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January 13, 2024

Raffi A. Balmanoukian  
Registrar in Bankruptcy  
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia  
In Bankruptcy and Insolvency  
The Law Courts  
1815 Upper Water Street  
Halifax, NS B3J 1S7

**Re: In the matter of the Notice of Intention to make a proposal of Motryx Inc.  
pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as  
amended  
Court No. 45907  
Estate No. 51-3134197**

This is the submission of the Applicant, Motryx Inc., which is seeking, *inter alia*, an order for:

- a) abridging notice periods and service requirements pursuant to section 6 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency General Rules*; and
- b) extending the time for the Applicant to file a proposal under the BIA by 45 days, commencing from and including October 27, 2024, up to and including January 17, 2024, pursuant to section 50.4(9) of the BIA; and

**A. Concise Statement of Facts**

Motryx is in the business of delivering quality control and assurance in blood-specimen transport.

Its mission is to empower hospitals, labs and their patients with confidence that blood specimens are transported in a manner that ensures quality diagnostics and accurate testing by monitoring, measuring and reporting on quality indicators related to transport, which are relevant to testing outcomes to help laboratories fulfill requirements.



On September 27, 2024, Motryx filed a Notice of Intention to make a proposal. On December 20, 2024, this Honourable Court granted a Sales Investment and Solicitation Process (“SISP”) Order.

Motryx is now seeking a third extension. In support of this motion, Motryx has filed the Fourth Report of the Proposal Trustee.

**B. Service, Notice and Abridgement of Time**

The relief sought in this motion is pursuant to the BIA and therefore the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency General Rules* supersede the *Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules* in the event of any inconsistency. BIA Rule 3 states:

3 In cases not provided for in the Act or these Rules, the courts shall apply, within their respective jurisdictions, their ordinary procedure to the extent that that procedure is not inconsistent with the Act or these Rules.

As this is a matter where the BIA does not specify a minimum notice requirement, BIA Rule 6 applies, which states:

6 (1) Unless otherwise provided in the Act or these Rules, every notice or other document given or sent pursuant to the Act or these Rules must be served, delivered personally, or sent by mail, courier, facsimile or electronic transmission.

(2) Unless otherwise provided in these Rules, every notice or other document given or sent pursuant to the Act or these Rules

(a) must be received by the addressee at least four days before the event to which it relates, if it is served, delivered personally, or sent by facsimile or electronic transmission; or

(b) must be sent to the addressee at least 10 days before the event to which it relates, if it is sent by mail or by courier.

(3) A trustee, receiver or administrator who gives or sends a notice or other document shall prepare an affidavit, or obtain proof, that it was given or sent, and shall retain the affidavit or proof in their files.

(4) The court may, on an ex parte application, exempt any person from the application of subsection (2) or order any



terms and conditions that the court considers appropriate, including a change in the time limits.

In terms of measuring the four days provided for under BIA Rule 6, the period of time is governed by BIA Rule 4, which stipulates clear business days:

If a period of less than six days is provided for the doing of an act or the initiating of a proceeding under the Act or these Rules, calculation of the period does not include Saturdays or holidays.

In accordance with BIA Rule 6(1), the motion materials will be served electronically by email. No opposition is anticipated. Proof of service by affidavit will be filed in advance of the hearing of the pending motion.

Although Motryx anticipates filing and serving the notice materials within the foregoing timeline, it has included a request for the abridgment of time in case there is any breakdown in service. BIA 6(4) grants the Court authority to amend these time limits, including to reduce them. Given the nature of the relief sought and the surrounding circumstances, Motryx submits that this is an appropriate circumstance for the Court to abridge the time for the hearing of this matter if such abridgement is required.

### **C. Extension of Time to file a proposal**

Pursuant to section 69 of the BIA, a debtor that files an NOI is automatically given the benefit of an initial 30-day stay of proceedings, which may be extended in increments of 45 days on sufficient cause.

The current stay of proceedings is set to expire at the end of the day January 17, 2025. The Company is not yet in a position to deliver a proposal to its creditors. Accordingly, it seeks a 45-day extension of the time to make a viable proposal to its creditors and stakeholders.

The Court has discretion to extend the time for a debtor to file a proposal pursuant to section 50.4(9) of the BIA:

#### **Extension of time for filing proposal**

(9) The insolvent person may, before the expiry of the 30-day period referred to in subsection (8) or of any extension granted under this subsection, apply to the court for an extension, or further extension, as the case may be, of that period, and the court, on notice to any interested persons that the court may direct, may grant the extensions, not





exceeding 45 days for any individual extension and not exceeding in the aggregate five months after the expiry of the 30-day period referred to in subsection (8), if satisfied on each application that

- (a) the insolvent person has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence;
- (b) the insolvent person would likely be able to make a viable proposal if the extension being applied for were granted; and
- (c) no creditor would be materially prejudiced if the extension being applied for were granted. See BIA at s. 50.4(9).

In considering whether to exercise its discretion, the court assesses whether the debtor has discharged its burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the factors enumerated in s. 50.4(9) of the BIA are objectively satisfied. See, *Scotian Distribution Services Limited (Re)*, 2020 NSSC 131 at para. 19.

As will be described below, the Company submits that each of the factors of 50.4(9) of the BIA are satisfied.

**(a) The Company has acted in good faith and with due diligence**

Good Faith has been defined as a state of mind consisting of (1) honesty in belief of purpose, (2) faithfulness to one's duty and obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards or fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to use unconscionable advantage. See, *Lundrigan (Re)*, 2012 NSSC 231 at para. 18.

Likewise, the "good faith and "due diligence" requirement relates to the development of a viable proposal and not to other insolvency options. In other words, moving the viable proposal forward. See, *Atlantic Sea Cucumber (Re)*, 2023 NSSC 238, at para. 22. It is a question of fact determined on the evidence.

There is no evidence that the Company has acted with bad faith or conducted itself in an unacceptable manner. In contrast, the Company has submitted evidence, including the comments of the Proposal Trustee in the Fourth Report, which confirm that the Company has acted in good faith and with due diligence since the filing of the NOI.



Specifically, the Company has taken the following steps to address its liquidity issues and implement a restructuring that would see its business emerge as a going concern:

- (a) Successfully negotiated and arranged for the post filing support of its customers and channel partners as the Company continues to operate;
- (b) Continues to service existing customer contracts, progress business leads to generate new sales, and monitor and collect accounts receivable;
- (c) Consulted with the Proposal Trustee in respect of operations, cash management, and vendor and supplier payments;
- (d) Engaged with RBC, with the assistance of the Proposal Trustee, to discuss and develop next steps contemplated in the restructuring proceeding;
- (e) Prepared and populated the virtual data room, and assisted the Proposal Trustee in the drafting of a comprehensive buyer's list, a confidential information memorandum and a teaser document, in contemplation of a Sales Process;
- (f) Engaged with counsel for Aerocom Inc., and the Proposal Trustee on multiple occasions to discuss and provide all information required with respect to the preparation of an Asset Purchase Agreement (the which would preserve the assets and allow the business to continue as a going concern and preserve value for creditors and stakeholders; and
- (g) Begun the sales process pursuant to the December 20, 2024, order of this Honourable Court.

**(b) The Company will be likely to make a viable proposal**

The test for whether an insolvent person would likely be able to make a viable proposal if granted an extension is whether the insolvent person might (not certainly will) be able to present a proposal that seems reasonable on its face to a reasonable creditor. See, *Re Convergix Inc.*, 2006 NBQB 288 at para. 40.



The Company submits that the evidence before the Court satisfies this requirement. In particular, the Company has initiated the sales process pursuant to the order of this Honourable Court.

**(c) No creditor is materially prejudiced**

In considering this factor, courts consider whether there is a significant concern that would be unreasonable for a creditor to accept. In *Re H&H Fisheries Limited*, 2005 NSSC 346, at para. 37, and Registrar Balmanoukian has taken judicial notice that “proposals, if performed, generally result in a greater net recovery to creditors overall”. See, *Scotian Distribution Services Limited (Re)*, 2020 NSSC 131 at para. 22.

The Company submits that there is no evidence of any material prejudice to any creditor if the requested extension is granted. Conversely, if the extension is not granted, the Company will be deemed to have made an assignment in bankruptcy and its efforts to successfully restructure its business will be terminated during a court ordered sales process.

In such circumstances, the Company would lose the majority of its going concern enterprise value to the detriment of its creditors.

Accordingly, the extension of the stay will assist in the likelihood of a greater net recovery to creditors by allowing the Company to continue its Business as a going concern and avoid a liquidation.

**D. Relief Sought**

Motrixx respectfully submits that its application be granted in its entirety.

**ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED**

**BOYNECLARKE LLP**

Joshua J. Santimaw



**SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA**  
**IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY**

**Citation:** *Scotian Distribution Services Limited (Re)*, 2020 NSSC 131

**Date:** 20200406

**Docket:** No. 43999

**Registry:** Halifax

**Estate Number:** 51-2624515

**In the Matter of:** The Proposal of Scotian Distribution Services Limited

**Judge:** Raffi A. Balmanoukian, Registrar

**Heard:** March 27, 2020, in Halifax, Nova Scotia (via Teleconference)

**Counsel:** Tim Hill, QC, for the Applicant



**Balmanoukian, Registrar:**

[1] The word “Bankrupt” is derived from the Italian “*banca rotta*.” In times of yore, an insolvent merchant’s place of business would be trashed by irate creditors; the result was a “broken bench.”

[2] In Nova Scotia, the Bench will not break.

[3] During the Great Plague of 1665-6, the Court in London moved from Westminster to Oxford (as did Parliament). But yet, they persisted.

[4] In 2020, we are blessed with far greater modalities of communication and administration. As circumstances direct they are being, and will be brought, to bear in the interests of delivering both justice and access to justice.

[5] As I write, and with a hat tip to Mr. Yeats, mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.

[6] It is not business as usual. Virtually nothing is.

[7] On March 19, 2020, the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia adopted an “essential services” model in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. This has meant that only matters deemed urgent or essential by the presiding jurist will be heard



until further notice; and those, by the method of least direct personal interaction that is consistent with the delivery and administration of justice. This can, in appropriate instances, include written, virtual, electronic, telephone, video, or other modalities, and adaptations of procedures surrounding filing of affidavit and other material.

[8] On March 20, 2020, I issued a memorandum to all Trustees in Nova Scotia reflecting this as it applies to this Court, and underscoring the “urgent or essential” standard. It can be obtained from the Deputy Registrar whose contact coordinates, in turn, are posted on the Court website ([courts.ns.ca](http://courts.ns.ca)).

[9] “Essential” means such matters that must be filed, with or without a scheduled hearing, to preserve the rights of the parties – such as those which face a legislative limitation period. “Urgent” means matters that simply cannot wait, in the opinion of the presiding jurist.

[10] Both the Chief Justice of Nova Scotia, the Honourable Chief Justice Michael J. Wood, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, the Honourable Chief Justice Deborah K. Smith, have been clear that this does not mean that Courts, being an essential branch of government and the guardian of the

rule of law, cease to function. It means that they operate during this global emergency – and its local manifestation – on an essential services basis.

[11] Accordingly, scheduled matters are deemed to be adjourned *sine die* unless brought to my attention in accordance with the memorandum noted above and I (or a presiding Justice) deem the standard to be met.

[12] Against that backdrop, evolving in real time, I faced the present application. It is a motion for an extension of time to file a proposal, pursuant to Section 50.4(9) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c. B-3, as amended (the “BIA”). That section reads:

(9) The insolvent person may, before the expiry of the 30-day period referred to in subsection (8) or of any extension granted under this subsection, apply to the court for an extension, or further extension, as the case may be, of that period, and the court, on notice to any interested persons that the court may direct, may grant the extensions, not exceeding 45 days for any individual extension and not exceeding in the aggregate five months after the expiry of the 30-day period referred to in subsection (8), if satisfied on each application that

(a) the insolvent person has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence;

(b) the insolvent person would likely be able to make a viable proposal if the extension being applied for were granted; and

(c) no creditor would be materially prejudiced if the extension being applied for were granted. [emphasis added]

[13] The present motion had been scheduled for March 27, 2020. The applicant’s Notice of Intention had been filed on February 28, 2020, meaning that its expiration, 30 days thereafter, was at the end of March, 2020 (BIA s. 50.4(8)). The

scheduled motion was therefore at the very end of this timeline, and the lack of an extension would result in a deemed assignment in bankruptcy (BIA s. 50.4(8)).

[14] The applicant sought to have the matter heard by teleconference. After a review of the file material, I agreed. The Deputy Registrar, with my gratitude, arranged for recording facilities; this is still an open Court of record. Affected entities are still entitled to notice, and they are still entitled to be heard. As well, our open court principle remains and is at least as important as ever.

[15] To that end, the applicant was directed to provide affected entities, including creditors, with particulars of the conference call, including time and call-in particulars. That was done, and a creditor (who did not object to the application) did indeed avail itself of this facility.

[16] I note that the affidavit of service, and other material, was filed electronically. That is perfectly in order in accordance with the current directives in effect at present.

[17] I have granted the order based on the following factors:

[18] First, I am satisfied that the 'urgent or essential' threshold was met. The limitation period in BIA 50.4(8) was nigh. The deemed assignment would be



automatic. As I will recount below, such an assignment would at least potentially have impacts that run beyond solely the individual interests of the corporate debtor.

[19] Section 50.4(9) requires the Court to be satisfied that the applicant meets a three part test each time it is asked for an extension: that it has and continues to act with due diligence; that there is a likely prospect of a viable proposal; and that no creditor would be materially prejudiced by the extension. The burden is on the applicant each time, to meet each test.

[20] The applicant's affidavit evidence is that the applicant continues in operation and is diligently pursuing the proposal process; the evidence of the current status of the process (ie the engagement of MNP Ltd., review of operations, and review of assets and liabilities) satisfies me, at present, of the good faith requirement.

[21] It has employees and contracts. Its operations include transportation operations, which at least for the basis of the current application are important and perhaps essential on both a micro and macroeconomic basis. While "bigger picture" ramifications outside the particular debtor and creditors are not part of the Section 50.4(9) test, I believe I can take them into account when assessing and placing appropriate weight on the benefit/detriment elements which are the overall thrust of that tripartite standard.

[22] No creditor objected, and there is no evidence that the extension would cause material prejudice to any creditor. Although this burden, too, is on the applicant, I can take judicial notice that proposals, if performed, generally result in a greater net recovery to creditors overall; while there is some indication that the applicant will seek to resile from certain obligations, the test is whether the extension would be prejudicial, not whether the proposal itself would be.

[23] This would be the applicant's first extension under 50.4(9), which allows for a series of extensions of up to 45 days each, to a maximum of five months.

[24] To say that virtually all economic prospects in the near to medium term are moving targets is a considerable understatement. The applicant must still demonstrate that it is "likely [to] be able to make a viable proposal" with the extension in place, but in the current context I consider this to be a threshold in which the benefit of any doubt should be accorded to the applicant. This does not relieve the burden of proof on the applicant of establishing that likelihood to a civil standard; it does, however, indicate that at least on a first extension, it will not likely be a difficult standard to meet.

[25] I can take further judicial notice that especially in the current environment, a bankruptcy of an operating enterprise would almost inevitably be nasty, brutish,

and anything but short. Creditors would be well advised to consider the viability and desirability of a proposal through that lens.

[26] This Court will, no doubt, face a considerable additional case load as the economic fallout of the current human disaster works its way through what is and remains a robust legal process. An applicant should have every reasonable opportunity to avail itself of a restructuring rather than a bankruptcy, assuming it otherwise meets the requirements of BIA 50.4(9).

### **Conclusion**

[27] The application is granted, and I have issued the order allowing the time to file a proposal to be extended to and including May 11, 2020.

Balmanoukian, R.



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA  
IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY  
**Citation:** Lundrigan (Re), 2012 NSSC 231

**Date:** June 18, 2012  
**Docket:** B 36348  
**Registry:** Halifax

District of Nova Scotia  
Division No. 3 - Sydney  
Court No. 36348  
Estate No. 51-1464188

**In the Matter of the Bankruptcy of Daniel George Lundrigan**

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DECISION

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**Registrar:** Richard W. Cregan, Q.C.

**Heard:** May 10, 2012

**Present:** Joseph R. Wall, representing the Attorney General of  
Canada.

Rita Anderson, representing the Trustee,  
PricewaterhouseCoopers.

Daniel George Lundrigan, representing himself.

[1] Background

This is an application by Daniel George Lundrigan for relief under Subsection 178(1.1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (*BIA*) with respect to two student loans which have remained outstanding after his discharge from Bankruptcy. It is opposed by the Attorney General of Canada.

[2] Mr. Lundrigan enrolled in a two year course at the Marconi Campus in Sydney in 2003. However after completing one and a half years, his common law relationship ended leaving him responsible for debts totalling \$27,000.00, in addition to two student loans, one under Federal sponsorship and the other under Provincial sponsorship, on which were owing on the date of his assignment, February 17, 2011, balances of \$14,575.97 and \$3,799.49 respectively.

[3] He ceased to be a student in June 2004. This date is 4 months short of seven years from the date of his assignment. Accordingly, because of the provisions of Subsection 178(1)(g) of the *BIA*, the student loans were not discharged with his automatic discharge on November 18, 2011.

[4] There was considerable pressure on him to deal with the indebtedness from his broken relationship. His father agreed to help him. They arranged a loan with the TD Bank for the \$27,000.00. His father co-signed the loan on condition that he live at home and thus be able to make \$600.00 payments each month against this loan. He had to leave his studies and find work. The loan apparently was paid in a timely manner. He then addressed his student loans. He had an understanding with the collection agency that he would pay \$150.00 per month. That was all he could pay as he was no longer living at home. He only made 9 payments.

[5] He has been working throughout as a cashier at the casino in Sydney. He has married. He and his wife, Michelle Lynn Lundrigan, have twins, born July 19, 2010.

[6] His monthly take home pay averages \$1,500.00. His wife's monthly take home pay averages \$1,084.00. She also receives the Child Tax Benefits of \$223.00 and Universal Child Care Benefit of \$200.00 each month. The total current household monthly income is now \$3,007.00.



- [7] He works the evening shift at the casino and she works during the day so that one of them is always able to look after their children. This way they avoid child care expenses.
- [8] The claims made in his bankruptcy, in addition to the student loans, consisted of a secured claim by TD Canada Trust for \$10,875.47, and an unsecured claims of Capital One Services, LLC for \$4,163.76.
- [9] Mr. Lundrigan's work at the casino is steady but he does not see any opportunity for advancement. He does not see that there are other opportunities in the region for him which would pay more.
- [10] If he had completed the course at the Marconi Campus, he would be qualified for much better paying work. He needed another half year of study to complete it. He doubts that he could now complete the course. He probably would have to start all over again as the technology involved is always changing.

[11] Law

To be relieved of student loans under Subsection 178(1.1) a bankrupt must satisfy the court that:

(a) the bankrupt has acted in good faith in connection with the bankrupt's liabilities under the debt; and

(b) the bankrupt has and will continue to experience financial difficulty to such an extent that the bankrupt will be unable to pay the debt.

[12] I must be satisfied that Mr. Lundrigan has acted in good faith with respect to these debts. The following is a review I have made of cases and commentary on good faith. A number of points are relevant to Mr. Lundrigan's situation.

[13] I shall start by quoting what I wrote in *Hankinson (Re)*, 2009 NSSC 211:

[17] *Re Minto* (1999), 14 C.B.R. (4<sup>th</sup>) 235 (Sask., Registrar Herauf) is often referred to for its list of factors relevant to the determination of good faith. In paragraph [62] he says:

I agree with counsel that in the context of student loans one can look at certain factors considered in determining whether a condition should be imposed on the discharge of a bankrupt with student loan liabilities; namely, whether the money was used for the purpose loaned, whether the applicant completed the education, whether the applicant derived economic benefit from the education (ie: is the applicant employed in an area directly related to the education), whether the applicant has made

reasonable efforts to pay the debts and whether the applicant has made use of available options such as interest relief, remission, etc.

[18] Registrar Sprout in *Kelly, Re*, 2000 CanL II 22 497 (Ont., S.C.) after referring to these factors added:

- the timing of the bankruptcy, and
- whether the student loan forms a significant part of the bankrupt's overall indebtedness as of the date of bankruptcy.

[19] I would add the following:

- whether the applicant had sufficient work and income to be reasonably expected to make payments on the loan,
- the lifestyle of the applicant,
- whether the applicant has had sufficient income for there to be surplus income under the Superintendent's standards,
- what proposals the applicant may have made to the loan administrators and the responses received, and
- whether the applicant was at any time disabled from working by illness.

[14] Black's Law Dictionary (9<sup>th</sup> ed): gives the following definition:

A state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one's duty or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards or fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to see unconscionable advantage. - Also termed *bona fides*.

"The phrase 'good faith' is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat with the context. Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; It excludes a variety of types of conduct



characterized as involving 'bad faith' because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.,

and Barron's Law Dictionary, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, the following:

GOOD FAITH a total absence of any intention to seek an unfair advantage or to defraud another party; an honest and sincere intention to fulfill one's obligations. In the case of a merchant, good faith refers to honest in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. U.C.C. §2-103(1)(b). More generally, the term means "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. "U.C.C. §1-201(19).

[15] In Frank Bennett: *Bennett on Bankruptcy*, 14<sup>th</sup> ed, at page 564 the following factors are suggested:

- whether the money was used for the purpose loaned;
- whether the bankrupt completed the education;
- whether the bankrupt derived economic benefit from the education, namely whether the bankrupt obtained a job in the area directly related to the education;
- whether the bankrupt made reasonable efforts to repay the debts;
- whether the bankrupt had made use of available options such as interest relief, remission, etc.;
- the timing of the bankruptcy;
- whether the student loans form a significant part of the bankrupt's overall debts.
- whether the bankrupt has acquired a significant estate, property, savings, investments or has the bankrupt incurred and discharged other debts for non-necessaries,

while continuing in default of the student loan;

- whether the bankrupt had sufficient work and income to be reasonably expected to make payments on the loan;
- the lifestyle of the applicant;
- whether the applicant has had sufficient income for there to be surplus income under the Superintendent's standards;
- what proposals the applicant may have made to the loan administrators and the responses received; and
- whether the applicant was at any time disabled from working by illness.

[16] The following is said in Roderick J. Wood: *Bankruptcy & Insolvency Law*, Irwin Law, 2009, at page 295:

The good faith requirement means that the debtor must have acted honestly both in the bankruptcy and in obtaining the student loan.

[17] *Houlden, Morawetz & Sarra: Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada*, Fourth Edition, at H§40, page 6-185, says the following:

“Good faith” implies honesty of intention. Failure to properly disclose the debtor's marital status on the student loan application shows dishonesty of intention: *Re Dustow* (1999), 14 C.B.R. (4<sup>th</sup>) 186, 1999 Carswell Sask 831, 193 Sask. R. 159 (Sask. Q.B.).

In determining whether the bankrupt acted in good faith, the following factors may be

considered:

1. Was the money used for the purpose loaned?
2. Did the bankrupt complete the education or make an honest effort to do so?
3. Did the bankrupt derive benefit from the education in the sense of gaining employment in an area directly related to the education?
4. Did the bankrupt make reasonable efforts to pay the loan or did the bankrupt make an immediate assignment in bankruptcy?
5. Did the bankrupt take advantage of other options with respect to the loan such as interest relief or loan remission?
6. Was the bankrupt extravagant or irresponsible with his or her finances?
7. Did the bankrupt fairly disclose his or her circumstances on the application for the loan in the sense of acting with an honest intention?

[18] In *Duke v. Nanaimo (Regional District)*(1998), 50 M.P.L.R. (2d) 116 (B.C.S.C.) at paragraph 52 one finds the following:

Although the phrase "good faith" always contains a component of honesty, it often connotes additional qualities depending on the circumstance in which it is used. In my view, the requirement of good faith mandates genuineness, realism and reasonableness both subjectively and objectively.

[19] *Lowe, Re*, 2004 ABQB 255 (Romaine J.) concerned a modest balance owing on a student loan of a bankrupt, the head of a family of eight. He ran a successful business. The family income was well in excess of \$100,000. It was observed they lived very well - two cars, several computers,

involvement in sports, the expenses for which were very high. He never made voluntary payments on the student loan in question. He spent his money on family priorities. The point made in this case is that, although it is important that children be given access to sports, cultural activities etc., good faith requires that one's priorities reasonably reflect community standards. Put another way, a certain life style is necessary to earn a living and be a part of a community, and children should be able to participate in community activities, sports, etc., but the expenditures must be reasonable; extravagance is not acceptable. This observation applies to both the bankrupt's good faith and ability to pay.

[20] In *Cardwell, Re*, 2006 SKQB 164, Registrar Herauf was first concerned with whether Subsection 178(1.1) relief was available to one who had made a consumer proposal. He determined that it did, but questioned whether making such was indicative of good faith. He said:

55.To put it bluntly, I have not been convinced that the applicant has satisfied the requirements in subsection 178(1.1) of the *Act*. The applicant made no attempt to make any payment until compelled to do so by enforcement action brought against him. He did not take advantage of any interest relief mechanisms. While I certainly appreciate the effort by the applicant to complete a Consumer Proposal I cannot equate that effort as a show of good faith. It



was judgment enforcement that prompted the Consumer Proposal and not a genuine effort by the applicant to pay down this debt.

56. I also agree with the respondent's submission that the applicant is gainfully employed in a profession for which he received a student loan funded education. Furthermore, he will be employed in that area for the foreseeable future. The applicant earns substantial remuneration for this work. To allow the application in the present circumstances would make a farce of this provision.

[21] In *Fournier, Re*, 2009 Carswell Ont. 3522, Registrar Nettie considered the need for the applicant to have acquired a new automobile when it was apparent that she could be well served by public transit, as she lived and worked in central Toronto. He said:

14. When what apparently gives in her budget at the same time that the car is leased are the payments to the student loans, I find this not to be acting in good faith in respect of those loans. No evidence was offered of any real exploration of taking public transit, or of keeping the old car, either of which would have permitted continued or increased payments on the student loans, and I draw the adverse inference that either of those options could have resulted in money being paid under the loans, but that the Applicant chose to have a new car for reasons personal to herself, and not in keeping with her obligation to act in good faith to these two loan programs.

15. Turning to the second part of the test, financial difficulty, I find that while the Applicant certainly appears to be in financial difficulty, her present difficulty is of her own choosing - the car. But for that new car, which increases her regular transit

costs from approximately \$200.00 per month for bus passes to \$800.00 or more, she would be able to make her support payments and pay something to the student loans.

[22] Analysis - Good Faith

Mr. Lundrigan has not benefitted from the education acquired with the money borrowed. The technology behind it is now stale. The asset he acquired with the loans is now of little, if any, value to him.

[23] One might criticize him for abandoning his studies with only six months left in the course. However, one must consider the situation he was in. In addition to these loans he was confronted with the debts he assumed from his previous relationship. No doubt he was being pursued by creditors more aggressive than the student loan authorities. He was a person with limited qualifications in an acknowledged depressed economic area. His father was willing to help him with the assumed debts. He let him stay at home free, so that from a modest income he was able to repay them, no doubt with his father seeing that such happened as quickly as possible. His father's generosity did not extend to the student loans. He had done his part. It might be argued that he preferred these creditors to his student loan

creditors. I do not see this as a strong argument. He managed what he could with limited income. His father's help was limited.

[24] One can second guess what he did. Maybe he could have made a few more payments, but with his limited income the amount available would not be significant. In the situation he found himself I do not see that he can be accused of acting unreasonably. There is no suggestion of extravagance on his part nor of dishonesty. With the birth of his children and with his limited income I see no basis for suggesting that he should be paying anything on these loans to prove that he has been acting in good faith.

[25] As to the period before his children's birth, there is nothing before me to suggest that he was not acting in good faith. He made some payments. He discharged the other loans, which would not have been possible without his father's help and discipline. There would have been little, if anything, left over.

[26] Although the respondent has suggested bad faith on Mr. Lundrigan's part, and one must be careful in this regard, no real incidents of it have been

proved. The question is simply - Has Mr. Lundrigan, considering all the circumstances and looking at the total picture, acted in good faith?

[27] He found himself in debt because of personal misfortune. He was fortunate that his father offered to help him out. He would not help him with the student loan, but at least he was relieved of the greater part of his indebtedness. There were few options for him. He did what he could, maybe not perfectly. He would not have had any significant surplus income prior to the birth of his children, and certainly has had none since. The most he could find for the student loans would be very little.

[28] Some flexibility and generosity regarding human nature has to be given in determining whether one has acted in good faith. One must look at his actions and ask whether he has he acted in good faith. His resources have been limited. To act in good faith does not require perfection. I think he, on the whole, has acted with honesty and reasonableness. I am thus satisfied that he has acted with the good faith required of him.

[29] Analysis - Financial Difficulty



As to financial difficulty, the household monthly income is approximately \$3,000.00. The Superintendent's Standard for a family of four is currently \$3,680.00. There is no reasonable expectation of any significant increase in the family income. He and his wife have two young children to raise on a modest income. Their circumstances are such that I am quite satisfied that they will continue to have financial difficulty and be unable to pay off these loans.

[30] Conclusion

He is entitled to the relief provided by Subsection 178(1.1) of the *BIA*.

R.

Halifax, Nova Scotia  
June 18, 2012

**SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA**  
**IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY**

**Citation:** *Atlantic Sea Cucumber Limited (re)*, 2023 NSSC 238

**Date:** 20230721

**Docket:** No. 45461

**Registry:** Halifax

**Estate Number:** 51-2939212

**In the Matter of:** The intention to make a proposal by Atlantic Sea Cucumber Limited

**Registrar:** Raffi A. Balmanoukian, Registrar in Bankruptcy

**Heard:** July 17, 2023, in Halifax, Nova Scotia

**Final Written Submissions:** July 17, 2023

**Counsel:** Darren O’Keefe and Caitlin Fell, for the applicant Atlantic Sea Cucumber Limited (“ASC” or the “Debtor”)  
Joshua Santimaw, for the Trustee MSI Spergel Inc. (the “Trustee”)  
Gavin D.F. MacDonald and Meaghan Kells, for the objecting creditor, Weihai Tawei Haiyang Aquatic Food Co. Ltd. (“WTH”)

**Revised Decision:** The text of the original decision has been corrected according to the attached erratum, dated **July 25, 2023**.

**Balmanoukian, Registrar:**

[1] On July 19, 2023, I wrote to Counsel in the form attached, dismissing the application by Atlantic Sea Cucumber Limited (“ASC” or “Debtor”) for an extension of time to file a proposal pursuant to s. 50.4(9) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c. B-3 as amended (the “BIA”), following an unsuccessful application to convert the matter to a proceeding under the *Companies Creditors Arrangement Act*, RSC 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the “CCAA”). This extension application also sought to abridge time for making that application, and for the matter to be heard by a Justice or by the Registrar on an emergency basis, *ex parte*. The Trustee, MSI Spergel Inc. (the “Trustee”) supported this application. The objecting creditor, Weihai Tawei Haiyang Aquatic Food Co. Ltd. (“WTH”) did not. This document is to put that communication in reportable form. With the exception of this introductory paragraph, and to add paragraph numbers, there have been no changes from the body of that letter, and it is so reproduced below.

[2] On Monday, July 17, 2023 at 4:00 pm, I heard this application on an emergency basis. At the conclusion of that hearing, I gave a ‘bottom line’ decision dismissing the application, with reasons to follow, in accordance with the Court of

Appeal's comments in *R. v. Desmond*, 2020 NSCA 1 respecting written supplements to oral decisions. As I understand an appeal has been filed (which I have not seen), I will do so in this format and in a summary fashion.

[3] On May 1, 2023, the Debtor filed a Notice of Intention to make a proposal. On May 26, 2023, Debtor's counsel filed a first application to extend time pursuant to s. 50.4(9) of the BIA. I granted it (and an application for abridgement of time) on May 31, 2023, which was the last day of the initial stay. Mr. MacDonald, for WTH, did not object to the abridgement but did object to the extension (or in the alternative sought a shorter extension). I granted the extension for the full 45 days, given that a 30 day period proposed by Mr. MacDonald as an alternative to a refusal would coincide with the Canada Day weekend. However, I expressed significant concern both with the timing of the application, in light of the timing of the Trustee's first report (May 24, 2023) and observed that there may have been incomplete communication between Trustee and Debtor for a period of time between the initial NOI and the Trustee's first report. I emphasized to all parties that I would be seeking fulsome evidence of substantive progress, should a further extension be sought.

[4] On July 6, 2023, the Debtor sought to convert to CCAA proceedings. That was heard, I understand on a contested basis, before Justice Rosinski on July 13,



2023, two days before the BIA stay was set to expire. No prior application was made to extend the BIA stay. I was advised by counsel that the determination to seek to proceed under the CCAA was made in “late June” and that it was deemed to be a “no brainer” that the initial CCAA order would be granted, notwithstanding that it was to be contested.

[5] On the afternoon of July 13, 2023, Justice Rosinski heard the CCAA application and I understand that was dismissed on Friday, July 14, 2023 with reasons that are yet to follow.

[6] WTH asserts that the BIA stay expired on Saturday, July 15. It argues that the federal Interpretation Act, not the Civil Procedure Rules, applies and that Saturdays “count” for such purposes. As such, the application for extension of time that was filed and heard on Monday, July 17 was out of time. That application also sought to abridge time, and for the matter to be heard *ex parte* (although WTH, the Trustee, and perhaps others were in fact served).

[7] That application was filed with the Supreme Court, not with me as Rule 9(5) of the BIA *General Rules* require; in fairness, the cover email to the Court sought either a Justice or the Registrar, and the matter was redirected to me.

[8] I did not explicitly deal with the *ex parte* element of the application, as the objecting creditor and trustee in fact appeared, and I was prepared for the sake of argument to accept that the July 17 application was not out of time.

[9] I was presented with the Trustee's second report, which was principally if not exclusively for the CCAA proceedings. I was also advised that the Trustee had completed an inventory and the report contains a cash flow projection (including \$325,000 in professional fees over four months on \$800,000 in sales), and obtained an opinion on the "validity and enforceability" of security granted by the Debtor to a non-arm's length entity.

[10] WTH objects to various assumptions and elements in this opinion, including under ss. 95 and 137 of the BIA and the *Statute of Elizabeth*. It points out that the security was granted just after Justice Coughlan's decision in favour of WTH against the Debtor (2023 NSSC 27), and just two months prior to the Debtor's NOI, although it purports to secure advances made in 2018.

[11] Because of this dispute (and continuing developments in determining creditors), it is currently unclear whether WTH has a 'veto' on any proposal or not. Although I am cognizant of Justice Moir's decision in *Kocken* (2017 NSSC 80) that adverse statements by a veto-holder with respect to a proposal are not

determinative of its ultimate viability, in these circumstances I did pay some attention to WTH's comments, for reasons to which I will return.

[12] Against that backdrop, I considered (using the assumption that the application was not in fact out of time to begin with) the three part test in s. 50.4(9) BIA, which may be summarized as present and continuing good faith and diligence, the "likelihood" of an ultimate viable proposal, and lack of material prejudice to any creditor. I further considered whether, should the test be met, granting an extension would be a proper exercise of my resultant discretion. I will discuss the 50.4(9) requirements in inverse order.

### **Prejudice**

[13] WTH concedes that an extension would not materially prejudice it under 50.4(9)(c). I agree.

### **Proposal viability**

[14] I was asked for a ten day extension, following Justice Rosinski's oral decision. This was not ultimately for the purposes of getting a proposal out to creditors or before the Court, but to assemble the materials to make a *further* extension application. In short, the "no brainer" that the Debtor thought it had in

obtaining the CCAA initial order caught the Debtor with its pants down when the application was refused at a minutes-to-midnight deadline.

[15] This is not the test under 50.4(9)(b) respecting “proposal viability” although I conclude that the application fails not for lack of viability, but under 50.4(9)(a)’s requirement for good faith and due diligence or, if I am wrong, because I would not exercise my discretion in favour of the Debtor.

[16] In *Re T&C Steel Ltd. et al*, 2022 SKKB 236, Justice Scherman reviewed the “viability” test, particularly in the context of a second (or subsequent) application, as follows:

[7] In *Enirgi Group Corp. v Andover Mining Corp.*, 2013 BCSC 1833, 6 CBR (6th) 32 [Enirgi Group], the Court said:

[66] Turning to s. 50.4(9)(b), a viable proposal is one that would be reasonable on its face to a reasonable creditor; “this ignores the possible idiosyncrasies of any specific creditor”: *Cumberland* [[1994] OJ No 132 (Ont Ct J)] at para. 4. It follows that Enirgi’s views about any proposal are not necessarily determinative. The proposal need not be a certainty and “likely” means “such as might well happen.” (*Baldwin* [[1994] OJ No 271 (Ont Ct J)], paras. 3-4). And Enirgi’s statement that it has lost faith in Andover is not determinative under s. 50.4(9): *Baldwin* at para. 3; *Cantrail* at paras. 13-18).



[17] The Court went on to cite my own decision in *Re Scotian Distribution Services Limited*, 2020 NSSC 131, drawing a distinction between a “first extension” and a subsequent one. Justice Scherman was quite critical of the dearth of information before it, granting the second extension by the proverbial skin of its teeth.

[18] In summary, the test for the likelihood of a viable proposal is an objective one: *Nautican v. Dumont*, 2020 PESC 15 at paras. 16-18. Chief Justice Kennedy put it this way (invoking the inimitable Justice Farley in the process) in *Re Scotian Rainbow Ltd. et al*, (2000), 186 NSR (2d) 154 at para. 17 *et seq.*:

[17] As to s. 50.4(9)(b), that the insolvent person would likely be able to make a viable proposal of the extension being applied for were granted. Counsel for the primary creditor Shur Gain, in support of the applicant, has brought to this Court’s attention the case of *Re Baldwin Valley Investors Inc.* (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 219. In that matter Justice Farley of the Ontario Court of Justice (General Division) (which it then was), Justice Farley considers the phrase a viable proposal as set out in subsection (b) of s. 50.4(9). He says that that phrase should take on a meaning akin to one that seems reasonable, a proposal that seems reasonable on its face to the reasonable creditor. Reasonable on its face to the reasonable creditor. Justice Farley says this ignores the possible idiosyncrasies of any specific creditor. Justice Farley also examines the meaning of the word ‘likely’, and refers to the Concise Oxford Dictionary of current English where likely is defined, and I quote:

Might well happen or turn out to be the thing specified.

[18] Might well happen or turn out to be the thing specified...I am in agreement with Justice Farley’s determinations as to the meaning of these

words, and I adopt his findings as to their meanings for our purposes. When I make reference to those words for our purposes, I am adopting Justice Farley's definitions.

[19] While I have very considerable doubts in the context of a second extension of "viability," particularly given WTH's express loss of confidence in the Debtor and its ability to drive a proposal, given the objectivity of the test and the binding comments of Justice Moir in *Kocken*, I am compelled on a bare balance of probabilities *for current purposes* to conclude that the "viability" test, as interpreted by the caselaw, has been met.

#### **Good faith and due diligence**

[20] That leaves us with 50.4(9)(a) – the due diligence and good faith tests – and with my discretion.

[21] Mr. O'Keefe urges that in his experience, the 59.4(9)(a) inquiry is little more than a catechism – a recitation by the Trustee that good faith and due diligence are at hand. I do not accept that is appropriate. It is a determination to be made by the Court, not by the Trustee. It is also something of an exercise in "don't ask a barber if you need a haircut." I observed this in stark relief at the initial extension application when the Trustee's representative (a different individual from that later involved in the file) became quite agitated when I challenged the timeline leading

up to that initial (and successful) extension application and whether developments to that date passed the “due diligence” test.”

[22] The current case is something of an unusual situation in that although there were notable developments between May 31 and July 6, they were primarily if not exclusively geared towards converting the insolvency to CCAA proceedings. As I read the BIA, the “good faith and due diligence” requirement relates to the development of a viable proposal, not to other insolvency options. In *Re Royalton Banquet and Convention Centre Ltd.* 2007 CanLii 1970 (Ont. SC), the Court refused an extension when nothing had been done “in preparing the proposal.” While there was no indication on whether any other work had been done at all (unlike the present case), I read this as supporting the view that due diligence relates to moving the (likely viable) proposal forward – not other options.

[23] Again, it appears that the Debtor thought a Justice would “rubber stamp” an initial CCAA order, filed on the eve of the expiry of the initial BIA extension, and when it was unsuccessful was left scrambling for a second BIA extension – not having left time either for a Justice to consider the CCAA application in a timely fashion, or to make a timely application to extend the 50.4 timeline should that be unsuccessful (as it ultimately was). As I discuss below, as well, I question whether in the last 75 days, more could have been done to determine who are the creditors



and what is their status. On balance, I am not convinced that what has been done, in these circumstances, are adequate to satisfy me to a civil standard of due diligence.

[24] Which brings me to good faith. There are two places where this is relevant: directly, in the 50.4(9)(a) test, and more holistically under Section 4.2(1) of the BIA.

[25] I begin by observing that a failure to prove good faith is not the same as a finding of bad faith. It does not require malice or caprice or abuse of process. It is an affirmative test – that there is good faith; not the presence or absence of bad faith.

[26] At all Court stages of this and the CCAA proceeding, there have been distinct flavours of attempts to “strong arm” the Court by compressing timelines where the upshot has been “you have to sign this or disaster will result.” It will be recalled that the initial 50.4(9) extension was filed on May 26 (together with an application for abridgement of time) and was heard on the very last possible day. The CCAA application was heard on the last juridical day before that extension expired (having been filed seven days prior). The CCAA materials make the point that if the initial CCAA order was not granted, a disastrous bankruptcy would



follow; when that was rejected, the Debtor returned (arguably out of time) to this Court making the same argument, and sought to do so *ex parte* (although again, in fairness, having in fact given short notice to adverse parties).

[27] I was not presented with any reason for this. It is not consistent with good faith and fair dealing. It is, conversely, consistent with attempting to compel the Court to the Debtor's agenda and objectives.

[28] Inconsistent with good faith as well is the current state of affairs. Distilled, it is this: "we were unsuccessful in the CCAA application. We don't have any additional materials to put in front of you; we don't even know what the creditor matrix is going to look like, given a potential substantial additional creditor and the security dispute. So give us ten days to pull that all together because we didn't think we would fail on the CCAA application."

[29] In *Cogent Fibre Inc.*, 2015 ONSC 5139, Justice Penny said this, which I find completely consistent with my prior comments on "recalcitrant creditors" not being determinative but yet not relieving the Debtor of its burden under 50.4(9):

[17] In effect, Cogent says it needs more time to continue discussions with its two major creditors when at least one of those creditors (a creditor with veto power) has not engaged in any discussions with Cogent and has no intention of doing so. Cogent's position is, I find, entirely tautological.

[18] In his factum and in oral submissions, counsel for Cogent emphasized the rehabilitative nature of the proposal sections. He relied heavily on recent Ontario and B.C. authority to the effect that a veto-empowered creditor's statement that it will never agree to a proposal is not dispositive of whether to terminate or refuse to extend a stay. I quite agree with this position and the supporting law. Creditors often, for strategic reasons, say they will never agree.

[19] Nevertheless, it seems to me there must be a certain forthrightness on the part of the debtor about what is sought to be achieved. There must also be an air of reality about the likelihood of any proposal being viable.  
[emphases added]

[30] In this case, the Debtor is essentially saying, "we need more time to get a third extension request in front of you, because we didn't get what we wanted under the CCAA. We know there will be a sale, but we can't tell you yet what that is going to look like or who is going to be voting in what proportions on it." I cannot consider that, on a balance of probabilities, to be "forthright....about what is to be achieved," or in furtherance of good faith. It is at least questionable whether it meets the test of due diligence as well.

[31] In making these comments, I wish to be clear that I am not making negative aspersions as to any individual. I am not privy to the communications among Debtor, Trustee, or Counsel. I am aware that the Debtor's principal is in China and that this posed logistical and perhaps language barriers. This was not a new development and existed at least from the original NOI onward. What is clear is that, for whatever reason, the Debtor found itself in a situation that was awkward at

best and out of time at worst, and expected the Court essentially as a matter of right or rote, to fix it.

### **Discretion**

[32] Finally, I turn to my discretion. 50.4(9) is permissive, not mandatory. It states that I “may” grant an extension (assuming it to be made in time) if the three part test is met. I have assumed the application was timely, and concluded the test was not met. If I am right on the first point and wrong on the second, however, I would not exercise my discretion in favour of the Debtor.

[33] The case law recognizes that a 50.4(9) extension is a discretionary order, if the conditions for its exercise have been met: see *Re Dynamic Transport* 2016 NBCA 70 at paras. 4 and 9; *Re Entegrity Wind Systems Inc.* 2009 PESC 25 at para. 30; *Re Entegrity Wind Systems Inc.* 2009 PESC 33 at para. 36; *Royalton Banquet and Convention Centre Ltd.* 2007 CanLii 1970 (Ont. SC).

[34] Thrice in this insolvency has the Debtor come forward on an “emergency” basis, in effect seeking forgiveness not permission. There are circumstances when that comes with the territory of insolvency. The subject can be on occasions sedate, in others it can develop in real time. However, here it was known both that there was a substantial adversarial and opposing creditor, that the Court was



concerned with the prior timelines, and that the Creditor would be seeking to convert to CCAA proceedings no later than late June. It frankly appears that the Creditor did indeed consider such an application to be what counsel described to me as a “no brainer” and got caught flat-footed when (again at the last possible moment) the initial CCAA order was refused.

[35] It was argued that while this may have been a strategic or procedural mistake, the Debtor should not be held to account for that, given the alleged inimical consequences of a bankruptcy. While both the CCAA and BIA 50.4(9) arguments focused on this alleged destruction of value, no evidence of that was presented to me. I pointed out that a bankrupt can make a proposal (50(1) BIA), and this was argued to be undesirable given the dynamics of who would be “driving the bus” in a bankruptcy proposal versus an insolvency proposal. I did not find that persuasive in convincing me to exercise my discretion if I am wrong in finding that the 50.4(9) “good faith and due diligence” tests have failed. Indeed, it may well be that a change of drivers is exactly what is needed to move the sale process forward, given the other disputes in the file.

[36] As I have said, I am aware that my “bottom line” decision is under appeal, on grounds that I have neither seen nor heard. These reasons will illustrate the basis upon which that decision was made.



[37] Costs were not argued before me. In the circumstances, that issue should it arise is best left to the appellate Justice.

[38] Mr. O'Keefe, solicitor for the Debtor, is to provide a copy of this decision to the service list forthwith.

Balmanoukian, R.

**SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA**  
**IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY**

**Citation:** *Atlantic Sea Cucumber Limited (re)*, 2023 NSSC 238

**Date:** 20230721

**Docket:** No. 45461

**Registry:** Halifax

**Estate Number:** 51-2939212

**In the Matter of:** The intention to make a proposal by Atlantic Sea Cucumber Limited

**ERRATUM**

**Registrar:** Raffi A. Balmanoukian, Registrar in Bankruptcy

**Heard:** July 17, 2023, in Halifax, Nova Scotia

**Final Written  
Submissions:** July 17, 2023

**Erratum Date:** July 25, 2023

**Counsel:** Darren O’Keefe and Caitlin Fell, for the applicant Atlantic Sea Cucumber Limited (“ASC” or the “Debtor”)  
Joshua Santimaw, for the Trustee MSI Spergel Inc. (the “Trustee”)  
Gavin D.F. MacDonald and Meaghan Kells, for the objecting creditor, Weihai Tawei Haiyang Aquatic Food Co. Ltd. (“WTH”)

**Erratum:**

- [1] Meaghan Kells was added as co-counsel for the objecting creditor.
- [2] Additional underlining was included in paragraph 29.
- [3] The word “Debtor” was added the counsel section on the title page and added to the decision in paragraph 1.

**Convergix, Re 2006 NBQB 288**

**IN THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF NEW BRUNSWICK**

**IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY**

**JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SAINT JOHN**

**Court Numbers: 12381, 12382, 12383, 12384 and 12385**

**Estate Numbers: 51-879293, 879309, 879319, 879326 and 879332**

**IN THE MATTER of the Proposals of Convergix,  
Inc., Cynaptec Information Systems Inc.,  
InteliSys Acquisition Inc., InteliSys (NS) Co.,  
InteliSys Aviation Systems Inc.**

**BEFORE: Justice Peter S. Glennie**

**HEARING HELD: Saint John**

**DATE OF HEARING: July 27, 2006**

**DATE OF DECISION: August 1, 2006**

**COUNSEL:**

**R. Gary Faloon, Q.C., on behalf of the Applicants**

06 244 014

## **DECISION**

### **GLENNIE, J. (Orally)**

[1] The issue to be determined on this application is whether related insolvent corporations are permitted to file a joint proposal pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that such corporations are permitted to do so.

### **OVERVIEW**

[2] The Applicants, Convergix, Inc., Cynaptec Information Systems Inc., IntelliSys Acquisition Inc., IntelliSys (NS) Co., and IntelliSys Aviation Systems Inc. (the "Insolvent Corporations") are each wholly owned subsidiaries of IntelliSys Aviation Systems of America Inc. ("IYSA").

[3] For all intents and purposes, the Insolvent Corporations have operated as one entity since 2001. The Insolvent Corporations have one "directing mind" and have the same directors. The Insolvent Corporations maintain one bank account.

[4] The Insolvent Corporations are considered related companies under the provisions of the *Income Tax Act (Canada)*.

[5] Payments to all creditors of the Insolvent Corporations, including some of the major creditors such as Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency have all been made by one of the Insolvent Corporations, namely, IntelliSys Aviation Systems Inc., ("IntelliSys"), even though loan agreements may have been made with other of the Insolvent Corporations. Similarly, all employees of all the Insolvent Corporations are paid by IntelliSys.



### **Filing of Notice of Intention to make a Proposal**

[6] The Insolvent Corporations attempted to file a joint Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA") on June 27<sup>th</sup>, 2006 in the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy ("OSB"). By letter dated June 28<sup>th</sup>, 2006 the OSB advised that it would not accept the filing of this joint Proposal.

[7] On June 29<sup>th</sup>, 2006 each of the Applicants filed in the OSB a Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal. The Insolvent Corporations have each filed in the OSB a Projected Monthly Cash-Flow Summary and Trustee's Report on Cash-Flow Statement.

### **Extension Pursuant to Subsection 50.4(9) of the BIA**

[8] IYSA is required to file quarterly reports with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington, D.C. It is a publicly traded security, over-the-counter, on the NASDAQ. The Applicants say the implications on IYSA created by the financial situation of the Insolvent Corporations must be considered. The Applicants assert that the initial 30 day period of protection under the BIA is not sufficient time for all of the implications on IYSA to be determined and dealt with.

[9] The Applicants say that their insolvency was caused by the unexpected loss of their major client which represented in excess of 25% of their combined revenue. They say that time is needed to assess the market and determine if this revenue can be replaced and over what period of time.

[10] The Insolvent Corporations and Grant Thornton Limited have completed a business plan. It has been presented to investors and/or lenders. The Insolvent Corporations will need more time than the initial period of protection of 30 days under the BIA to have these lenders and investors consider the business plan and make lending and/or investment decisions.

[11] Counsel for the Applicants advise the Court that the OSB does not object to joint proposals being filed by related corporations but requires a Court Order to do so.

[12] The Insolvent Corporations host systems for several Canadian airlines. They provide all aspects of reservation management including booking through call centers and web sites as well as providing the capability to check in and board passengers. The total reservation booking volume is about 1300 reservations per day which results in a revenue stream of \$520,000 per day. The applicants say the loss of revenue for even one day would be catastrophic. They assert that serious damage would be caused to the various client airlines. The Applicants also say it would take at least 30 days to bring another reservation system online.

### **ANALYSIS**

[13] There are no reported decisions dealing with the issue of whether a Division I proposal can be made under the BIA on a joint basis by related corporations. There are two decisions, one dealing with partners [*Howe Re*, [2004] O.J. No. 4257, 49 C.B.R. (4th) 104, 2004 CarswellOnt 1253] and the other dealing with individuals [*Nitsopoulos Re*, [2001] O.J. No. 2181, 25 C.B.R. (4th) 305, 2001 CarswellOnt 1994].

[14] Section 2 of the BIA provides that 'persons' includes corporations.

[15] When interpreting the breadth of the BIA section dealing with proposals, I am mindful of the following comments from ***Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada*** by Hon. L.W. Houlden and Hon. G. B. Morawetz, Third Edition Revised, (2006, Release 6, pages 1-6 and 1-6.1):

The *Act* should not be interpreted in an overly narrow, legalistic manner: *A. Marquette & Fils Inc. v. Mercure*, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 547, 65 D.L.R. (3d) 136, 10 N.R. 239; *Re Olympia and York Developments Ltd.* (1997), 143 D.L.R. (4th) 536, 45 C.B.R. (3d) 85, 1997 CarswellOnt 657 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Revenue Canada (Taxation)*, 45 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 47 Alta L.R. (3d) 296, 1997 CarswellAlta 254, [1997] 5 W.W.R. 159, 144 D.L.R. (4th) 653 (C.A.); *Re County Trucking Ltd.* (1999), 10 C.B.R. (4th) 124, 1999 CarswellNS 231 (N.S.S.C.). It should be given a reasonable interpretation which supports the framework of the legislation; an absurd result should be avoided: *Re Handelman* (1997), 48 C.B.R. (3d) 29, 1997 CarswellOnt 2891 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

The *Act* puts day-to-day administration into the hands of business people - - trustees in bankruptcy and inspectors. It is intended that the administration should be practical not legalistic, and the *Act* should be interpreted to give effect to this intent: *Re Russell* (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 396, 1999 CarswellAlta 718, 12 C.B.R. (4th) 316, 71 Alta. L.R. (3d) 85, 237 A.R. 136, 197 W.A.C. 136 (C.A.).

[16] In *Howe, supra*, the debtors brought a motion for an order directing the OSB to accept for filing a joint Division I proposal, together with a joint statement of affairs, joint assessment certificate and joint cash flow statement.

[17] The OSB accepted that the filing of a joint Division I proposal by the debtors was appropriate as the debts were substantially the same and because the joint filing was in the best interests of the debtors and their creditors. However, the OSB attended at the motion to make submissions regarding its policy in relation to the filing of joint Division I proposals. The policy stipulated



that the OSB would refuse the filing of a proposal that did not on its face meet the eligibility criteria set out in the BIA. The policy further provided that the OSB would refuse the filing of a joint Division I proposal where the trustee or the debtors failed to obtain a Court Order authorizing the filing.

[18] Registrar Sproat rejected the OSB's position as expressed in the policy. He held that the OSB had no authority to reject the filing of a proposal, subject to the proposal meeting the requirements of section 50(2) of the BIA, namely the lodging of documents.

[19] The Registrar reviewed case law dealing with the permissibility of joint Division I proposals under the BIA. He found that, while not explicitly authorized, the provisions of the BIA could reasonably be interpreted as permitting a trustee to file with the official receiver a joint Division I proposal. In this regard he quoted from his comments in ***Re Shireen Catharine Bennett***, Court File No. 31-207072T, where he stated:

It seems to me that the decision of Farley J. in *Re Nitsopoulos* (2001) 25 C.B.R. (4th) 305 (Ont. S.C.) is clear on the issue that the BIA does not prohibit the filing of a joint proposal and. . .does not formally approve/permit a joint proposal to be filed. In my view, it would be consistent with the purpose of the BIA and most efficient and economical to extend the decision in *Re Nitsopoulos* and hold that joint proposals may be filed. . .I am not persuaded that a formal court order is required to permit a joint proposal to be filed. It seems to me that potential abuses can be avoided in the fashion outlined at paragraph 9 of *re Nitsopoulos* i.e. on an application for court approval. . .and determination of abuse (if any) can be dealt with on that application.

Thus to summarize, no order is necessary for a joint Division I proposal to be filed. In the event that the Trustee has difficulty in the said filing the matter may be restored to my list and the OSB shall attend on the date agreed upon.



[20] In the result, the Registrar ordered the OSB to accept for filing the joint proposal. The Court further held that a joint Division I proposal is permitted under the BIA and that the OSB must accept the filing of the joint proposal even in the absence of a Court Order authorizing such filing.

[21] In *Nitsopoulos, supra*, a creditor of each of Mr. and Mrs. Notsopoulos brought a motion for an order that a proposal could not be filed on a joint basis.

[22] The joint proposal lumped all unsecured creditors of the Nitsopouloses into one class, whether such creditors were creditors of the husband, the wife, or both. Justice Farley identified the issue as whether the BIA allowed a joint Division I proposal to be made.

[23] He focused on an important distinction between a Division II consumer proposal and a Division I proposal. A Division I proposal must be approved by the Court to be effective. In contrast, a Division II proposal need not be specifically approved by the Court unless the Official Receiver or any other interested party applies within fifteen days of creditor acceptance to have the proposal reviewed. Justice Farley stated that the role of the Superintendent in Bankruptcy, on a directive basis, is not necessary given that there will automatically be a review by the Court to determine whether the terms and conditions of the proposal are fair and reasonable and generally beneficial to the creditors. He concluded that this review would encompass a consideration equivalent to section 66.12(1.1) of the BIA such that it would be able to determine if a joint proposal should be permitted.

[24] Justice Farley concluded that the BIA should not be construed so as to prohibit the filing of a joint Division I proposal.

[25] In my opinion the filing of a joint proposal is permitted under the BIA and with respect to this case, the filing of a joint proposal by the related corporations is permitted. The BIA should not be construed so as to prohibit the filing of a joint proposal. As well, I am not persuaded that a formal court order is required to permit a joint proposal to be filed.

[26] In this particular case, the affidavit evidence reveals various facts which support the view that a joint filing is in the best interest of the Insolvent Corporations and their creditors.

[27] I am satisfied that the Insolvent Corporations have essentially operated as a single entity since 2001. Payments to all creditors have been made by IntelliSys, even though the loan agreements may have been made with other of the insolvent corporations. Inter-corporate accounting for the Insolvent Corporations may not reflect these payments or transactions.

[28] In reaching the conclusion that a joint filing is in order in this case, I have taken the following factors into consideration:

- (a) The cost of reviewing and vetting all inter-corporate transactions of the Insolvent Corporations in order to prepare separate proposals would be unduly expensive and counter-productive to the goal of restructuring and rehabilitating the Insolvent Corporations.
- (b) The cost of reviewing and vetting all arms-length creditors' claims to determine which Insolvent Corporation they are actually a creditor of would be unduly expensive and counter-productive to the goal of restructuring and rehabilitating the Insolvent Corporations.
- (c) The cost of reviewing and determining ownership and title to the assets of the Insolvent Corporations would be unduly expensive

and counter-productive to the goal of restructuring and rehabilitating the Insolvent Corporations.

[29] In addition, certain of the Insolvent Corporations have only related party debt. Pursuant to section 54(3) of the BIA, a related creditor can vote against a proposal, but not in favor of the proposal. As a result, IntelliSys (NS) Co. and IntelliSys Acquisition Inc. cannot obtain the required votes for the approval of an individual proposal without a court order.

[30] In my opinion, these considerations are consistent only with a finding that a joint proposal is the most efficient, beneficial and appropriate approach in this case.

[31] In view of the reasoning in *Howe* and *Nitsopoulos*, the interrelatedness of the Insolvent Corporations, the court review inherent in any Division I proposal, and the lack of any prejudice to the creditors of the Insolvent Corporations, I conclude that the Insolvent Corporations ought to be permitted to file a joint proposal.

[32] In *Re Pateman* [1991] M.J. No. 221 (Q.B.), Justice Oliphant commented, "I have some serious reservations as to whether a joint proposal can be made save and except in the case of partners, but since I need not determine that issue, I leave it for another day."

[33] In my opinion, the companies in this case are in effect corporate partners because they are so interrelated. They have the same bank account, the same controlling mind and the same location of their offices.



[34] I am of the view that the filing of a joint proposal by related corporations is permitted under the BIA, and that on the facts of this case, an Order should issue authorizing such a filing. Such an Order is consistent with the principles underlying the interpretation of the BIA, and is in the best interests of all stakeholders of the Insolvent Corporations.

### **Extension of Time for Filing a Proposal**

[35] The Applicants also seek an order pursuant to Section 50.4(9) of the BIA that the time for filing a Proposal be extended by 45 days to September 10<sup>th</sup>, 2006.

[36] The Proposal sections of the BIA are designed to give an insolvent company an opportunity to put forth a proposal as long as a court is satisfied that the requirements of section 50.4(9) are met: *Re Doaktown Lumber Ltd.* (1996), 39 C.B.R. (3d) 41 (N.B.C.A.) at paragraph 12.

[37] An extension may be granted if the Insolvent Corporations satisfy the Court that they meet the following criteria on a balance of probabilities:

- (a) The Insolvent Corporations have acted, and are acting, in good faith and with due diligence;
- (b) The Insolvent Corporations would likely be able to make a viable proposal if the extension is granted; and,
- (c) No creditor of the Insolvent Corporations would be materially prejudiced if the extension is granted.



[38] In considering applications under section 50.4(9) of the BIA, an objective standard must be applied and matters considered under this provision should be judged on a rehabilitation basis rather than on a liquidation basis: See **Re Cantrail Coach Lines Ltd.** (2005), 10 C.B.R. (5<sup>th</sup>) 164.

[39] I am satisfied that the Insolvent Corporations' actions demonstrate good faith and diligence. These actions include the following:

- (a) The Insolvent Corporations have retained the professional services of Grant Thornton Limited to assist them in their restructuring;
- (b) The Insolvent Corporations have completed a business plan;
- (c) The Insolvent Corporations are diligently working on the Restructuring;
- (d) Since the filing of the five Notices of Intention to Make a Proposal, representatives of the Insolvent Corporations and Grant Thornton Limited have met with representatives of ACOA, the principle outside creditor of the Insolvent Corporations, to advise them of these proceedings, and
- (e) Representatives of the Insolvent Corporations have met with outside investors.

[40] The test for whether insolvent persons would likely be able to make a viable proposal if granted an extension is whether the insolvent person would likely (as opposed to certainly) be able to present a proposal that seems reasonable on its face to a reasonable creditor. The test is not whether or not a specific creditor would be prepared to support the proposal. In **Re Baldwin Valley Investors Inc.** (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 219 (Ont. G.D.), Justice Farley was of the opinion that "viable" means reasonable on its face to a reasonable creditor and that "likely" does not require certainty but means "might well

happen" and "probable" "to be reasonably expected". See also ***Scotia Rainbow Inc. v. Bank of Montreal*** (2000), 18 C.B.R. (4<sup>th</sup>) 114 (N.S.S.C.).

[41] The Affidavit evidence in this case demonstrates that the Insolvent Corporations would likely be able to make a viable proposal as there appears to be a core business to form the base of a business enterprise; management is key to the ongoing viability of the business and management appears committed to such ongoing viability; and debts owing to secured creditors can likely be serviced by a restructured entity.

[42] I am satisfied that the proposed extension would not materially prejudice creditors of the Insolvent Corporations. My conclusion in this regard is based on the following facts: the Insolvent Corporations continue to pay equipment leases and the equipment continues to be insured and properly maintained and preserved by the Insolvent Corporations; the principle debt of the Insolvent Corporations is inter-company debt; the collateral of the secured creditors is substantially comprised of equipment and software and its value is unlikely to be eroded as a result of an extension; based on the Projected Monthly Cash-Flow Summary the Insolvent Corporations have sufficient cash to meet their ongoing current liabilities to the end of September, 2006 and in a bankruptcy scenario it is likely that there will be little if any recovery for the unsecured creditors of the Insolvent Corporations.

[43] Accordingly, I conclude that each of the requirements of section 50.4(9) of the BIA are satisfied on the facts of this case and that an extension of time for filing a proposal should be granted.

**CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION**

[44] In the result, an Order will issue that the Insolvent Corporations may file a joint proposal pursuant to the provisions of the BIA, and that, pursuant to Section 50.4(9) of the BIA, the time for filing a Proposal is extended by 45 days to September 10<sup>th</sup>, 2006.

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**Peter S. Glennie**  
**A Judge of the Court of Queen's Bench**  
**of New Brunswick**

**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA  
IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY**  
**Citation: *H &H Fisheries Limited, Re*, 2005 NSSC 346**

**Date:** 20051219  
**Docket:** SH B259148  
**Registry:** Halifax

05 355 018

**IN THE MATTER OF: H & H Fisheries Limited**

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**DECISION**

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**Judge:** The Honourable Justice Walter R.E. Goodfellow

**Heard:** December 14, 2005 in Halifax, Nova Scotia

**Counsel:** Victor J. Goldberg and Martha L. Mann for  
H & H Fisheries Limited  
Stephen J. Kingston and Bob Mann, articulated clerk, for  
the Bank of Nova Scotia



**By the Court:**

**BACKGROUND:**

[1] H & H Fisheries Limited (HHFL) owns and operates a fish processing plant at Eastern Passage, Halifax, Nova Scotia, which is a somewhat seasonal operation and it presently employs seventy-five people which diminishes to approximately twelve people off-season.

[2] Reginald P. Hartlen is the president, a founding shareholder and director of HHFL and the company became a customer of the Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) in May of 2003.

[3] HHFL and BNS secured a commitment letter December 2, 2004 with the stated purpose of BNS "to finance trade receivables and inventory". It provided that BNS would have a first charge over accounts receivable and inventory and set out the terms and conditions of their agreement including "for ongoing credit risk management purposes, all operating accounts of the borrower shall be maintained with the Bank as long as the borrower has any operating line facilities with the Bank". There were several additional terms and conditions dealing with reporting ratios of current assets to current liabilities, ratio of debt to tangible net worth, etc. The letter of commitment contained a clear outline of the general borrower reporting conditions. The letter of commitment made reference to two specific receivables outstanding; Emporio and Simone, upon which I will comment further.

[4] In November 2004 HHFL applied to increase its limit on its operating credit line from \$400,000 to \$1,100,000 and this increase was approved subject to confirmation as to the collection of the Emporio and Simone accounts.

[5] In December 2004 the Simone account was paid in full but Emporio remained outstanding. Because the lobster season was approaching, HHFL requested BNS to waive the condition relating to the Emporio account. BNS did not waive the requirement in relation to that account but did allow access to the full operating line of \$1,100,000 to January 31, 2005 when the limit was reduced to \$750,000.

[6] In February 2005, HHFL again requested access to the \$1,100,000 credit limit to February 28, 2005 when again it would be reduced to \$750,000 and this

was agreed upon by the parties. HHFL provided BNS with an update on the status of the Emporio account which continued to remain outstanding. BNS became increasingly concerned with respect to the impact of the potential write-off of the Emporio account and as a result in March 2005 conversations took place between BNS and Reginald Hartlen, who undertook April 7, 2005 to inject equity of \$200,000 into HHFL by April 22, 2005. Mr. Hartlen did come up with \$100,000 and endeavoured to obtain additional funds in relation to mortgaging his residence but unfortunately there was a lien/judgment against his property and his financing has not been possible.

[7] In June 2005 HHFL advised that as part of its 2005 fiscal year ending June 30, 2005, the company would write off the Emporio account which would give it an operating loss of \$300,000 which would be partially set off by an SR&ED refund of \$200,000, leaving a net loss of \$100,000 for the fiscal year 2005.

[8] In September 2005 BNS received a copy of HHFL's unaudited financial statement for the year ending June 30, 2005 which showed a net loss of \$596,043. This compared with a net loss of \$21,003 for the year ending June 30, 2004.

[9] HHFL had problems with cash flow and operating and contrary to the letter of commitment started to deposit funds to its accounts with CIBC and this was acknowledged by the director of finance of the company in September 2005. There followed innumerable meetings, correspondence between the parties and Mark S. Rosen, a licensed trustee in bankruptcy, who has consented to act as trustee for any proposal in this matter.

## **LEGISLATION:**

**Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 1; 1992, c. 27, s. 2.**

ss. 50.4(9):

### **Extension of Time for Filing Proposal**

In order to obtain an extension, the debtor must establish the following three items

(a) that it is acting in good faith and with due diligence;

(b) that it would likely be able to make a viable proposal if an extension were granted; and

(c) that no creditor would be materially prejudiced.

s. 54(2.2)(3):

**Related creditor** - A creditor who is related to the debtor may vote against but not for the acceptance of the proposal.

62(1.2)(2):

**On whom approval binding** - A proposal accepted by the creditors and approved by the court is binding on creditors in respect of

(a) All unsecured claims, and

(b) the secured claims in respect of which the proposal was made and that were in classes in which the secured creditors voted for the acceptance of the proposal by a majority in number and two thirds in value of the secured creditors present, personally or by proxy, at the meeting and voting on the resolution to accept the proposal.

but does not release the insolvent person from the debts and liabilities referred to in section 178, unless the creditor assents thereto. (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 26).

## **Interpretation Act, R.C.C. 1985, c. I-21**

### **Law Always Speaking**

#### *Law always speaking*

10. The law shall be considered as always speaking, and where a matter or thing is expressed in the present tense, it shall be applied to the circumstances as they arise, so that effect may be given to the enactment according to its true spirit, intent and meaning.

### **Enactments Remedial**

#### *Enactments deemed remedial*



12. Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.

### **APPLICATION:**

[10] HHFL filed a Notice of Intention dated November 3, 2005 under ss. 50.4(1) to make a Proposal of H & H Fisheries Limited. An order was granted extending the time to file a proposal November 29, 2005 to December 8, 2005. Unfortunately, the Chambers' docket was so heavy that the Justice presiding on December 8, 2005 was unable to address the matter and I was asked to deal with it and it was put over by consent to December 14, 2005. The application is comprised of several affidavits and both parties declined cross-examination of the other sides' supporting affidavits. On December 14<sup>th</sup> I heard almost four hours of argument and reserved my decision in order to thoroughly review the extensive material filed by both parties and arrive at a determination.

### **ONUS:**

[11] The court, as directed by s. 50.4(9) above, must be satisfied on each application that:

- (a) the insolvent person has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence;
- (b) the insolvent person would likely be able to make a viable proposal if the extension being applied for were granted; and
- (c) no creditor would be materially prejudiced if the extension being applied for were granted.

[12] The onus is upon the applicant, in this case HHFL), to satisfy the court on a balance of probabilities that all three prerequisites of s. 50.4(9) have been established on the application.

[13] This is so because of the use of the "semi-colon" and the use of the word "and" in (b), rendering the requirements conjunctive. This requires the court to consider each of the subsections as to whether the applicant has established the



prerequisite contained in the subsection on a balance of probabilities. For the application to be successful the court must be satisfied that all three prerequisites of the application have been established on a balance of probabilities before extending the time for filing a proposal. It is, in essence, a three part test and if the applicant fails on any part the court would not then be satisfied, requiring the application to be dismissed.

**[14] Has HHFL satisfied the court that it has acted in good faith and exercised due diligence?**

[15] There is some merit to the arguments advanced by BNS and the court is particularly concerned about a party HHFL signing a commitment letter with the clear undertaking noted above that all its operating accounts were to be maintained with BNS. This is for the obvious purpose of providing BNS with an opportunity to monitor and protect its interests as a creditor and clearly HHFL in moving all its trading, operating business to its CIBC accounts has committed a breach of contract, a breach of the commitment it made in the original committal letter executed by both parties December 2, 2004.

[16] Does a breach of contract automatically constitute bad faith? The answer is, "not necessarily", but it is evidence that must be weighed very carefully and the evidence here does show a deliberate failure to notify BNS of this redirection of operating funds and at one point a signed invoice or record which was somewhat misleading with respect to the possibility of some relatively minor accounts having been directed to the CIBC in error.

[17] The converse of good faith is bad faith and bad faith requires a motivation and conduct that is unacceptable. If, for example, the diversion of operating/trading proceeds had been diverted to the CIBC for the purposes of personal gain for any officer, director or shareholder of HHFL, an example of which would be payment to ones family or a pay-down on a mortgage or judgment on ones home, etc., or to enhance the third level of a secured creditor being Mr. Hartlen's company, R. Hartlen Investments Inc., then clearly such would amount to bad faith and quite possibly fraud. It is clear that the motivation for moving the funds to the CIBC account was, in one word, for the purpose of "survival". Funds were essential in that I accept the view expressed by HHFL that had it continued to direct its operating/trading funds to BNS the probability is almost a certainty that BNS would have utilized such funds to pay-down its advances precluding the company from

having any operating funds and the door to the plant would have been shut. This result would not have been, and is not at this time, in the best interest of either party and coincidentally the seventy-five employees who are at the moment gainfully employed by HHFL. I make it clear that it is not necessary that there be fraud for the conduct to fall short of good faith. HHFL have also fallen behind in many other aspects of the original commitment letter but they have responded and provided documentation, bank records, reconciliation of invoices with cash withdrawals. Its recent conduct probably directed by the trustee entirely mitigates against any suggestion of the diversion being for personal gain other than as I have said, a course of conduct taken for the benefit of both parties some other ninety-six outstanding creditors and the seventy-five employees. In some cases a breach of contract may be such of itself that it precludes acceptance on a balance of probabilities that the overall conduct meets the good faith requirement.

[18] It is argued by HHFL that only its conduct since the filing of the Notice of intention November 3, 2005 should be considered and with respect, I am inclined to disagree. The manner in which a party conducts itself in the past, particularly the immediate past, is often an indicator of likely conduct in the immediate future. In addition, what you have here is a breach of the contract/commitment letter which occurred before November 3, 2005 and continued and overlapped the date of the filing of the Notice of intention.

[19] The court does have the opinion of a respected trustee whose sworn testimony by affidavit has not been challenged and Mark S. Rosen, LLB, FCIRP, has been involved for some time and very active in endeavouring to come to grips with the challenge and has met with and communicated with officials of BNS, BDC and many of the unsecured creditors. After reciting in detail the extent of such activity he deposes in paragraph 14 of his affidavit of December 1, 2005 as follows:

14. I have been working with and receiving information from Messrs. Hartlen and Limpert as well as Harley Hiltz, the director of marketing and production for the Company, who at all times have been fully co-operative. From my experience and dealings with the Company, I believe that the Company has acted and is acting in good faith and with due diligence in working towards formulating a viable proposal. I believe that the Company would likely be able to make a viable proposal if the extension is granted.

My finding on this prerequisite is that by a relatively small margin HHFL has satisfied the court on a balance of probabilities that it has been and is likely to act in



good faith. In reaching this conclusion I have not taken into account the representation made in oral argument that Mr. Hartlen has probably advanced \$90,000 to \$95,000 to HHFL recently because I do not recall seeing anything in the evidence, particularly documentation confirming this infusion and therefore I am unable to give it any weight.

[20] The second wing of subparagraph (a) is in relation to due diligence and while the company has not acted in quite the timely manner it ought to have acted its deficiency in this regard is not severe and the cumulative evidence before me including the summary contained in Mr. Rosen's affidavit of December 1, 2005 and the volume of response which has been made to the BNS's requests and entitlement for documentation, combined with the efforts being made by the trustee in bankruptcy, Mark S. Rosen, to address a resolution constitutes satisfaction on a balance of probabilities of due diligence to this date.

**[21] Would HHFL likely to be able to make a viable proposal if the extension being applied for were granted?**

[22] "Viable" in this context means a proposal which seems reasonable on its face to a reasonable creditor (*Re Baldwin Valley Investors Inc.*, [1994] 23 C.B.R. (3<sup>rd</sup>) 219). Again, the court must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that HHFL **would likely**. This at the very least means that a reasonable level of effort dictated by the circumstances must have been made that gives some indication of the likelihood a viable proposal will be advanced within the time frame of the extension applied for.

[23] Lack of detail and assurance of this kind was considered in *St. Isidore Meats Inc. v. Paquette Fine Foods Inc.* [1997] O.J. No. 1863. In dismissing an application for an extension of time, Justice Chadwick stated (at para. 16):

"...[T]he debtors have not been able to put forth any meaningful financial plan which would support a proposal. There is a vague reference in the affidavit material that they have approached at least two prospective purchasers, however there is no evidence that any of these parties are interested in assisting the debtor either now or in the future."

[24] The BNS points to a number of specifics of what it considers a lack of effort that should result in a finding that there is little likelihood of HHFL making a viable proposal. BNS notes the fact that it has stated clearly that it no longer has any

interest of being involved in the affairs of HHFL which will necessitate, in all probability, an alternate financial institution and to date no inquiries have been made by HHFL or the Trustee of any financial institution. The absence of this step will take on weight depending upon the totality of the circumstances that exist at the time of the Notice of intention and that have developed since the Notice of intention was filed.

[25] There has been a considerable degree of activity before and since the Notice of intention was filed November 3, 2005. It seems in the total evidence available to the court through the affidavits filed that it is a reasonable inference to draw that it is highly unlikely that any financial institution would show any interest in filling the shoes of BNS until a determination is made with respect to this application for an extension of time to January 30, 2006. Since the Notice of intention has been filed the evidence is that HHFL has made a profit for November 2005 greater than that was anticipated. It had been anticipated that the profit would have been \$7,000 and it appears to be approximately \$19,600. There is an indication that the company is operating a new business model as a processing facility and there is evidence of the projected sales. In addition, there is evidence of a company, Pesca Pronto, having entered into a contract which by now would have had two substantial deliveries of lobster and in response to my inquiry during argument it appears that the first delivery has been paid for. HHFL advances the affidavit of Francesco Amoruso of Rome, Italy as to a possible solution and substitution by financial injection from that company, however, at this stage all that affidavit establishes is that an effort is being made by HHFL to address their situation. It further confirms that this is a busy, crucial period for HHFL but it does not at this point provide any comfort to be BNS or the court as to being a probable element of a viable proposal.

[26] Paragraph 5 of Francesco Amoruso's affidavit merely states:

I have had discussions with Mr. Hartlen with respect to a potential share investment in H & H by Pesca Pronto in the approximate amount of \$400,000.00 Cdn. I am very interested in pursuing the investment opportunity but will require 30 days to discuss the situation with my brothers/partners. I am hopeful that the transaction can be finalized. In the meantime, my company will continue to deal with H & H.

[27] To this point the court has not been advised nor has BNS of any further developments, inquiries or progress with respect to Amoruso's affidavit which can only be classified as a statement of interest.



[28] HHFL has made a concerted effort to secure government financing by way of a grant. The company has spent \$6,000 for the services of a consultant in the preparation of its grant application and on December 9, 2005 a science officer who is performing the due diligence for the grant indicated her satisfaction with the scientific basis of the claim and that she would be making a positive recommendation. The only weight that can be given at this stage to the grant application is that it is another example of the efforts being made by HHFL and its proposed trustee but until the grant reaches the stage of being a balance sheet item it can be given no further weight.

[29] BNS raises an objection to a determination that HHFL can satisfy the requirement pointing out that BNS and BDC as one class of secured creditor represent a substantial majority position of the secured claims. R. Hartlen Investments Inc. is bound by s. 54.2.2(3) as noted above.

[30] BNS takes the position that it has a clear veto over any proposal that may be advanced and that it will not be supporting any proposal to secured creditors that might be filed by HHFL.

[31] In *Re Cumberland Trading Inc.*, [1994] O.J. No. 132, wherein Farley J. stated at para. 4:

Cumberland's Notice of Intention to File a Proposal acknowledges that Skyview is owed \$750,000. On that basis, Skyview has 95% in value of Cumberland's admitted secured creditors' claims and 67% of all creditors' claims of whatever nature. No matter what, Skyview's claim is so large that Skyview cannot be swamped in any class in which it could be put. Clearly, Skyview would have a veto on any vote as to a proposal, at least so far as the secured class, assuming the secureds are treated as a separate class. This leaves the interesting aspect that under BIA regime, one could have a proposal turned down by the secured creditor class but approved by the unsecured creditor class and effective vis-a-vis this latter class, but with the secured class being able to enforce their security. One may question the practicality of a proposal affecting only unsecured creditors becoming effective in similar circumstances to this situation.

[32] In that case Farley, J. held that Skyview's position was satisfactory proof that the company would not likely be able to make a proposal that would be accepted by the creditors. In that case Skyview had 95% in value of Cumberland's admitted

secured creditors and here the math appears to give BNS a virtual veto. HHFL counters that when you look at the funds in the company's bank accounts at the end of November 2005 of approximately \$170,000 that such reduces the debt outstanding of BNS and again reiterates that BNS has since the Notice of intention being filed received approximately \$90,000 U.S. on its account. BNS is correct in that the mere presence of money in a debtor's bank account does not reduce indebtedness unless it is applied to the indebtedness. Since the notice of intention was filed HHFL has paid the required interest to BNS for November 2005. In this case, it is clear from the evidence before me and particularly the affidavit of the Trustee that there is a recognition of the proposal providing either alternate financing, such as speculated in Mr. Amoruso's affidavit or approaching alternate financial institutions. It would seem reasonable to assume that the proposal that will be advanced if it has a means of essentially paying out by substitution injection of capital of BNS indebtedness then the proposal presumably would be acceptable. It is inconceivable that if the BNS indebtedness were satisfied that BNS should retain the right to apply a guillotine effect to the extreme prejudice of itself and all other interested parties including the probable closure of the plant. The second largest secured creditor is the Business Development Corporation and they are in agreement to the granting of an extension to HHFL.

[33] In these circumstances, again by the a fairly narrow margin, I conclude that HHFL has met this prerequisite on a balance of probabilities. In doing so, I am not overlooking the considerable debt of HHFL that, while the projections for the next couple of months are favourable, clearly, the proposal will require addressing BNS.

[34] The third step is: **Will any creditor be materially prejudiced if the extension being applied for were granted?** As noted, there has been some improvement in the position of BNS since the Notice of intention was filed in that it has received approximately \$95,000 U.S. which the Bank's solicitor points out came direct to it and not through any exercise of direction by HHFL. BNS has also received the November 2005 interest. In this case there are only two significant unrelated secured creditors, BNS and BDC. BDC consents to the extension of time but I am mindful of the fact that its security is a first charge over the fixed assets which are by themselves not likely to significantly decrease in value but on the other hand would probably have some measure of increased value by virtue of an operating going concern and also there is an indication of additional land being acquired from government by HHFL. I do agree with BNS that additional land,



even if the obtaining of it is imminent, does not by itself provide any comfort to the Bank which has as its security a first charge on trade receivables and inventory. What does come through from the totality of the evidence is that this is a busy and likely profitable time for the industry and Mr. Rosen, in his affidavit, deposes at paragraphs 11 and 12:

11. I believe that the forty five day extension for filing the proposal is critical to the operations of the Company. It is my opinion that no creditor would be materially prejudiced if the extension is granted. The security of BNS would actually be enhanced during the extension period because of the profitable time of year and increase in inventory and receivables. BDC would have an opportunity to add to their security the land which I understand is to be conveyed to the Company by the government.
12. In the event the Company were to become bankrupt, it is my opinion that both BDC and R. Hartlen Investments Inc., which has a third charge on the assets would be severely prejudiced. It is also my opinion that the unsecured creditors would lose any opportunity of recovery.

[35] I struggle with what constitutes material prejudice and there is some guidance in *Re Cumberland Trading Inc.* above. In that case the creditor under the BIA applied to have a stay, etc. In paragraph 11 Justice Farley stated:

Is Skyview entitled to the benefit of s. 69.4(a) BIA? I am of the view that the material prejudice referred to therein is an objective prejudice as opposed to a subjective one- ie., it refers to the degree of the prejudice suffered vis-a-vis the indebtedness and the attendant security and not to the extent that such prejudice may affect the creditor *quo* person, organization or entity. If it were otherwise then a "big creditor" may be so financially strong that it could never have the benefit of this clause. ...

[36] In the case before the court, the accounts receivables as of November 31, 2005 amounted to \$956,532.16, almost double the indebtedness outstanding to BNS. HHFL certainly has as great if not greater motive in pursuing and collecting receivables as does BNS and I do not think there need be any concern as to the attempts in the short run for collection. Arguably, if an accounts receivable is uncollectible now its position cannot be any worse a few weeks from now. Extending the time period obviously creates some risk and some possibility of benefit. Provided a proper monitoring scheme is in effect, what normally should follow an extension is a flowing of proceeds from existing accounts receivables,



new sales and new accounts receivables into the operating costs in an operation where in the immediate future a degree of profitability is projected.

[37] This section of the *Act* contemplates some prejudice to creditors and I am of the view that the prejudice must be of a degree that raises significant concern to a level that it would be unreasonable for a creditor or creditors to accept. Overall, I am satisfied that HHFL has met the requirement of establishing on the balance of probabilities that the granting of an extension will not materially prejudice any of the creditors and in particular BNS.

### CONDITIONS:

[38] During the course of argument I indicated if an extension was granted that BNS at the very least was entitled to have timely full disclosure of the utilization of funds for the continued operation of the company. This could be achieved by requiring HHFL to return to the commitment of having all operating funds passed through its accounts with BNS but it will also require a direction that other than interest entitlement, if not paid, BNS would not be able in the intervening period to encroach upon the trading funds which are absolutely necessary for the continued operation and survival chances of the business. The direction would probably also require any outstanding documentation, possibly requiring HHFL to produce the invoices in the reconciliation it provided for cash withdrawals for cash purchases from Pacmar Norway, etc. There would be a requirement of timely disclosure. There are a number of other possible conditions that come to mind. However, as both counsel indicated if the extension was granted they requested the opportunity to address possible conditions, I readily accede to their offer of assistance. Counsel, if they agree, may take some time to consult with each other and put their views in writing or alternatively address the matter orally and, in any event, I will, as scheduled be available at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon unless both counsel agree on the appropriate terms and conditions of the order of extension.

J.

137.