — Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106, r. 151, 312.

The federal government provided a Crown corporation with a \$1.5 billion loan for the construction and sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to China. An environmental organization sought judicial review of that decision, maintaining that the authorization of financial assistance triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*. The Crown corporation was an intervenor with the rights of a party in the application for judicial review. The Crown corporation filed an affidavit by a senior manager referring to and summarizing confidential documents. Before cross-examining the senior manager, the environmental organization applied for production of the documents. After receiving authorization from the Chinese authorities to disclose the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, the Crown corporation sought to introduce the documents under [R. 312 of the \*Federal Court Rules, 1998\*](#) and requested a confidentiality order. The confidentiality order would make the documents available only to the parties and the court but would not restrict public access to the proceedings.

The trial judge refused to grant the order and ordered the Crown corporation to file the documents in their current form, or in an edited version if it chose to do so. The Crown corporation appealed under [R. 151 of the \*Federal Court Rules, 1998\*](#) and the environmental organization cross-appealed under [R. 312](#). The majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the cross-appeal. The confidentiality order would have been granted by the dissenting judge. The Crown corporation appealed.

**Held:** The appeal was allowed.

Publication bans and confidentiality orders, in the context of judicial proceedings, are similar. The analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under [R. 151](#) should echo the underlying principles set out in *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.). A confidentiality order under [R. 151](#) should be granted in only two circumstances, when an order is needed to prevent serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk, and when the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which includes public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

The alternatives to the confidentiality order suggested by the Trial Division and Court of Appeal were problematic. Expunging the documents would be a virtually unworkable and ineffective solution. Providing summaries was not a reasonable alternative measure to having the underlying documents available to the parties. The confidentiality order was necessary in that disclosure of the documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the Crown corporation, and there were no reasonable alternative measures to granting the order.

The confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on the Crown corporation's right to a fair trial and on freedom of expression. The deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on the open court principle and freedom of expression would be minimal. If the order was not granted and in the course of the judicial review application the Crown corporation was not required to mount a defence under the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, it was possible that the Crown corporation would suffer the harm of having disclosed confidential information in breach of its obligations with no corresponding benefit to the right of the public to freedom of expression. The salutary effects of the order outweighed the deleterious effects.

Le gouvernement fédéral a fait un prêt de l'ordre de 1,5 milliards de dollar en rapport avec la construction et la vente par une société d'État de deux réacteurs nucléaires CANDU à la Chine. Un organisme environnemental a sollicité le contrôle judiciaire de cette décision, soutenant que cette autorisation d'aide financière avait déclenché l'application de l'art. 5(1)(b) de la *Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale*. La société d'État était intervenante au débat et elle avait reçu les droits de partie dans la demande de contrôle judiciaire. Elle a déposé l'affidavit d'un cadre supérieur dans lequel ce dernier faisait référence à certains documents confidentiels et en faisait le résumé. L'organisme environnemental a demandé la production des documents avant de procéder au contre-interrogatoire du cadre supérieur. Après avoir obtenu l'autorisation des autorités chinoises de communiquer les documents à la condition qu'ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité, la société d'État a cherché à les introduire en invoquant la [r. 312 des \*Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998\*](#), et elle a aussi demandé une ordonnance de confidentialité. Selon les termes de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, les documents seraient uniquement mis à la disposition des parties et du tribunal, mais l'accès du public aux débats ne serait pas interdit.

Le juge de première instance a refusé l'ordonnance de confidentialité et a ordonné à la société d'État de déposer les documents sous leur forme actuelle ou sous une forme révisée, à son gré. La société d'État a interjeté appel en vertu de la [r. 151 des \*Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998\*](#), et l'organisme environnemental a formé un appel incident en vertu de la [r. 312](#). Les juges majoritaires de la Cour d'appel ont rejeté le pourvoi et le pourvoi incident. Le juge dissident aurait accordé l'ordonnance de confidentialité. La société d'État a interjeté appel.

**Arrêt:** Le pourvoi a été accueilli.

Il y a de grandes ressemblances entre l'ordonnance de non-publication et l'ordonnance de confidentialité dans le contexte des procédures judiciaires. L'analyse de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire sous le régime de la r. 151 devrait refléter les principes sous-jacents énoncés dans l'arrêt *Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada*, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835. Une ordonnance de confidentialité rendue en vertu de la r. 151 ne devrait l'être que lorsque: 1) une telle ordonnance est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le cadre d'un litige, en l'absence d'autres solutions raisonnables pour écarter ce risque; et 2) les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, y compris les effets sur les droits des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris les effets sur le droit à la liberté d'expression, lequel droit comprend l'intérêt du public à l'accès aux débats judiciaires.

Les solutions proposées par la Division de première instance et par la Cour d'appel comportaient toutes deux des problèmes. Épurier les documents serait virtuellement impraticable et inefficace. Fournir des résumés des documents ne constituait pas une « autre option raisonnable » à la communication aux parties des documents de base. L'ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la communication des documents menacerait gravement un intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'existait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance.

L'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait d'importants effets bénéfiques sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression. Elle n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimales sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression. Advenant que l'ordonnance ne soit pas accordée et que, dans le cadre de la demande de contrôle judiciaire, la société d'État n'ait pas l'obligation de présenter une défense en vertu de la *Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale*, il se pouvait que la société d'État subisse un préjudice du fait d'avoir communiqué cette information confidentielle en violation de ses obligations, sans avoir pu profiter d'un avantage similaire à celui du droit du public à la liberté d'expression. Les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables.

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- AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)*, 2000 CarswellNat 356, 5 C.P.R. (4th) 149, 253 N.R. 284, [2000] 3 F.C. 360, 2000 CarswellNat 3254 (Fed. C.A.) — considered
- Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, 2 C.R. (5th) 1, 110 C.C.C. (3d) 193, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, 139 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 182 N.B.R. (2d) 81, 463 A.P.R. 81, 39 C.R.R. (2d) 189, 203 N.R. 169, 1996 CarswellNB 462, 1996 CarswellNB 463, 2 B.H.R.C. 210 (S.C.C.) — followed
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s. 1 — referred to

s. 2(b) — referred to

s. 11(d) — referred to

*Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, S.C. 1992, c. 37

Generally — considered

s. 5(1)(b) — referred to

s. 8 — referred to

s. 54 — referred to

s. 54(2)(b) — referred to

*Criminal Code*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46

s. 486(1) — referred to

**Rules considered:**

*Federal Court Rules, 1998*, SOR/98-106

R. 151 — considered

R. 312 — referred to

APPEAL from judgment reported at 2000 CarswellNat 970, 2000 CarswellNat 3271, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note) (Fed. C.A.), dismissing appeal from judgment reported at 1999 CarswellNat 2187, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 1999 CarswellNat 3038, 179 F.T.R. 283 (Fed. T.D.), granting application in part.

POURVOI à l'encontre de l'arrêt publié à 2000 CarswellNat 970, 2000 CarswellNat 3271, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note) (C.A. Féd.), qui a rejeté le pourvoi à l'encontre du jugement publié à 1999 CarswellNat 2187, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 1999 CarswellNat 3038, 179 F.T.R. 283 (C.F. (1<sup>re</sup> inst.)), qui avait accueilli en partie la demande.

**The judgment of the court was delivered by Iacobucci J.:****I. Introduction**

1 In our country, courts are the institutions generally chosen to resolve legal disputes as best they can through the application of legal principles to the facts of the case involved. One of the underlying principles of the judicial process is public openness, both in the proceedings of the dispute, and in the material that is relevant to its resolution. However, some material can be made the subject of a confidentiality order. This appeal raises the important issues of when, and under what circumstances, a confidentiality order should be granted.

2 For the following reasons, I would issue the confidentiality order sought and, accordingly, would allow the appeal.

## II. Facts

3 The appellant, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. ("AECL"), is a Crown corporation that owns and markets CANDU nuclear technology, and is an intervener with the rights of a party in the application for judicial review by the respondent, the Sierra Club of Canada ("Sierra Club"). Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government's decision to provide financial assistance in the form of a \$1.5 billion guaranteed loan relating to the construction and sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to China by the appellant. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where the appellant is the main contractor and project manager.

4 The respondent maintains that the authorization of financial assistance by the government triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, S.C. 1992, c. 37 ("CEAA"), which requires that an environmental assessment be undertaken before a federal authority grants financial assistance to a project. Failure to undertake such an assessment compels cancellation of the financial arrangements.

5 The appellant and the respondent Ministers argue that the CEAA does not apply to the loan transaction, and that if it does, the statutory defences available under ss. 8 and 54 apply. Section 8 describes the circumstances where Crown corporations are required to conduct environmental assessments. Section 54(2)(b) recognizes the validity of an environmental assessment carried out by a foreign authority provided that it is consistent with the provisions of the CEAA.

6 In the course of the application by Sierra Club to set aside the funding arrangements, the appellant filed an affidavit of Dr. Simon Pang, a senior manager of the appellant. In the affidavit, Dr. Pang referred to and summarized certain documents (the "Confidential Documents"). The Confidential Documents are also referred to in an affidavit prepared by Dr. Feng, one of AECL's experts. Prior to cross-examining Dr. Pang on his affidavit, Sierra Club made an application for the production of the Confidential Documents, arguing that it could not test Dr. Pang's evidence without access to the underlying documents. The appellant resisted production on various grounds, including the fact that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have authority to disclose them. After receiving authorization by the Chinese authorities to disclose the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, the appellant sought to introduce the Confidential Documents under R. 312 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106*, and requested a confidentiality order in respect of the documents.

7 Under the terms of the order requested, the Confidential Documents would only be made available to the parties and the court; however, there would be no restriction on public access to the proceedings. In essence, what is being sought is an order preventing the dissemination of the Confidential Documents to the public.

8 The Confidential Documents comprise two Environmental Impact Reports on Siting and Construction Design (the "EIRs"), a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (the "PSAR"), and the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang, which summarizes the contents of the EIRs and the PSAR. If admitted, the EIRs and the PSAR would be attached as exhibits to the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang. The EIRs were prepared by the Chinese authorities in the Chinese language, and the PSAR was prepared by the appellant with assistance from the Chinese participants in the project. The documents contain a mass of technical information and comprise thousands of pages. They describe the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities under Chinese law.

9 As noted, the appellant argues that it cannot introduce the Confidential Documents into evidence without a confidentiality order; otherwise, it would be in breach of its obligations to the Chinese authorities. The respondent's position is that its right to cross-examine Dr. Pang and Dr. Feng on their affidavits would be effectively rendered nugatory in the absence of the supporting documents to which the affidavits referred. Sierra Club proposes to take the position that the affidavits should therefore be afforded very little weight by the judge hearing the application for judicial review.

10 The Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, refused to grant the confidentiality order and the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In his dissenting opinion, Robertson J.A. would have granted the confidentiality order.

### III. Relevant Statutory Provisions

#### 11 *Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106*

151.(1) On motion, the Court may order that material to be filed shall be treated as confidential.

(2) Before making an order under subsection (1), the Court must be satisfied that the material should be treated as confidential, notwithstanding the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

### IV. Judgments below

#### *A. Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, [2000] 2 F.C. 400*

12 Pelletier J. first considered whether leave should be granted pursuant to R. 312 to introduce the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang to which the Confidential Documents were filed as exhibits. In his view, the underlying question was that of relevance, and he concluded that the documents were relevant to the issue of the appropriate remedy. Thus, in the absence of prejudice to the respondent, the affidavit should be permitted to be served and filed. He noted that the respondents would be prejudiced by delay, but since both parties had brought interlocutory motions which had contributed to the delay, the desirability of having the entire record before the court outweighed the prejudice arising from the delay associated with the introduction of the documents.

13 On the issue of confidentiality, Pelletier J. concluded that he must be satisfied that the need for confidentiality was greater than the public interest in open court proceedings, and observed that the argument for open proceedings in this case was significant given the public interest in Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology. As well, he noted that a confidentiality order was an exception to the rule of open access to the courts, and that such an order should be granted only where absolutely necessary.

14 Pelletier J. applied the same test as that used in patent litigation for the issue of a protective order, which is essentially a confidentiality order. The granting of such an order requires the appellant to show a subjective belief that the information is confidential and that its interests would be harmed by disclosure. In addition, if the order is challenged, then the person claiming the benefit of the order must demonstrate objectively that the order is required. This objective element requires the party to show that the information has been treated as confidential, and that it is reasonable to believe that its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could be harmed by the disclosure of the information.

15 Concluding that both the subjective part and both elements of the objective part of the test had been satisfied, he nevertheless stated: "However, I am also of the view that in public law cases, the objective test has, or should have, a third component which is whether the public interest in disclosure exceeds the risk of harm to a party arising from disclosure" (para. 23).

16 A very significant factor, in his view, was the fact that mandatory production of documents was not in issue here. The fact that the application involved a voluntary tendering of documents to advance the appellant's own cause as opposed to mandatory production weighed against granting the confidentiality order.

17 In weighing the public interest in disclosure against the risk of harm to AECL arising from disclosure, Pelletier J. noted that the documents the appellant wished to put before the court were prepared by others for other purposes, and recognized that the appellant was bound to protect the confidentiality of the information. At this stage, he again considered the issue of materiality. If the documents were shown to be very material to a critical issue, "the requirements of justice militate in favour of a confidentiality order. If the documents are marginally relevant, then the voluntary nature of the production argues against a confidentiality order" (para. 29). He then decided that the documents were material to a question of the appropriate remedy, a significant issue in the event that the appellant failed on the main issue.

18 Pelletier J. also considered the context of the case and held that since the issue of Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology was one of significant public interest, the burden of justifying a confidentiality order was very onerous. He found

that AECL could expunge the sensitive material from the documents, or put the evidence before the court in some other form, and thus maintain its full right of defence while preserving the open access to court proceedings.

19 Pelletier J. observed that his order was being made without having perused the Confidential Documents because they had not been put before him. Although he noted the line of cases which holds that a judge ought not to deal with the issue of a confidentiality order without reviewing the documents themselves, in his view, given their voluminous nature and technical content as well as his lack of information as to what information was already in the public domain, he found that an examination of these documents would not have been useful.

20 Pelletier J. ordered that the appellant could file the documents in current form, or in an edited version if it chose to do so. He also granted leave to file material dealing with the Chinese regulatory process in general and as applied to this project, provided it did so within 60 days.

***B. Federal Court of Appeal, [2000] 4 F.C. 426***

*(1) Evans J.A. (Sharlow J.A. concurring)*

21 At the Federal Court of Appeal, AECL appealed the ruling under [R. 151 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998](#), and Sierra Club cross-appealed the ruling under [R. 312](#).

22 With respect to [R. 312](#), Evans J.A. held that the documents were clearly relevant to a defence under s. 54(2)(b), which the appellant proposed to raise if s. 5(1)(b) of the CEAA was held to apply, and were also potentially relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion to refuse a remedy even if the Ministers were in breach of the CEAA. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the benefit to the appellant and the court of being granted leave to file the documents outweighed any prejudice to the respondent owing to delay and thus concluded that the motions judge was correct in granting leave under [R. 312](#).

23 On the issue of the confidentiality order, Evans J.A. considered [R. 151](#), and all the factors that the motions judge had weighed, including the commercial sensitivity of the documents, the fact that the appellant had received them in confidence from the Chinese authorities, and the appellant's argument that without the documents it could not mount a full answer and defence to the application. These factors had to be weighed against the principle of open access to court documents. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the weight to be attached to the public interest in open proceedings varied with context and held that, where a case raises issues of public significance, the principle of openness of judicial process carries greater weight as a factor in the balancing process. Evans J.A. noted the public interest in the subject matter of the litigation, as well as the considerable media attention it had attracted.

24 In support of his conclusion that the weight assigned to the principle of openness may vary with context, Evans J.A. relied upon the decisions in *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)*, [\[2000\] 3 F.C. 360](#) (Fed. C.A.), where the court took into consideration the relatively small public interest at stake, and *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), [17 C.P.C. \(4th\) 278](#) (Ont. Gen. Div.), at p. 283, where the court ordered disclosure after determining that the case was a significant constitutional case where it was important for the public to understand the issues at stake. Evans J.A. observed that openness and public participation in the assessment process are fundamental to the CEAA, and concluded that the motions judge could not be said to have given the principle of openness undue weight even though confidentiality was claimed for a relatively small number of highly technical documents.

25 Evans J.A. held that the motions judge had placed undue emphasis on the fact that the introduction of the documents was voluntary; however, it did not follow that his decision on the confidentiality order must therefore be set aside. Evans J.A. was of the view that this error did not affect the ultimate conclusion for three reasons. First, like the motions judge, he attached great weight to the principle of openness. Secondly, he held that the inclusion in the affidavits of a summary of the reports could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals, should the appellant choose not to put them in without a confidentiality order. Finally, if AECL submitted the documents in an expunged fashion, the claim for confidentiality would rest upon a relatively unimportant factor, i.e., the appellant's claim that it would suffer a loss of business if it breached its undertaking with the Chinese authorities.

26 Evans J.A. rejected the argument that the motions judge had erred in deciding the motion without reference to the actual documents, stating that it was not necessary for him to inspect them, given that summaries were available and that the documents were highly technical and incompletely translated. Thus, the appeal and cross-appeal were both dismissed.

(2) *Robertson J.A. (dissenting)*

27 Robertson J.A. disagreed with the majority for three reasons. First, in his view, the level of public interest in the case, the degree of media coverage, and the identities of the parties should not be taken into consideration in assessing an application for a confidentiality order. Instead, he held that it was the nature of the evidence for which the order is sought that must be examined.

28 In addition, he found that without a confidentiality order, the appellant had to choose between two unacceptable options: either suffering irreparable financial harm if the confidential information was introduced into evidence or being denied the right to a fair trial because it could not mount a full defence if the evidence was not introduced.

29 Finally, he stated that the analytical framework employed by the majority in reaching its decision was fundamentally flawed as it was based largely on the subjective views of the motions judge. He rejected the contextual approach to the question of whether a confidentiality order should issue, emphasizing the need for an objective framework to combat the perception that justice is a relative concept, and to promote consistency and certainty in the law.

30 To establish this more objective framework for regulating the issuance of confidentiality orders pertaining to commercial and scientific information, he turned to the legal rationale underlying the commitment to the principle of open justice, referring to *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 (S.C.C.). There, the Supreme Court of Canada held that open proceedings foster the search for the truth, and reflect the importance of public scrutiny of the courts.

31 Robertson J.A. stated that, although the principle of open justice is a reflection of the basic democratic value of accountability in the exercise of judicial power, in his view, the principle that justice itself must be secured is paramount. He concluded that justice as an overarching principle means that exceptions occasionally must be made to rules or principles.

32 He observed that, in the area of commercial law, when the information sought to be protected concerns "trade secrets," this information will not be disclosed during a trial if to do so would destroy the owner's proprietary rights and expose him or her to irreparable harm in the form of financial loss. Although the case before him did not involve a trade secret, he nevertheless held that the same treatment could be extended to commercial or scientific information which was acquired on a confidential basis and attached the following criteria as conditions precedent to the issuance of a confidentiality order (at para. 13):

(1) the information is of a confidential nature as opposed to facts which one would like to keep confidential; (2) the information for which confidentiality is sought is not already in the public domain; (3) on a balance of probabilities the party seeking the confidentiality order would suffer irreparable harm if the information were made public; (4) the information is relevant to the legal issues raised in the case; (5) correlatively, the information is "necessary" to the resolution of those issues; (6) the granting of a confidentiality order does not unduly prejudice the opposing party; and (7) the public interest in open court proceedings does not override the private interests of the party seeking the confidentiality order. The onus in establishing that criteria one to six are met is on the party seeking the confidentiality order. Under the seventh criterion, it is for the opposing party to show that a *prima facie* right to a protective order has been overtaken by the need to preserve the openness of the court proceedings. In addressing these criteria one must bear in mind two of the threads woven into the fabric of the principle of open justice: the search for truth and the preservation of the rule of law. As stated at the outset, I do not believe that the perceived degree of public importance of a case is a relevant consideration.

33 In applying these criteria to the circumstances of the case, Robertson J.A. concluded that the confidentiality order should be granted. In his view, the public interest in open court proceedings did not override the interests of AECL in maintaining the confidentiality of these highly technical documents.

34 Robertson J.A. also considered the public interest in the need to ensure that site-plans for nuclear installations were not, for example, posted on a web-site. He concluded that a confidentiality order would not undermine the two primary objectives underlying the principle of open justice: truth and the rule of law. As such, he would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

## V. Issues

35

A. What is the proper analytical approach to be applied to the exercise of judicial discretion where a litigant seeks a confidentiality order under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*?

B. Should the confidentiality order be granted in this case?

## VI. Analysis

### A. The Analytical Approach to the Granting of a Confidentiality Order

#### (1) *The General Framework: Herein the Dagenais Principles*

36 The link between openness in judicial proceedings and freedom of expression has been firmly established by this Court. In *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter *New Brunswick*], at para. 23, La Forest J. expressed the relationship as follows:

The principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the rights guaranteed by s. 2(b). Openness permits public access to information about the courts, which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. While the freedom to express ideas and opinions about the operation of the courts is clearly within the ambit of the freedom guaranteed by s. 2(b), so too is the right of members of the public to obtain information about the courts in the first place.

Under the order sought, public access and public scrutiny of the Confidential Documents would be restricted; this would clearly infringe the public's freedom of expression guarantee.

37 A discussion of the general approach to be taken in the exercise of judicial discretion to grant a confidentiality order should begin with the principles set out by this Court in *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.). Although that case dealt with the common law jurisdiction of the court to order a publication ban in the criminal law context, there are strong similarities between publication bans and confidentiality orders in the context of judicial proceedings. In both cases a restriction on freedom of expression is sought in order to preserve or promote an interest engaged by those proceedings. As such, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a publication ban or a confidentiality order is whether, in the circumstances, the right to freedom of expression should be compromised.

38 Although in each case freedom of expression will be engaged in a different context, the *Dagenais* framework utilizes overarching *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* principles in order to balance freedom of expression with other rights and interests, and thus can be adapted and applied to various circumstances. As a result, the analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under R. 151 should echo the underlying principles laid out in *Dagenais, supra*, although it must be tailored to the specific rights and interests engaged in this case.

39 *Dagenais, supra*, dealt with an application by four accused persons under the court's common law jurisdiction requesting an order prohibiting the broadcast of a television programme dealing with the physical and sexual abuse of young boys at religious institutions. The applicants argued that because the factual circumstances of the programme were very similar to the facts at issue in their trials, the ban was necessary to preserve the accuseds' right to a fair trial.

40 Lamer C.J. found that the common law discretion to order a publication ban must be exercised within the boundaries set by the principles of the *Charter*. Since publication bans necessarily curtail the freedom of expression of third parties, he adapted the pre-*Charter* common law rule such that it balanced the right to freedom of expression with the right to a fair trial of the accused in a way which reflected the substance of the test from *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). At p. 878 of *Dagenais*, Lamer C.J. set out his reformulated test:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

- (a) Such a ban is *necessary* in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
- (b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. [Emphasis in original.]

41 In *New Brunswick*, *supra*, this Court modified the *Dagenais* test in the context of the related issue of how the discretionary power under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code* to exclude the public from a trial should be exercised. That case dealt with an appeal from the trial judge's order excluding the public from the portion of a sentencing proceeding for sexual assault and sexual interference dealing with the specific acts committed by the accused on the basis that it would avoid "undue hardship" to both the victims and the accused.

42 La Forest J. found that s. 486(1) was a restriction on the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression in that it provided a "discretionary bar on public and media access to the courts": *New Brunswick*, *supra*, at para. 33; however, he found this infringement to be justified under s. 1 provided that the discretion was exercised in accordance with the *Charter*. Thus, the approach taken by La Forest J. at para. 69 to the exercise of discretion under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code*, closely mirrors the *Dagenais* common law test:

- (a) the judge must consider the available options and consider whether there are any other reasonable and effective alternatives available;
- (b) the judge must consider whether the order is limited as much as possible; and
- (c) the judge must weigh the importance of the objectives of the particular order and its probable effects against the importance of openness and the particular expression that will be limited in order to ensure that the positive and negative effects of the order are proportionate.

In applying this test to the facts of the case, La Forest J. found that the evidence of the potential undue hardship consisted mainly in the Crown's submission that the evidence was of a "delicate nature" and that this was insufficient to override the infringement on freedom of expression.

43 This Court has recently revisited the granting of a publication ban under the court's common law jurisdiction in *R. v. Mentuck*, 2001 SCC 76 (S.C.C.), and its companion case *R. v. E. (O.N.)*, 2001 SCC 77 (S.C.C.). In *Mentuck*, the Crown moved for a publication ban to protect the identity of undercover police officers and operational methods employed by the officers in their investigation of the accused. The accused opposed the motion as an infringement of his right to a fair and public hearing under s. 11(d) of the *Charter*. The order was also opposed by two intervening newspapers as an infringement of their right to freedom of expression.

44 The Court noted that, while *Dagenais* dealt with the balancing of freedom of expression on the one hand, and the right to a fair trial of the accused on the other, in the case before it, both the right of the accused to a fair and public hearing, and freedom of expression weighed in favour of denying the publication ban. These rights were balanced against interests relating to the proper administration of justice, in particular, protecting the safety of police officers and preserving the efficacy of undercover police operations.

45 In spite of this distinction, the Court noted that underlying the approach taken in both *Dagenais* and *New Brunswick* was the goal of ensuring that the judicial discretion to order publication bans is subject to no lower a standard of compliance with the *Charter* than legislative enactment. This goal is furthered by incorporating the essence of s. 1 of the *Charter* and the *Oakes* test into the publication ban test. Since this same goal applied in the case before it, the Court adopted a similar approach to that taken in *Dagenais*, but broadened the *Dagenais* test (which dealt specifically with the right of an accused to a fair trial) such that it could guide the exercise of judicial discretion where a publication ban is requested in order to preserve any important aspect of the proper administration of justice. At para. 32, the Court reformulated the test as follows:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.

46 The Court emphasized that under the first branch of the test, three important elements were subsumed under the "necessity" branch. First, the risk in question must be a serious risk well-grounded in the evidence. Second, the phrase "proper administration of justice" must be carefully interpreted so as not to allow the concealment of an excessive amount of information. Third, the test requires the judge ordering the ban to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available, but also to restrict the ban as far as possible without sacrificing the prevention of the risk.

47 At para. 31, the Court also made the important observation that the proper administration of justice will not necessarily involve *Charter* rights, and that the ability to invoke the *Charter* is not a necessary condition for a publication ban to be granted:

The [common law publication ban] rule can accommodate orders that must occasionally be made in the interests of the administration of justice, which encompass more than fair trial rights. As the test is intended to "reflect . . . the substance of the *Oakes* test", we cannot require that *Charter* rights be the only legitimate objective of such orders any more than we require that government action or legislation in violation of the *Charter* be justified exclusively by the pursuit of another *Charter* right. [Emphasis added.]

The Court also anticipated that, in appropriate circumstances, the *Dagenais* framework could be expanded even further in order to address requests for publication bans where interests other than the administration of justice were involved.

48 *Mentuck* is illustrative of the flexibility of the *Dagenais* approach. Since its basic purpose is to ensure that the judicial discretion to deny public access to the courts is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles, in my view, the *Dagenais* model can and should be adapted to the situation in the case at bar where the central issue is whether judicial discretion should be exercised so as to exclude confidential information from a public proceeding. As in *Dagenais*, *New Brunswick* and *Mentuck*, granting the confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the *Charter* right to freedom of expression, as well as the principle of open and accessible court proceedings, and, as in those cases, courts must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles. However, in order to adapt the test to the context of this case, it is first necessary to determine the particular rights and interests engaged by this application.

## (2) *The Rights and Interests of the Parties*

49 The immediate purpose for AECL's confidentiality request relates to its commercial interests. The information in question is the property of the Chinese authorities. If the appellant were to disclose the Confidential Documents, it would be in breach of its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. This is clear from the findings of fact of the motions judge that AECL was bound by its commercial interests and its customer's property rights not to disclose the information (para. 27), and that such disclosure could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23).

50 Aside from this direct commercial interest, if the confidentiality order is denied, then in order to protect its commercial interests, the appellant will have to withhold the documents. This raises the important matter of the litigation context in which the order is sought. As both the motions judge and the Federal Court of Appeal found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to defences available under the CEAA, the inability to present this information hinders the appellant's capacity to make full answer and defence or, expressed more generally, the appellant's right, as a civil litigant, to present its case. In that sense, preventing the appellant from disclosing these documents on a confidential basis infringes its right to a fair trial. Although in the context of a civil proceeding this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial generally can be viewed as a fundamental principle of justice: *M. (A.) v. Ryan*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.), at para. 84, *per* L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting, but not on that point). Although this fair trial right is directly relevant to the appellant, there is also a general public interest in protecting the right to a fair trial. Indeed, as a general proposition, all disputes in the courts should be decided under a fair trial standard. The legitimacy of the judicial process alone demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done.

51 Thus, the interests which would be promoted by a confidentiality order are the preservation of commercial and contractual relations, as well as the right of civil litigants to a fair trial. Related to the latter are the public and judicial interests in seeking the truth and achieving a just result in civil proceedings.

52 In opposition to the confidentiality order lies the fundamental principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This principle is inextricably tied to freedom of expression enshrined in s. 2(b) of the *Charter: New Brunswick, supra*, at para. 23. The importance of public and media access to the courts cannot be understated, as this access is the method by which the judicial process is scrutinized and criticized. Because it is essential to the administration of justice that justice is done and is *seen* to be done, such public scrutiny is fundamental. The open court principle has been described as "the very soul of justice," guaranteeing that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner: *New Brunswick, supra*, at para. 22.

### ***(3) Adapting the Dagenais Test to the Rights and Interests of the Parties***

53 Applying the rights and interests engaged in this case to the analytical framework of *Dagenais* and subsequent cases discussed above, the test for whether a confidentiality order ought to be granted in a case such as this one should be framed as follows:

A confidentiality order under R. 151 should only be granted when:

- (a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
- (b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

54 As in *Mentuck, supra*, I would add that three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of this test. First, the risk in question must be real and substantial, in that the risk is well-grounded in the evidence and poses a serious threat to the commercial interest in question.

55 In addition, the phrase "important commercial interest" is in need of some clarification. In order to qualify as an "important commercial interest," the interest in question cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order; the interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. For example, a private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no "important commercial interest" for the purposes of this test. Or, in the words of Binnie J. in *Re N. (F.)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35

(S.C.C.), at para. 10, the open court rule only yields" where the *public* interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness" (emphasis added).

56 In addition to the above requirement, courts must be cautious in determining what constitutes an "important commercial interest." It must be remembered that a confidentiality order involves an infringement on freedom of expression. Although the balancing of the commercial interest with freedom of expression takes place under the second branch of the test, courts must be alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule. See generally Muldoon J. in *Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437 (Fed. T.D.), at p. 439.

57 Finally, the phrase "reasonably alternative measures" requires the judge to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives to a confidentiality order are available, but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

## **B. Application of the Test to this Appeal**

### ***(1) Necessity***

58 At this stage, it must be determined whether disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and whether there are reasonable alternatives, either to the order itself or to its terms.

59 The commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality. The appellant argues that it will suffer irreparable harm to its commercial interests if the confidential documents are disclosed. In my view, the preservation of confidential information constitutes a sufficiently important commercial interest to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met.

60 Pelletier J. noted that the order sought in this case was similar in nature to an application for a protective order which arises in the context of patent litigation. Such an order requires the applicant to demonstrate that the information in question has been treated at all relevant times as confidential and that on a balance of probabilities its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by the disclosure of the information: *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)* (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428 (Fed. T.D.), at p. 434. To this I would add the requirement proposed by Robertson J.A. that the information in question must be of a "confidential nature" in that it has been "accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential" (para. 14) as opposed to "facts which a litigant would like to keep confidential by having the courtroom doors closed" (para. 14).

61 Pelletier J. found as a fact that the *AB Hassle* test had been satisfied in that the information had clearly been treated as confidential both by the appellant and by the Chinese authorities, and that, on a balance of probabilities, disclosure of the information could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23). As well, Robertson J.A. found that the information in question was clearly of a confidential nature as it was commercial information, consistently treated and regarded as confidential, that would be of interest to AECL's competitors (para. 16). Thus, the order is sought to prevent a serious risk to an important commercial interest.

62 The first branch of the test also requires the consideration of alternative measures to the confidentiality order, as well as an examination of the scope of the order to ensure that it is not overly broad. Both courts below found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to potential defences available to the appellant under the CEAA and this finding was not appealed at this Court. Further, I agree with the Court of Appeal's assertion (para. 99) that, given the importance of the documents to the right to make full answer and defence, the appellant is, practically speaking, compelled to produce the documents. Given that the information is necessary to the appellant's case, it remains only to determine whether there are reasonably alternative means by which the necessary information can be adduced without disclosing the confidential information.

63 Two alternatives to the confidentiality order were put forward by the courts below. The motions judge suggested that the Confidential Documents could be expunged of their commercially sensitive contents, and edited versions of the documents could be filed. As well, the majority of the Court of Appeal, in addition to accepting the possibility of expungement, was of the opinion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals. If either of these options is a reasonable alternative to submitting the Confidential Documents under a confidentiality order, then the order is not necessary, and the application does not pass the first branch of the test.

64 There are two possible options with respect to expungement, and, in my view, there are problems with both of these. The first option would be for AECL to expunge the confidential information without disclosing the expunged material to the parties and the court. However, in this situation the filed material would still differ from the material used by the affiants. It must not be forgotten that this motion arose as a result of Sierra Club's position that the summaries contained in the affidavits should be accorded little or no weight without the presence of the underlying documents. Even if the relevant information and the confidential information were mutually exclusive, which would allow for the disclosure of all the information relied on in the affidavits, this relevancy determination could not be tested on cross-examination because the expunged material would not be available. Thus, even in the best case scenario, where only irrelevant information needed to be expunged, the parties would be put in essentially the same position as that which initially generated this appeal in the sense that at least some of the material relied on to prepare the affidavits in question would not be available to Sierra Club.

65 Further, I agree with Robertson J.A. that this best case scenario, where the relevant and the confidential information do not overlap, is an untested assumption (para. 28). Although the documents themselves were not put before the courts on this motion, given that they comprise thousands of pages of detailed information, this assumption is at best optimistic. The expungement alternative would be further complicated by the fact that the Chinese authorities require prior approval for any request by AECL to disclose information.

66 The second option is that the expunged material be made available to the Court and the parties under a more narrowly drawn confidentiality order. Although this option would allow for slightly broader public access than the current confidentiality request, in my view, this minor restriction to the current confidentiality request is not a viable alternative given the difficulties associated with expungement in these circumstances. The test asks whether there are *reasonably* alternative measures; it does not require the adoption of the absolutely least restrictive option. With respect, in my view, expungement of the Confidential Documents would be a virtually unworkable and ineffective solution that is not reasonable in the circumstances.

67 A second alternative to a confidentiality order was Evans J.A.'s suggestion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits "may well go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals" (para. 103). However, he appeared to take this fact into account merely as a factor to be considered when balancing the various interests at stake. I would agree that at this threshold stage to rely on the summaries alone, in light of the intention of Sierra Club to argue that they should be accorded little or no weight, does not appear to be a "reasonably alternative measure" to having the underlying documents available to the parties.

68 With the above considerations in mind, I find the confidentiality order necessary in that disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and that there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

## ***(2) The Proportionality Stage***

69 As stated above, at this stage, the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, must be weighed against the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right to free expression, which, in turn, is connected to the principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This balancing will ultimately determine whether the confidentiality order ought to be granted.

### ***(a) Salutary Effects of the Confidentiality Order***

70 As discussed above, the primary interest that would be promoted by the confidentiality order is the public interest in the right of a civil litigant to present its case or, more generally, the fair trial right. Because the fair trial right is being invoked in this case in order to protect commercial, not liberty, interests of the appellant, the right to a fair trial in this context is not a *Charter* right; however, a fair trial for all litigants has been recognized as a fundamental principle of justice: *Ryan, supra*, at para. 84. It bears repeating that there are circumstances where, in the absence of an affected *Charter* right, the proper administration of justice calls for a confidentiality order: *Mentuck, supra*, at para. 31. In this case, the salutary effects that such an order would have on the administration of justice relate to the ability of the appellant to present its case, as encompassed by the broader fair trial right.

71 The Confidential Documents have been found to be relevant to defences that will be available to the appellant in the event that the CEAA is found to apply to the impugned transaction and, as discussed above, the appellant cannot disclose the documents without putting its commercial interests at serious risk of harm. As such, there is a very real risk that, without the confidentiality order, the ability of the appellant to mount a successful defence will be seriously curtailed. I conclude, therefore, that the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial.

72 Aside from the salutary effects on the fair trial interest, the confidentiality order would also have a beneficial impact on other important rights and interests. First, as I discuss in more detail below, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the Confidential Documents, and permit cross-examination based on their contents. By facilitating access to relevant documents in a judicial proceeding, the order sought would assist in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression.

73 Second, I agree with the observation of Robertson J.A. that, as the Confidential Documents contain detailed technical information pertaining to the construction and design of a nuclear installation, it may be in keeping with the public interest to prevent this information from entering the public domain (para. 44). Although the exact contents of the documents remain a mystery, it is apparent that they contain technical details of a nuclear installation, and there may well be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

*(b) Deleterious Effects of the Confidentiality Order*

74 Granting the confidentiality order would have a negative effect on the open court principle, as the public would be denied access to the contents of the Confidential Documents. As stated above, the principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the s. 2(b) *Charter* right to freedom of expression, and public scrutiny of the courts is a fundamental aspect of the administration of justice: *New Brunswick, supra*, at paras. 22-23. Although as a *general* principle, the importance of open courts cannot be overstated, it is necessary to examine, in the context of this case, the *particular* deleterious effects on freedom of expression that the confidentiality order would have.

75 Underlying freedom of expression are the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good, (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit, and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons: *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (Procureur général)*, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.), at p. 976, *R. v. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J., at pp. 762-764. *Charter* jurisprudence has established that the closer the speech in question lies to these core values, the harder it will be to justify a s. 2(b) infringement of that speech under s. 1 of the *Charter*: *Keegstra, supra*, at pp. 760-761. Since the main goal in this case is to exercise judicial discretion in a way which conforms to *Charter* principles, a discussion of the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on freedom of expression should include an assessment of the effects such an order would have on the three core values. The more detrimental the order would be to these values, the more difficult it will be to justify the confidentiality order. Similarly, minor effects of the order on the core values will make the confidentiality order easier to justify.

76 Seeking the truth is not only at the core of freedom of expression, but it has also been recognized as a fundamental purpose behind the open court rule, as the open examination of witnesses promotes an effective evidentiary process: *Edmonton Journal, supra*, per Wilson J., at pp. 1357-1358. Clearly, the confidentiality order, by denying public and media access to documents

relied on in the proceedings, would impede the search for truth to some extent. Although the order would not exclude the public from the courtroom, the public and the media would be denied access to documents relevant to the evidentiary process.

77 However, as mentioned above, to some extent the search for truth may actually be *promoted* by the confidentiality order. This motion arises as a result of Sierra Club's argument that it must have access to the Confidential Documents in order to test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence. If the order is denied, then the most likely scenario is that the appellant will not submit the documents, with the unfortunate result that evidence which may be relevant to the proceedings will not be available to Sierra Club or the court. As a result, Sierra Club will not be able to fully test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence on cross-examination. In addition, the court will not have the benefit of this cross-examination or documentary evidence, and will be required to draw conclusions based on an incomplete evidentiary record. This would clearly impede the search for truth in this case.

78 As well, it is important to remember that the confidentiality order would restrict access to a relatively small number of highly technical documents. The nature of these documents is such that the general public would be unlikely to understand their contents, and thus they would contribute little to the public interest in the search for truth in this case. However, in the hands of the parties and their respective experts, the documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would, in turn, assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the nature of the documents, in my view, the important value of the search for truth which underlies both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the Confidential Documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order, and thereby preventing the parties and the court from relying on the documents in the course of the litigation.

79 In addition, under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions on these documents relate to their public distribution. The Confidential Documents would be available to the court and the parties, and public access to the proceedings would not be impeded. As such, the order represents a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule, and thus would not have significant deleterious effects on this principle.

80 The second core value underlying freedom of speech, namely, the promotion of individual self-fulfilment by allowing open development of thoughts and ideas, focuses on individual expression, and thus does not closely relate to the open court principle which involves institutional expression. Although the confidentiality order would restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, I find that this value would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order.

81 The third core value, open participation in the political process, figures prominently in this appeal, as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. This connection was pointed out by Cory J. in *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at p. 1339:

It can be seen that freedom of expression is of fundamental importance to a democratic society. It is also essential to a democracy and crucial to the rule of law that the courts are seen to function openly. The press must be free to comment upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in fact, seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny.

Although there is no doubt as to the importance of open judicial proceedings to a democratic society, there was disagreement in the courts below as to whether the weight to be assigned to the open court principle should vary depending on the nature of the proceeding.

82 On this issue, Robertson J.A. was of the view that the nature of the case and the level of media interest were irrelevant considerations. On the other hand, Evans J.A. held that the motions judge was correct in taking into account that this judicial review application was one of significant public and media interest. In my view, although the public nature of the case may be a factor which strengthens the importance of open justice in a particular case, the level of media interest should not be taken into account as an independent consideration.

83 Since cases involving public institutions will generally relate more closely to the core value of public participation in the political process, the public nature of a proceeding should be taken into consideration when assessing the merits of a

confidentiality order. It is important to note that this core value will *always* be engaged where the open court principle is engaged owing to the importance of open justice to a democratic society. However, where the political process is also engaged by the *substance* of the proceedings, the connection between open proceedings and public participation in the political process will increase. As such, I agree with Evans J.A. in the court below, where he stated, at para. 87:

While all litigation is important to the parties, and there is a public interest in ensuring the fair and appropriate adjudication of all litigation that comes before the courts, some cases raise issues that transcend the immediate interests of the parties and the general public interest in the due administration of justice, and have a much wider public interest significance.

84 This motion relates to an application for judicial review of a decision by the government to fund a nuclear energy project. Such an application is clearly of a public nature, as it relates to the distribution of public funds in relation to an issue of demonstrated public interest. Moreover, as pointed out by Evans J.A., openness and public participation are of fundamental importance under the CEAA. Indeed, by their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection. In this regard, I agree with Evans J.A. that the public interest is engaged here more than it would be if this were an action between private parties relating to purely private interests.

85 However, with respect, to the extent that Evans J.A. relied on media interest as an indicium of public interest, this was an error. In my view, it is important to distinguish *public* interest from *media* interest, and I agree with Robertson J.A. that media exposure cannot be viewed as an impartial measure of public interest. It is the public *nature* of the proceedings which increases the need for openness, and this public nature is not necessarily reflected by the media desire to probe the facts of the case. I reiterate the caution given by Dickson C.J. in *Keegstra, supra*, at p. 760, where he stated that, while the speech in question must be examined in light of its relation to the core values, "we must guard carefully against judging expression according to its popularity."

86 Although the public interest in open access to the judicial review application *as a whole* is substantial, in my view, it is also important to bear in mind the nature and scope of the information for which the order is sought in assigning weight to the public interest. With respect, the motions judge erred in failing to consider the narrow scope of the order when he considered the public interest in disclosure, and consequently attached excessive weight to this factor. In this connection, I respectfully disagree with the following conclusion of Evans J.A., at para. 97:

Thus, having considered the nature of this litigation, and having assessed the extent of public interest in the openness of the proceedings in the case before him, the Motions Judge cannot be said in all the circumstances to have given this factor undue weight, even though confidentiality is claimed for only three documents among the small mountain of paper filed in this case, and their content is likely to be beyond the comprehension of all but those equipped with the necessary technical expertise.

Open justice is a fundamentally important principle, particularly when the substance of the proceedings is public in nature. However, this does not detract from the duty to attach weight to this principle in accordance with the specific limitations on openness that the confidentiality order would have. As Wilson J. observed in *Edmonton Journal, supra*, at pp. 1353-1354:

One thing seems clear and that is that one should not balance one value at large and the conflicting value in its context. To do so could well be to pre-judge the issue by placing more weight on the value developed at large than is appropriate in the context of the case.

87 In my view, it is important that, although there is significant public interest in these proceedings, open access to the judicial review application would be only slightly impeded by the order sought. The narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the Confidential Documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts.

88 In addressing the effects that the confidentiality order would have on freedom of expression, it should also be borne in mind that the appellant may not have to raise defences under the CEAA, in which case the Confidential Documents would

be irrelevant to the proceedings, with the result that freedom of expression would be unaffected by the order. However, since the necessity of the Confidential Documents will not be determined for some time, in the absence of a confidentiality order, the appellant would be left with the choice of either submitting the documents in breach of its obligations or withholding the documents in the hopes that either it will not have to present a defence under the [CEAA](#) or that it will be able to mount a successful defence in the absence of these relevant documents. If it chooses the former option, and the defences under the [CEAA](#) are later found not to apply, then the appellant will have suffered the prejudice of having its confidential and sensitive information released into the public domain with no corresponding benefit to the public. Although this scenario is far from certain, the possibility of such an occurrence also weighs in favour of granting the order sought.

89 In coming to this conclusion, I note that if the appellant is not required to invoke the relevant defences under the [CEAA](#), it is also true that the appellant's fair trial right will not be impeded, even if the confidentiality order is not granted. However, I do not take this into account as a factor which weighs in favour of denying the order because, if the order is granted and the Confidential Documents are not required, there will be no deleterious effects on *either* the public interest in freedom of expression *or* the appellant's commercial interests or fair trial right. This neutral result is in contrast with the scenario discussed above where the order is denied and the possibility arises that the appellant's commercial interests will be prejudiced with no corresponding public benefit. As a result, the fact that the Confidential Documents may not be required is a factor which weighs in favour of granting the confidentiality order.

90 In summary, the core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. As such, the order would not have significant deleterious effects on freedom of expression.

## VII. Conclusion

91 In balancing the various rights and interests engaged, I note that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, and freedom of expression. On the other hand, the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal. In addition, if the order is not granted and in the course of the judicial review application the appellant is not required to mount a defence under the [CEAA](#), there is a possibility that the appellant will have suffered the harm of having disclosed confidential information in breach of its obligations with no corresponding benefit to the right of the public to freedom of expression. As a result, I find that the salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects, and the order should be granted.

92 Consequently, I would allow the appeal with costs throughout, set aside the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, and grant the confidentiality order on the terms requested by the appellant under [R. 151 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998](#).

*Appeal allowed.*

*Pourvoi accueilli.*

# TAB 15

**Most Negative Treatment:** Distinguished

**Most Recent Distinguished:** *T.Z. v. P.V.R.* | 2022 SKQB 129, 2022 CarswellSask 256 | (Sask. Q.B., May 17, 2022)

2021 SCC 25, 2021 CSC 25  
Supreme Court of Canada

Sherman Estate v. Donovan

2021 CarswellOnt 8339, 2021 CarswellOnt 8340, 2021 SCC 25, 2021 CSC 25, [2021] 2  
S.C.R. 75, [2021] 2 R.C.S. 75, [2021] S.C.J. No. 25, 331 A.C.W.S. (3d) 489, 458 D.L.R.  
(4th) 361, 66 C.P.C. (8th) 1, 67 E.T.R. (4th) 163, 72 C.R. (7th) 223, EYB 2021-391973

**Estate of Bernard Sherman and Trustees of the Estate and Estate of Honey Sherman and Trustees of the Estate (Appellants) and Kevin Donovan and Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. (Respondents) and Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of British Columbia, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Income Security Advocacy Centre, Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers Association, Postmedia Network Inc., CTV, a Division of Bell Media Inc., Global News, a division of Corus Television Limited Partnership, The Globe and Mail Inc., Citytv, a division of Rogers Media Inc., British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario, HIV Legal Network and Mental Health Legal Committee (Interveners)**

Wagner C.J.C., Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Brown, Rowe, Martin, Kasirer JJ.

Heard: October 6, 2020  
Judgment: June 11, 2021  
Docket: 38695

Proceedings: affirming *Donovan v. Sherman Estate* (2019), 56 C.P.C. (8th) 82, 47 E.T.R. (4th) 1, 2019 CarswellOnt 6867, 2019 ONCA 376, C.W. Hourigan J.A., Doherty J.A., Paul Rouleau J.A. (Ont. C.A.); reversing *Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Sherman Estate* (2018), 41 E.T.R. (4th) 126, 2018 CarswellOnt 13017, 2018 ONSC 4706, 28 C.P.C. (8th) 102, 417 C.R.R. (2d) 321, S.F. Dunphy J. (Ont. S.C.J.)

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Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Criminal; Estates and Trusts

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Civil practice and procedure

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**Headnote**

Judges and courts --- Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction of court over own process — Sealing files

Wealthy couple were found dead in their home and deaths generated intense public interest and press scrutiny — Estates and estate trustees sought to stem press scrutiny — When applications to obtain certificates of appointment of estate trustees were made, trustees sought sealing order — Application judge granted sealing order — Journalist and newspaper successfully appealed and sealing order was set aside — Trustees appealed — Appeal dismissed — Court of Appeal was right to set aside sealing order — Information in court files was not of highly sensitive character that it could be said to strike at core identity of affected persons — Trustees had failed to show how lifting of sealing orders engaged dignity of affected individuals — It could not be said that risk to privacy was sufficiently serious to overcome strong presumption of openness — Same was true of risk to physical safety.

Civil practice and procedure --- Practice on appeal — Powers and duties of appellate court — Evidence on appeal — New evidence

Juges et tribunaux --- Compétence — Compétence de la cour sur sa propre procédure — Mise sous scellés de dossiers

Couple riche et célèbre a été retrouvé sans vie dans sa résidence, et la mort du couple a suscité un vif intérêt dans le public et provoqué une attention médiatique intense — Successions ainsi que les fiduciaires des successions ont cherché à réfréner l'attention médiatique intense — Quand le temps est venu d'obtenir leurs certificats de nomination à titre de fiduciaires des successions, les fiduciaires ont sollicité une ordonnance de mise sous scellés — Juge de première instance a accordé l'ordonnance de mise sous scellés — Journaliste et journal ont eu gain de cause en appel et l'ordonnance a été annulée — Fiduciaires ont formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi rejeté — Cour d'appel a eu raison d'annuler l'ordonnance de mise sous scellés — Renseignements contenus dans les dossiers judiciaires ne revêtaient pas un caractère si sensible qu'on pourrait dire qu'ils touchaient à l'identité fondamentale des personnes concernées — Fiduciaires n'ont pas démontré en quoi la levée des ordonnances de mise sous scellés mettait en jeu la dignité des personnes touchées — On ne saurait affirmer que le risque pour la vie privée était suffisamment sérieux pour permettre de réfuter la forte présomption de publicité des débats judiciaires — Il en était de même du risque pour la sécurité physique.

Procédure civile --- Procédure en appel — Pouvoirs et obligations de la cour d'appel — Preuve en appel — Nouvelle preuve

A wealthy and prominent husband and wife were found dead in their home. Their deaths generated intense public interest and press scrutiny, and the following year the police service announced that the deaths were being investigated as homicides. The couple's estates and the estate trustees sought to stem the intense press scrutiny. When the time came to obtain certificates of appointment of estate trustees, the trustees sought a sealing order so that the trustees and beneficiaries might be spared any further intrusions into their privacy and be protected from what was alleged to be a risk to their safety. These sealing orders were granted, with the application judge sealing the orders for an initial period of two years with the possibility of renewal.

The sealing orders were challenged by a journalist, who had written a series of articles on the couple's death, and the newspaper for which he wrote. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and the sealing orders were lifted. The Court of Appeal concluded that the privacy interest for which the trustees sought protection lacked the quality of public interest and that there was no evidence that could warrant a finding that disclosure of the content of the estate files posed a real risk to anyone's physical safety. The trustees had failed the first stage of the test for obtaining orders sealing the probate files.

The trustees appealed, seeking to restore the sealing orders. The newspaper brought a motion to adduce new evidence on the appeal.

**Held:** The appeal was dismissed; the motion was dismissed as moot.

Per Kasirer J. (Wagner C.J.C., Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Brown, Rowe, Martin JJ. concurring): There is a strong presumption in favour of open courts. Notwithstanding this presumption, exceptional circumstances do arise where competing interests justified a restriction on the open court principle. Where a discretionary court order limiting constitutionally-protected openness was sought, the applicant must demonstrate as a threshold requirement that openness presents a serious risk to a competing

interest of public importance. The applicant must show that the order was necessary to prevent the risk and that, as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of that order restricting openness outweighed its negative effects. For the purposes of the relevant test, an aspect of privacy was recognized as an important public interest. Proceedings in open court could lead to the dissemination of highly sensitive personal information that would result not just in discomfort or embarrassment, but in an affront to the affected person's dignity. Where this narrower dimension of privacy, rooted in what was seen as the public interest in protecting human dignity, was shown to be at serious risk, an exception to the open court principle may be justified. It could not be said that the risk to privacy was sufficiently serious to overcome the strong presumption of openness. The same was true of the risk to physical safety. The Court of Appeal was right to set aside the sealing orders.

The broad claims of the trustees failed to focus on the elements of privacy that were deserving of public protection in the open court context. Personal information disseminated in open court could be more than a source of discomfort and may result in an affront to a person's dignity. Insofar as privacy served to protect individuals from this affront, it was an important public interest relevant under the 2002 Supreme Court of Canada judgment that set out the relevant test. This public interest would only be seriously at risk where the information in question struck at what was the core identity of the individual concerned: information so sensitive that its dissemination could be an affront to dignity that the public would not tolerate, even in service of open proceedings. The information in the court files was not of this highly sensitive character that it could be said to strike at the core identity of the affected persons. The trustees had failed to show how the lifting of the sealing orders engaged the dignity of the affected individuals.

In order to succeed, the person asking a court to exercise discretion in a way that limits the open court presumption must establish that: (1) court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest; (2) the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and (3) as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects. Only where all three of these prerequisites have been met can a discretionary limit on openness properly be ordered. Contrary to what the trustees argue, the matters in a probate file are not quintessentially private or fundamentally administrative. The fundamental rationale for openness applies to probate proceedings and thus to the transfer of property under court authority and other matters affected by that court action. The emphasis that the Court of Appeal placed on personal concerns as a means of deciding that the sealing orders failed to meet the necessity requirement was mistaken. It was inappropriate to dismiss the public interest in protecting privacy as merely a personal concern. The important public interest in privacy, as understood in the context of the limits on court openness, is aimed at allowing individuals to preserve control over their core identity in the public sphere to the extent necessary to preserve their dignity. The public has a stake in openness, but it also has an interest in the preservation of dignity: the administration of justice requires that where dignity is threatened in this way, measures be taken to accommodate this privacy concern. The risk to this interest would be serious only where the information that would be disseminated as a result of court openness was sufficiently sensitive such that openness could be shown to meaningfully strike at the individual's biographical core in a manner that threatens their integrity.

The failure of the application judge to assess the sensitivity of the information constituted a failure to consider a required element of the legal test, and this warranted intervention on appeal. Applying the appropriate framework to the facts of this case, it was concluded that the risk to the important public interest in the affected individuals' privacy was not serious. The information that the trustees sought to protect was not highly sensitive and this alone was sufficient to conclude that there was no serious risk to the important public interest in privacy so defined. The relevant privacy interest bearing on the dignity of the affected persons had not been shown. Merely associating the beneficiaries or trustees with the couple's unexplained deaths was not enough to constitute a serious risk to the identified important public interest in privacy, defined in reference to dignity. The trustees did not advance any specific reason why the contents of these files were more sensitive than they may seem at first glance. While some of the material in the court files may well be broadly disseminated, the nature of the information had not been shown to give rise to a serious risk to the important public interest in privacy.

There was no controversy that there was an important public interest in protecting individuals from physical harm. Direct evidence was not necessarily required to establish a serious risk to an important interest. It was not just the probability of the feared harm but also the gravity of the harm itself that was relevant to the assessment of serious risk. There was no dispute that the feared physical harm was grave, but it was agreed that the probability of this harm was speculative. The bare assertion that such a risk exists failed to meet the threshold necessary to establish a serious risk of physical harm. The application judge's conclusion to the contrary was an error warranting intervention. Even if the trustees had succeeded in showing a serious risk

to the privacy interest they asserted, a publication ban would likely have been sufficient as a reasonable alternative to prevent this risk. The trustees were not entitled to any discretionary order limiting the open court principle. The Court of Appeal rightly concluded that there was no basis for asking for redactions because the trustees had failed at this stage of the test for discretionary limits on court openness.

Les cadavres d'un homme et de sa femme, un couple riche et célèbre, ont été retrouvés dans leur résidence. Leur mort a suscité un vif intérêt dans le public et provoqué une attention médiatique intense et, au cours de l'année qui a suivi, le service de police a annoncé que les morts faisaient l'objet d'une enquête pour homicides. La succession du couple ainsi que les fiduciaires des successions ont cherché à réfréner l'attention médiatique intense. Quand le temps est venu d'obtenir leurs certificats de nomination à titre de fiduciaires des successions, les fiduciaires ont sollicité une ordonnance de mise sous scellés dans le but d'épargner aux fiduciaires des successions et aux bénéficiaires de nouvelles atteintes à leur vie privée, et de les protéger contre ce qui, selon les allégations, aurait constitué un risque pour leur sécurité. Les ordonnances de mise sous scellés ont été accordées et le juge de première instance a fait placer sous scellés les dossiers pour une période initiale de deux ans avec possibilité de renouvellement.

Les ordonnances de mise sous scellés ont été contestées par un journaliste qui avait écrit une série d'articles sur la mort du couple et par le journal pour lequel il écrivait. La Cour d'appel a accueilli l'appel et les ordonnances de mise sous scellés ont été levées. La Cour d'appel a conclu que l'intérêt en matière de vie privée à l'égard duquel les fiduciaires sollicitaient une protection ne comportait pas la qualité d'intérêt public et qu'il n'y avait aucun élément de preuve permettant de conclure que la divulgation du contenu des dossiers de succession posait un risque réel pour la sécurité physique de quiconque. Les fiduciaires n'avaient pas franchi la première étape du test relatif à l'obtention d'ordonnances de mise sous scellés des dossiers d'homologation.

Les fiduciaires ont formé un pourvoi visant à faire rétablir les ordonnances de mise sous scellés. Le journal a déposé une requête visant à introduire une nouvelle preuve dans le cadre du pourvoi.

**Arrêt:** Le pourvoi a été rejeté; la requête, devenue théorique, a été rejetée.

Kasirer, J. (Wagner, J.C.C., Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Brown, Rowe, Martin, J.J., souscrivant à son opinion) : Il existe une forte présomption en faveur de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Malgré cette présomption, il peut arriver des circonstances exceptionnelles où des intérêts opposés justifient de restreindre le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Lorsqu'un demandeur sollicite une ordonnance judiciaire discrétionnaire limitant le principe constitutionnalisé de la publicité des procédures judiciaires, il doit démontrer, comme condition préliminaire, que la publicité des débats en cause présente un risque sérieux pour un intérêt opposé qui revêt une importance pour le public. Le demandeur doit démontrer que l'ordonnance est nécessaire pour écarter le risque et que, du point de vue de la proportionnalité, les avantages de cette ordonnance restreignant la publicité l'emportent sur ses effets négatifs. On a reconnu qu'un aspect de la vie privée constituait un intérêt public important pour l'application du test pertinent. La tenue de procédures judiciaires publiques était susceptible de mener à la diffusion de renseignements personnels très sensibles, laquelle entraînerait non seulement un désagrément ou de l'embarras pour la personne touchée, mais aussi une atteinte à sa dignité. Dans les cas où il est démontré que cette dimension plus restreinte de la vie privée, qui semble tirer son origine de l'intérêt du public à la protection de la dignité humaine, était sérieusement menacée, une exception au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires peut être justifiée. On ne saurait affirmer que le risque pour la vie privée était suffisamment sérieux pour permettre de réfuter la forte présomption de publicité des débats judiciaires. Il en était de même du risque pour la sécurité physique. La Cour d'appel a eu raison d'annuler les ordonnances de mise sous scellés.

Les larges revendications des fiduciaires n'étaient pas axées sur les éléments de la vie privée qui méritaient une protection publique dans le contexte de la publicité des débats judiciaires. La diffusion de renseignements personnels dans le cadre de débats judiciaires publics peut être plus qu'une source de désagrément et peut aussi entraîner une atteinte à la dignité d'une personne. Dans la mesure où elle sert à protéger les personnes contre une telle atteinte, la vie privée constitue un intérêt public important qui est pertinent en vertu du critère établi par la Cour suprême du Canada dans une décision rendue en 2002. L'intérêt public ne serait sérieusement menacé que si les renseignements en question portaient atteinte à ce que l'on considère comme l'identité fondamentale de la personne concernée : des renseignements si sensibles que leur diffusion pourrait porter atteinte à la dignité de la personne d'une manière que le public ne tolérerait pas, pas même au nom du principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires. En l'espèce, les renseignements contenus dans les dossiers judiciaires ne revêtaient pas ce caractère si sensible qu'on pourrait dire qu'ils touchaient à l'identité fondamentale des personnes concernées. Les fiduciaires n'ont pas démontré en quoi la levée des ordonnances de mise sous scellés mettait en jeu la dignité des personnes touchées.

Pour obtenir gain de cause, la personne qui demande au tribunal d'exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire de façon à limiter la présomption de publicité doit établir que : 1) la publicité des débats judiciaires pose un risque sérieux pour un intérêt public important; 2) l'ordonnance sollicitée est nécessaire pour écarter ce risque sérieux pour l'intérêt mis en évidence, car d'autres mesures raisonnables ne permettront pas d'écarter ce risque; et 3) du point de vue de la proportionnalité, les avantages de l'ordonnance l'emportent sur ses effets négatifs. Ce n'est que lorsque ces trois conditions préalables sont remplies qu'une ordonnance discrétionnaire ayant pour effet de limiter la publicité des débats judiciaires pourra dûment être rendue. Contrairement à ce que les fiduciaires soutiennent, les questions soulevées dans un dossier d'homologation ne sont pas typiquement de nature privée ou fondamentalement de nature administrative. La raison d'être fondamentale de la publicité des débats s'applique aux procédures d'homologation et donc au transfert de biens sous l'autorité d'un tribunal ainsi qu'à d'autres questions touchées par ce recours judiciaire. La Cour d'appel a eu tort de mettre l'accent sur les préoccupations personnelles pour décider que les ordonnances de mise sous scellés ne satisfaisaient pas à l'exigence de la nécessité. Il est inapproprié de rejeter l'intérêt du public à la protection de la vie privée au motif qu'il s'agit d'une simple préoccupation personnelle. L'intérêt public important en matière de vie privée, tel qu'il est considéré dans le contexte des limites à la publicité des débats, vise à permettre aux personnes de garder un contrôle sur leur identité fondamentale dans la sphère publique dans la mesure nécessaire pour protéger leur dignité. Le public a un intérêt dans la publicité des débats, mais il a aussi un intérêt dans la protection de la dignité : l'administration de la justice exige que, lorsque la dignité est menacée de cette façon, des mesures puissent être prises pour tenir compte de cette préoccupation en matière de vie privée. Le risque pour cet intérêt ne sera sérieux que lorsque les renseignements qui seraient diffusés en raison de la publicité des débats judiciaires sont suffisamment sensibles pour que l'on puisse démontrer que la publicité porte atteinte de façon significative au coeur même des renseignements biographiques de la personne d'une manière qui menace son intégrité.

En n'examinant pas le caractère sensible des renseignements, le juge de première instance a omis de se pencher sur un élément nécessaire du test juridique, ce qui justifiait une intervention en appel. En appliquant le cadre approprié aux faits de la présente affaire, on a conclu que le risque pour l'intérêt public important à l'égard de la vie privée des personnes touchées n'était pas sérieux. Les renseignements que les fiduciaires cherchaient à protéger n'étaient pas très sensibles, ce qui suffisait en soi pour conclure qu'il n'y avait pas de risque sérieux pour l'intérêt public important en matière de vie privée tel que défini. L'intérêt pertinent en matière de vie privée se rapportant à la dignité des personnes touchées n'a pas été démontré. Le simple fait d'associer les bénéficiaires ou les fiduciaires à la mort inexplicquée du couple ne suffisait pas à constituer un risque sérieux pour l'intérêt public important en matière de dignité ayant été constaté, intérêt défini au regard de la dignité. Les fiduciaires n'ont pas fait valoir de raison précise pour laquelle le contenu de ces dossiers serait plus sensible qu'il n'y paraît à première vue. Même si certains des éléments contenus dans les dossiers judiciaires pouvaient fort bien être largement diffusés, il n'a pas été démontré que la nature des renseignements en cause entraînerait un risque sérieux pour l'intérêt public important en matière de vie privée. Nul n'a contesté l'existence d'un intérêt public important dans la protection des personnes contre un préjudice physique. Une preuve directe n'est pas nécessairement exigée pour démontrer qu'un intérêt important est sérieusement menacé. Ce n'est pas seulement la probabilité du préjudice appréhendé qui est pertinente lorsqu'il s'agit d'évaluer si un risque est sérieux, mais également la gravité du préjudice lui-même. Si nul ne contestait que le préjudice physique appréhendé fût grave, il fallait cependant reconnaître que la probabilité que ce préjudice se produise était conjecturale. Le simple fait d'affirmer qu'un tel risque existe ne permettait pas de franchir le seuil requis pour établir l'existence d'un risque sérieux de préjudice physique. La conclusion contraire tirée par le juge de première instance était une erreur justifiant l'intervention de la Cour d'appel. Même si les fiduciaires avaient réussi à démontrer l'existence d'un risque sérieux pour l'intérêt en matière de vie privée qu'ils invoquent, une interdiction de publication aurait probablement été suffisante en tant qu'autre option raisonnable pour écarter ce risque. Les fiduciaires n'ont droit à aucune ordonnance discrétionnaire limitant le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires. La Cour d'appel a conclu à juste titre qu'il n'y avait aucune raison de demander un caviardage parce que les fiduciaires n'avaient pas franchi cette étape du test des limites discrétionnaires à la publicité des débats judiciaires.

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*Lac d'Amiante du Québec ltée c. 2858-0702 Québec inc.* (2001), 2001 SCC 51, 2001 CarswellQue 1864, 2001 CarswellQue 1865, (sub nom. *Lac d'Amiante du Québec Ltée v. 2858-0702 Québec Inc.*) 204 D.L.R. (4th) 331, (sub nom. *Lac d'Amiante du Québec ltée v. 2858-0702 Québec inc.*) 274 N.R. 201, 14 C.P.C. (5th) 189, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 743, 2001 CSC 51 (S.C.C.) — considered

*Lavigne v. Canada (Commissioner of Official Languages)* (2002), 2002 SCC 53, 2002 CarswellNat 1357, 2002 CarswellNat 1358, 214 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 289 N.R. 282, 228 F.T.R. 319 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 773, 2002 CSC 53 (S.C.C.) — considered

*MacIntyre v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General)* (1982), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175, 49 N.S.R. (2d) 609, 40 N.R. 181, 26 C.R. (3d) 193, 96 A.P.R. 609, 132 D.L.R. (3d) 385, (sub nom. *Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. MacIntyre*) 65 C.C.C. (2d) 129, 1982 CarswellNS 21, 1982 CarswellNS 110 (S.C.C.) — followed

*N. (F.), Re* (2000), 2000 SCC 35, 2000 CarswellNfld 213, 2000 CarswellNfld 214, 146 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 188 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 35 C.R. (5th) 1, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 191 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 181, 577 A.P.R. 181 (S.C.C.) — considered

*Otis v. Otis* (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 1643, 7 E.T.R. (3d) 221 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

*R. v. Chanmany* (2016), 2016 ONCA 576, 2016 CarswellOnt 11225, 338 C.C.C. (3d) 578, 352 O.A.C. 121 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

*R. v. Cole* (2012), 2012 SCC 53, 2012 CarswellOnt 12684, 2012 CarswellOnt 12685, D.T.E. 2012T-731, 96 C.R. (6th) 88, 223 L.A.C. (4th) 1, 290 C.C.C. (3d) 247, 353 D.L.R. (4th) 447, 436 N.R. 102, 2012 C.L.L.C. 210-059, 297 O.A.C. 1, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, 269 C.R.R. (2d) 228, 128 O.R. (3d) 639 (note) (S.C.C.) — considered

*R. v. Dymont* (1988), 10 M.V.R. (2d) 1, 66 C.R. (3d) 348, 89 N.R. 249, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244, 73 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 13, 229 A.P.R. 13, 55 D.L.R. (4th) 503, 38 C.R.R. 301, 1988 CarswellPEI 7, 1988 CarswellPEI 73 (S.C.C.) — considered

*R. v. Esseghaier* (2017), 2017 ONCA 970, 2017 CarswellOnt 19349, 356 C.C.C. (3d) 455 (Ont. C.A.) — distinguished

*R. v. Henry* (2009), 2009 BCCA 86, 2009 CarswellBC 439, 244 C.C.C. (3d) 175, 270 B.C.A.C. 5, 454 W.A.C. 5, 187 C.R.R. (2d) 366 (B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

*R. v. Mabior* (2012), 2012 SCC 47, 2012 CarswellMan 509, 2012 CarswellMan 510, [2012] 11 W.W.R. 213, 96 C.R. (6th) 1, 352 D.L.R. (4th) 619, 290 C.C.C. (3d) 32, 284 Man. R. (2d) 114, 555 W.A.C. 114, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 584, 268 C.R.R. (2d) 39, 434 N.R. 341 (S.C.C.) — considered

*R. v. Marakah* (2017), 2017 SCC 59, 2017 CSC 59, 2017 CarswellOnt 19341, 2017 CarswellOnt 19342, 42 C.R. (7th) 1, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 608, 418 D.L.R. (4th) 313, 357 C.C.C. (3d) 281, 396 C.R.R. (2d) 247 (S.C.C.) — referred to

*R. v. Mentuck* (2001), 2001 SCC 76, 2001 CarswellMan 535, 2001 CarswellMan 536, 158 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 512, 47 C.R. (5th) 63, 277 N.R. 160, [2002] 2 W.W.R. 409, 163 Man. R. (2d) 1, 269 W.A.C. 1, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 (S.C.C.) — followed

*R. v. Oakes* (1986), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, 65 N.R. 87, 14 O.A.C. 335, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 50 C.R. (3d) 1, 19 C.R.R. 308, 1986 CarswellOnt 95, 1986 CarswellOnt 1001, 53 O.R. (2d) 719 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

*R. v. Paterson* (1998), 122 C.C.C. (3d) 254, 1998 CarswellBC 122, 102 B.C.A.C. 200, 166 W.A.C. 200 (B.C. C.A.) — considered

*R. v. Pickton* (2010), 2010 BCSC 1198, 2010 CarswellBC 2242 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

*R. v. Plant* (1993), [1993] 8 W.W.R. 287, 145 A.R. 104, 55 W.A.C. 104, 17 C.R.R. (2d) 297, 12 Alta. L.R. (3d) 305, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 203, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, 24 C.R. (4th) 47, 157 N.R. 321, 1993 CarswellAlta 94, 1993 CarswellAlta 566 (S.C.C.) — considered

*R. v. Quesnelle* (2014), 2014 SCC 46, 2014 CSC 46, 2014 CarswellOnt 9195, 2014 CarswellOnt 9196, 11 C.R. (7th) 221, 460 N.R. 27, 320 O.A.C. 38, 375 D.L.R. (4th) 71, 312 C.C.C. (3d) 187, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 390, 314 C.R.R. (2d) 283, 129 O.R. (3d) 640 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

*R. v. Spencer* (2014), 2014 SCC 43, 2014 CSC 43, 2014 CarswellSask 342, 2014 CarswellSask 343, [2014] 8 W.W.R. 209, 11 C.R. (7th) 52, 458 N.R. 249, 438 Sask. R. 230, 608 W.A.C. 230, 312 C.C.C. (3d) 215, 375 D.L.R. (4th) 255, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, 312 C.R.R. (2d) 349 (S.C.C.) — referred to

*R. v. Tessling* (2004), 2004 SCC 67, 2004 CarswellOnt 4351, 2004 CarswellOnt 4352, 244 D.L.R. (4th) 541, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 129, 23 C.R. (6th) 207, 326 N.R. 228 (Eng.), 326 N.R. 228 (Fr.), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, 192 O.A.C. 168, 75 O.R. (3d) 480 (note), 123 C.R.R. (2d) 257 (S.C.C.) — referred to

*Reference re s. 12 (1) of the Juvenile Delinquents Act (Canada)* (1983), 146 D.L.R. (3d) 408, 41 O.R. (2d) 113, 3 C.C.C. (3d) 515, (sub nom. *R. v. Southam Inc.*) 34 C.R. (3d) 27, 6 C.R.R. 1, (sub nom. *R. v. Southam Inc.*) 33 R.F.L. (2d) 279, 1983 CarswellOnt 273 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

*S. c. Lamontagne* (2020), 2020 QCCA 663, 2020 CarswellQue 4349 (C.A. Que.) — considered

*Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* (2002), 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 287 N.R. 203, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, 2002 CSC 41 (S.C.C.) — followed

*Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd. v. R.* (2012), 2012 ONCJ 27, 2012 CarswellOnt 1255, (sub nom. *Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd. v. Ontario*) 255 C.R.R. (2d) 207, 289 C.C.C. (3d) 549 (Ont. C.J.) — referred to

*Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario* (2005), 2005 SCC 41, 2005 CarswellOnt 2613, 2005 CarswellOnt 2614, 197 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 253 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 29 C.R. (6th) 251, (sub nom. *R. v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd.*) 200 O.A.C. 348, (sub nom. *R. v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd.*) 335 N.R. 201, 76 O.R. (3d) 320 (note), 132 C.R.R. (2d) 178, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 (S.C.C.) — referred to

*UFCW, Local 401 v. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner)* (2013), 2013 SCC 62, 2013 CarswellAlta 2210, 2013 CarswellAlta 2211, D.T.E. 2013T-775, 365 D.L.R. (4th) 257, [2014] 2 W.W.R. 1, 60 Admin. L.R. (5th) 173, 88 Alta. L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Alberta (IPC) v. UFCW, Local 401*) 2014 C.L.L.C. 210-003, (sub nom. *United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 v. Privacy Commissioner (Alta.)*) 451 N.R. 253, (sub nom. *Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401*) [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733, (sub nom. *United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 v. Privacy Commissioner (Alta.)*) 561 A.R. 359, (sub nom. *United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 v. Privacy Commissioner (Alta.)*) 594 W.A.C. 359, 239 L.A.C. (4th) 317, (sub nom. *Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial Workers, local 401*) 297 C.R.R. (2d) 71 (S.C.C.) — considered

*Vancouver Sun, Re* (2004), 2004 SCC 43, 2004 CarswellBC 1376, 2004 CarswellBC 1377, (sub nom. *R. v. Bagri*) 184 C.C.C. (3d) 515, (sub nom. *R. v. Bagri*) 240 D.L.R. (4th) 147, (sub nom. *Application Under Section 83.28 of the Criminal Code, Re*) 322 N.R. 161, 21 C.R. (6th) 142, (sub nom. *Application Under Section 83.28 of the Criminal Code, Re*) 199 B.C.A.C. 1, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332, 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 261, 120 C.R.R. (2d) 203, [2005] 2 W.W.R. 671 (S.C.C.) — considered

*Work Safe Twerk Safe v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario* (2021), 2021 ONSC 1100, 2021 CarswellOnt 1831 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to

*X. v. Y.* (2011), 2011 BCSC 943, 2011 CarswellBC 1874, 21 B.C.L.R. (5th) 410, [2011] 11 W.W.R. 514, 338 D.L.R. (4th) 156, 238 C.R.R. (2d) 219 (B.C. S.C.) — distinguished

#### Statutes considered:

*Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11

Generally — referred to

s. 2(b) — referred to

s. 8 — considered

*Charte des droits et libertés de la personne*, RLRQ, c. C-12

art. 5 — referred to

*Code civil du Québec*, L.Q. 1991, c. 64

art. 35-41 — referred to

*Code de procédure civile*, RLRQ, c. C-25.01

art. 12 — considered

*Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31

Generally — referred to

*Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act*, S.C. 2000, c. 5

Generally — referred to

*Privacy Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21

Generally — referred to

APPEAL by estate trustees from judgment reported at *Donovan v. Sherman Estate* (2019), 2019 ONCA 376, 2019 CarswellOnt 6867, 47 E.T.R. (4th) 1, 56 C.P.C. (8th) 82 (Ont. C.A.), allowing appeal from judgment imposing sealing orders.

POURVOI formé par les fiduciaires d'une succession à l'encontre d'un jugement publié à *Donovan v. Sherman Estate* (2019), 2019 ONCA 376, 2019 CarswellOnt 6867, 47 E.T.R. (4th) 1, 56 C.P.C. (8th) 82 (Ont. C.A.), ayant accueilli l'appel interjeté à l'encontre d'un jugement imposant une ordonnance de mise sous scellés.

**Kasirer J. (Wagner C.J.C. and Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Brown, Rowe and Martin JJ. concurring):**

## I. Overview

1 This Court has been resolute in recognizing that the open court principle is protected by the constitutionally-entrenched right of freedom of expression and, as such, it represents a central feature of a liberal democracy. As a general rule, the public can attend hearings and consult court files and the press — the eyes and ears of the public — is left free to inquire and comment on the workings of the courts, all of which helps make the justice system fair and accountable.

2 Accordingly, there is a strong presumption in favour of open courts. It is understood that this allows for public scrutiny which can be the source of inconvenience and even embarrassment to those who feel that their engagement in the justice system brings intrusion into their private lives. But this discomfort is not, as a general matter, enough to overturn the strong presumption that the public can attend hearings and that court files can be consulted and reported upon by the free press.

3 Notwithstanding this presumption, exceptional circumstances do arise where competing interests justify a restriction on the open court principle. Where a discretionary court order limiting constitutionally-protected openness is sought — for example, a sealing order, a publication ban, an order excluding the public from a hearing, or a redaction order — the applicant must demonstrate, as a threshold requirement, that openness presents a serious risk to a competing interest of public importance. That this requirement is considered a high bar serves to maintain the strong presumption of open courts. Moreover, the protection of open courts does not stop there. The applicant must still show that the order is necessary to prevent the risk and that, as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of that order restricting openness outweigh its negative effects.

4 This appeal turns on whether concerns advanced by persons seeking an exception to the ordinarily open court file in probate proceedings — the concerns for privacy of the affected individuals and their physical safety — amount to important public interests that are at such serious risk that the files should be sealed. The parties to this appeal agree that physical safety is an important public interest that could justify a sealing order but disagree as to whether that interest would be at serious risk, in the circumstances of this case, should the files be unsealed. They further disagree whether privacy is in itself an important interest that could justify a sealing order. The appellants say that privacy is a public interest of sufficient import that can justify limits on openness, especially in light of the threats individuals face as technology facilitates widespread dissemination of personally sensitive information. They argue that the Court of Appeal was mistaken to say that personal concerns for privacy, without more, lack the public interest component that is properly the subject-matter of a sealing order.

5 This Court has, in different settings, consistently championed privacy as a fundamental consideration in a free society. Pointing to cases decided in other contexts, the appellants contend that privacy should be recognized here as a public interest that, on the facts of this case, substantiates their plea for orders sealing the probate files. The respondents resist, recalling that privacy has generally been seen as a poor justification for an exception to openness. After all, they say, virtually every court proceeding entails some disquiet for the lives of those concerned and these intrusions on privacy must be tolerated because open courts are essential to a healthy democracy.

6 This appeal offers, then, an occasion to decide whether privacy can amount to a public interest in the open court jurisprudence and, if so, whether openness puts privacy at serious risk here so as to justify the kind of orders sought by the appellants.

7 For the reasons that follow, I propose to recognize an aspect of privacy as an important public interest for the purposes of the relevant test from *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522. Proceedings in open court can lead to the dissemination of highly sensitive personal information that would result not just in discomfort or embarrassment, but in an affront to the affected person's dignity. Where this narrower dimension of privacy, rooted in what I see as the public interest in protecting human dignity, is shown to be at serious risk, an exception to the open court principle may be justified.

8 In this case, and with this interest in mind, it cannot be said that the risk to privacy is sufficiently serious to overcome the strong presumption of openness. The same is true of the risk to physical safety here. The Court of Appeal was right in the circumstances to set aside the sealing orders and I would therefore dismiss the appeal.

## II. Background

9 Prominent in business and philanthropic circles, Bernard Sherman and Honey Sherman were found dead in their Toronto home in December of 2017. Their deaths had no apparent explanation and generated intense public interest and press scrutiny. In January of the following year, the Toronto Police Service announced that the deaths were being investigated as homicides. As the present matter came before the courts, the identity and motive of those responsible remained unknown.

10 The couple's estates and estate trustees (collectively the "Trustees")<sup>1</sup> sought to stem the intense press scrutiny prompted by the events. The Trustees hoped to see to the orderly transfer of the couple's property, at arm's length from what they saw as the public's morbid interest in the unexplained deaths and the curiosity around apparently great sums of money involved.

11 When the time came to obtain certificates of appointment of estate trustee from the Superior Court of Justice, the Trustees sought a sealing order so that the estate trustees and beneficiaries ("affected individuals") might be spared any further intrusions into their privacy and be protected from what was alleged to be a risk to their safety. The Trustees argued that if the information in the court files was revealed to the public, the safety of the affected individuals would be at risk and their privacy compromised as long as the deaths were unexplained and those responsible for the tragedy remained at large. In support of their request, they argued that there was a real and substantial risk that the affected individuals would suffer serious harm from the public exposure of the materials in the circumstances.

12 Initially granted, the sealing orders were challenged by Kevin Donovan, a journalist who had written a series of articles on the couple's deaths, and Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., for which he wrote (collectively the "Toronto Star").<sup>2</sup> The Toronto Star said the orders violated its constitutional rights of freedom of expression and freedom of the press, as well as the attending principle that the workings of the courts should be open to the public as a means of guaranteeing the fair and transparent administration of justice.

## III. Proceedings Below

### *A. Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 2018 ONSC 4706, 41 E.T.R. (4th) 126 (Dunphy J.)*

13 In addressing whether the circumstances warranted interference with the open court principle, the application judge relied on this Court's judgment in *Sierra Club*. He noted that a confidentiality order should only be granted when: "(1) such an order is necessary ... to prevent a serious risk to an important interest because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (2) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression and the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings" (para. 13(d)).

14 The application judge considered whether the Trustees' interests would be served by granting the sealing orders. In his view, the Trustees had correctly identified two legitimate interests in support of making an exception to the open court principle: "protecting the privacy and dignity of victims of crime and their loved ones" and "a reasonable apprehension of risk on behalf of those known to have an interest in receiving or administering the assets of the deceased" (paras. 22-25). With respect to the first interest, the application judge found that "[t]he degree of intrusion on that privacy and dignity has already been extreme and ... excruciating" (para. 23). For the second interest, although he noted that "it would have been preferable to include objective evidence of the gravity of that risk from, for example, the police responsible for the investigation", he concluded that "the lack of such evidence is not fatal" (para. 24). Rather, the necessary inferences could be drawn from the circumstances notably the "willingness of the perpetrator(s) of the crimes to resort to extreme violence to pursue whatever motive existed" (*ibid.*). He concluded that the "current uncertainty" was the source of a reasonable apprehension of the risk of harm and, further, that the foreseeable harm was "grave" (*ibid.*).

15 The application judge ultimately accepted the Trustees' submission that these interests "very strongly outweigh" what he called the proportionately narrow public interest in the "essentially administrative files" at issue (paras. 31 and 33). He therefore

concluded that the harmful effects of the sealing orders were substantially outweighed by the salutary effects on the rights and interests of the affected individuals.

16 Finally, the application judge considered what order would protect the affected individuals while infringing upon the open court principle to the minimum extent possible. He decided no meaningful part of either file could be disclosed if one were to make the redactions necessary to protect the interests he had identified. Open-ended sealing orders did not, however, sit well with him. The application judge therefore sealed the files for an initial period of two years, with the possibility of renewal.

### ***B. Court of Appeal for Ontario, 2019 ONCA 376, 47 E.T.R. (4th) 1 (Doherty, Rouleau and Hourigan J.J.A.)***

17 The Toronto Star's appeal was allowed, unanimously, and the sealing orders were lifted.

18 The Court of Appeal considered the two interests advanced before the application judge in support of the orders to seal the probate files. As to the need to protect the privacy and dignity of the victims of violent crime and their loved ones, it recalled that the kind of interest that is properly protected by a sealing order must have a public interest component. Citing *Sierra Club*, the Court of Appeal wrote that "[p]ersonal concerns cannot, without more, justify an order sealing material that would normally be available to the public under the open court principle" (para. 10). It concluded that the privacy interest for which the Trustees sought protection lacked this quality of public interest.

19 While it recognized the personal safety of individuals as an important public interest generally, the Court of Appeal wrote that there was no evidence in this case that could warrant a finding that disclosure of the contents of the estate files posed a real risk to anyone's physical safety. The application judge had erred on this point: "the suggestion that the beneficiaries and trustees are somehow at risk because the Shermans were murdered is not an inference, but is speculation. It provides no basis for a sealing order" (para. 16).

20 The Court of Appeal concluded that the Trustees had failed the first stage of the test for obtaining orders sealing the probate files. It therefore allowed the appeal and set aside the orders.

### ***C. Subsequent Proceedings***

21 The Court of Appeal's order setting aside the sealing orders has been stayed pending the disposition of this appeal. The Toronto Star brought a motion to adduce new evidence on this appeal, comprised of land titles documents, transcripts of the cross-examination of a detective on the murder investigation, and various news articles. This evidence, it says, supports the conclusion that the sealing orders should be lifted. The motion was referred to this panel.

## **IV. Submissions**

22 The Trustees have appealed to this Court seeking to restore the sealing orders made by the application judge. In addition to contesting the motion for new evidence, they maintain that the orders are necessary to prevent a serious risk to the privacy and physical safety of the affected individuals and that the salutary effects of sealing the court probate files outweigh the harmful effects of limiting court openness. The Trustees argue that two legal errors led the Court of Appeal to conclude otherwise.

23 First, they submit the Court of Appeal erred in holding that privacy is a personal concern that cannot, without more, constitute an important interest under *Sierra Club*. The Trustees say the application judge was right to characterize privacy and dignity as an important public interest which, as it was subject to a serious risk, justified the orders. They ask this Court to recognize that privacy in itself is an important public interest for the purposes of the analysis.

24 Second, the Trustees submit that the Court of Appeal erred in overturning the application judge's conclusion that there was a serious risk of physical harm. They argue that the Court of Appeal failed to recognize that courts have the ability to draw reasonable inferences by applying reason and logic even in the absence of specific evidence of the alleged risk.

25 The Trustees say that these errors led the Court of Appeal to mistakenly set aside the sealing orders. In answer to questions at the hearing, the Trustees acknowledged that an order redacting certain documents in the file or a publication ban could assist in addressing some of their concerns, but maintained neither is a reasonable alternative to the sealing orders in the circumstances.

26 The Trustees submit further that the protection of these interests outweighs the deleterious effects of the orders. They argue that the importance of the open court principle is attenuated by the nature of these probate proceedings. Given that it is non-contentious and not strictly speaking necessary for the transfer of property at death, probate is a court proceeding of an "administrative" character, which diminishes the imperative of applying the open court principle here (paras. 113-14).

27 The Toronto Star takes the position that the Court of Appeal made no mistake in setting aside the sealing orders and that the appeal should be dismissed. In the Toronto Star's view, while privacy can be an important interest where it evinces a public component, the Trustees have only identified a subjective desire for the affected individuals in this case to avoid further publicity, which is not inherently harmful. According to the Toronto Star and some of the interveners, the Trustees' position would allow that measure of inconvenience and embarrassment that arises in every court proceeding to take precedence over the interest in court openness protected by the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* in which all of society has a stake. The Toronto Star argues further that the information in the court files is not highly sensitive. On the issue of whether the sealing orders were necessary to protect the affected individuals from physical harm, the Toronto Star submits that the Court of Appeal was right to conclude that the Trustees had failed to establish a serious risk to this interest.

28 In the alternative, even if there were a serious risk to one or another important interest, the Toronto Star says the sealing orders are not necessary because the risk could be addressed by an alternative, less onerous order. Furthermore, it says the orders are not proportionate. In seeking to minimize the importance of openness in probate proceedings, the Trustees invite an inflexible approach to balancing the effects of the order that is incompatible with the principle that openness applies to all court proceedings. In any event, there is a public interest in openness specifically here, given that the certificates sought can affect the rights of third parties and that openness ensures the fairness of the proceedings, whether they are contested or not.

## V. Analysis

29 The outcome of the appeal turns on whether the application judge should have made the sealing orders pursuant to the test for discretionary limits on court openness from this Court's decision in *Sierra Club*.

30 Court openness is protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression and is essential to the proper functioning of our democracy (*Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, at para. 23; *Vancouver Sun (Re)*, 2004 SCC 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332, at paras. 23-26). Reporting on court proceedings by a free press is often said to be inseparable from the principle of open justice. "In reporting what has been said and done at a public trial, the media serve as the eyes and ears of a wider public which would be absolutely entitled to attend but for purely practical reasons cannot do so" (*Khuja v. Times Newspapers Ltd*, 2017 UKSC 49, [2019] A.C. 161 (U.K. S.C.), at para. 16, citing *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, at pp. 1339-40, per Cory J.). Limits on openness in service of other public interests have been recognized, but sparingly and always with an eye to preserving a strong presumption that justice should proceed in public view (*Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, at p. 878; *R. v. Mentuck*, 2001 SCC 76, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, at paras. 32-39; *Sierra Club*, at para. 56). The test for discretionary limits on court openness is directed at maintaining this presumption while offering sufficient flexibility for courts to protect these other public interests where they arise (*Mentuck*, at para. 33). The parties agree that this is the appropriate framework of analysis for resolving this appeal.

31 The parties and the courts below disagree, however, about how this test applies to the facts of this case and this calls for clarification of certain points of the *Sierra Club* analysis. Most centrally, there is disagreement about how an important interest in the protection of privacy could be recognized such that it would justify limits on openness, and in particular when privacy can be a matter of public concern. The parties bring two settled principles of this Court's jurisprudence to bear in support of their respective positions. First, this Court has often observed that privacy is a fundamental value necessary to the preservation of a

free and democratic society (*Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages)*, 2002 SCC 53, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 773, at para. 25; *Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403, at paras. 65-66, per La Forest J. (dissenting but not on this point); *New Brunswick*, at para. 40). Courts have invoked privacy, in some instances, as the basis for an exception to openness under the *Sierra Club* test (see, e.g., *R. v. Henry*, 2009 BCCA 86, 270 B.C.A.C. 5, at paras. 11 and 17). At the same time, the jurisprudence acknowledges that some degree of privacy loss — resulting in inconvenience, even in upset or embarrassment — is inherent in any court proceeding open to the public (*New Brunswick*, at para. 40). Accordingly, upholding the presumption of openness has meant recognizing that neither individual sensibilities nor mere personal discomfort associated with participating in judicial proceedings are likely to justify the exclusion of the public from court (*Attorney General of Nova Scotia v. MacIntyre*, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175, at p. 185; *New Brunswick*, at para. 41). Determining the role of privacy in the *Sierra Club* analysis requires reconciling these two ideas, which is the nub of the disagreement between the parties. The right of privacy is not absolute; the open court principle is not without exceptions.

32 For the reasons that follow, I disagree with the Trustees that the ostensibly unbounded privacy interest they invoke qualifies as an important public interest within the meaning of *Sierra Club*. Their broad claim fails to focus on the elements of privacy that are deserving of public protection in the open court context. That is not to say, however, that privacy can never ground an exceptional measure such as the sealing orders sought in this case. While the mere embarrassment caused by the dissemination of personal information through the open court process does not rise to the level justifying a limit on court openness, circumstances do exist where an aspect of a person's private life has a plain public interest dimension.

33 Personal information disseminated in open court can be more than a source of discomfort and may result in an affront to a person's dignity. Insofar as privacy serves to protect individuals from this affront, it is an important public interest relevant under *Sierra Club*. Dignity in this sense is a related but narrower concern than privacy generally; it transcends the interests of the individual and, like other important public interests, is a matter that concerns the society at large. A court can make an exception to the open court principle, notwithstanding the strong presumption in its favour, if the interest in protecting core aspects of individuals' personal lives that bear on their dignity is at serious risk by reason of the dissemination of sufficiently sensitive information. The question is not whether the information is "personal" to the individual concerned, but whether, because of its highly sensitive character, its dissemination would occasion an affront to their dignity that society as a whole has a stake in protecting.

34 This public interest in privacy appropriately focuses the analysis on the impact of the dissemination of sensitive personal information, rather than the mere fact of this dissemination, which is frequently risked in court proceedings and is necessary in a system that privileges court openness. It is a high bar — higher and more precise than the sweeping privacy interest relied upon here by the Trustees. This public interest will only be seriously at risk where the information in question strikes at what is sometimes said to be the core identity of the individual concerned: information so sensitive that its dissemination could be an affront to dignity that the public would not tolerate, even in service of open proceedings.

35 I hasten to say that applicants for an order making exception to the open court principle cannot content themselves with an unsubstantiated claim that this public interest in dignity is compromised any more than they could by an unsubstantiated claim that their physical integrity is endangered. Under *Sierra Club*, the applicant must show on the facts of the case that, as an important interest, this dignity dimension of their privacy is at "serious risk". For the purposes of the test for discretionary limits on court openness, this requires the applicant to show that the information in the court file is sufficiently sensitive such that it can be said to strike at the biographical core of the individual and, in the broader circumstances, that there is a serious risk that, without an exceptional order, the affected individual will suffer an affront to their dignity.

36 In the present case, the information in the court files was not of this highly sensitive character that it could be said to strike at the core identity of the affected persons; the Trustees have failed to show how the lifting of the sealing orders engages the dignity of the affected individuals. I am therefore not convinced that the intrusion on their privacy raises a serious risk to an important public interest as required by *Sierra Club*. Moreover, as I shall endeavour to explain, there was no serious risk of physical harm to the affected individuals by lifting the sealing orders. Accordingly, this is not an appropriate case in which to make sealing orders, or any order limiting access to these court files. In the circumstances, the admissibility of the Toronto Star's new evidence is moot. I propose to dismiss the appeal.

### A. The Test for Discretionary Limits on Court Openness

37 Court proceedings are presumptively open to the public (*MacIntyre*, at p. 189; *A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc.*, 2012 SCC 46, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567, at para. 11).

38 The test for discretionary limits on presumptive court openness has been expressed as a two-step inquiry involving the necessity and proportionality of the proposed order (*Sierra Club*, at para. 53). Upon examination, however, this test rests upon three core prerequisites that a person seeking such a limit must show. Recasting the test around these three prerequisites, without altering its essence, helps to clarify the burden on an applicant seeking an exception to the open court principle. In order to succeed, the person asking a court to exercise discretion in a way that limits the open court presumption must establish that:

- (1) court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;
- (2) the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and,
- (3) as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.

Only where all three of these prerequisites have been met can a discretionary limit on openness — for example, a sealing order, a publication ban, an order excluding the public from a hearing, or a redaction order — properly be ordered. This test applies to all discretionary limits on court openness, subject only to valid legislative enactments (*Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario*, 2005 SCC 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188, at paras. 7 and 22).

39 The discretion is structured and controlled in this way to protect the open court principle, which is understood to be constitutionalized under the right to freedom of expression at s. 2(b) of the Charter (*New Brunswick*, at para. 23). Sustained by freedom of expression, the open court principle is one of the foundations of a free press given that access to courts is fundamental to newsgathering. This Court has often highlighted the importance of open judicial proceedings to maintaining the independence and impartiality of the courts, public confidence and understanding of their work and ultimately the legitimacy of the process (see, e.g., *Vancouver Sun*, at paras. 23-26). In *New Brunswick*, La Forest J. explained the presumption in favour of court openness had become "one of the hallmarks of a democratic society" (citing *Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No.1)*, (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 113 (C.A.), at p. 119), that "acts as a guarantee that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner, according to the rule of law ... thereby fostering public confidence in the integrity of the court system and understanding of the administration of justice" (para. 22). The centrality of this principle to the court system underlies the strong presumption — albeit one that is rebuttable — in favour of court openness (para. 40; *Mentuck*, at para. 39).

40 The test ensures that discretionary orders are subject to no lower standard than a legislative enactment limiting court openness would be (*Mentuck*, at para. 27; *Sierra Club*, at para. 45). To that end, this Court developed a scheme of analysis by analogy to the *Oakes* test, which courts use to understand whether a legislative limit on a right guaranteed under the Charter is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society (*Sierra Club*, at para. 40, citing *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; see also *Dagenais*, at p. 878; *Vancouver Sun*, at para. 30).

41 The recognized scope of what interests might justify a discretionary exception to open courts has broadened over time. In *Dagenais*, Lamer C.J. spoke of a requisite risk to the "fairness of the trial" (p. 878). In *Mentuck*, Iacobucci J. extended this to a risk affecting the "proper administration of justice" (para. 32). Finally, in *Sierra Club*, Iacobucci J., again writing for a unanimous Court, restated the test to capture any serious risk to an "important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation" (para. 53). He simultaneously clarified that the important interest must be expressed as a public interest. For example, on the facts of that case, a harm to a particular business interest would not have been sufficient, but the "general commercial interest of preserving confidential information" was an important interest because of its public character (para. 55). This is consistent with the fact that this test was developed in reference to the *Oakes* jurisprudence that focuses on the "pressing and substantial" objective of legislation of general application (*Oakes*, at pp. 138-39; see also *Mentuck*, at para. 31). The term "important interest" therefore captures a broad array of public objectives.

42 While there is no closed list of important public interests for the purposes of this test, I share Iacobucci J.'s sense, explained in *Sierra Club*, that courts must be "cautious" and "alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule" even at the earliest stage when they are identifying important public interests (para. 56). Determining what is an important public interest can be done in the abstract at the level of general principles that extend beyond the parties to the particular dispute (para. 55). By contrast, whether that interest is at "serious risk" is a fact-based finding that, for the judge considering the appropriateness of an order, is necessarily made in context. In this sense, the identification of, on the one hand, an important interest and, on the other, the seriousness of the risk to that interest are, theoretically at least, separate and qualitatively distinct operations. An order may therefore be refused simply because a valid important public interest is not at serious risk on the facts of a given case or, conversely, that the identified interests, regardless of whether they are at serious risk, do not have the requisite important public character as a matter of general principle.

43 The test laid out in *Sierra Club* continues to be an appropriate guide for judicial discretion in cases like this one. The breadth of the category of "important interest" transcends the interests of the parties to the dispute and provides significant flexibility to address harm to fundamental values in our society that unqualified openness could cause (see, e.g., P. M. Perell and J. W. Morden, *The Law of Civil Procedure in Ontario* (4th ed. 2020), at para. 3.185; J. Bailey and J. Burkell, "Revisiting the Open Court Principle in an Era of Online Publication: Questioning Presumptive Public Access to Parties' and Witnesses' Personal Information" (2016), 48 *Ottawa L. Rev.* 143, at pp. 154-55). At the same time, however, the requirement that a serious risk to an important interest be demonstrated imposes a meaningful threshold necessary to maintain the presumption of openness. Were it merely a matter of weighing the benefits of the limit on court openness against its negative effects, decision-makers confronted with concrete impacts on the individuals appearing before them may struggle to put adequate weight on the less immediate negative effects on the open court principle. Such balancing could be evasive of effective appellate review. To my mind, the structure provided by *Dagenais*, *Mentuck*, and *Sierra Club* remains appropriate and should be affirmed.

44 Finally, I recall that the open court principle is engaged by all judicial proceedings, whatever their nature (*MacIntyre* at pp. 185-86; *Vancouver Sun*, at para. 31). To the extent the Trustees suggested, in their arguments about the negative effects of the sealing orders, that probate in Ontario does not engage the open court principle or that the openness of these proceedings has no public value, I disagree. The certificates the Trustees sought from the court are issued under the seal of that court, thereby bearing the imprimatur of the court's authority. The court's decision, even if rendered in a non-contentious setting, will have an impact on third parties, for example by establishing the testamentary paper that constitutes a valid will (see *Otis v. Otis*, (2004), 7 E.T.R. (3d) 221 (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 23-24). Contrary to what the Trustees argue, the matters in a probate file are not quintessentially private or fundamentally administrative. Obtaining a certificate of appointment of estate trustee in Ontario is a court proceeding and the fundamental rationale for openness — discouraging mischief and ensuring confidence in the administration of justice through transparency — applies to probate proceedings and thus to the transfer of property under court authority and other matters affected by that court action.

45 It is true that other non-probate estate planning mechanisms may allow for the transfer of wealth outside the ordinary avenues of testate or intestate succession — that is the case, for instance, for certain insurance and pension benefits, and for certain property held in co-ownership. But this does not change the necessarily open court character of probate proceedings. That non-probate transfers keep certain information related to the administration of an estate out of public view does not mean that the Trustees here, by seeking certificates from the court, somehow do not engage this principle. The Trustees seek the benefits that flow from the public judicial probate process: transparency ensures that the probate court's authority is administered fairly and efficiently (*Vancouver Sun*, at para. 25; *New Brunswick*, at para. 22). The strong presumption in favour of openness plainly applies to probate proceedings and the Trustees must satisfy the test for discretionary limits on court openness.

### ***B. The Public Importance of Privacy***

46 As mentioned, I disagree with the Trustees that an unbounded interest in privacy qualifies as an important public interest under the test for discretionary limits on court openness. Yet in some of its manifestations, privacy does have social importance beyond the person most immediately concerned. On that basis, it cannot be excluded as an interest that could justify, in the right circumstances, a limit to court openness. Indeed, the public importance of privacy has been recognized by this Court in

various settings, and this sheds light on why the narrower aspect of privacy related to the protection of dignity is an important public interest.

47 I respectfully disagree with the manner in which the Court of Appeal disposed of the claim by the Trustees that there is a serious risk to the interest in protecting personal privacy in this case. For the appellate judges, the privacy concerns raised by the Trustees amounted to "[p]ersonal concerns" which cannot, "without more", satisfy the requirement from *Sierra Club* that an important interest be framed as a public interest (para. 10). The Court of Appeal in our case relied, at para. 10, on *H. (M.E.) v. Williams*, 2012 ONCA 35, 108 O.R. (3d) 321, in which it was held that "[p]urely personal interests cannot justify non-publication or sealing orders" (para. 25). Citing as authority judgments of this Court in *MacIntyre* and *Sierra Club*, the court continued by observing that "personal concerns of a litigant, including concerns about the very real emotional distress and embarrassment that can be occasioned to litigants when justice is done in public, will not, standing alone, satisfy the necessity branch of the test" (para. 25). Respectfully stated, the emphasis that the Court of Appeal placed on personal concerns as a means of deciding that the sealing orders failed to meet the necessity requirement in this case and in *Williams* is, I think, mistaken. Personal concerns that relate to aspects of the privacy of an individual who is before the courts can coincide with a public interest in confidentiality.

48 Like the Court of Appeal, I do agree with the view expressed particularly in the pre-*Charter* case of *MacIntyre*, that where court openness results in an intrusion on privacy which disturbs the "sensibilities of the individuals involved" (p. 185), that concern is generally insufficient to justify a sealing or like order and does not amount to an important public interest under *Sierra Club*. But I disagree with the Court of Appeal in this case and in *Williams* that this is because the intrusion only occasions "personal concerns". Certain personal concerns — even "without more" — can coincide with important public interests within the meaning of *Sierra Club*. To invoke the expression of Binnie J. in *F.N. (Re)*, 2000 SCC 35, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, at para. 10, there is a "public interest in confidentiality" that is felt, first and foremost, by the person involved and is most certainly a personal concern. Even in *Williams*, the Court of Appeal was careful to note that where, without privacy protection, an individual would face "a substantial risk of serious debilitating emotional ... harm", an exception to openness should be available (paras. 29-30). The means of discerning whether a privacy interest reflects a "public interest in confidentiality" is therefore not whether the interest reflects or is rooted in "personal concerns" for the privacy of the individuals involved. Some personal concerns relating to privacy overlap with public interests in confidentiality. These interests in privacy can be, in my view, important public interests within the meaning of *Sierra Club*. It is true that an individual's privacy is pre-eminently important to that individual. But this Court has also long recognized that the protection of privacy is, in a variety of settings, in the interest of society as a whole.

49 The proposition that privacy is important, not only to the affected individual but to our society, has deep roots in the jurisprudence of this Court outside the context of the test for discretionary limits on court openness. This background helps explain why privacy cannot be rejected as a mere personal concern. However, the key differences in these contexts are such that the public importance of privacy cannot be transposed to open courts without adaptation. Only specific aspects of privacy interests can qualify as important public interests under *Sierra Club*.

50 In the context of s. 8 of the *Charter* and public sector privacy legislation, La Forest J. cited American privacy scholar Alan F. Westin for the proposition that privacy is a fundamental value of the modern state, first in *R. v. Dyment*, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at pp. 427-28 (concurring), and then in Dagg, at para. 65 (dissenting but not on this point). In the latter case, La Forest J. wrote: "The protection of privacy is a fundamental value in modern, democratic states. An expression of an individual's unique personality or personhood, privacy is grounded on physical and moral autonomy — the freedom to engage in one's own thoughts, actions and decisions" (para. 65 (citations omitted)). That statement was endorsed unanimously by this Court in Lavigne, at para. 25.

51 Further, in *Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401* 2013 SCC 62, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733 ("UFCW"), decided in the context of a statute regulating the use of information by organizations, the objective of providing an individual with some control over their information was recognized as "intimately connected to individual autonomy, dignity and privacy, self-evidently significant social values" (para. 24). The importance of privacy, its "quasi-constitutional status" and its role in protecting moral autonomy continues to find expression in our recent jurisprudence (see, e.g., Lavigne, at para. 24; Bragg, at para. 18, per Abella J., citing *Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd. v. R.*, 2012 ONCJ 27, 289

C.C.C. (3d) 549, at paras. 40-41 and 44; *Douez v. Facebook, Inc.*, 2017 SCC 33, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 751, at para. 59). In *Douez*, Karakatsanis, Wagner (as he then was) and Gascon J.J. underscored this same point, adding that "the growth of the Internet, virtually timeless with pervasive reach, has exacerbated the potential harm that may flow from incursions to a person's privacy interests" (para. 59).

52 Privacy as a public interest is underlined by specific aspects of privacy protection present in legislation at the federal and provincial levels (see, e.g., *Privacy Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21; *Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act*, S.C. 2000, c. 5 ("PIPEDA"); *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31; *Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms*, CQLR, c. C-12, s. 5; *Civil Code of Québec*, arts. 35 to 41).<sup>3</sup> Further, in assessing the constitutionality of a legislative exception to the open court principle, this Court has recognized that the protection of individual privacy can be a pressing and substantial objective (*Edmonton Journal*, at p. 1345, per Cory J.; see also the concurring reasons of Wilson J., at p. 1354, in which "the public interest in protecting the privacy of litigants generally in matrimonial cases against the public interest in an open court process" was explicitly noted). There is also continued support for the social and public importance of individual privacy in the academic literature (see, e.g., A. J. Cockfield, "Protecting the Social Value of Privacy in the Context of State Investigations Using New Technologies" (2007), 40 U.B.C. L. Rev. 41, at p. 41; K. Hughes, "A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and its Implications for Privacy Law" (2012), 75 *Mod. L. Rev.* 806, at p. 823; P. Gewirtz, "Privacy and Speech" (2001), *Sup. Ct. Rev.* 139, at p. 139). It is therefore inappropriate, in my respectful view, to dismiss the public interest in protecting privacy as merely a personal concern. This does not mean, however, that privacy generally is an important public interest in the context of limits on court openness.

53 The fact that the case before the application judge concerned individuals who were advancing their own privacy interests, which were undeniably important to them as individuals, does not mean that there is no public interest at stake. In *F.N. (Re)*, this was the personal interest that young offenders had in remaining anonymous in court proceedings as a means of encouraging their personal rehabilitation (para. 11). All of society had a stake, according to Binnie J., in the young person's personal prospect for rehabilitation. This same idea from *F.N. (Re)* was cited in support of finding the interest in *Sierra Club* to be a public interest. That interest, rooted first in an agreement of personal concern to the contracting parties involved, was a private matter that evinced, alongside its personal interest to the parties, a "public interest in confidentiality" (*Sierra Club*, at para. 55). Similarly, while the Trustees have a personal interest in preserving their privacy, this does not mean that the public has no stake in this same interest because — as this Court has made clear — it is related to moral autonomy and dignity which are pressing and substantial concerns.

54 In this appeal, the Toronto Star suggests that legitimate privacy concerns would be effectively protected by a discretionary order where there is "something more" to elevate them beyond personal concerns and sensibilities (R.F., at para. 73). The Income Security Advocacy Centre, by way of example, submits that privacy serves the public interests of preventing harm and of ensuring individuals are not dissuaded from accessing the courts. I agree that these concepts are related, but in my view care must be taken not to conflate the public importance of privacy with that of other interests; aspects of privacy, such as dignity, may constitute important public interests in and of themselves. A risk to personal privacy may be tied to a risk to psychological harm, as it was in *Bragg* (para. 14; see also J. Rossiter, *Law of Publication Bans, Private Hearings, and Sealing Orders* (loose-leaf), s. 2.4.1). But concerns for privacy may not always coincide with a desire to avoid psychological harm, and may focus instead, for example, on protecting one's professional standing (see, e.g., *R. v. Paterson*(1998), 102 B.C.A.C. 200, at paras. 76, 78 and 87-88). Similarly, there may be circumstances where the prospect of surrendering the personal information necessary to pursue a legal claim may deter an individual from bringing that claim (see *S. v. Lamontagne*, 2020 QCCA 663, at paras. 34-35 (CanLII)). In the same way, the prospect of surrendering sensitive commercial information would have impaired the conduct of the party's defence in *Sierra Club* (at para. 71), or could pressure an individual into settling a dispute prematurely (K. Eltis, *Courts, Litigants and the Digital Age* (2nd ed. 2016), at p. 86). But this does not necessarily mean that a public interest in privacy is wholly subsumed by such concerns. I note, for example, that access to justice concerns do not apply where the privacy interest to be protected is that of a third party to the litigation, such as a witness, whose access to the courts is not at stake and who has no choice available to terminate the litigation and avoid any privacy impacts (see, e.g., *Himel v. Greenberg*, 2010 ONSC 2325, 93 R.F.L. (6th) 357, at para. 58; see also Rossiter, s. 2.4.2(2)). In any event, the recognition of these related

and valid important public interests does not answer the question as to whether aspects of privacy in and of themselves are important public interests and does not diminish the distinctive public character of privacy, considered above.

55 Indeed, the specific harms to privacy occasioned by open courts have not gone unnoticed nor been discounted as merely personal concerns. Courts have exercised their discretion to limit court openness in order to protect personal information from publicity, including to prevent the disclosure of sexual orientation (see, e.g., *Paterson*, at paras. 76, 78 and 87-88), HIV status (see, e.g., *A.B. v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2017 FC 629, at para. 9 (CanLII)) and a history of substance abuse and criminality (see, e.g., *R. v. Pickton*, 2010 BCSC 1198, at paras. 11 and 20 (CanLII)). This need to reconcile the public interest in privacy with the open court principle has been highlighted by this Court (see, e.g., *Edmonton Journal*, at p. 1353, per Wilson J.). Writing extra-judicially, McLachlin C.J. explained that "[i]f we are serious about peoples' private lives, we must preserve a modicum of privacy. Equally, if we are serious about our justice system, we must have open courts. The question is how to reconcile these dual imperatives in a fair and principled way" ("Courts, Transparency and Public Confidence — To the Better Administration of Justice" (2003), 8 *Deakin L. Rev.* 1, at p. 4). In seeking that reconciliation, the question becomes whether the relevant dimension of privacy amounts to an important public interest that, when seriously at risk, would justify rebutting the strong presumption favouring open courts.

### ***C. The Important Public Interest in Privacy Bears on the Protection of Individual Dignity***

56 While the public importance of privacy has clearly been recognized by this Court in various settings, caution is required in deploying this concept in the test for discretionary limits on court openness. It is a matter of settled law that open court proceedings by their nature can be a source of discomfort and embarrassment and these intrusions on privacy are generally seen as of insufficient importance to overcome the presumption of openness. The *Toronto Star* has raised the concern that recognizing privacy as an important public interest will lower the burden for applicants because the privacy of litigants will, in some respects, always be at risk in court proceedings. I agree that the requirement to show a serious risk to an important interest is a key threshold component of the analysis that must be preserved in order to protect the open court principle. The recognition of a public interest in privacy could threaten the strong presumption of openness if privacy is cast too broadly without a view to its public character.

57 Privacy poses challenges in the test for discretionary limits on court openness because of the necessary dissemination of information that openness implies. It bears recalling that when Dickson J., as he then was, wrote in *MacIntyre* that "covertness is the exception and openness the rule", he was explicitly treating a privacy argument, returning to and dismissing the view, urged many times before, "that the 'privacy' of litigants *requires* that the public be excluded from court proceedings" (p. 185 (emphasis added)). Dickson J. rejected the view that personal privacy concerns require closed courtroom doors, explaining that "[a]s a general rule the sensibilities of the individuals involved are no basis for exclusion of the public from judicial proceedings" (*ibid*).

58 Though writing before *Dagenais*, and therefore not commenting on the specific steps of the analysis as we now understand them, to my mind, Dickson J. was right to recognize that the open court principle brings necessary limits to the right to privacy. While individuals may have an expectation that information about them will not be revealed in judicial proceedings, the open court principle stands presumptively in opposition to that expectation. For example, in *Lac d'Amiante du Québec Ltée v. 2858-0702 Québec Inc.*, 2001 SCC 51, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 743, LeBel J. held that "a party who institutes a legal proceeding waives his or her right to privacy, at least in part" (para. 42). *MacIntyre* and cases like it recognize — in stating that openness is the rule and covertness the exception — that the right to privacy, however defined, in some measure gives way to the open court ideal. I share the view that the open court principle presumes that this limit on the right to privacy is justified.

59 The *Toronto Star* is therefore right to say that the privacy of individuals will very often be at some risk in court proceedings. Disputes between and concerning individuals that play out in open court necessarily reveal information that may have otherwise remained out of public view. Indeed, much like the Court of Appeal in this case, courts have explicitly adverted to this concern when concluding that mere inconvenience is insufficient to cross the initial threshold of the test (see, e.g., *3834310 Canada inc. v. Chamberland* 2004 CanLII 4122(Que. C.A.), at para. 30). Saying that any impact on individual privacy is sufficient to establish a serious risk to an important public interest for the purposes of the test for discretionary limits on court openness could

render this initial requirement moot. Many cases would turn on the balancing at the proportionality stage. Such a development would amount to a departure from *Sierra Club*, which is the appropriate framework and one which must be preserved.

60 Further, recognizing an important interest in privacy generally could prove to be too open-ended and difficult to apply. Privacy is a complex and contextual concept (*Dagg*, at para. 67; see also B. McIsaac, K. Klein and S. Brown, *The Law of Privacy in Canada* (loose-leaf), vol. 1, at pp. 1-4; D. J. Solove, "Conceptualizing Privacy" (2002), 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1087, at p. 1090). Indeed, this Court has described the nature of limits of privacy as being in a state of "theoretical disarray" (*R. v. Spencer*, 2014 SCC 43, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, at para. 35). Much turns on the context in which privacy is invoked. I agree with the Toronto Star that a bald recognition of privacy as an important interest in the context of the test for discretionary limits on court openness, as the Trustees advance here, would invite considerable confusion. It would be difficult for courts to measure a serious risk to such an interest because of its multi-faceted nature.

61 While I acknowledge these concerns have merit, I disagree that they require that privacy never be considered in determining whether there is a serious risk to an important public interest. I reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, the problem of privacy's complexity can be attenuated by focusing on the purpose underlying the public protection of privacy as it is relevant to the judicial process, in order to fix precisely on that aspect which transcends the interests of the parties in this context. That narrower dimension of privacy is the protection of dignity, an important public interest that can be threatened by open courts. Indeed, rather than attempting to apply a single unwieldy concept of privacy in all contexts, this Court has generally fixed on more specific privacy interests tailored to the particular situation (*Spencer*, at para. 35; *Edmonton Journal*, at p. 1362, per Wilson J.). That is what must be done here, with a view to identifying the public aspect of privacy that openness might inappropriately undermine.

62 Second, I recall that in order to pass the first stage of the analysis one must not simply invoke an important interest, but must also overcome the presumption of openness by showing a serious risk to this interest. The burden of showing a risk to such an interest on the facts of a given case constitutes the true initial threshold on the person seeking to restrict openness. It is never sufficient to plead a recognized important public interest on its own. The demonstration of a serious risk to this interest is still required. What is important is that the interest be accurately defined to capture only those aspects of privacy that engage legitimate public objectives such that showing a serious risk to that interest remains a high bar. In this way, courts can effectively maintain the guarantee of presumptive openness.

63 Specifically, in order to preserve the integrity of the open court principle, an important public interest concerned with the protection of dignity should be understood to be seriously at risk only in limited cases. Nothing here displaces the principle that covertness in court proceedings must be exceptional. Neither the sensibilities of individuals nor the fact that openness is disadvantageous, embarrassing or distressing to certain individuals will generally on their own warrant interference with court openness (*MacIntyre*, at p. 185; *New Brunswick*, at para. 40; *Williams*, at para. 30; *Coltsfoot Publishing Ltd. v. Foster-Jacques*, 2012 NSCA 83, 320 N.S.R. (2d) 166, at para. 97). These principles do not preclude recognizing the public character of a privacy interest as important when it is related to the protection of dignity. They merely require that a serious risk be shown to exist in respect of this interest in order to justify, exceptionally, a limit on openness, as is the case with any important public interest under *Sierra Club*. As Professors Sylvette Guillemard and Séverine Menétreay explain, [TRANSLATION] "[t]he confidentiality of the proceedings may be justified, in particular, in order to protect the parties' privacy .... However, the jurisprudence indicates that embarrassment or shame is not a sufficient reason to order that proceedings be held *in camera* or to impose a publication ban" (*Comprendre la procédure civile québécoise* (2nd ed. 2017), at p. 57).

64 How should the privacy interest at issue be understood as raising an important public interest relevant to the test for discretionary limits on court openness in this context? It is helpful to recall that the orders below were sought to limit access to documents and information in the court files. The Trustees' argument on this point focused squarely on the risk of immediate and widespread dissemination of the personally identifying and other sensitive information contained in the sealed materials by the Toronto Star. The Trustees submit that this dissemination would constitute an unwarranted intrusion into the privacy of the affected individuals beyond the upset they have already suffered as a result of the publicity associated with the death of the Shermans.

65 In my view, there is value in leaving individuals free to restrict when, how and to what extent highly sensitive information about them is communicated to others in the public sphere, because choosing how we present ourselves in public preserves our moral autonomy and dignity as individuals. This Court has had occasion to underscore the connection between the privacy interest engaged by open courts and the protection of dignity specifically. For example, in *Edmonton Journal*, Wilson J. noted that the impugned provision which would limit publication about matrimonial proceedings addressed "a somewhat different aspect of privacy, one more closely related to the protection of one's dignity ... namely the personal anguish and loss of dignity that may result from having embarrassing details of one's private life printed in the newspapers" (pp. 1363-64). In *Bragg*, as a further example, the protection of a young person's ability to control sensitive information was said to foster respect for "dignity, personal integrity and autonomy" (para. 18, citing *Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd.*, at para. 44).

66 Consistent with this jurisprudence, I note by way of example that the Quebec legislature expressly highlighted the preservation of dignity when the *Sierra Club* test was codified in the *Code of Civil Procedure*, CQLR, c. C-25.01 ("C.C.P."), art. 12 (see also Ministère de la Justice, *Commentaires de la ministre de la Justice: Code de procédure civile, chapitre C-25.01* (2015), art. 12). Under art. 12 C.C.P., a discretionary exception to the open court principle can be made by the court if "public order, in particular the preservation of the dignity of the persons involved or the protection of substantial and legitimate interests", requires it.

67 The concept of public order evidences flexibility analogous to the concept of an important public interest under *Sierra Club* yet it recalls that the interest invoked transcends, in importance and consequence, the purely subjective sensibilities of the persons affected. Like the "important public interest" that must be at serious risk to justify the sealing orders in the present appeal, public order encompasses a wide array of general principles and imperative norms identified by a legislature and the courts as fundamental to a given society (see *Goulet v. Transamerica Life Insurance Co. of Canada*, 2002 SCC 21, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 719, at paras. 42-44, citing *Godbout v. Longueuil (Ville de)*, [1995] R.J.Q. 2561 (C.A.), at p. 2570, aff'd [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844). As one Quebec judge wrote, referring to *Sierra Club* prior to the enactment of art. 12 C.C.P., the interest must be understood as defined [TRANSLATION] "in terms of a public interest in confidentiality" (see *3834310 Canada inc.*, at para. 24, per Gendreau J.A. for the Court of appeal). From among the various considerations that make up the concept of public order and other legitimate interests to which art. 12 C.C.P. alludes, it is significant that dignity, and not an untailored reference to either privacy, harm or access to justice, was given pride of place. Indeed, it is that narrow aspect of privacy considered to be a fundamental right that courts had fixed upon before the enactment of art. 12 C.C.P. — [TRANSLATION] "what is part of one's personal life, in short, what constitutes a minimum personal sphere" (*Godbout*, at p. 2569, per Baudouin J.A.; see also *A. v. B.* 1990 CanLII 3132(Que. C.A.), at para. 20, per Rothman J.A.).

68 The "preservation of the dignity of the persons involved" is now consecrated as the archetypal public order interest in art. 12 C.C.P. It is the exemplar of the *Sierra Club* important public interest in confidentiality that stands as justification for an exception to openness (S. Rochette and J.-F. Côté, "Article 12", in L. Chamberland, ed., *Le grand collectif: Code de procédure civile — Commentaires et annotations* (5th ed. 2020), vol. 1, at p. 102; D. Ferland and B. Emery, *Précis de procédure civile du Québec* (6th ed. 2020), vol. 1, at para. 1-111). Dignity gives concrete expression to this public order interest because all of society has a stake in its preservation, notwithstanding its personal connections to the individuals concerned. This codification of *Sierra Club*'s notion of important public interest highlights the superordinate importance of human dignity and the appropriateness of limiting court openness on this basis as against an overbroad understanding of privacy that might be otherwise unsuitable to the open court context.

69 Consistent with this idea, understanding privacy as predicated on dignity has been advanced as useful in connection with challenges brought by digital communications (K. Eltis, "The Judicial System in the Digital Age: Revisiting the Relationship between Privacy and Accessibility in the Cyber Context" (2011), 56 *McGill L.J.* 289, at p. 314).

70 It is also significant, in my view, that the application judge in this case explicitly recognized, in response to the relevant arguments from the Trustees, an interest in "protecting the privacy *and dignity* of victims of crime and their loved ones" (para. 23 (emphasis added)). This elucidates that the central concern for the affected individuals on this point is not merely protecting their privacy for its own sake but privacy where it coincides with the public character of the dignity interests of these individuals.

71 Violations of privacy that cause a loss of control over fundamental personal information about oneself are damaging to dignity because they erode one's ability to present aspects of oneself to others in a selective manner (D. Matheson, "Dignity and Selective Self-Presentation", in I. Kerr, V. Steeves and C. Lucock, eds., *Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity, Privacy and Identity in a Networked Society* (2009), 319, at pp. 327-28; L. M. Austin, "Re-reading Westin" (2019), 20 *Theor. Inq. L.* 53, at pp. 66-68; Eltis (2016), at p. 13). Dignity, used in this context, is a social concept that involves presenting core aspects of oneself to others in a considered and controlled manner (see generally Matheson, at pp. 327-28; Austin, at pp. 66-68). Dignity is eroded where individuals lose control over this core identity-giving information about themselves, because a highly sensitive aspect of who they are that they did not consciously decide to share is now available to others and may shape how they are seen in public. This was even alluded to by La Forest J., dissenting but not on this point, in *Dagg*, where he referred to privacy as "[a]n expression of an individual's unique personality or personhood" (para. 65).

72 Where dignity is impaired, the impact on the individual is not theoretical but could engender real human consequences, including psychological distress (see generally Bragg, at para. 23). La Forest J., concurring, observed in *Dymnt* that privacy is essential to the well-being of individuals (p. 427). Viewed in this way, a privacy interest, where it shields the core information associated with dignity necessary to individual well-being, begins to look much like the physical safety interest also raised in this case, the important and public nature of which is neither debated, nor, in my view, seriously debatable. The administration of justice suffers when the operation of courts threatens physical well-being because a responsible court system is attuned to the physical harm it inflicts on individuals and works to avoid such effects. Similarly, in my view, a responsible court must be attuned and responsive to the harm it causes to other core elements of individual well-being, including individual dignity. This parallel helps to understand dignity as a more limited dimension of privacy relevant as an important public interest in the open court context.

73 I am accordingly of the view that protecting individuals from the threat to their dignity that arises when information revealing core aspects of their private lives is disseminated through open court proceedings is an important public interest for the purposes of the test.

74 Focusing on the underlying value of privacy in protecting individual dignity from the exposure of private information in open court overcomes the criticisms that privacy will always be at risk in open court proceedings and is theoretically complex. Openness brings intrusions on personal privacy in virtually all cases, but dignity as a public interest in protecting an individual's core sensibility is more rarely in play. Specifically, and consistent with the cautious approach to the recognition of important public interests, this privacy interest, while determined in reference to the broader factual setting, will be at serious risk only where the sensitivity of the information strikes at the subject's more intimate self.

75 If the interest is ultimately about safeguarding a person's dignity, that interest will be undermined when the information reveals something sensitive about them as an individual, as opposed to generic information that reveals little if anything about who they are as a person. Therefore the information that will be revealed by court openness must consist of intimate or personal details about an individual — what this Court has described in its jurisprudence on s. 8 of the Charter as the "biographical core" — if a serious risk to an important public interest is to be recognized in this context (*R. v. Plant*, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, at p. 293; *R. v. Tessling*, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 60; *R. v. Cole*, 2012 SCC 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, at para. 46). Dignity transcends personal inconvenience by reason of the highly sensitive nature of the information that might be revealed. This Court in *Cole* drew a similar line between the sensitivity of personal information and the public interest in protecting that information in reference to the biographical core. It held that "reasonable and informed Canadians" would be more willing to recognize the existence of a privacy interest where the relevant information cuts to the "biographical core" or, "[p]ut another way, the more personal and confidential the information" (para. 46). The presumption of openness means that mere discomfort associated with lesser intrusions of privacy will generally be tolerated. But there is a public interest in ensuring that openness does not unduly entail the dissemination of this core information that threatens dignity — even if it is "personal" to the affected person.

76 The test for discretionary limits on court openness imposes on the applicant the burden to show that the important public interest is at serious risk. Recognizing that privacy, understood in reference to dignity, is only at serious risk where the information in the court file is sufficiently sensitive erects a threshold consistent with the presumption of openness. This

threshold is fact specific. It addresses the concern, noted above, that personal information can frequently be found in court files and yet finding this sufficient to pass the serious risk threshold in every case would undermine the structure of the test. By requiring the applicant to demonstrate the sensitivity of the information as a necessary condition to the finding of a serious risk to this interest, the scope of the interest is limited to only those cases where the rationale for not revealing core aspects of a person's private life, namely protecting individual dignity, is most actively engaged.

77 There is no need here to provide an exhaustive catalogue of the range of sensitive personal information that, if exposed, could give rise to a serious risk. It is enough to say that courts have demonstrated a willingness to recognize the sensitivity of information related to stigmatized medical conditions (see, e.g., *A.B.*, at para. 9), stigmatized work (see, e.g., *Work Safe Twerk Safe v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario*, 2021 ONSC 1100, at para. 28 (CanLII)), sexual orientation (see, e.g., *Paterson*, at paras. 76, 78 and 87-88), and subsection to sexual assault or harassment (see, e.g., *Fedeli v. Brown*, 2020 ONSC 994, at para. 9 (CanLII)). I would also note the submission of the intervener the Income Security Advocacy Centre, that detailed information about family structure and work history could in some circumstances constitute sensitive information. The question in every case is whether the information reveals something intimate and personal about the individual, their lifestyle or their experiences.

78 I pause here to note that I refer to cases on s. 8 of the Charter above for the limited purpose of providing insight into types of information that are more or less personal and therefore deserving of public protection. If the impact on dignity as a result of disclosure is to be accurately measured, it is critical that the analysis differentiate between information in this way. Helpfully, one factor in determining whether an applicant's subjective expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable in the s. 8 jurisprudence focuses on the degree to which information is private (see, e.g., *R. v. Marakah*, 2017 SCC 59, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 608, at para. 31; *Cole*, at paras. 44-46). But while these decisions may assist for this limited purpose, this is not to say that the remainder of the s. 8 analysis has any relevance to the application of the test for discretionary limits on court openness. For example, asking what the Trustees' reasonable expectation of privacy was here could invite a circular analysis of whether they reasonably expected their court files to be open to the public or whether they reasonably expected to be successful in having them sealed. Therefore, it is only for the limited purpose described above that the s. 8 jurisprudence is useful.

79 In cases where the information is sufficiently sensitive to strike at an individual's biographical core, a court must then ask whether a serious risk to the interest is made out in the full factual context of the case. While this is obviously a fact-specific determination, some general observations may be made here to guide this assessment.

80 I note that the seriousness of the risk may be affected by the extent to which information would be disseminated without an exception to the open court principle. If the applicant raises a risk that the personal information will come to be known by a large segment of the public in the absence of an order, this is a plainly more serious risk than if the result will be that a handful of people become aware of the same information, all else being equal. In the past, the requirement that one be physically present to acquire information in open court or from a court record meant that information was, to some extent, protected because it was "practically obscure" (D. S. Ardia, "Privacy and Court Records: Online Access and the Loss of Practical Obscurity" (2017), 4 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1385, at p. 1396). However, today, courts should be sensitive to the information technology context, which has increased the ease with which information can be communicated and cross-referenced (see Bailey and Burkell, at pp. 169-70; Ardia, at pp. 1450-51). In this context, it may well be difficult for courts to be sure that information will not be broadly disseminated in the absence of an order.

81 It will be appropriate, of course, to consider the extent to which information is already in the public domain. If court openness will simply make available what is already broadly and easily accessible, it will be difficult to show that revealing the information in open court will actually result in a meaningful loss of that aspect of privacy relating to the dignity interest to which I refer here. However, just because information is already accessible to some segment of the public does not mean that making it available through the court process will not exacerbate the risk to privacy. Privacy is not a binary concept, that is, information is not simply either private or public, especially because, by reason of technology in particular, absolute confidentiality is best thought of as elusive (see generally *R. v. Quesnelle*, 2014 SCC 46, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 390, at para. 37; *UFCW*, at para. 27). The fact that certain information is already available somewhere in the public sphere does not preclude further harm to the privacy interest by additional dissemination, particularly if the feared dissemination of highly sensitive information is broader or more easily

accessible (see generally Solove, at p. 1152; Ardia, at p. 1393-94; E. Paton-Simpson, "Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places" (2000), 50 U.T.L.J. 305, at p. 346).

82 Further, the seriousness of the risk is also affected by the probability that the dissemination the applicant suggests will occur actually occurs. I hasten to say that implicit in the notion of risk is that the applicant need not establish that the feared dissemination will certainly occur. However, the risk to the privacy interest related to the protection of dignity will be more serious the more likely it is that the information will be disseminated. While decided in a different context, this Court has held that the magnitude of risk is a product of both the gravity of the feared harm and its probability (*R. v. Mabior*, 2012 SCC 47, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 584, at para. 86).

83 That said, the likelihood that an individual's highly sensitive personal information will be disseminated in the absence of privacy protection will be difficult to quantify precisely. It is best to note as well that probability in this context need not be identified in mathematical or numerical terms. Rather, courts may merely discern probability in light of the totality of the circumstances and balance this one factor alongside other relevant factors.

84 Finally, and as discussed above, individual sensitivities alone, even if they can be notionally associated with "privacy", are generally insufficient to justify a restriction on court openness where they do not rise above those inconveniences and discomforts that are inherent to court openness (*MacIntyre*, at p. 185). An applicant will only be able to establish that the risk is sufficient to justify a limit on openness in exceptional cases, where the threatened loss of control over information about oneself is so fundamental that it strikes meaningfully at individual dignity. These circumstances engage "social values of superordinate importance" beyond the more ordinary intrusions inherent to participating in the judicial process that Dickson J. acknowledged could justify curtailing public openness (pp. 186-87).

85 To summarize, the important public interest in privacy, as understood in the context of the limits on court openness, is aimed at allowing individuals to preserve control over their core identity in the public sphere to the extent necessary to preserve their dignity. The public has a stake in openness, to be sure, but it also has an interest in the preservation of dignity: the administration of justice requires that where dignity is threatened in this way, measures be taken to accommodate this privacy concern. Although measured by reference to the facts of each case, the risk to this interest will be serious only where the information that would be disseminated as a result of court openness is sufficiently sensitive such that openness can be shown to meaningfully strike at the individual's biographical core in a manner that threatens their integrity. Recognizing this interest is consistent with this Court's emphasis on the importance of privacy and the underlying value of individual dignity, but is also tailored to preserve the strong presumption of openness.

#### ***D. The Trustees Have Failed to Establish a Serious Risk to an Important Public Interest***

86 As *Sierra Club* made plain, a discretionary order limiting court openness can only be made where there is a serious risk to an important public interest. The arguments on this appeal concerned whether privacy is an important public interest and whether the facts here disclose the existence of serious risks to privacy and safety. While the broad privacy interest invoked by the Trustees cannot be relied on to justify a limit on openness, the narrower concept of privacy understood in relation to dignity is an important public interest for the purposes of the test. I also recognize that a risk to physical safety is an important public interest, a point on which there is no dispute here. Accordingly, the relevant question at the first step is whether there is a serious risk to one or both of these interests. For reasons that follow, the Trustees have failed to establish a serious risk to either. This alone is sufficient to conclude that the sealing orders should not have been issued.

##### *(1) The Risk to Privacy Alleged in this Case Is Not Serious*

87 As I have said, the important public interest in privacy must be understood as one tailored to the protection of individual dignity and not the broadly defined interest the Trustees have asked this Court to recognize. In order to establish a serious risk to this interest, the information in the court files about which the Trustees are concerned must be sufficiently sensitive in that it strikes at the biographical core of the affected individuals. If it is not, there is no serious risk that would justify an exception to openness. If it is, the question becomes whether a serious risk is made out in light of the facts of this case.

88 The application judge never explicitly identified a serious risk to the privacy interest he identified but, to the extent he implicitly reached this conclusion, I respectfully do not share his view. His finding was limited to the observation that "[t]he degree of intrusion on that privacy and dignity [i.e., that of the victims and their loved ones] has already been extreme and, I am sure, excruciating" (para. 23). But the intense scrutiny faced by the Shermans up to the time of the application is only part of the equation. As the sealing orders can only protect against the disclosure of the information in these court files relating to probate, the application judge was required to consider the sensitivity of the specific information they contained. He made no such measure. His conclusion about the seriousness of the risk then focused entirely on the risk of physical harm, with no indication that he found that the Trustees met their burden as to the serious risk to the privacy interest. Said very respectfully and with the knowledge that the application judge did not have the benefit of the above framework, the failure to assess the sensitivity of the information constituted a failure to consider a required element of the legal test. This warranted intervention on appeal.

89 Applying the appropriate framework to the facts of this case, I conclude that the risk to the important public interest in the affected individuals' privacy, as I have defined it above in reference to dignity, is not serious. The information the Trustees seek to protect is not highly sensitive and this alone is sufficient to conclude that there is no serious risk to the important public interest in privacy so defined.

90 There is little controversy in this case about the likelihood and extent of dissemination of the information contained in the estate files. There is near certainty that the Toronto Star will publish at least some aspects of the estate files if it is provided access. Given the breadth of the audience of its media organization, and the high-profile nature of the events surrounding the death of the Shermans, I have no difficulty in concluding that the affected individuals would lose control over this information to a significant extent should the files be open.

91 With regard to the sensitivity of the information, however, the information contained in these files does not reveal anything particularly private about the affected individuals. What would be revealed might well cause inconvenience and perhaps embarrassment, but it has not been shown that it would strike at their biographical core in a way that would undermine their control over the expression of their identities. Their privacy would be troubled, to be sure, but the relevant privacy interest bearing on the dignity of the affected persons has not been shown to be at serious risk. At its highest, the information in these files will reveal something about the relationship between the deceased and the affected individuals, in that it may reveal to whom the deceased entrusted the administration of their estates and those who they wished or were deemed to wish to be beneficiaries of their property at death. It may also reveal some basic personal information, such as addresses. Some of the beneficiaries might well, it may fairly be presumed, bear family names other than Sherman. I am mindful that the deaths are being investigated as homicides by the Toronto Police Service. However, even in this context, none of this information provides significant insight into who they are as individuals, nor would it provoke a fundamental change in their ability to control how they are perceived by others. The fact of being linked through estate documents to victims of an unsolved murder is not in itself highly sensitive. It may be the source of discomfort but has not been shown to constitute an affront to dignity in that it does not probe deeply into the biographical core of these individuals. As a result, the Trustees have failed to establish a serious risk to an important public interest as required by *Sierra Club*.

92 The fact that some of the affected individuals may be minors is also insufficient to cross the seriousness threshold. While the law recognizes that minors are especially vulnerable to intrusions of privacy (see Bragg, at para. 17), the mere fact that information concerns minors does not displace the generally applicable analysis (see, e.g., Bragg, at para. 11). Even taking into account the increased vulnerability of minors who may be affected individuals in the probate files, there is no evidence that they would lose control of information about themselves that reveals something close to the core of their identities. Merely associating the beneficiaries or trustees with the Shermans' unexplained deaths is not enough to constitute a serious risk to the identified important public interest in privacy, defined in reference to dignity.

93 Further, while the intense media scrutiny on the family following the deaths suggests that the information would likely be widely disseminated, it is not in itself indicative of the sensitivity of the information contained in the probate files.

94 Showing that the information that would be revealed by court openness is sufficiently sensitive and private such that it goes to the biographical core of the affected individual is a necessary prerequisite to showing a serious risk to the relevant public interest aspect of privacy. The Trustees did not advance any specific reason why the contents of these files are more sensitive than they may seem at first glance. When asserting a privacy risk, it is essential to show not only that information about individuals will escape the control of the person concerned — which will be true in every case — but that this particular information concerns who the individuals are as people in a manner that undermines their dignity. This the Trustees have not done.

95 Therefore, while some of the material in the court files may well be broadly disseminated, the nature of the information has not been shown to give rise to a serious risk to the important public interest in privacy, as appropriately defined in this context in reference to dignity. For that reason alone, I conclude that the Trustees have failed to show a serious risk to this interest.

*(2) The Risk to Physical Safety Alleged in this Case is Not Serious*

96 Unlike the privacy interest raised in this case, there was no controversy that there is an important public interest in protecting individuals from physical harm. It is worth underscoring that the application judge correctly treated the protection from physical harm as a distinct important interest from that of the protection of privacy and found that this risk of harm was "foreseeable" and "grave" (paras. 22-24). The issue is whether the Trustees have established a serious risk to this interest for the purpose of the test for discretionary limits on court openness. The application judge observed that it would have been preferable to include objective evidence of the seriousness of the risk from the police service conducting the homicide investigation. He nevertheless concluded there was sufficient proof of risk to the physical safety of the affected individuals to meet the test. The Court of Appeal says that was a misreading of the evidence, and the Toronto Star agrees that the application judge's conclusion as to the existence of a serious risk to safety was mere speculation.

97 At the outset, I note that direct evidence is not necessarily required to establish a serious risk to an important interest. This Court has held that it is possible to identify objectively discernable harm on the basis of logical inferences (*Bragg*, at paras. 15-16). But this process of inferential reasoning is not a licence to engage in impermissible speculation. An inference must still be grounded in objective circumstantial facts that reasonably allow the finding to be made inferentially. Where the inference cannot reasonably be drawn from the circumstances, it amounts to speculation (*R. v. Chanmany*, 2016 ONCA 576, 352 O.A.C. 121, at para. 45).

98 As the Trustees correctly argue, it is not just the probability of the feared harm, but also the gravity of the harm itself that is relevant to the assessment of serious risk. Where the feared harm is particularly serious, the probability that this harm materialize need not be shown to be likely, but must still be more than negligible, fanciful or speculative. The question is ultimately whether this record allowed the application judge to objectively discern a serious risk of physical harm.

99 This conclusion was not open to the application judge on this record. There is no dispute that the feared physical harm is grave. I agree with the Toronto Star, however, that the probability of this harm occurring was speculative. The application judge's conclusion as to the seriousness of the risk of physical harm was grounded on what he called "the degree of mystery that persists regarding both the perpetrator and the motives" associated with the deaths of the Shermans and his supposition that this motive might be "transported" to the trustees and beneficiaries (para. 5; see also paras. 19 and 23). The further step in reasoning that the unsealed estate files would lead to the perpetrator's next crime, to be visited upon someone mentioned in the files, is based on speculation, not the available affidavit evidence, and cannot be said to be a proper inference or some kind of objectively discerned harm or risk thereof. If that were the case, the estate files of every victim of an unsolved murder would pass the initial threshold of the test for a sealing order.

100 Further, I recall that what is at issue here is not whether the affected individuals face a safety risk in general, but rather whether they face such a risk as a result of the openness of these court files. In light of the contents of these files, the Trustees had to point to some further reason why the risk posed by this information becoming publicly available was more than negligible.

101 The speculative character of the chain of reasoning leading to the conclusion that a serious risk of physical harm exists in this case is underlined by differences between these facts and those cases relied on by the Trustees. In *X. v. Y.*, 2011 BCSC 943, 21

**B.C.L.R. (5th) 410**, the risk of physical harm was inferred on the basis that the plaintiff was a police officer who had investigated "cases involving gang violence and dangerous firearms" and wrote sentencing reports for such offenders which identified him by full name (para. 6). In *R. v. Esseghaier*, 2017 ONCA 970, 356 C.C.C. (3d) 455, Watt J.A. considered it "self-evident" that the disclosure of identifiers of an undercover operative working in counter-terrorism would compromise the safety of the operative (para. 41). In both cases, the danger flowed from facts establishing that the applicants were in antagonistic relationships with alleged criminal or terrorist organizations. But in this case, the Trustees asked the application judge to infer not only the fact that harm would befall the affected individuals, but also that a person or persons exist who wish to harm them. To infer all this on the basis of the Shermans' deaths and the association of the affected individuals with the deceased is not reasonably possible on this record. It is not a reasonable inference but, as the Court of Appeal noted, a conclusion resting on speculation.

102 Were the mere assertion of grave physical harm sufficient to show a serious risk to an important interest, there would be no meaningful threshold in the analysis. Instead, the test requires the serious risk asserted to be well grounded in the record or the circumstances of the particular case (*Sierra Club*, at para. 54; *Bragg*, at para. 15). This contributes to maintaining the strong presumption of openness.

103 Again, in other cases, circumstantial facts may allow a court to infer the existence of a serious risk of physical harm. Applicants do not necessarily need to retain experts who will attest to the physical or psychological risk related to the disclosure. But on this record, the bare assertion that such a risk exists fails to meet the threshold necessary to establish a serious risk of physical harm. The application judge's conclusion to the contrary was an error warranting the intervention of the Court of Appeal.

#### ***E. There Would Be Additional Barriers to a Sealing Order on the Basis of the Alleged Risk to Privacy***

104 While not necessary to dispose of the appeal, it bears mention that the Trustees would have faced additional barriers in seeking the sealing orders on the basis of the privacy interest they advanced. I recall that to meet the test for discretionary limits on court openness, a person must show, in addition to a serious risk to an important interest, that the particular order sought is necessary to address the risk and that the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects as a matter of proportionality (*Sierra Club*, at para. 53).

105 Even if the Trustees had succeeded in showing a serious risk to the privacy interest they assert, a publication ban — less constraining on openness than the sealing orders — would have likely been sufficient as a reasonable alternative to prevent this risk. The condition that the order be necessary requires the court to consider whether there are alternatives to the order sought and to restrict the order as much as reasonably possible to prevent the serious risk (*Sierra Club*, at para. 57). An order imposing a publication ban could restrict the dissemination of personal information to only those persons consulting the court record for themselves and prohibit those individuals from spreading the information any further. As I have noted, the likelihood and extent of dissemination may be relevant factors in determining the seriousness of a risk to privacy in this context. While the Toronto Star would be able to consult the files subject to a publication ban, for example, which may assist it in its investigations, it would not be able to publish and thereby broadly disseminate the contents of the files. A publication ban would seem to protect against this latter harm, which has been the focus of the Trustees' argument, while allowing some access to the file, which is not possible under the sealing orders. Therefore, even if a serious risk to the privacy interest had been made out, it would likely not have justified a sealing order, because a less onerous order would have likely been sufficient to mitigate this risk effectively. I hasten to add, however, that a publication ban is not available here since, as noted, the seriousness of the risk to the privacy interest at play has not been made out.

106 Further, the Trustees would have had to show that the benefits of any order necessary to protect from a serious risk to the important public interest outweighed the harmful effects of the order, including the negative impact on the open court principle (*Sierra Club*, at para. 53). In balancing the privacy interests against the open court principle, it is important to consider whether the information the order seeks to protect is peripheral or central to the judicial process (paras. 78 and 86; *Bragg*, at paras. 28-29). There will doubtless be cases where the information that poses a serious risk to privacy, bearing as it does on individual dignity, will be central to the case. But the interest in important and legally relevant information being aired in open court may well overcome any concern for the privacy interests in that same information. This contextual balancing, informed

by the importance of the open court principle, presents a final barrier to those seeking a discretionary limit on court openness for the purposes of privacy protection.

## VI. Conclusion

107 The conclusion that the Trustees have failed to establish a serious risk to an important public interest ends the analysis. In such circumstances, the Trustees are not entitled to any discretionary order limiting the open court principle, including the sealing orders they initially obtained. The Court of Appeal rightly concluded that there was no basis for asking for redactions because the Trustees had failed at this stage of the test for discretionary limits on court openness. This is dispositive of the appeal. The decision to set aside the sealing orders rendered by the application judge should be affirmed. Given that I propose to dismiss the appeal on the existing record, I would dismiss the Toronto Star's motion for new evidence as being moot.

108 For the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss the appeal. The Toronto Star requests no costs given the important public issues in dispute. As such, there will be no order as to costs.

*Appeal dismissed.*

*Pourvoi rejeté.*

## Footnotes

- 1 As noted in the title of proceedings, the appellants in this matter have been referred to consistently as the "Estate of Bernard Sherman and Trustees of the Estate and Estate of Honey Sherman and Trustees of the Estate." In these reasons the appellants are referred to throughout as the "Trustees" for convenience.
- 2 The use of "Toronto Star" as a collective term referring to both respondents should not be taken to suggest that only Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. is participating in this appeal. Mr. Donovan is the only respondent to have been a party throughout. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. was a party in first instance, but was removed as a party on consent at the Court of Appeal. By order of Karakatsanis J. dated March 25, 2020, Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. was added as a respondent in this Court.
- 3 At the time of writing the House of Commons is considering a bill that would replace part one of *PIPEDA*: Bill C-11, *An Act to enact the Consumer Privacy Protection Act and the Personal Information and Data Protection Tribunal Act and to make consequential and related amendments to other Acts*, 2nd Sess., 43rd Parl., 2020.

# TAB 16

2009 CarswellOnt 7952  
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Look Communications Inc. v. Look Mobile Corp.

2009 CarswellOnt 7952, [2009] O.J. No. 5440, 183 A.C.W.S. (3d) 736

**IN THE MATTER OF LOOK COMMUNICATIONS INC. (Applicant) and LOOK  
MOBILE CORPORATION AND LOOK COMMUNICATIONS L.P. (Respondent)**

AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY LOOK COMMUNICATIONS INC. UNDER  
SECTION 192 OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C.44, AS AMENDED

Newbould J.

Heard: December 17, 2009  
Judgment: December 18, 2009  
Docket: 08-CL-7877

Counsel: John T. Porter for Look Communications Inc.  
Aubrey E. Kauffman for Inukshuk Wireless Partnership

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Civil Practice and Procedure

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Business associations

VI Changes to corporate status

VI.3 Arrangements and compromises

VI.3.b Under general corporate legislation

**Headnote**

Business associations --- Changes to corporate status — Arrangements and compromises — Under general corporate legislation Corporation made plan of arrangement under [Canada Business Corporations Act](#) — Court approved sale of most of corporation's assets to joint venture — Monitor's first report was ordered sealed until sale was completed — Completion occurred much earlier than expected — Corporation meanwhile was attempting to sell remaining assets and wished to keep earlier bids confidential — Joint venture wanted information to gain advantage in bidding for remaining assets — Corporation brought motion to extend sealing order for six months — Motion granted — Court had jurisdiction under [s. 137 of Courts of Justice Act](#) to extend order notwithstanding that plan of arrangement was finalized — Corporation had commercial interest in selling its remaining assets — Extending order would not have substantial detrimental effect on core values of freedom of expression.

**Table of Authorities**

**Cases considered by Newbould J.:**

*MacIntyre v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General)* (1982), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175, 49 N.S.R. (2d) 609, 40 N.R. 181, 1982 CarswellNS 21, 26 C.R. (3d) 193, 96 A.P.R. 609, 132 D.L.R. (3d) 385, (sub nom. *Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. MacIntyre*) 65 C.C.C. (2d) 129, 1982 CarswellNS 110 (S.C.C.) — considered

*Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — considered

887574 *Ontario Inc. v. Pizza Pizza Ltd.* (1994), 35 C.P.C. (3d) 323, 23 B.L.R. (2d) 239, 1994 CarswellOnt 1214 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

**Statutes considered:**

*Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44

s. 192 — referred to

*Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11

s. 2(b) — referred to

*Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43

s. 137 — considered

MOTION by corporation for order extending sealing order made in court approved sale of assets.

***Newbould J.:***

1 Look Communications Inc.(Look) moves for an order extending a sealing order under which bids made in a court approved sales process were sealed. The order is opposed by Inukshuk Wireless Partnership which is a joint venture between Rogers Communications Inc. and Bell Canada.

**Circumstances of Sealing Order**

2 On December 1, 2008, Look was authorized by Pepall J. to conduct a special shareholder's meeting to pass resolutions (i) authorizing Look to establish a sales process for the sale of all or substantially all of its assets and to seek an order approving the sales process, and (ii) authorizing a plan of arrangement under [section 192 of the CBCA](#) which contemplated the sale of all or substantially all of Look's assets. The shareholders voted in favour of both a sales process and the arrangement.

3 On January 21, 2009, Look obtained an order approving the sales process and Grant Thornton Limited was appointed as Monitor to manage and conduct the sales process with Look. The sales process provided for bids from interested persons for five assets of Look, which were substantially all of its assets, being (i) Spectrum, being approximately 100MHz of License Spectrum in Ontario and Quebec; (ii) a CRTC Broadcast License; (iii) Subscribers; (iv) a Network consisting of two network operating centers and (v) approximately \$300 million in "tax attributes" or losses. Court approval was required for any sale.

4 Under the sales process, a bidder was entitled to bid for any or all of the assets that were being sold, or a combination thereof. Pursuant to the sales process, four bids were received and Look and the Monitor engaged in discussions with each bidder. Look eventually accepted an offer from Inukshuk for the Spectrum and Broadcast License. It is agreed that while not all of the assets of Look were sold, what was sold to Inukshuk were substantially all of the assets of Look.

5 The parties obtained a consent order on May 14, 2009 from Marrocco J. in which the sale of the Spectrum and Broadcast License to Inukshuk was approved. The order provided that the assets would vest in Inukshuk upon the Monitor filing a certificate with the court certifying as to the completion of the transaction. The sale contemplated a staged closing, with the first taking place immediately following the order of Marrocco J., the second being December 31, 2009 and the final taking place as late as what the sale agreement defined as the Outside Date, being the third anniversary of the date of the final order approving the transaction, i.e., May 14, 2012. I am told that the reason for the staged dates was that it was anticipated that the necessary regulatory approvals for the sale of the Spectrum and License could take some time.

6 As it turned out, the final closing took place much earlier than the Outside Date within a few months of the order of Marrocco J. On September 11, 2009, the Monitor filed its certificate with the Court certifying that the purchase price had been paid in full and that the conditions of closing had been satisfied. Thus the sold assets vested in Inukshuk. Under the terms of the plan of arrangement that was approved by the order of Marrocco J., once the certificate of the Monitor as to the completion of the transaction was delivered, the articles of arrangement became effective.

7 In connection with the application to Marrocco J. to approve the arrangement and the sale to Inukshuk, the Monitor filed a redacted version of its First Report, as is usual in the Commercial List for sales carried out under a court process, redacting the information about the bids received in the sales process. The order of Marrocco J. provided that an unredacted version of the First Report was to be sealed and not form part of the public record until the Monitor's Certificate after the sale was completed

was filed with the Court. That certificate, as I have said, was filed with the Court on September 11, 2009. Therefore under the order of Marrocco J. the unredacted First Report of the Monitor was no longer to be sealed.

8 Look is now attempting to sell its remaining assets, which include a corporation which had been approved by the CRTC to hold a license and has \$350 million of tax losses. Look is presently in discussions for the sale of its remaining assets with some of the same parties with whom discussions were held and bids were received under the previous sales process, including Rogers.

9 In early November 2009 Inukshuk asked the Monitor for the information contained in the Monitor's First Report that was sealed under the order of Marrocco J. Look immediately obtained an *ex parte* order from Campbell J. on November 4, 2009 extending the sealing of the Monitor's First Report pending a determination of this motion.

### Analysis

10 Look seeks to extend the sealing order for six months while it completes the sale of its remaining assets. It has a concern that publication of the information could impede the sale process now underway and affect the amount received. Look is concerned that if the bids were disclosed, and with Rogers being one of the parties in discussions with Look for the purchase of Look's tax losses, other players in the telecommunications industry would not bid for the remaining assets.

11 Inukshuk has filed no affidavit material as to why it is interested in the sealed information in the Monitor's First Report dealing with all of the bids that were received for all assets. Inukshuk's position in a nutshell is that the sales process previously approved by the Court is over and that the public interest in seeing an open court process should prevent any further sealing of the Monitor's First Report. Mr. Kauffman said that his clients are here in this motion "in their own interest as two members of the public" seeking access to the documents that were filed in the court process.

12 It is understandable why Rogers would want the information. It has been negotiating with Look for the purchase of one or more of Look's remaining assets. Having access to prior bids in the prior sales process in which one or more of those remaining assets may have been the subject of a bid would obviously be of benefit to Rogers in considering what price it is prepared to offer for the company with the tax loss benefits. While Mr. Kauffman pointed out that it is Inukshuk Wireless Partnership that is opposing the order sought, and that includes Bell as well as Rogers, the fact remains that the partnership does include Rogers which is in negotiations with Look. In any event, it is unrealistic to think that Bell, through its interest in Inukshuk, is funding at least in part the opposition to the extension of the sealing order out of altruistic or public purposes.

13 [Section 137 of the Courts of Justice Act](#) provides that a court may order any document filed in a civil proceeding to be treated as confidential, sealed and not form part of the public record. The fact that the plan of arrangement consummated under the court proceedings under [s. 192 of the CBCA](#) has now been finalized does not in itself mean that the court does not have jurisdiction to continue with the sealing order if it is otherwise appropriate to do so. There is no limitation in [section 137](#) limiting a sealing order to the time during which the litigation in question is ongoing.

14 In *MacIntyre v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General)*, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175 (S.C.C.), it was held that sworn information to obtain a search warrant could not be made available to the public until the search warrant had been executed. In that case, Dixon J. (as he then was) for the majority noted that the case law did not distinguish between judicial proceedings which are part of a trial and those which are not, and that subject to a few well-recognized exceptions, all judicial proceedings should be in public. He held that the presumption was in favour of public access and the burden of contrary proof lay upon the person contending otherwise.

15 In *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.), the court authorized a confidentiality order. It stated that an order should be granted in only two circumstances, being (i) when an order is needed to prevent serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk, and (ii) when the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right civil litigants to a fair trial, outweighs its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right of free expression, which includes public interest in open and accessible court proceedings. In dealing with the notion of an important commercial interest, Iacobucci J. stated:

In addition, the phrase "important commercial interest" is in need of some clarification. In order to qualify as an "important commercial interest", the interest in question cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order; the interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. For example, a private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no "important commercial interest" for the purposes of this test. Or, in the words of Binnie J. in *Re N. (F.)* [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35, at para. 10, the open court rule only yields "where the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness".

16 Look points out that it is not a private company. It is a public company with stakeholders, being public shareholders. It is not the kind of private corporation that Iacobucci J. was discussing in *Sierra*.

17 It is common when assets are being sold pursuant to a court process to seal the Monitor's report disclosing all of the various bids in case a further bidding process is required if the transaction being approved falls through. Invariably, no one comes back asking that the sealing order be set aside. That is because ordinarily all of the assets that were bid on during the court sale process end up being sold and approved by court order, and so long as the sale transaction or transactions closed, no one has any further interest in the information. In *887574 Ontario Inc. v. Pizza Pizza Ltd.* (1994), 23 B.L.R. (2d) 239 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), Farley J. discussed the fact that valuations submitted by a Receiver for the purpose of obtaining court approval are normally sealed. He pointed out that the purpose of that was to maintain fair play so that competitors or potential bidders do not obtain an unfair advantage by obtaining such information while others have to rely on their own resources. In that context, he stated that he thought the most appropriate sealing order in a court approval sale situation would be that the supporting valuation materials remain sealed until such time as the sale transaction had closed.

18 This case is a little different from the ordinary. Some of the assets that were bid on during the sales process were not sold. However, because the assets that were sold constituted substantially all of the assets of Look, the arrangement under section 192 of the CBCA was completed. Those assets that were not sold remained, however, to be sold and it is in the context of that process that Rogers has been discussing purchasing one or more of these assets from Look.

19 In this case, had the closing of the sale of the Spectrum and the License been drawn out to the maximum three year period provided for in the sale agreement, these remaining assets in all likelihood would have been sold before the maximum period ran out and during a period of time in which the Receiver's First Report remaining sealed. In those circumstances the effect of the sealing order would have been to protect the later sale process, a process which originally involved a sale of all of the assets of Look. While the remaining sales will not take place under the original sale process that was conducted by Look and the Monitor, the commercial interest in seeing that the remaining assets are sold to the benefit of all stakeholders, including the public shareholders of Look, remains now as it did before.

20 The advantage to Rogers in seeing what other bidders may have bid on the assets that have remained unsold is obvious. Rogers is in negotiations with Look regarding the acquisition of one or more of those assets. If other bidders previously bid on one or more of those assets, that information would be beneficial to Rogers. If the other bidders did not bid on any of those remaining assets, that too would be of interest to Rogers. As well, Look's concern that the disclosure of the sealed information could impede other bidders from coming forward is not without some merit.

21 In *Sierra*, Iacobucci J. said there were core values that should be considered in a motion such as this. *Sierra* involved an application by the Government of Canada for a confidentiality order protecting documents from public disclosure in litigation between the *Sierra* and the Government. Iacobucci J. stated that under the order sought, public access to the documents in question would be restricted, which would infringe the public's freedom of expression guarantees contained in section 2(b) of the *Charter*. He discussed the core values of freedom of expression and how they should be considered in a motion seeking confidentiality of documents. He stated:

Underlying freedom of expression are the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good; (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit; and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons: *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (AttorneyGeneral)*, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, [page551] at p. 976; *R. v. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at pp. 762-64, per Dickson C.J. Charter jurisprudence has established that the closer the speech in question lies to these core values, the harder it will be to justify a s. 2(b) infringement of that speech under s. 1 of the Charter: *Keegstra*, at pp. 760-61. Since the main goal in this case is to exercise judicial discretion in a way which conforms to Charter principles, a discussion of the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on freedom of expression should include an assessment of the effects such an order would have on the three core values. The more detrimental the order would be to these values, the more difficult it will be to justify the confidentiality order. Similarly, minor effects of the order on the core values will make the confidentiality order easier to justify. (underlining added)

22 Rogers, or Inukshuk, cannot, in my view, claim that there will be a substantial detrimental effect on these core values by a continuation of the sealing order for a further six months. What Rogers will lose will be access to information that it could use against the interests of Look and its stakeholders. In my view, the salutary effects of extending the sealing order for six months to permit the sale of the remaining assets of Look outweighs the deleterious effects of such order in this case.

23 Inukshuk asks that if the extension order is made, there is no reason to seal the prior bids for the Spectrum that Inukshuk purchased and thus the order should permit that information to be made public. It is said by Mr. Kauffman that such information is of historical interest. I would not make this exception as requested by Inukshuk. Bidders under the prior sales process were entitled to bid on all of the assets either individually or together, and Mr. Porter points out that it may well be difficult to separate out the portion of any prior bid dealing with the Spectrum from a bid for other assets that are now sought to be sold. If the interest sought is only for historical purposes, a six month delay will not be of much or any consequence.

24 In the circumstances, the order sought by Look shall go. Look is entitled to its costs of the motion against Inukshuk. If costs cannot be agreed, short submissions may be made within ten days by Look and reply submissions may be made within a further ten days by Inukshuk.

*Motion granted.*

# **TAB 17**

1994 CarswellOnt 1214  
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division), Commercial List

887574 Ontario Inc. v. Pizza Pizza Ltd.

1994 CarswellOnt 1214, [1994] O.J. No. 3112, 23 B.L.R. (2d) 239, 35 C.P.C. (3d) 323, 52 A.C.W.S. (3d) 516

**RE ARBITRATION BEFORE THE HONOURABLE R.E. HOLLAND, Q.C.**

887574 ONTARIO INC., 863644 ONTARIO INC., 801409 ONTARIO INC., WESTBRIDGE FOODS LTD., 830542 ONTARIO INC., 779975 ONTARIO LIMITED, 783129 ONTARIO INC., 284055 ONTARIO INC., 946171 ONTARIO INC., 768027 ONTARIO INC., 841875 ONTARIO INC., 660840 ONTARIO LTD., BULE ENTERPRISES LIMITED, 900766 ONTARIO INC., 755950 ONTARIO LIMITED, 554135 ONTARIO INC., 769049 ONTARIO INC., 781380 ONTARIO INC., 892922 ONTARIO INC., 814591 ONTARIO INC., 925446 ONTARIO LTD., 876310 ONTARIO INC., 812138 ONTARIO INC., 880602 ONTARIO INC., 697339 ONTARIO INC., 863008 ONTARIO INC., 898201 ONTARIO INC., 989897 ONTARIO INC., 857387 ONTARIO INC., 828659 ONTARIO INC., 750242 ONTARIO LIMITED, 803767 ONTARIO INC., 910874 ONTARIO INC., 805837 ONTARIO INC., GOLD LION GROUP OF COMPANIES, 697246 ONTARIO LIMITED, 827532 ONTARIO INC., 914470 ONTARIO LIMITED, 804631 ONTARIO INC., 954270 ONTARIO INC., 686603 ONTARIO LIMITED, 741897 ONTARIO LIMITED, 675367 ONTARIO LIMITED, 809692 ONTARIO LIMITED, 681630 ONTARIO INC., 763012 ONTARIO LTD., 905933 ONTARIO INC., 945671 ONTARIO INC., 807352 ONTARIO INC. and 909206 ONTARIO INC. v. PIZZA PIZZA LIMITED

Farley J.

Oral reasons: December 14, 1994 \*

Written reasons: December 27, 1994

Docket: Doc. 93-CQ-33541; Commercial Court File Doc. B85/93

Counsel: *Peter Griffin*, *Gavin MacKenzie* and *Daniel Vukovich*, for moving party (defendant).

*Nancy Spies* and *Timothy Mitchell*, for responding parties (plaintiffs) except 828659 Ontario Inc., 805837 Ontario Inc., 807353 Ontario Inc., and Drag Eleven Pizza Inc.

*P. Waldmann*, for other responding parties (plaintiffs).

*B. Bruser*, for Toronto Star.

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Judges and courts

[XVI Jurisdiction](#)

[XVI.11 Jurisdiction of court over own process](#)

[XVI.11.c Sealing files](#)

**Headnote**

Judges and Courts --- Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction of court over own process

Arbitration — Commercial arbitration — Large group of franchisees and their franchisor agreeing to discontinue litigation and settle their differences through arbitration — Arbitration agreed to be subject to appeal — Franchisor appealing arbitration award and franchisees cross-appealing — Application by franchisor for order directing material filed on appeal be sealed because arbitration to be kept confidential.

Practice — Practice on appeal — Record on appeal — Application by appellant from arbitration award for order directing record to be sealed denied — No evidence adduced to support any public policy grounds to depart from rule of public accessibility to court proceedings.

In 1993, 50 franchisees commenced legal proceedings against their franchisor, PP Ltd. Later, the parties entered into minutes of settlement whereby the dispute would be mediated and/or arbitrated by H, a retired judge and highly respected private arbitrator. The minutes of settlement also provided that the parties would have a right to appeal any binding decision by H. Arbitration proceedings ensued over many months and interim awards and a final award were issued by H.

He issued a confidentiality award with respect to the arbitration proceedings. This was followed by a consent order made by the judge before whom the present motion was argued confirming that the interim and final awards were to remain confidential until the final Award was filed in court.

PP Ltd. appealed four components of H's award. Six of the franchisees cross-appealed one component of the award. PP Ltd. then brought a motion seeking an order that the appeal material be sealed on the grounds that, (i) the arbitration proceedings were confidential by agreement, (ii) the parties would not have entered into the arbitration process without the condition of confidentiality, and (iii) the disclosure of the arbitration proceedings to the public could affect the competitive position of PP Ltd.

**Held:**

The motion was dismissed.

When a matter comes to court, the philosophy of the court system is openness. There are established exceptions to this general rule, such as actions involving infants or mentally disturbed people and actions involving matters of secrecy; however, this sealing application did not fit within any of those exceptions.

If the dispute settlement process had involved other types of alternative dispute resolution such as mediation, conciliation or neutral evaluation where the focus is on the parties' coming to a consensual arrangement, then other considerations could be brought to bear.

Curtailment of public accessibility can be justified only where there is present the need to protect social values of great importance. This test is not met by wishing to keep secret the material involved in an arbitration appeal which of necessity takes the parties back into the court system with its insistence on openness, an aspect which one must assume the parties fully recognized before proceeding to appeal the award.

**Table of Authorities**

**Cases considered:**

- A. (J.) v. Canada Life Assurance Co.* (1989), 35 C.P.C. (2d) 6, 70 O.R. (2d) 27 (H.C.) — *considered*
- Hassnah Insurance Co. of Israel v. Mew*, [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 243, (Q.B.D. [Com. Ct.]) — *considered*
- London & Leeds Estates Ltd. v. Paribas Ltd.* (July 28, 1994), Mance J. (Eng. Q.B.) [unreported] — *considered*
- MacIntyre v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General)*, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175, 26 C.R. (3d) 193, 49 N.S.R. (2d) 609, 96 A.P.R. 609, 40 N.R. 181, 132 D.L.R. (3d) 385, 65 C.C.C. (2d) 129 — *followed*
- MDS Health Group Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1993), 20 C.P.C. (3d) 137, 15 O.R. (3d) 630 (Gen. Div.) *applied*
- S. (P.) v. C. (D.)* (1987), 22 C.P.C. (2d) 225 (Ont. H.C.) — *applied*

**Statutes considered:**

- Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17.
- Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.
- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.
- Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 —  
s. 137(2)
- Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.1.

**Words and phrases considered:**

**ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION**

This [non-binding arbitration] differs from other forms of [Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR")] in which the parties themselves are part of the decision-making mechanism and the neutral third party's involvement is of a facilitative nature: e.g. mediation, conciliation, neutral evaluation, nonbinding opinion, nonbinding arbitration. Of course, the simplest method — often

overlooked — is that of noninvolvement by a neutral: a negotiation between the parties. It is not unusual that ADR resolutions are conducted privately, more to the point . . . it would be unusual to see a public ADR session especially where the focus is on coming to a consensual arrangement. The parties need to have the opportunity of discussion and natural give and take with brainstorming and conditional concessions giving without the concern of being under a microscope. If the parties were under constant surveillance, one could well imagine that they would be severely inhibited in the frank and open discussions with the result that settlement ratios would tend to dry up. The litigation system depends on a couple of percent of new cases only going to trial. If this were doubled to several percent the system would collapse . . . public policy supports the nontrial resolution of disputes.

. . . . .

. . . if the ADR process entered into is along the mediation philosophy structure that it will be appreciated that the best and most productive results re dispute resolution will be achieved generally if such process involves a degree of confidentiality. This of course if subject to some exceptions such as when the parties agree that in a mediation of public policy issues there is a positive requirement for public exposure . . . In other instances public exposure may induce a very negative reaction . . .

### **BINDING ARBITRATION**

. . . a binding arbitration is a noncourt equivalent to a court trial. In either case a neutral third party hears the case and makes his decision which (subject to appeal) is binding upon the parties.

Motion for an order that material relating to appeal from commercial arbitration be sealed on grounds of confidentiality.

#### ***Editor's Note***

*This judgment, taken together with the arbitration award immediately preceding and the two reasons for judgment immediately following, forms an interesting quartet. It provides a basis for comment on several aspects of commercial arbitration in a general business setting. See the Case Comment at p. 277 post.*

#### ***Farley J.:***

1 At the hearing I dismissed the confidentiality/sealing motion, promising formal reasons at a later date. These are those reasons.

2 The defendant Pizza Pizza Limited ("P<sup>2</sup>") moved for an order:

(a) pursuant to Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C43 directing that the appeal materials upon the appeal to be heard on February 20, 1995 in this Honourable Court be sealed pending further order;

(b) continuing the order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Farley dated July 20, 1994.

P<sup>2</sup> submitted that the grounds for such a motion were:

1. The parties were originally before this Honourable Court by way of injunction proceedings (and extensive materials) in the spring of 1993;

2. The parties entered into Minutes of Settlement by which they submitted these issues to arbitration/mediation before the Honourable R.E. Holland;

3. Those proceedings were, by agreement and by order of the Honourable R.E. Holland, confidential;

4. The arbitration proceedings were conducted over many months involving at least 20 days of hearing time, during which a wide range of issues were canvassed;

5. The parties would not have entered into the arbitration process without the condition of confidentiality;
6. The parties have expended significant amounts of money upon the arbitration proceedings;
7. Only a handful of the myriad issues before the Honourable R.E. Holland are the subject of the appeal herein;
8. The disclosure of the arbitration proceedings to the public may affect the competitive position of the defendant and its franchisees in releasing the details of its operations to the public and competitors;
9. To fail to continue the order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Farley would discourage the attempts (and success) of the arbitration/mediation process which these parties underwent in confidence.

The aspect of item 8 was not in substance pursued. This is not in essence a situation involving trade secrets or confidential proprietary information. Further it was acknowledged that the proceedings resolved into an arbitration (versus other forms of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR")).

3 On Wednesday, June 22, 1994, the Honourable R.E. Holland, Q.C. ("Arbitrator") issued a confidentiality order. This was followed by a consent order issued by myself on July 20, 1994. Its terms provided (and clearly contemplated not only that there could be an adjustment or amendment to or cancellation of the sealing order, but also that the award would be made public when the matter was in court):

It is hereby ordered that:

1. The Interim Award of the Honourable R.E. Holland dated April 8, 1994 and the Cost Award dated May 19, 1994 (the "Awards") are, as all of the proceedings in this matter, confidential and may not be released to any party other than the parties to this proceeding and their professional advisors in this proceeding.
2. Until such time as it is filed in court, the Final Award arising from the Awards (the "Final Award") is also confidential and may only be released to those parties identified above.

4 The award has been appealed by P<sup>2</sup> and cross-appealed by the plaintiffs. Thus the matter is "re-entering" the court system after functionally having been in the private confidential sector before the Arbitrator. When the matter went out to the arbitration, it may have been that the parties contemplated some form of arbitration, but it was also conceivable that another form of ADR could have been employed. I think it fair to observe that a binding arbitration is a non-court equivalent to a court trial. In either case a neutral third party hears the case and makes his decision which (subject to appeal) is binding upon the parties. This differs from other forms of ADR in which the parties themselves are part of the decision-making mechanism and the neutral third party's involvement is of a facilitative nature: e.g. mediation, conciliation, neutral evaluation, non-binding opinion, non-binding arbitration. Of course, the simplest method — often overlooked — is that of non-involvement by a neutral: a negotiation between the parties. It is not unusual that ADR resolutions are conducted privately; more to the point, I suspect it would be unusual to see a public ADR session especially where the focus is on coming to a consensual arrangement. The parties need to have the opportunity of discussion and natural give and take with brainstorming and conditional concession giving without the concern of being under a microscope. If the parties were under constant surveillance, one could well imagine that they would be severely inhibited in the frank and open discussions with the result that settlement ratios would tend to dry up. The litigation system depends on a couple of percent of new cases only going to trial. If this were doubled to several percent the system would collapse. Therefore in my view public policy supports the non-trial resolution of disputes. I note the observation of Oliver Tickell, "Shogun's Beginnings" *Oxford Today*, vol. 7, no. 1 Michaelmas Issue 1994 at p. 20 where he observed as to Professor Jeffrey Mass' view of the benefits of the first Shogunate in Japan:

... finding to [Professor Mass'] surprise that its rule was based far more on efficient administration than on military heroics. "Although a warrior government, it was devoted not to the battlefield but to maintaining the peace ... It developed laws, institutions of justice, and an adversarial legal system that even today seems extraordinarily ingenious and sophisticated.

Written evidence always took precedence over oral testimony, and women enjoyed their full day in court. The vendetta was illegal, as the objective was to keep people ensnared in litigation".

I also note that perhaps the legal sector in Canada has progressed a little too far in the ensnarement direction.

5 Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (CJA) provides:

A court may order that any document filed in a civil proceeding before it be treated as confidential, sealed and not form part of the public record.

However when a matter comes to court the philosophy of the court system is openness: See *MDS Health Group Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1993), 15 O.R. (3d) 630 (Gen. Div.) at p. 633. The present sealing application would not fit within any of the exceptions to the general rule of *public* justice as discussed in *A. (J.) v. Canada Life Assurance Co.* (1989), 70 O.R. (2d) 27 (H.C.) at p. 34: "... actions involving infants, or mentally disturbed people and actions involving matters of secrecy '... secret processes, inventions, documents or the like ...' " The broader principle of confidentiality possibly being "warranted where confidentiality is precisely what is at stake" was also discussed at the same page but would not appear applicable.

6 Mr. Griffin raised the question of reorganization material under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 or the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 or valuations submitted by a receiver for the purpose of obtaining court approval on a sale arrangement having been sealed. The purpose of that, of course, is to maintain fair play so that competitors or potential bidders do not obtain an unfair advantage by obtaining such information whilst others have to rely on their own resources. I would think the most appropriate sealing order in a court approval sale situation would be that the supporting valuation material remain sealed until such time as the sale transaction has closed.

7 I believe that it is obvious that if the ADR process entered into is along the mediation philosophy structure that it will be appreciated that the best and most productive results re dispute resolution will be achieved generally if such process involves a degree of confidentiality. This of course is subject to some exceptions such as when the parties agree that in a mediation of public policy issues there is a positive requirement for public exposure: see Brown and Marriott, *ADR Principles and Practice* (1993, London), Sweet & Maxwell, at p. 356. In other instances public exposure may induce a very negative reaction — e.g. if outsiders can be observers, then some (depending on their relationship to the parties involved) may become "cheerleaders", "advisors without the benefit of the facts" or "advisors without the discipline of having to live with the end result of the mediation" (which may be a non-resolution of the issues which may otherwise have been resolved). Unwanted pressure may thus be applied to one or more of the participants. Similarly a volunteer advisor-type may give "free" advice (e.g. "Don't settle; take him to court; you've got an absolute winner!") when the hidden agenda of this officious intermeddler is to foment disruption, harass the other side or pursue his own self interests. Allow me to observe that it would be unusual for anyone to feel obliged to conduct all of his negotiations (including those to settle disputes) in a fishbowl: Consider for instance one having a mild disagreement with one's mother as to where the two of you should have lunch — or a debate between a customer and a supplier over whether an order was short-shipped and, if so, what adjustment should be made (all without resort to the *Sale of Goods Act* and/or the courts).

8 While it is true that it appears in this case that the parties went private in a dispute which they could have litigated openly in the courts with a trial rather than an arbitration, I do not see that this choice would oblige the parties to make their arbitration public in and of itself. As for the confidentiality order of July 20, 1994 referring to two types of awards, an interim and a final, I now understand from counsel that the thrust of the interim award was the legal principles and of the final the damage calculation or other results flowing as opposed to the interim being a draft for comment and possible adjustment. If the latter were the case then one would appreciate the practicality/necessity of maintaining confidentiality so as to avoid the types of unwarranted pressures aforesaid in achieving the end result. If of the other nature, I believe the same result prevails. Similarly if the process were something other than non-binding arbitration, one would also see the same type of necessity. In the instant case, the parties could have, if they had so chosen (i.e. either side), decided not to appeal the Arbitration's award. In such case, the result would have been the same as the two sides entering into settlement negotiations to end their dispute and coming to an agreement. In effect that is what they did by entering the arbitration process except that in doing so, they at the start of the piece delegated the resolution determination function to the Arbitrator for him to do so by applying legal principles to the facts as he found

them. If the parties had not made the detour from the main channel of court proceedings leading to trial by going to arbitration but had merely negotiated a settlement, then with a settlement achieved they would customarily merely proceed to put on the public court record that the claim had been dismissed on consent. Details of the settlement would remain with the parties; they would be free to disclose or agree not to disclose, subject to some legal obligation to make disclosure (e.g. timely disclosure requirements under securities legislation).

9 However in this case, it appears that both sides were dissatisfied to some degree by the decision of the Arbitrator for various reasons. Perhaps counsel would be of assistance to their clients if they were able to reflect upon what may have been attempted to be communicated by the other side at the hearing before me. I state the obvious: sometimes signals are obliquely broadcast; sometimes what might be perceived as a signal is nothing more than a false hope by the recipient. However if there is truly a signal intended, it would be very unfortunate if the recipient did not pick it up because it was too oblique or worse still because the mind was closed (possibly because the mouth was open so as to block the ear passage).

10 The onus is upon P<sup>2</sup> as moving party to demonstrate sound reason for departing from the openness rule: See *MDS*, supra, at p. 633. As the factum of P<sup>2</sup> put it:

There is an overriding public interest in the 1990's especially in fostering effective Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") in such a way that parties will willingly submit to it in a manner which fosters its use and development and reduces the demands for scarce court resources.

The authority for this was given as *Brown and Marriott*, supra, at p. 356; *London & Leeds Estates Ltd. v. Paribas Ltd.*, unreported decision of Mance, J. (Q.B.) of July 28, 1994 and *Hassnah Insurance Co. of Israel v. Mew*, [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 243 (Q.B. [Com. Ct.]). In citing *Hassnah*, Mance, J. at p. 8 of *London* merely stated:

There is no doubt that the parties to such a previous arbitration owed each other a duty of confidence and privacy in respect of the course of and evidence given during it.

He went on to say at p. 9:

None of those authorities deals with the need to consider the rights of a witness which could arise if duties of confidentiality or privacy were owed to him or her. Despite this I see some force in the submission that it is implicit in the nature of private consensual arbitration that witnesses who give evidence, even paid and professional experts, will within certain limits be accorded the benefits of the privacy which overall attaches to this type of arbitration. The privacy of arbitration is likely to be a factor in persuading many witnesses to give evidence and a factor in encouraging them to speak, or in the case of experts, enabling them to obtain permission from other principals to speak, about matters within their experience about which otherwise they might be hesitant or unable to speak.

*London* of course involved a question of whether a subpoena to an expert witness should be set aside where the confidential or private documents of the expert were sought to be obtained by the subpoena. It is even clearer in *Hassnah* what the limits of confidentiality would be concerning an arbitration and the award issuing therefrom. In that case there was an arbitration between the defendant who was reinsured by the plaintiff under various reinsurance contracts which had been placed by brokers. The defendant pursued arbitration to recover under the policies; the arbitration went mainly against the defendant which now wished to proceed in court against the placing brokers for negligence in breach of duty. Coleman, J. found as stated in the headnote: "that if it was reasonably necessary for the establishment or protection of an arbitrating party's legal rights vis-a-vis a third party that the award should be disclosed to that third party in order to found a defence or as the basis for a cause of action, so to disclose it including its reasons would not be a breach of the duty of confidence (See p. 249, col. 2)".

11 However as discussed above the parties clearly contemplated the possibility of appeal pursuant to the *Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17*. Both have availed themselves of that opportunity; the court files for whatever is filed pursuant to that appeal (and cross-appeal) will be open for inspection in the same way any other appeal of whatever nature or kind would be (assuming no valid sealing order obtained on the basis of the reasons set out above). This is not a case such as *Hassnah* where

witness statements, documents and transcripts of a confidential arbitration were not to be made public for the purpose of a court action against a third person-*Hassnah* being a completely "separate" proceeding. In this case (the P<sup>2</sup> case) the court proceedings are merely the continuation of the fight between P<sup>2</sup> and the plaintiff franchisees (and not between one of them and a third person in separate proceedings), a fight which they took private but which they have now returned to the open arena of the court.

12 As Dickson, J. said at p. 186 (S.C.R.) of *MacIntyre v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General)*, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175, 49 N.S.R. (2d) 609 (and cited in *MDS*, supra, at p. 635):

In my view, curtailment of public accessibility can only be justified where there is present the need to protect social values of superordinate importance. One of these is the protection of the innocent.

In my view "one of these" is not to keep secret the material involved in an arbitration appeal which of its necessity takes the parties back into the court system with its insistence on openness for court proceedings, an aspect which one must assume each side fully recognized before proceeding to appeal the award.

13 I believe it well expressed by Smith, J. in *S. (P.) v. C. (D.)* (1987), 22 C.P.C. (2d) 225 (Ont. H.C.) at p. 229 and p. 231:

It may be argued that private litigants resorting to our public justice system should have the right to do so away from the public glare. The answer, very simply put, is that secrecy can only attend a private system of justice, not a public one. Or put in a different way, publicity is a necessary consequence of the obvious benefits that are derived from a public system put in place to serve society in general, including private litigants (p. 229).

.....

There is no need to refer to the voluminous case law bearing upon the general principles of openness of Court proceedings. There is a dearth of authority on the interpretation of s. 147(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act*. Suffice it to say that it ought to be resorted to sparingly in the clearest of cases and on the clearest of material where as one instance the interests of justice would be subverted and/or the totally innocent would unduly suffer without any significant compensating public interest being served (p. 231).

14 P<sup>2</sup> has not adduced any evidence to support a sealing order pursuant to s. 137(2) CJA but rather it has relied on the court to fashion an order so as to extend the confidentiality which the parties had in their arbitration to the material in that arbitration which would otherwise be public pursuant to the appeal. I see no public policy grounds for doing so.

15 Mr. Griffin with his usual candour immediately agreed with Mr. Waldmann's proposition that if the sealing motion were dismissed then Mr. Waldmann's two clients outside the arbitration would be allowed access to the arbitration material.

16 The sealing order motion of P<sup>2</sup> is dismissed. P<sup>2</sup> is to pay \$1,000 in costs forthwith to the plaintiffs represented by Ms. Spies and Mr. Mitchell; no other costs awarded.

*Motion dismissed.*

#### Footnotes

- \* Leave to appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal was refused with costs on June 7, 1995, Doc. CA M15773, McKinlay, Griffiths and Doherty J.J.A. (Ont. C.A.).