



COURT FILE NUMBER **2101-00814**

COURT COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA

JUDICIAL CENTRE CALGARY

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES'
CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, RSC 1985, c
C-36, as amended

OT
COM
April 13, 2021
Justice Gill

AND IN THE MATTER OF CALGARY OIL & GAS SYNDICATE GROUP LTD., CALGARY OIL AND GAS INTERCONTINENTAL GROUP LTD. (IN ITS OWN CAPACITY AND IN ITS CAPACITY AS GENERAL PARTNER OF T5 SC OIL AND GAS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP), CALGARY OIL AND SYNDICATE PARTNERS LTD., and PETROWORLD ENERGY LTD.

BENCH BRIEF OF THE APPLICANTS,

CALGARY OIL & GAS SYNDICATE GROUP LTD., CALGARY OIL AND GAS INTERCONTINENTAL GROUP LTD. (IN ITS OWN CAPACITY AND IN ITS CAPACITY AS GENERAL PARTNER OF T5 SC OIL AND GAS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP), CALGARY OIL AND SYNDICATE PARTNERS LTD. and PETROWORLD ENERGY LTD.

**IN SUPPORT OF AN APPLICATION RETURNABLE APRIL 13, 2020 AT 2:00 P.M.
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J.J. GILL**

ADDRESS FOR
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I. INTRODUCTION

1. This Brief of Law is submitted on behalf of the Applicants, Calgary Oil & Gas Syndicate Group Ltd. (“**Syndicate Group**”), Calgary Oil and Gas Intercontinental Group Ltd. (“**Intercontinental**”) (in its own capacity and in its capacity as general partner of T5 SC Oil and Gas Limited Partnership (the “**Partnership**”)), Calgary Oil and Syndicate Partners Ltd. (“**Syndicate Partners**”) and Petroworld Energy Ltd. (“**Petroworld**” and, collectively, the “**Companies**”), in support of an application for a stay extension order (the “**Stay Extension Order**”) and a claims procedure order (the “**Claims Procedure Order**”) appended as Schedules “B” and “C” to the Applicants’ Stay Extension Order and Claims Procedure Order Application.
2. All capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Brief have the meanings ascribed thereto in the Affidavits of Ryan Martin filed in these proceedings.

II. FACTS

3. The facts supporting the relief sought in the within Application are more particularly set out in the Affidavit sworn by Ryan Martin, the Applicants’ corporate representative (the “**Martin Affidavit**”).¹ Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the same meanings as ascribed to them in the Martin Affidavit.

III. ISSUES

4. The Applicants respectfully request that this Honourable Court determine the following issues:
 - (a) Should the claims procedure be approved?
 - (b) Should the requested stay extension be granted?
 - (c) Should the Community Payment to Sunchild First Nation be approved?

¹ Affidavit of Ryan Martin, sworn on April 6, 2021 at para 1 [**Martin Affidavit**].

IV. LAW & ARGUMENT

A. The Extended Stay of Proceedings is Necessary and Appropriate in the Circumstances

5. Section 11.02(2) of the *Companies Creditors' Arrangement Act*, RSC 1985, c C-36 (the “CCAA”) empowers a Court to extend the stay of proceedings granted to a debtor company. In considering whether to grant a stay extension, the Court should consider whether it is appropriate in the circumstances and whether the applicant has been acting in good faith and with due diligence.² These considerations underpin any exercise of the Court’s discretionary authority under the CCAA.³
6. Appropriateness is assessed by examining whether the order sought advances the remedial policy objectives underlying the CCAA designed to mitigate the potentially catastrophic impacts of insolvency. These objectives include: (a) the timely, efficient and impartial resolution of a debtor’s insolvency; (b) preserving and maximizing value of the debtor’s assets for the benefit of its stakeholders; (c) ensuring the fair and equitable treatment of claims against the debtor; and (d) the preservation of jobs and communities affected by the company’s financial distress.⁴
7. The possibility that one or more creditors may be prejudiced as a result of a stay should not affect the court’s exercise of its authority to grant one. The prejudice to one or more stakeholders must be balanced against, and offset by the benefit to all stakeholders impacted by the company facilitating a reorganization. Thus, the Court’s primary concerns under the CCAA are not for one stakeholder, but for the debtor and all of its stakeholders.⁵
8. Since the granting of the Second ARIO, the Companies, with the oversight and assistance of the Monitor, have been working diligently to maintain the stability of their operations, manage their liquidity position, and review potential strategic options and alternatives to address their financial position.⁶ In particular, the Companies have diligently worked to

² *Companies Creditors' Arrangement Act*, RSC 1985, c C-36, s 11.02(3) [TAB 1] [CCAA].

³ 9354-9186 *Québec Inc v Callidus Capital Corp*, 2020 SCC 10 at para 49 [Callidus] [TAB 2].

⁴ *Callidus* at paras 40, 42 and 50 [TAB 2].

⁵ *Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd*, 17 CBR (3d) 24, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 at paras 5-6 [TAB 3].

⁶ Martin Affidavit at para 9.

raise capital, engaging with over 30 parties to explore options for financing.⁷ These efforts have resulted in draft and formalized term sheets, letters of intent and expressions of interest from multiple parties, and have culminated in a firm financing commitment in the form of a Letter of Interest (the “**Spartan LOI**”) from Spartan Delta Corp (“**Spartan**”).⁸

9. The Spartan LOI contemplates a significant injection of funds by way of an equity transaction, and has several aspects which preserve and maximize the value of the debtor’s assets. The Spartan LOI contemplates a transaction that will:
 - (a) preserve existing Indian Oil and Gas Canada (“**IOGC**”) leases with the Companies and allow the Companies to continue to operate their assets, minimizing business disruption;⁹
 - (b) preserve tax losses, providing increased value for all stakeholders;¹⁰
 - (c) offer the highest price with a firm commitment; and¹¹
 - (d) provide increased certainty to creditors.¹²
10. The Companies seek a stay of proceedings up to and including May 25, 2021, which would extend to the Partnership, and their directors and officers. The requested stay extension will allow the Companies time to complete the Spartan LOI and complete, or nearly complete the Claims Process for the benefit of all stakeholders.
11. The Companies have been acting in good faith and with due diligence throughout these CCAA proceedings and submit that the requested stay extension is appropriate in the circumstances.

B. The Claims Procedure Order is Cost-Effective and Provides Creditors with Sufficient Information

12. Section 11 of the CCAA provides the Court with the jurisdiction to make any order it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which includes the ability to approve a process

⁷ Martin Affidavit at para 10.

⁸ Martin Affidavit at para 20.

⁹ Martin Affidavit at para 31.

¹⁰ Martin Affidavit at para 32.

¹¹ Martin Affidavit at para 35.

¹² Martin Affidavit at paras 33, 34.

to solicit and determine claims against the debtor company.¹³ The Court’s authority to approve a process of determining claims against a debtor company is well accepted in Canada and the practice has arisen for the Court to create a flexible and expeditious process.¹⁴

13. The Supreme Court confirmed in *9354-9186 Quebec inc. v Callidus Capital Corp* that section 11 of the CCAA is meant to signal legislative endorsement of the broad reading of CCAA authority developed by the jurisprudence:¹⁵

[68] Where a party seeks an order relating to a matter that falls within the supervising judge’s purview, and for which there is no CCAA provision conferring more specific jurisdiction, s. 11 necessarily is the provision of first resort in anchoring jurisdiction...

[69] Oversight of the plan negotiation, voting and approval process falls squarely within the supervising judge’s purview...

14. The Supreme Court also confirmed the benefits of a “single proceeding model” in *Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] Ltd., Re*:

[22] The single proceeding model avoids the inefficiency and chaos that would attend insolvency if each creditor initiated proceedings to recover its debt. Grouping all possible actions against the debtor into a single proceeding controlled in a single forum facilitates negotiation with creditors because it places them all on an equal footing, rather than exposing them to the risk that a more aggressive creditor will realize its claims against the debtor’s limited assets while the other creditors attempt a compromise.¹⁶

15. The purposes of a claims process are to streamline resolution of claims against the CCAA parties in the most cost effective manner, assist the debtor company in determining the value of the claims against it and allow creditors to make informed decisions as to the alternatives presented to them.¹⁷

¹³ CCAA s 11 [TAB 1].

¹⁴ *ScoZinc Ltd., Re*, 2009 NSSC 136 at paras 23-26 [TAB 4].

¹⁵ *Callidus* at paras 68-69 [TAB 2].

¹⁶ *Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] (Re)*, 2010 SCC 60 at para 22 [TAB 5]

¹⁷ *Canwest Gloval Communications Re*, 2011 ONSC 2215 at para 40 [TAB 6], *Timminco Ltd Re*, 2014 ONSC 3393 at para 43 [TAB 7].

16. Alberta courts have applied a “reverse claims process” in meeting these goals whereby a claims package is issued to each claimant by the Monitor.¹⁸
17. To assist in the closing of the Spartan LOI, the Companies seek to ensure an expeditious and efficient timeline for notice, review and adjudication of their creditors’ claims. To this effect, the Companies will, with the assistance of the Monitor, provide a mechanism for determining the claim of each claimant.¹⁹
18. The Claims Procedure Order, as a “reverse claims process” provides for notice to Creditors and allows Creditors to dispute a Claim,²⁰ and is therefore appropriate in the circumstances and in line with the purpose of having all claims against the debtor company determined in a single, flexible and expeditious manner.
19. The Claims Procedure Order further allows for the closing of the Spartan LOI prior to the projected closing date, and allows the Companies and Spartan sufficient certainty to move forward with their restructuring efforts on a timely basis for the benefit of all stakeholders.²¹
20. The Companies’ Creditors primarily consist of Crown Capital (as the major secured creditor) and trade creditors, as well as creditors arising as a result of ongoing obligations from surface leases, royalties and equipment and office leases.²² Many creditors have begun litigation against the Companies, providing the Companies with an accurate description of their purported claims and the associated quantum.²³ Accordingly, the Companies have a high level of confidence that all of their creditors and contracting counterparties will receive notice of the Claims Procedure.²⁴

¹⁸ *Allarco Entertainment 2008 Inc., Re*, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, File No. 1603 09338, Order Filed Jan 24, 2017, unreported [**TAB 8**].

¹⁹ Martin Affidavit at para 39.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Martin Affidavit at para 38.

²³ Martin Affidavit at para 38.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

C. The Value of the Community Payment to Sunchild First Nation Outweighs any Prejudice to Other Creditors

21. While uncommon, some debtors in CCAA proceedings have brought applications to pay pre-filing debts where exceptional or unusual circumstances warrant a departure from the normal rule.²⁵
22. The Court has broad jurisdiction to permit the payment of pre-filing obligations in a CCAA proceeding.²⁶ In granting authority to pay certain pre-filing obligations, courts have considered:
- (a) whether the goods and services are integral to the debtor's business;
 - (b) the debtor's need for the uninterrupted supply of the goods or services;
 - (c) the fact that no payments will be made without the consent of the monitor;
 - (d) the monitor's support and willingness to work with the debtor to ensure that payments in respect of pre-filing liabilities are appropriate;
 - (e) whether the debtor has sufficient inventory of the goods on hand to meet its needs; and
 - (f) the effect on the debtor's ongoing operations and ability to restructure if it is unable to make pre-filing payments.²⁷
23. In *Clover Leaf Holdings Company, Re*, the Ontario Superior Court held that "it is critical to the operation of their business that the Companies preserve key relationships".²⁸ Though *Clover Leaf* was decided in the context of a traditional "critical supplier", courts have also applied their broad jurisdiction to permit the payment of pre-filing obligations in more holistic ways.

²⁵ *Veris Gold Corp., (Re)*, 2015 BCSC 399 at para 51 [TAB 9].

²⁶ *Clover Leaf Holdings Company, Re*, 2019 ONSC 6966 at para 25 [TAB 10].

²⁷ *Ibid* [TAB 10].

²⁸ *Ibid* at para 26 [TAB 10].

24. In *EarthFirst Canada*, Romaine J. approved the creation of a “hardship fund” to pay pre-filing obligations owed to certain suppliers and contractors of the applicant, based on evidence that suppliers and contractors in a remote community had become dependent upon the applicant’s wind farm project, and if they were not paid, would face immediate financial difficulty. In that case, Earthfirst, a power company, was not suggesting that the recipients of the fund were “critical suppliers” in the usual sense of the term – instead, it noted that the potential future benefit to the company of relatively modest payments of pre-filing debt was considerable and of value to the estate as a whole. Romaine J. therefore found that the probative value of payment of pre-filing obligations outweighed the prejudice to other creditors and justified departure from the “usual rule”.²⁹ The Ontario Superior Court in *The Future Loyalty Group Inc. (Re)*, agreed with this proposition and allowed for the payment of (or actions otherwise honouring) pre-filing obligations.³⁰
25. The Community Payment owing to Sunchild First Nation arose in part prior to the commencement of the within proceedings, as \$213,101.00 owing under the Community Payment accrued up to and until the start these proceedings on February 11, 2021.³¹ The total amount of \$256,552.00 owing under the terms of the Community Payment is relatively modest in comparison to the Companies’ total liabilities of approximately \$42.89 million, including approximately \$27 million of secured debt and approximately \$13.94 million in other accrued liabilities.³² While a substantial part of the Community Payment was payable “in kind” through use of facility usage at the West Edmonton Mall in the past and credited by Sunchild First Nation towards the Community Payment accordingly, this arrangement is impossible in the near future as a result of the COVID-19 Pandemic and the Sunchild First Nation has recently sought payment in cash rather than “in kind”.³³ This change to a cash payment for the Community Payment was not anticipated at the time of the Initial Order. The Companies have enjoyed a positive working relationship with

²⁹ *EarthFirst Canada Inc. (Re)*, 2009 ABQB 78 at para 7 [TAB 11].

³⁰ *The Futura Loyalty Group Inc. (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 6403 at para 15 [TAB 12].

³¹ Martin Affidavit at paras 16-17.

³² Martin Affidavit at para 17; Affidavit of Ryan Martin, sworn February 5, 2021 at para 46.

³³ Martin Affidavit at para 18.

Sunchild First Nation in the past, and the Community Payment is an integral part of this good relationship.³⁴

26. The Companies' relationship with the Sunchild First Nation is analogous to the situation in *Earthfirst*. While Sunchild First Nation may not be a "critical supplier" in the usual sense of the term, the potential future benefit from a continued positive relationship with Sunchild First Nation is great, given the significant assets of the Companies. Given the relatively small amount owing to Sunchild First Nation by way of the Community Payment, the Companies submit that the probative value of continuing the strong partnership with Sunchild First Nation far outweighs any prejudice to other creditors.

V. CONCLUSION

27. Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, the Companies submit that it is necessary and appropriate in the circumstances to grant the requested relief as set forth in the proposed Stay Extension Order and the proposed Claims Procedure Order

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 7TH DAY OF APRIL 2021

BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP



Per: Matti Lemmens / Tiffany Bennett
Solicitors for the Companies, Calgary Oil & Gas Syndicate Group Ltd., Calgary Oil and Gas Intercontinental Group Ltd. ((in its own capacity and in its capacity as general partner of T5 SC Oil and Gas Limited Partnership), Calgary Oil and Syndicate Partners Ltd., and Petroworld Energy Ltd.

³⁴ Martin Affidavit at paras 19, 31.

VI. LIST OF AUTHORITIES AND OTHER ATTACHMENTS

TAB NO.	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
1.	<i>Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act</i> , RSC 1985, c C-36.
2.	9354-9186 <i>Québec Inc v Callidus Capital Corp</i> , 2020 SCC 10
3.	<i>Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd</i> , 17 CBR (3d) 24, 1993 CarswellOnt 183
4.	<i>ScoZinc Ltd., Re</i> , 2009 NSSC 136
5.	<i>Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] (Re)</i> , 2010 SCC 60
6.	<i>Canwest Gloval Communications Re</i> , 2011 ONSC 2215
7.	<i>Timminco Ltd Re</i> . 2014 ONSC 3393
8.	<i>Allarco Entertainment 2008 Inc., Re</i> , Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, File No. 1603 09338, Order Filed Jan 24, 2017, unreported
9.	<i>Veris Gold Corp.,(Re)</i> , 2015 BCSC 399
10.	<i>Clover Leaf Holdings Company, Re</i> , 2019 ONSC 6966
11.	<i>EarthFirst Canada Inc. (Re)</i> , 2009 ABQB 78
12.	<i>The Futura Loyalty Group Inc. (Re)</i> , 2012 ONSC 6403

TAB 1

Canada Federal Statutes
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

Most Recently Cited in: [Ardenton Financial Inc., Re](#), 2021 CarswellOnt 3786, 44 O.S.C.B. 2583 | (Ont. Securities Comm., Mar 15, 2021)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

[Currency](#)

An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as am. R.S.C. 1985, c. 27 (2nd Supp.), ss. 10 (Sched., item 3), 11; S.C. 1990, c. 17, s. 4; 1992, c. 27, s. 90(1)(f); 1993, c. 28, s. 78 (Sched. III, item 20) [Repealed 1999, c. 3, s. 12 (Sched., item 4).]; 1993, c. 34, s. 52; 1996, c. 6, s. 167(1)(d), (2); 1997, c. 12, ss. 120-127; 1998, c. 19, s. 260; 1998, c. 30, s. 14(c); 1999, c. 3, s. 22; 1999, c. 28, s. 154; 2000, c. 30, ss. 156-158; 2001, c. 9, ss. 575-577; 2001, c. 34, s. 33; 2002, c. 7, ss. 133-135; 2004, c. 25, ss. 193-195; 2005, c. 3, ss. 15, 16; 2005, c. 47, ss. 124-131 [ss. 124, 126 amended 2007, c. 36, ss. 105, 106.]; 2007, c. 29, ss. 104-109; 2007, c. 36, ss. 61(1), (2), (3) (Fr.), (4), 62 (Fr.), 63-73, 74(1), (2) (Fr.), 75-82, 112(17), (20), (23) [s. 63 repealed 2007, c. 36, s. 112(15).]; 2009, c. 33, ss. 27-29; 2012, c. 16, s. 82; 2012, c. 31, ss. 419-421; 2015, c. 3, s. 37; 2017, c. 26, s. 14; 2018, c. 10, s. 89; 2018, c. 27, s. 269; 2019, c. 29, ss. 136-140.

Currency

Federal English Statutes reflect amendments current to March 17, 2021

Federal English Regulations are current to Gazette Vol. 155:4 (February 17, 2021)

Canada Federal Statutes
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
Part II — Jurisdiction of Courts (ss. 9-18.5)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11

s 11. General power of court

Currency

11. General power of court

Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

Amendment History

1992, c. 27, s. 90; 1996, c. 6, s. 167(1)(d); 1997, c. 12, s. 124; 2005, c. 47, s. 128

Currency

Federal English Statutes reflect amendments current to March 17, 2021

Federal English Regulations are current to Gazette Vol. 155:4 (February 17, 2021)

Canada Federal Statutes
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
Part II — Jurisdiction of Courts (ss. 9-18.5)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.02

S 11.02

Currency

11.02

11.02(1) Stays, etc. — initial application

A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the court considers necessary, which period may not be more than 10 days,

- (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*;
- (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
- (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

11.02(2) Stays, etc. — other than initial application

A court may, on an application in respect of a debtor company other than an initial application, make an order, on any terms that it may impose,

- (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for any period that the court considers necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in paragraph (1)(a);
- (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
- (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

11.02(3) Burden of proof on application

The court shall not make the order unless

- (a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and
- (b) in the case of an order under subsection (2), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

11.02(4) Restriction

Orders doing anything referred to in subsection (1) or (2) may only be made under this section.

Amendment History

2005, c. 47, s. 128; 2019, c. 29, s. 137

Currency

Federal English Statutes reflect amendments current to March 17, 2021

Federal English Regulations are current to Gazette Vol. 155:4 (February 17, 2021)

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TAB 2

2020 SCC 10, 2020 CSC 10
Supreme Court of Canada

9354-9186 Québec inc. v. Callidus Capital Corp.

2020 CarswellQue 3772, 2020 CarswellQue 3773, 2020 SCC 10, 2020 CSC 10,
1 B.L.R. (6th) 1, 317 A.C.W.S. (3d) 532, 444 D.L.R. (4th) 373, 78 C.B.R. (6th) 1

**9354-9186 Québec inc. and 9354-9178 Québec inc. (Appellants) and
Callidus Capital Corporation, International Game Technology, Deloitte
LLP, Luc Carignan, François Vigneault, Philippe Millette, Francis
Proulx and François Pelletier (Respondents) and Ernst & Young Inc.,
IMF Bentham Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Limited),
Bentham IMF Capital Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Capital
(Canada) Limited), Insolvency Institute of Canada and Canadian
Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals (Intervenors)**

IMF Bentham Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Limited) and Bentham IMF Capital Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Capital (Canada) Limited (Appellants) and Callidus Capital Corporation, International Game Technology, Deloitte LLP, Luc Carignan, François Vigneault, Philippe Millette, Francis Proulx and François Pelletier (Respondents) and Ernst & Young Inc., 9354-9186 Québec inc., 9354-9178 Québec inc., Insolvency Institute of Canada and Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals (Intervenors)

Wagner C.J.C., Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Kasirer JJ.

Heard: January 23, 2020

Judgment: May 8, 2020

Docket: 38594

Proceedings: reasons in full to *9354-9186 Québec inc. v. Callidus Capital Corp.* (2020), 2020 CarswellQue 237, 2020 CarswellQue 236, Abella J., Côté J., Karakatsanis J., Kasirer J., Moldaver J., Rowe J., Wagner C.J.C. (S.C.C.); reversing *Arrangement relatif à 9354-9186 Québec inc. (Bluberi Gaming Technologies Inc.)* (2019), 2019 QCCA 171, EYB 2019-306890, 2019 CarswellQue 94, Dumas J.C.A. (ad hoc), Dutil J.C.A., Schrager J.C.A. (C.A. Que.)

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Neil A. Peden, for Appellants / Intervenors IMF Bentham Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Limited) and Bentham IMF Capital Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Capital (Canada) Limited)

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Joseph Reynaud, Nathalie Nouvet, for Intervener, Ernst & Young Inc.

Sylvain Rigaud, Arad Mojtahedi, Saam Pousht-Mashhad, for Intervenors, Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.3 Arrangements](#)

XIX.3.e Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Miscellaneous

Debtor sought protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Debtor brought application seeking authorization of funding agreement and requested placement of super-priority charge in favour of lender — After its first plan of arrangement was rejected, secured creditor submitted second plan and sought authorization to vote on it — Supervising judge dismissed secured creditor's application, holding that secured creditor was acting with improper purpose — After reviewing terms of proposed financing, supervising judge found it met criteria set out by courts — Finally, supervising judge imposed super-priority charge on debtor's assets in favour of lender — Secured creditor appealed supervising judge's order — Court of Appeal allowed appeal, finding that exercise of judge's discretion was not founded in law nor on proper treatment of facts — Debtor and lender, supported by monitor, appealed to Supreme Court of Canada — Appeal allowed — By seeking authorization to vote on second version of its own plan, secured creditor was attempting to circumvent creditor democracy CCAA protects — By doing so, secured creditor acted contrary to expectation that parties act with due diligence in insolvency proceeding and was properly barred from voting on second plan — Supervising judge considered proposed financing to be fair and reasonable and correctly determined that it was not plan of arrangement — Therefore, supervising judge's order should be reinstated.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Arrangements — Divers

Débitrice s'est placée sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC) — Débitrice a déposé une requête visant à obtenir l'autorisation de conclure un accord de financement et a demandé l'autorisation de grever son actif d'une charge super-prioritaire en faveur du prêteur — Après que son premier plan d'arrangement ait été rejeté, la créancière garantie a soumis un deuxième plan et a demandé l'autorisation de voter sur ce plan — Juge surveillant a rejeté la demande de la créancière garantie, estimant que la créancière garantie agissait dans un but illégitime — Après en avoir examiné les modalités, le juge surveillant a conclu que le financement proposé respectait le critère établi par les tribunaux — Enfin, le juge surveillant a ordonné que les actifs de la débitrice soient grevés d'une charge super-prioritaire en faveur du prêteur — Créancière garantie a interjeté appel de l'ordonnance du juge surveillant — Cour d'appel a accueilli l'appel, estimant que l'exercice par le juge de son pouvoir discrétionnaire n'était pas fondé en droit, non plus qu'il ne reposât sur un traitement approprié des faits — Débitrice et le prêteur, appuyés par le contrôleur, ont formé un pourvoi devant la Cour suprême du Canada — Pourvoi accueilli — En cherchant à obtenir l'autorisation de voter sur la deuxième version de son propre plan, la créancière garantie tentait de contourner la démocratie entre les créanciers que défend la LACC — Ce faisant, la créancière garantie agissait manifestement à l'encontre de l'attente selon laquelle les parties agissent avec diligence dans les procédures d'insolvabilité et a été à juste titre empêchée de voter sur le nouveau plan — Juge surveillant a estimé que le financement proposé était juste et raisonnable et a eu raison de conclure que le financement ne constituait pas un plan d'arrangement — Par conséquent, l'ordonnance du juge surveillant devrait être rétablie.

The debtor manufactured, distributed, installed, and serviced electronic casino gaming machines. The debtor sought financing from a secured creditor, the debt being secured in part by a share pledge agreement. Over the following years, the debtor lost significant amounts of money, and the secured creditor continued to extend credit. Eventually, the debtor sought protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA). In its petition, the debtor alleged that its liquidity issues were the result of the secured creditor taking de facto control of the corporation and dictating a number of purposefully detrimental business decisions in order to deplete the corporation's equity value with a view to owning the debtor's business and, ultimately, selling it. The debtor's petition succeeded, and an initial order was issued. The debtor then entered into an asset purchase agreement with the secured creditor whereby the secured creditor would obtain all of the debtor's assets in exchange for extinguishing almost the entirety of its secured claim against the debtor. The agreement would also permit the debtor to retain claims for damages against the creditor arising from its alleged involvement in the debtor's financial difficulties. The asset purchase agreement was approved by the supervising judge. The debtor brought an application seeking authorization of a proposed third-party litigation funding agreement (LFA) and the placement of a super-priority charge in favour of the lender. The secured creditor submitted a plan of arrangement along with an application seeking the authorization to vote with the unsecured creditors.

The supervising judge dismissed the secured creditor's application, holding that the secured creditor should not be allowed to vote on its own plan because it was acting with an improper purpose. He noted that the secured creditor's first plan had been rejected and this attempt to vote on the new plan was an attempt to override the result of the first vote. Under the circumstances, given that the secured creditor's conduct was contrary to the requirements of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence,

allowing the secured creditor to vote would be both unfair and unreasonable. Since the new plan had no reasonable prospect of success, the supervising judge declined to submit it to a creditors' vote. The supervising judge determined that the LFA did not need to be submitted to a creditors' vote because it was not a plan of arrangement. After reviewing the terms of the LFA, the supervising judge found it met the criteria for approval of third-party litigation funding set out by the courts. Finally, the supervising judge imposed the litigation financing charge on the debtor's assets in favour of the lender. The secured creditor appealed the supervising judge's order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the exercise of the judge's discretion was not founded in law nor on a proper treatment of the facts so that irrespective of the standard of review applied, appellate intervention was justified. In particular, the Court of Appeal identified two errors. First, the Court of Appeal was of the view that the supervising judge erred in finding that the secured creditor had an improper purpose in seeking to vote on its plan. The Court of Appeal relied heavily on the notion that creditors have a right to vote in their own self-interest. Second, the Court of Appeal concluded that the supervising judge erred in approving the LFA as interim financing because, in its view, the LFA was not connected to the debtor's commercial operations. In light of this perceived error, the Court of Appeal substituted its view that the LFA was a plan of arrangement and, as a result, should have been submitted to a creditors' vote. The debtor and the lender, supported by the monitor, appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Held: The appeal was allowed.

Per Wagner C.J.C., Moldaver J. (Abella, Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Kasirer JJ. concurring): Section 11 of the CCAA empowers a judge to make any order that the judge considers appropriate in the circumstances. A high degree of deference is owed to discretionary decisions made by judges supervising CCAA proceedings. As such, appellate intervention will only be justified if the supervising judge erred in principle or exercised their discretion unreasonably. This deferential standard of review accounts for the fact that supervising judges are steeped in the intricacies of the CCAA proceedings they oversee.

A creditor can generally vote on a plan of arrangement or compromise that affects its rights, subject to any specific provisions of the CCAA that may restrict its voting rights, or a proper exercise of discretion by the supervising judge to constrain or bar the creditor's right to vote. One such constraint arises from s. 11 of the CCAA, which provides supervising judges with the discretion to bar a creditor from voting where the creditor is acting for an improper purpose. For example, a creditor acts for an improper purpose where the creditor is seeking to exercise its voting rights in a manner that frustrates, undermines, or runs counter to the objectives of the CCAA. Supervising judges are best placed to determine whether the power to bar a creditor from voting should be exercised. Here, the supervising judge made no error in exercising his discretion to bar the secured creditor from voting on its plan. The supervising judge was intimately familiar with the debtor's CCAA proceedings and noted that, by seeking an authorization to vote on a second version of its own plan, the first one having been rejected, the secured creditor was attempting to strategically value its security to acquire control over the outcome of the vote and thereby circumvent the creditor democracy the CCAA protects. By doing so, the secured creditor acted contrary to the expectation that parties act with due diligence in an insolvency proceeding. Hence, the secured creditor was properly barred from voting on the second plan.

Interim financing is a flexible tool that may take on a range of forms, and third-party litigation funding may be one such form. Ultimately, whether proposed interim financing should be approved is a question that the supervising judge is best placed to answer. Here, there was no basis upon which to interfere with the supervising judge's exercise of his discretion to approve the LFA as interim financing. The supervising judge considered the LFA to be fair and reasonable, drawing guidance from the principles relevant to approving similar agreements in the class action context. While the supervising judge did not canvass each of the factors set out in s. 11.2(4) of the CCAA individually before reaching his conclusion, this was not itself an error. It was apparent that the supervising judge was focused on the fairness at stake to all parties, the specific objectives of the CCAA, and the particular circumstances of this case when he approved the LFA as interim financing. The supervising judge correctly determined that the LFA was not a plan of arrangement because it did not propose any compromise of the creditors' rights. The super-priority charge he granted to the lender did not convert the LFA into a plan of arrangement by subordinating creditors' rights. Therefore, he did not err in the exercise of his discretion, no intervention was justified and the supervising judge's order should be reinstated.

La débitrice fabriquait, distribuait, installait et entretenait des appareils de jeux électroniques pour casino. La débitrice a demandé du financement à la créancière garantie que la débitrice a garanti partiellement en signant une entente par laquelle elle mettait en gage ses actions. Au cours des années suivantes, la débitrice a perdu d'importantes sommes d'argent et la créancière garantie a continué de lui consentir du crédit. Finalement, la débitrice s'est placée sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les

créanciers des compagnies (LACC). Dans sa requête, la débitrice a fait valoir que ses problèmes de liquidité découlaient du fait que la créancière garantie exerçait un contrôle de facto à l'égard de son entreprise et lui dictait un certain nombre de décisions d'affaires dans l'intention de lui nuire et de réduire la valeur de ses actions dans le but de devenir propriétaire de l'entreprise de la débitrice et ultimement de la vendre. La requête de la débitrice a été accordée et une ordonnance initiale a été émise. La débitrice a alors signé une convention d'achat d'actifs avec la créancière garantie en vertu de laquelle la créancière garantie obtiendrait l'ensemble des actifs de la débitrice en échange de l'extinction de la presque totalité de la créance garantie qu'elle détenait à l'encontre de la débitrice. Cette convention prévoyait également que la débitrice se réservait le droit de réclamer des dommages-intérêts à la créancière garantie en raison de l'implication alléguée de celle-ci dans ses difficultés financières. Le juge surveillant a approuvé la convention d'achat d'actifs. La débitrice a déposé une requête visant à obtenir l'autorisation de conclure un accord de financement du litige par un tiers (AFL) et l'autorisation de grever son actif d'une charge super-prioritaire en faveur du prêteur. La créancière garantie a soumis un plan d'arrangement et une requête visant à obtenir l'autorisation de voter avec les créanciers chirographaires.

Le juge surveillant a rejeté la demande de la créancière garantie, estimant que la créancière garantie ne devrait pas être autorisée à voter sur son propre plan puisqu'elle agissait dans un but illégitime. Il a fait remarquer que le premier plan de la créancière garantie avait été rejeté et que cette tentative de voter sur le nouveau plan était une tentative de contourner le résultat du premier vote. Dans les circonstances, étant donné que la conduite de la créancière garantie était contraire à l'opportunité, à la bonne foi et à la diligence requises, lui permettre de voter serait à la fois injuste et déraisonnable. Comme le nouveau plan n'avait aucune possibilité raisonnable de recevoir l'aval des créanciers, le juge surveillant a refusé de le soumettre au vote des créanciers. Le juge surveillant a décidé qu'il n'était pas nécessaire de soumettre l'AFL au vote des créanciers parce qu'il ne s'agissait pas d'un plan d'arrangement. Après en avoir examiné les modalités, le juge surveillant a conclu que l'AFL respectait le critère d'approbation applicable en matière de financement d'un litige par un tiers établi par les tribunaux. Enfin, le juge surveillant a ordonné que les actifs de la débitrice soient grevés de la charge liée au financement du litige en faveur du prêteur. La créancière garantie a interjeté appel de l'ordonnance du juge surveillant.

La Cour d'appel a accueilli l'appel, estimant que l'exercice par le juge de son pouvoir discrétionnaire n'était pas fondé en droit, non plus qu'il ne reposât sur un traitement approprié des faits, de sorte que, peu importe la norme de contrôle appliquée, il était justifié d'intervenir en appel. En particulier, la Cour d'appel a relevé deux erreurs. D'une part, la Cour d'appel a conclu que le juge surveillant a commis une erreur en concluant que la créancière garantie a agi dans un but illégitime en demandant l'autorisation de voter sur son plan. La Cour d'appel s'appuyait grandement sur l'idée que les créanciers ont le droit de voter en fonction de leur propre intérêt. D'autre part, la Cour d'appel a conclu que le juge surveillant a eu tort d'approuver l'AFL en tant qu'accord de financement provisoire parce qu'à son avis, il n'était pas lié aux opérations commerciales de la débitrice. À la lumière de ce qu'elle percevait comme une erreur, la Cour d'appel a substitué son opinion selon laquelle l'AFL était un plan d'arrangement et que pour cette raison, il aurait dû être soumis au vote des créanciers. La débitrice et le prêteur, appuyés par le contrôleur, ont formé un pourvoi devant la Cour suprême du Canada.

Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été accueilli.

Wagner, J.C.C., Moldaver, J. (Abella, Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Kasirer, JJ., souscrivant à leur opinion) : L'article 11 de la LACC confère au juge le pouvoir de rendre toute ordonnance qu'il estime indiquée dans les circonstances. Les décisions discrétionnaires des juges chargés de la supervision des procédures intentées sous le régime de la LACC commandent un degré élevé de déférence. Ainsi, les cours d'appel ne seront justifiées d'intervenir que si le juge surveillant a commis une erreur de principe ou exercé son pouvoir discrétionnaire de manière déraisonnable. Cette norme déférente de contrôle tient compte du fait que le juge surveillant possède une connaissance intime des procédures intentées sous le régime de la LACC dont il assure la supervision.

En général, un créancier peut voter sur un plan d'arrangement ou une transaction qui a une incidence sur ses droits, sous réserve des dispositions de la LACC qui peuvent limiter son droit de voter, ou de l'exercice justifié par le juge surveillant de son pouvoir discrétionnaire de limiter ou de supprimer ce droit. Une telle limite découle de l'art. 11 de la LACC, qui confère au juge surveillant le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'empêcher le créancier de voter lorsqu'il agit dans un but illégitime. Par exemple, un créancier agit dans un but illégitime lorsque le créancier cherche à exercer ses droits de vote de manière à contrecarrer, à miner les objectifs de la LACC ou à aller à l'encontre de ceux-ci. Le juge surveillant est mieux placé que quiconque pour déterminer s'il doit exercer le pouvoir d'empêcher le créancier de voter. En l'espèce, le juge surveillant n'a commis aucune erreur en exerçant son pouvoir discrétionnaire pour empêcher la créancière garantie de voter sur son plan. Le juge surveillant

connaissait très bien les procédures fondées sur la LACC relatives à la débitrice et a fait remarquer que, en cherchant à obtenir l'autorisation de voter sur la deuxième version de son propre plan, la première ayant été rejetée, la créancière garantie tentait d'évaluer stratégiquement la valeur de sa sûreté afin de prendre le contrôle du vote et ainsi contourner la démocratie entre les créanciers que défend la LACC. Ce faisant, la créancière garantie agissait manifestement à l'encontre de l'attente selon laquelle les parties agissent avec diligence dans les procédures d'insolvabilité. Ainsi, la créancière garantie a été à juste titre empêchée de voter sur le nouveau plan.

Le financement temporaire est un outil souple qui peut revêtir différentes formes, et le financement d'un litige par un tiers peut constituer l'une de ces formes. Au bout du compte, la question de savoir s'il y a lieu d'approuver le financement temporaire projeté est une question à laquelle le juge surveillant est le mieux placé pour répondre. En l'espèce, il n'y avait aucune raison d'intervenir dans l'exercice par le juge surveillant de son pouvoir discrétionnaire d'approuver l'AFL à titre de financement temporaire. Se fondant sur les principes applicables à l'approbation d'accords semblables dans le contexte des recours collectifs, le juge surveillant a estimé que l'AFL était juste et raisonnable. Bien que le juge surveillant n'ait pas examiné à fond chacun des facteurs énoncés à l'art. 11.2(4) de la LACC de façon individuelle avant de tirer sa conclusion, cela ne constituait pas une erreur en soi. Il était manifeste que le juge surveillant a mis l'accent sur l'équité envers toutes les parties, les objectifs précis de la LACC et les circonstances particulières de la présente affaire lorsqu'il a approuvé l'AFL à titre de financement temporaire. Le juge surveillant a eu raison de conclure que l'AFL ne constituait pas un plan d'arrangement puisqu'il ne proposait aucune transaction visant les droits des créanciers. La charge super-prioritaire qu'il a accordée au prêteur ne convertissait pas l'AFL en plan d'arrangement en subordonnant les droits des créanciers. Par conséquent, il n'a pas commis d'erreur dans l'exercice de sa discrétion, aucune intervention n'était justifiée et l'ordonnance du juge surveillant devrait être rétablie.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Wagner C.J.C., Moldaver J.*:

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board) (2006), 2006 SCC 4, 2006 CarswellAlta 139, 2006 CarswellAlta 140, 344 N.R. 293, 54 Alta. L.R. (4th) 1, [2006] 5 W.W.R. 1, 263 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 39 Admin. L.R. (4th) 159, 380 A.R. 1, 363 W.A.C. 1, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Arrangement relatif à 9354-9186 Québec inc. (Bluberi Gaming Technologies Inc.) (2018), 2018 QCCS 1040, 2018 CarswellQue 1923 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

BA Energy Inc., Re (2010), 2010 ABQB 507, 2010 CarswellAlta 1598, 70 C.B.R. (5th) 24 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Blackburn Developments Ltd., Re (2011), 2011 BCSC 1671, 2011 CarswellBC 3291, 27 B.C.L.R. (5th) 199 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Boutiques San Francisco inc., Re (2003), 2003 CarswellQue 13882 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Bridging Finance Inc. v. Béton Brunet 2001 inc. (2017), 2017 CarswellQue 328, 2017 QCCA 138, 44 C.B.R. (6th) 175 (C.A. Que.) — referred to

Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. R. (2005), 2005 SCC 54, 2005 CarswellNat 3212, 2005 CarswellNat 3213, (sub nom. *Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada*) 2005 D.T.C. 5523 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Hypothèques Trustco Canada v. Canada*) 2005 D.T.C. 5547 (Fr.), [2005] 5 C.T.C. 215, (sub nom. *Minister of National Revenue v. Canada Trustco Mortgage Co.*) 340 N.R. 1, 259 D.L.R. (4th) 193, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. 360networks Corp. (2007), 2007 BCCA 14, 2007 CarswellBC 29, 28 E.T.R. (3d) 186, 27 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 61 B.C.L.R. (4th) 334, 10 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 311, 235 B.C.A.C. 95, 388 W.A.C. 95, 279 D.L.R. (4th) 701 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp. (2008), 2008 BCCA 327, 2008 CarswellBC 1758, 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7, [2008] 10 W.W.R. 575, 83 B.C.L.R. (4th) 214, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 258 B.C.A.C. 187, 434 W.A.C. 187 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

33 First, the court was of the view that the supervising judge erred in finding that Callidus had an improper purpose in seeking to vote on its New Plan. In its view, Callidus should have been permitted to vote. The court relied heavily on the notion that creditors have a right to vote in their own self-interest. It held that any judicial discretion to preclude voting due to improper purpose should be reserved for the "clearest of cases" (para. 62, referring to *Blackburn Developments Ltd., Re*, 2011 BCSC 1671, 27 B.C.L.R. (5th) 199 (B.C. S.C.), at para. 45). The court was of the view that Callidus's transparent attempt to obtain a release from Bluberi's claims against it did not amount to an improper purpose. The court also considered Callidus's conduct prior to and during the CCAA proceedings to be incapable of justifying a finding of improper purpose.

34 Second, the court concluded that the supervising judge erred in approving the LFA as interim financing because, in its view, the LFA was not connected to Bluberi's commercial operations. The court concluded that the supervising judge had both "misconstrued in law the notion of interim financing and misapplied that notion to the factual circumstances of the case" (para. 78).

35 In light of this perceived error, the court substituted its view that the LFA was a plan of arrangement and, as a result, should have been submitted to a creditors' vote. It held that "[a]n arrangement or proposal can encompass both a compromise of creditors' claims as well as the process undertaken to satisfy them" (para. 85). The court considered the LFA to be a plan of arrangement because it affected the creditors' share in any eventual litigation proceeds, would cause them to wait for the outcome of any litigation, and could potentially leave them with nothing at all. Moreover, the court held that Bluberi's scheme "as a whole", being the prosecution of the Retained Claims and the LFA, should be submitted as a plan to the creditors for their approval (para. 89).

36 Bluberi and Bentham (collectively, "appellants"), again supported by the Monitor, now appeal to this Court.

IV. Issues

37 These appeals raise two issues:

(1) Did the supervising judge err in barring Callidus from voting on its New Plan on the basis that it was acting for an improper purpose?

(2) Did the supervising judge err in approving the LFA as interim financing, pursuant to s. 11.2 of the CCAA?

V. Analysis

A. Preliminary Considerations

38 Addressing the above issues requires situating them within the contemporary Canadian insolvency landscape and, more specifically, the CCAA regime. Accordingly, before turning to those issues, we review (1) the evolving nature of CCAA proceedings; (2) the role of the supervising judge in those proceedings; and (3) the proper scope of appellate review of a supervising judge's exercise of discretion.

(1) The Evolving Nature of CCAA Proceedings

39 The CCAA is one of three principal insolvency statutes in Canada. The others are the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA"), which covers insolvencies of both individuals and companies, and the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11 ("WURA"), which covers insolvencies of financial institutions and certain other corporations, such as insurance companies (WURA, s. 6(1)). While both the CCAA and the BIA enable reorganizations of insolvent companies, access to the CCAA is restricted to debtor companies facing total claims in excess of \$5 million (CCAA, s. 3(1)).

40 Together, Canada's insolvency statutes pursue an array of overarching remedial objectives that reflect the wide ranging and potentially "catastrophic" impacts insolvency can have (*Indalex Ltd., Re*, 2013 SCC 6, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271 (S.C.C.), at para. 1). These objectives include: providing for timely, efficient and impartial resolution of a debtor's insolvency; preserving

and maximizing the value of a debtor's assets; ensuring fair and equitable treatment of the claims against a debtor; protecting the public interest; and, in the context of a commercial insolvency, balancing the costs and benefits of restructuring or liquidating the company (J. P. Sarra, "The Oscillating Pendulum: Canada's Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium for Insolvency Law", in J. P. Sarra and B. Romaine, eds., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2016* (2017), 9, at pp. 9-10; J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* 2nd ed. (2013), at pp. 4-5 and 14; Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, *Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2003), at pp. 9-10; R. J. Wood, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law* (2nd ed. 2015), at pp. 4-5).

41 Among these objectives, the CCAA generally prioritizes "avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company" (*Century Services*, at para. 70). As a result, the typical CCAA case has historically involved an attempt to facilitate the reorganization and survival of the pre-filing debtor company in an operational state — that is, as a going concern. Where such a reorganization was not possible, the alternative course of action was seen as a liquidation through either a receivership or under the BIA regime. This is precisely the outcome that was sought in *Century Services* (see para. 14).

42 That said, the CCAA is fundamentally insolvency legislation, and thus it also "has the simultaneous objectives of maximizing creditor recovery, preservation of going-concern value where possible, preservation of jobs and communities affected by the firm's financial distress ... and enhancement of the credit system generally" (Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at p. 14; see also *Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Limited*, 2017 ONCA 1014, 139 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 103). In pursuit of those objectives, CCAA proceedings have evolved to permit outcomes that do not result in the emergence of the pre-filing debtor company in a restructured state, but rather involve some form of liquidation of the debtor's assets under the auspices of the Act itself (Sarra, "The Oscillating Pendulum: Canada's Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium for Insolvency Law", at pp. 19-21). Such scenarios are referred to as "liquidating CCAAs", and they are now commonplace in the CCAA landscape (see *Third Eye Capital Corporation v. Ressources Dianor Inc./Dianor Resources Inc.*, 2019 ONCA 508, 435 D.L.R. (4th) 416 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 70).

43 Liquidating CCAAs take diverse forms and may involve, among other things: the sale of the debtor company as a going concern; an "en bloc" sale of assets that are capable of being operationalized by a buyer; a partial liquidation or downsizing of business operations; or a piecemeal sale of assets (B. Kaplan, "Liquidating CCAAs: Discretion Gone Awry?", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law* (2008), 79, at pp. 87-89). The ultimate commercial outcomes facilitated by liquidating CCAAs are similarly diverse. Some may result in the continued operation of the business of the debtor under a different going concern entity (e.g., the liquidations in *Indalex* and *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge*, *Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), while others may result in a sale of assets and inventory with no such entity emerging (e.g., the proceedings in *Target Canada Co., Re*, 2015 ONSC 303, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 7 and 31). Others still, like the case at bar, may involve a going concern sale of most of the assets of the debtor, leaving residual assets to be dealt with by the debtor and its stakeholders.

44 CCAA courts first began approving these forms of liquidation pursuant to the broad discretion conferred by the Act. The emergence of this practice was not without criticism, largely on the basis that it appeared to be inconsistent with the CCAA being a "restructuring statute" (see, e.g., *Royal Bank v. Fracmaster Ltd.*, 1999 ABCA 178, 244 A.R. 93 (Alta. C.A.), at paras. 15-16, aff'd 1999 ABQB 379, 11 C.B.R. (4th) 204 (Alta. Q.B.), at paras. 40-43; A. Nocilla, "The History of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Future of Re-Structuring Law in Canada" (2014), 56 *Can. Bus. L.J.* 73, at pp. 88-92).

45 However, since s. 36 of the CCAA came into force in 2009, courts have been using it to effect liquidating CCAAs. Section 36 empowers courts to authorize the sale or disposition of a debtor company's assets outside the ordinary course of business.³ Significantly, when the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce recommended the adoption of s. 36, it observed that liquidation is not necessarily inconsistent with the remedial objectives of the CCAA, and that it may be a means to "raise capital [to facilitate a restructuring], eliminate further loss for creditors or focus on the solvent operations of the business" (p. 147). Other commentators have observed that liquidation can be a "vehicle to restructure a business" by allowing the business to survive, albeit under a different corporate form or ownership (Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at p. 169; see also K. P. McElcheran, *Commercial Insolvency in Canada* (4th ed. 2019), at p. 311). Indeed,

in *Indalex*, the company sold its assets under the *CCAA* in order to preserve the jobs of its employees, despite being unable to survive as their employer (see para. 51).

46 Ultimately, the relative weight that the different objectives of the *CCAA* take on in a particular case may vary based on the factual circumstances, the stage of the proceedings, or the proposed solutions that are presented to the court for approval. Here, a parallel may be drawn with the *BIA* context. In *Orphan Well Association v. Grant Thornton Ltd.*, 2019 SCC 5, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 150 (S.C.C.), at para. 67, this Court explained that, as a general matter, the *BIA* serves two purposes: (1) the bankrupt's financial rehabilitation and (2) the equitable distribution of the bankrupt's assets among creditors. However, in circumstances where a debtor corporation will never emerge from bankruptcy, only the latter purpose is relevant (see para. 67). Similarly, under the *CCAA*, when a reorganization of the pre-filing debtor company is not a possibility, a liquidation that preserves going-concern value and the ongoing business operations of the pre-filing company may become the predominant remedial focus. Moreover, where a reorganization or liquidation is complete and the court is dealing with residual assets, the objective of maximizing creditor recovery from those assets may take centre stage. As we will explain, the architecture of the *CCAA* leaves the case-specific assessment and balancing of these remedial objectives to the supervising judge.

(2) The Role of a Supervising Judge in CCAA Proceedings

47 One of the principal means through which the *CCAA* achieves its objectives is by carving out a unique supervisory role for judges (see Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at pp. 18-19). From beginning to end, each *CCAA* proceeding is overseen by a single supervising judge. The supervising judge acquires extensive knowledge and insight into the stakeholder dynamics and the business realities of the proceedings from their ongoing dealings with the parties.

48 The *CCAA* capitalizes on this positional advantage by supplying supervising judges with broad discretion to make a variety of orders that respond to the circumstances of each case and "meet contemporary business and social needs" (*Century Services*, at para. 58) in "real-time" (para. 58, citing R. B. Jones, "The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring: Challenges for the Rule of Law", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005* (2006), 481, at p. 484). The anchor of this discretionary authority is s. 11, which empowers a judge "to make any order that [the judge] considers appropriate in the circumstances". This section has been described as "the engine" driving the statutory scheme (*Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 253 D.L.R. (4th) 109 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 36).

49 The discretionary authority conferred by the *CCAA*, while broad in nature, is not boundless. This authority must be exercised in furtherance of the remedial objectives of the *CCAA*, which we have explained above (see *Century Services*, at para. 59). Additionally, the court must keep in mind three "baseline considerations" (at para. 70), which the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating: (1) that the order sought is appropriate in the circumstances, and (2) that the applicant has been acting in good faith and (3) with due diligence (para. 69).

50 The first two considerations of appropriateness and good faith are widely understood in the *CCAA* context. Appropriateness "is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*" (para. 70). Further, the well-established requirement that parties must act in good faith in insolvency proceedings has recently been made express in s. 18.6 of the *CCAA*, which provides:

Good faith

18.6 (1) Any interested person in any proceedings under this Act shall act in good faith with respect to those proceedings.

Good faith — powers of court

(2) If the court is satisfied that an interested person fails to act in good faith, on application by an interested person, the court may make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

(See also *BIA*, s. 4.2; *Budget Implementation Act, 2019, No. 1*, S.C. 2019, c. 29, ss. 133 and 140.)

51 The third consideration of due diligence requires some elaboration. Consistent with the *CCAA* regime generally, the due diligence consideration discourages parties from sitting on their rights and ensures that creditors do not strategically manoeuvre or position themselves to gain an advantage (*Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at p. 31). The procedures set out in the *CCAA* rely on negotiations and compromise between the debtor and its stakeholders, as overseen by the supervising judge and the monitor. This necessarily requires that, to the extent possible, those involved in the proceedings be on equal footing and have a clear understanding of their respective rights (see McElcheran, at p. 262). A party's failure to participate in *CCAA* proceedings in a diligent and timely fashion can undermine these procedures and, more generally, the effective functioning of the *CCAA* regime (see, e.g., *North American Tungsten Corp. v. Global Tungsten and Powders Corp.*, 2015 BCCA 390, 377 B.C.A.C. 6 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 21-23; *BA Energy Inc., Re*, 2010 ABQB 507, 70 C.B.R. (5th) 24 (Alta. Q.B.); *HSBC Bank Canada v. Bear Mountain Master Partnership*, 2010 BCSC 1563, 72 C.B.R. (4th) 276 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]), at para. 11; *Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. 360networks Corp.*, 2007 BCCA 14, 279 D.L.R. (4th) 701 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 51-52, in which the courts seized on a party's failure to act diligently).

52 We pause to note that supervising judges are assisted in their oversight role by a court appointed monitor whose qualifications and duties are set out in the *CCAA* (see ss. 11.7, 11.8 and 23 to 25). The monitor is an independent and impartial expert, acting as "the eyes and the ears of the court" throughout the proceedings (*Essar*, at para. 109). The core of the monitor's role includes providing an advisory opinion to the court as to the fairness of any proposed plan of arrangement and on orders sought by parties, including the sale of assets and requests for interim financing (see *CCAA*, s. 23(1)(d) and (i); Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at pp-566 and 569).

(3) Appellate Review of Exercises of Discretion by a Supervising Judge

53 A high degree of deference is owed to discretionary decisions made by judges supervising *CCAA* proceedings. As such, appellate intervention will only be justified if the supervising judge erred in principle or exercised their discretion unreasonably (see *Grant Forest Products Inc. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank*, 2015 ONCA 570, 387 D.L.R. (4th) 426 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 98; *Bridging Finance Inc. v. Béton Brunet 2001 inc.*, 2017 QCCA 138, 44 C.B.R. (6th) 175 (C.A. Que.), at para. 23). Appellate courts must be careful not to substitute their own discretion in place of the supervising judge's (*New Skeena Forest Products Inc., Re*, 2005 BCCA 192, 39 B.C.L.R. (4th) 338 (B.C. C.A.), at para. 20).

54 This deferential standard of review accounts for the fact that supervising judges are steeped in the intricacies of the *CCAA* proceedings they oversee. In this respect, the comments of Tysoe J.A. in *Edgewater Casino Inc., Re*, 2009 BCCA 40, 305 D.L.R. (4th) 339 (B.C. C.A.) ("*Re Edgewater Casino Inc.*"), at para. 20, are apt:

... one of the principal functions of the judge supervising the *CCAA* proceeding is to attempt to balance the interests of the various stakeholders during the reorganization process, and it will often be inappropriate to consider an exercise of discretion by the supervising judge in isolation of other exercises of discretion by the judge in endeavoring to balance the various interests. ... *CCAA* proceedings are dynamic in nature and the supervising judge has intimate knowledge of the reorganization process. The nature of the proceedings often requires the supervising judge to make quick decisions in complicated circumstances.

55 With the foregoing in mind, we turn to the issues on appeal.

B. Callidus Should Not Be Permitted to Vote on Its New Plan

56 A creditor can generally vote on a plan of arrangement or compromise that affects its rights, subject to any specific provisions of the *CCAA* that may restrict its voting rights (e.g., s. 22(3)), or a proper exercise of discretion by the supervising judge to constrain or bar the creditor's right to vote. We conclude that one such constraint arises from s. 11 of the *CCAA*, which provides supervising judges with the discretion to bar a creditor from voting where the creditor is acting for an improper purpose. Supervising judges are best-placed to determine whether this discretion should be exercised in a particular case. In our view, the supervising judge here made no error in exercising his discretion to bar Callidus from voting on the New Plan.

(1) Parameters of Creditors' Right to Vote on Plans of Arrangement

57 Creditor approval of any plan of arrangement or compromise is a key feature of the *CCAA*, as is the supervising judge's oversight of that process. Where a plan is proposed, an application may be made to the supervising judge to order a creditors' meeting to vote on the proposed plan (*CCAA*, ss. 4 and 5). The supervising judge has the discretion to determine whether to order the meeting. For the purposes of voting at a creditors' meeting, the debtor company may divide the creditors into classes, subject to court approval (*CCAA*, s. 22(1)). Creditors may be included in the same class if "their interests or rights are sufficiently similar to give them a commonality of interest" (*CCAA*, s. 22(2); see also L. W. Houlden, G. B. Morawetz and J. P. Sarra, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada* (4th ed. (loose-leaf)), vol. 4, at N§149). If the requisite "double majority" in each class of creditors — again, a majority in *number* of class members, which also represents two-thirds in *value* of the class members' claims — vote in favour of the plan, the supervising judge may sanction the plan (*ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 34; see *CCAA*, s. 6). The supervising judge will conduct what is commonly referred to as a "fairness hearing" to determine, among other things, whether the plan is fair and reasonable (Wood, at pp. 490-92; see also Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at p. 529; Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra at N§45). Once sanctioned by the supervising judge, the plan is binding on each class of creditors that participated in the vote (*CCAA*, s. 6(1)).

58 Creditors with a provable claim against the debtor whose interests are affected by a proposed plan are usually entitled to vote on plans of arrangement (Wood, at p. 470). Indeed, there is no express provision in the *CCAA* barring such a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement, including a plan it sponsors.

59 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the appellants submit that a purposive interpretation of s. 22(3) of the *CCAA* reveals that, as a general matter, a creditor should be precluded from voting on its own plan. Section 22(3) provides:

Related creditors

(3) A creditor who is related to the company may vote against, but not for, a compromise or arrangement relating to the company.

The appellants note that s. 22(3) was meant to harmonize the *CCAA* scheme with s. 54(3) of the *BIA*, which provides that "[a] creditor who is related to the debtor may vote against but not for the acceptance of the proposal." The appellants point out that, under s. 50(1) of the *BIA*, only debtors can sponsor plans; as a result, the reference to "debtor" in s. 54(3) captures *all* plan sponsors. They submit that if s. 54(3) captures all plan sponsors, s. 22(3) of the *CCAA* must do the same. On this basis, the appellants ask us to extend the voting restriction in s. 22(3) to apply not only to creditors who are "related to the company", as the provision states, but to any creditor who sponsors a plan. They submit that this interpretation gives effect to the underlying intention of both provisions, which they say is to ensure that a creditor who has a conflict of interest cannot "dilute" or overtake the votes of other creditors.

60 We would not accept this strained interpretation of s. 22(3). Section 22(3) makes no mention of conflicts of interest between creditors and plan sponsors generally. The wording of s. 22(3) only places voting restrictions on creditors who are "related to the [debtor] company". These words are "precise and unequivocal" and, as such, must "play a dominant role in the interpretive process" (*Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. R.*, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601 (S.C.C.), at para. 10). In our view, the appellants' analogy to the *BIA* is not sufficient to overcome the plain wording of this provision.

61 While the appellants are correct that s. 22(3) was enacted to harmonize the treatment of related parties in the *CCAA* and *BIA*, its history demonstrates that it is not a general conflict of interest provision. Prior to the amendments incorporating s. 22(3) into the *CCAA*, the *CCAA* clearly allowed creditors to put forward a plan of arrangement (see Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra, at N§33, *Red Cross; 1078385 Ontario Ltd., Re* (2004), 206 O.A.C. 17 (Ont. C.A.)). In contrast, under the *BIA*, only debtors could make proposals. Parliament is presumed to have been aware of this obvious difference between the two statutes (see *ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board)*, 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140 (S.C.C.), at para. 59; see also *Third Eye Capital Corporation*, at para. 57). Despite this difference, Parliament imported, with necessary modification, the wording

of the *BIA* related creditor provision into the *CCAA*. Going beyond this language entails accepting that Parliament failed to choose the right words to give effect to its intention, which we do not.

62 Indeed, Parliament did not mindlessly reproduce s. 54(3) of the *BIA* in s. 22(3) of the *CCAA*. Rather, it made two modifications to the language of s. 54(3) to bring it into conformity with the language of the *CCAA*. First, it changed "proposal" (a defined term in the *BIA*) to "compromise or arrangement" (a term used throughout the *CCAA*). Second, it changed "debtor" to "company", recognizing that companies are the only kind of debtor that exists in the *CCAA* context.

63 Our view is further supported by Industry Canada's explanation of the rationale for s. 22(3) as being to "reduce the ability of *debtor companies* to organize a restructuring plan that confers additional benefits to *related parties*" (Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, *Bill C-12: Clause by Clause Analysis*, developed by Industry Canada, last updated March 24, 2015 (online), cl. 71, s. 22 (emphasis added); see also Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, at p. 151).

64 Finally, we note that the *CCAA* contains other mechanisms that attenuate the concern that a creditor with conflicting legal interests with respect to a plan it proposes may distort the creditors' vote. Although we reject the appellants' interpretation of s. 22(3), that section still bars creditors who are related to the debtor company from voting in favour of *any* plan. Additionally, creditors who do not share a sufficient commonality of interest may be forced to vote in separate classes (s. 22(1) and (2)), and, as we will explain, a supervising judge may bar a creditor from voting where the creditor is acting for an improper purpose.

(2) Discretion to Bar a Creditor From Voting in Furtherance of an Improper Purpose

65 There is no dispute that the *CCAA* is silent on when a creditor who is otherwise entitled to vote on a plan can be barred from voting. However, *CCAA* supervising judges are often called upon "to sanction measures for which there is no explicit authority in the *CCAA*" (*Century Services*, at para. 61; see also para. 62). In *Century Services*, this Court endorsed a "hierarchical" approach to determining whether jurisdiction exists to sanction a proposed measure: "courts [must] rely first on an interpretation of the provisions of the *CCAA* text before turning to inherent or equitable jurisdiction to anchor measures taken in a *CCAA* proceeding" (para. 65). In most circumstances, a purposive and liberal interpretation of the provisions of the *CCAA* will be sufficient "to ground measures necessary to achieve its objectives" (para. 65).

66 Applying this approach, we conclude that jurisdiction exists under s. 11 of the *CCAA* to bar a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement or compromise where the creditor is acting for an improper purpose.

67 Courts have long recognized that s. 11 of the *CCAA* signals legislative endorsement of the "broad reading of *CCAA* authority developed by the jurisprudence" (*Century Services*, at para. 68). Section 11 states:

General power of court

11 Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

On the plain wording of the provision, the jurisdiction granted by s. 11 is constrained only by restrictions set out in the *CCAA* itself, and the requirement that the order made be "appropriate in the circumstances".

68 Where a party seeks an order relating to a matter that falls within the supervising judge's purview, and for which there is no *CCAA* provision conferring more specific jurisdiction, s. 11 necessarily is the provision of first resort in anchoring jurisdiction. As Blair J.A. put it in *Stelco*, s. 11 "for the most part supplants the need to resort to inherent jurisdiction" in the *CCAA* context (para. 36).

69 Oversight of the plan negotiation, voting, and approval process falls squarely within the supervising judge's purview. As indicated, there are no specific provisions in the *CCAA* which govern when a creditor who is otherwise eligible to vote on

a plan may nonetheless be barred from voting. Nor is there any provision in the *CCAA* which suggests that a creditor has an absolute right to vote on a plan that cannot be displaced by a proper exercise of judicial discretion. However, given that the *CCAA* regime contemplates creditor participation in decision-making as an integral facet of the workout regime, creditors should only be barred from voting where the circumstances demand such an outcome. In other words, it is necessarily a discretionary, circumstance-specific inquiry.

70 Thus, it is apparent that s. 11 serves as the source of the supervising judge's jurisdiction to issue a discretionary order barring a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement. The exercise of this discretion must further the remedial objectives of the *CCAA* and be guided by the baseline considerations of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence. This means that, where a creditor is seeking to exercise its voting rights in a manner that frustrates, undermines, or runs counter to those objectives — that is, acting for an "improper purpose" — the supervising judge has the discretion to bar that creditor from voting.

71 The discretion to bar a creditor from voting in furtherance of an improper purpose under the *CCAA* parallels the similar discretion that exists under the *BIA*, which was recognized in *Laserworks Computer Services Inc., Re*, 1998 NSCA 42, 165 N.S.R. (2d) 296 (N.S. C.A.). In *Laserworks Computer Services Inc.*, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal concluded that the discretion to bar a creditor from voting in this way stemmed from the court's power, inherent in the scheme of the *BIA*, to supervise "[e]ach step in the bankruptcy process" (at para. 41), as reflected in ss. 43(7), 108(3), and 187(9) of the Act. The court explained that s. 187(9) specifically grants the power to remedy a "substantial injustice", which arises "when the *BIA* is used for an improper purpose" (para. 54). The court held that "[a]n improper purpose is any purpose collateral to the purpose for which the bankruptcy and insolvency legislation was enacted by Parliament" (para. 54).

72 While not determinative, the existence of this discretion under the *BIA* lends support to the existence of similar discretion under the *CCAA* for two reasons.

73 First, this conclusion would be consistent with this Court's recognition that the *CCAA* "offers a more flexible mechanism with greater judicial discretion" than the *BIA* (*Century Services*, at para. 14 (emphasis added)).

74 Second, this Court has recognized the benefits of harmonizing the two statutes to the extent possible. For example, in *Indalex*, the Court observed that "in order to avoid a race to liquidation under the *BIA*, courts will favour an interpretation of the *CCAA* that affords creditors analogous entitlements" to those received under the *BIA* (para. 51; see also *Century Services*, at para. 24; *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2015 ONCA 681, 391 D.L.R. (4th) 283 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 34-46). Thus, where the statutes are capable of bearing a harmonious interpretation, that interpretation ought to be preferred "to avoid the ills that can arise from [insolvency] 'statute-shopping'" (*Kitchener Frame Ltd., Re*, 2012 ONSC 234, 86 C.B.R. (5th) 274, at para. 78; see also para. 73). In our view, the articulation of "improper purpose" set out in *Laserworks Computer Services Inc.* — that is, any purpose collateral to the purpose of insolvency legislation — is entirely harmonious with the nature and scope of judicial discretion afforded by the *CCAA*. Indeed, as we have explained, this discretion is to be exercised in accordance with the *CCAA*'s objectives as an insolvency statute.

75 We also observe that the recognition of this discretion under the *CCAA* advances the basic fairness that "permeates Canadian insolvency law and practice" (Sarra, "The Oscillating Pendulum: Canada's Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium for Insolvency Law", at p. 27; see also *Century Services*, at paras. 70 and 77). As Professor Sarra observes, fairness demands that supervising judges be in a position to recognize and meaningfully address circumstances in which parties are working against the goals of the statute:

The Canadian insolvency regime is based on the assumption that creditors and the debtor share a common goal of maximizing recoveries. The substantive aspect of fairness in the insolvency regime is based on the assumption that all involved parties face real economic risks. Unfairness resides where only some face these risks, while others actually benefit from the situation If the *CCAA* is to be interpreted in a purposive way, the courts must be able to recognize when people have conflicting interests and are working actively against the goals of the statute.

TAB 3

1993 CarswellOnt 183

Ontario Court of Justice (General Division — Commercial List)

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re

1993 CarswellOnt 183, [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275

Re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36; Re Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43; Re plan of compromise in respect of LEHNDORFF GENERAL PARTNER LTD. (in its own capacity and in its capacity as general partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA), LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) and LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) II) and in respect of certain of their nominees LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA) LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS II LTD., BAYTEMP PROPERTIES LIMITED and 102 BLOOR STREET WEST LIMITED and in respect of THG LEHNDORFF VERMÖGENSVERWALTUNG GmbH (in its capacity as limited partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA))

Farley J.

Heard: December 24, 1992

Judgment: January 6, 1993

Docket: Doc. B366/92

Counsel: *Alfred Apps, Robert Harrison and Melissa J. Kennedy*, for applicants.

L. Crozier, for Royal Bank of Canada.

R.C. Heintzman, for Bank of Montreal.

J. Hodgson, Susan Lundy and James Hilton, for Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation.

Jay Schwartz, for Citibank Canada.

Stephen Golick, for Peat Marwick Thorne^{*} Inc., proposed monitor.

John Teolis, for Fuji Bank Canada.

Robert Thorton, for certain of the advisory boards.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.2 Initial application](#)

[XIX.2.b Grant of stay](#)

[XIX.2.b.i General principles](#)

Headnote

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act — Arrangements — Effect of arrangement — Stay of proceedings

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Stay of proceedings — Stay being granted even where it would affect non-applicants that were not companies within meaning of Act — Business operations of applicants and non-applicants being so intertwined as to make stay appropriate.

The applicant companies were involved in property development and management and sought the protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") in order that they could present a plan of compromise. They also sought a stay of all

proceedings against the individual company applicants either in their own capacities or because of their interest in a larger group of companies. Each of the applicant companies was insolvent and had outstanding debentures issued under trust deeds. They proposed a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of the debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors deemed appropriate in the circumstances.

A question arose as to whether the court had the power to grant a stay of proceedings against non-applicants that were not companies and, therefore, not within the express provisions of the CCAA.

Held:

The application was allowed.

It was appropriate, given the significant financial intertwining of the applicant companies, that a consolidated plan be approved. Further, each of the applicant companies had a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating even though each was currently unable to meet all of its expenses. This was precisely the sort of situation in which all of the creditors would likely benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it was appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings.

The inherent power of the court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Clearly, the court had the jurisdiction to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants that were companies fitting the criteria in the CCAA. However, the stay requested also involved limited partnerships where (1) the applicant companies acted on behalf of the limited partnerships, or (2) the stay would be effective against any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertakings of the limited partnerships in which they held a direct interest. The business operations of the applicant companies were so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for a stay to be granted to the applicant companies that would affect their business without affecting the undivided interest of the limited partnerships in the business. As a result, it was just and reasonable to supplement s. 11 and grant the stay.

While the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim, as well as the interest of any other person, anyone wishing to start or continue proceedings against the applicant companies could use the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain the stay. In such a motion, the onus would be on the applicant companies to show that it was appropriate in the circumstances to continue the stay.

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Fine's Flowers Ltd. v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of) (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 87, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 293, 87 D.L.R. (4th) 391, 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.) — referred to

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Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (C.A.) — referred to

Inducon Development Corp. Re (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.B. Ltd. (1992), 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290 (Q.B.) — considered

Keppoch Development Ltd., Re (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.) — referred to

Langley's Ltd., Re, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) — referred to

McCordic v. Bosanquet (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) — referred to

Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 53 A.R. 39, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Q.B.) — referred to

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 1 (Q.B.) — referred to

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) — referred to

Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) , affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.) , leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (note), 55 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxxiii (note), 135 N.R. 317 (note) — referred to

Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), [1934] S.C.R. 659, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 — referred to

Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R. (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137, 104 D.L.R. (3d) 274 (S.C.) , affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) — referred to

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Slavik, Re (1992), 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Stephanie's Fashions Ltd., Re (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of) (1990), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 151, (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) — referred to

United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative, Re (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44, 84 N.B.R. (2d) 415, 214 A.P.R. 415 (Q.B.) , varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170, 87 N.B.R. (2d) 333, 221 A.P.R. 333 (Q.B.) , reversed (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161, 88 N.B.R. (2d) 253, 224 A.P.R. 253, (sub nom. *Cdn. Co-op. Leasing Services v. United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.*) 51 D.L.R. (4th) 618 (C.A.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 —

s. 85

s. 142

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 — preamble

s. 2

s. 3

s. 4

s. 5

s. 6

s. 7

s. 8

s. 11

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.

Judicature Act, The, R.S.O. 1937, c. 100.

Limited Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 —

s. 2(2)

s. 3(1)

s. 8

s. 9

s. 11

s. 12(1)

s. 13

s. 15(2)

s. 24

Partnership Act, R.S.A. 1980, c.P-2 — Pt. 2

s. 75

Rules considered:

Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure —

r. 8.01

r. 8.02

Application under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to file consolidated plan of compromise and for stay of proceedings.

Farley J.:

1 These are my written reasons relating to the relief granted the applicants on December 24, 1992 pursuant to their application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA") and the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 ("CJA"). The relief sought was as follows:

(a) short service of the notice of application;

(b) a declaration that the applicants were companies to which the CCAA applies;

(c) authorization for the applicants to file a consolidated plan of compromise;

(d) authorization for the applicants to call meetings of their secured and unsecured creditors to approve the consolidated plan of compromise;

(e) a stay of all proceedings taken or that might be taken either in respect of the applicants in their own capacity or on account of their interest in Lehndorff United Properties (Canada) ("LUPC"), Lehndorff Properties (Canada) ("LPC") and Lehndorff Properties (Canada) II ("LPC II") and collectively (the "Limited Partnerships") whether as limited partner, as general partner or as registered titleholder to certain of their assets as bare trustee and nominee; and

(f) certain other ancillary relief.

2 The applicants are a number of companies within the larger Lehndorff group ("Group") which operates in Canada and elsewhere. The group appears to have suffered in the same way that a number of other property developers and managers which have also sought protection under the CCAA in recent years. The applicants are insolvent; they each have outstanding debentures

issues under trust deeds; and they propose a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of these debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors as they deemed appropriate in the circumstances. Each applicant except THG Lehndorff Vermögensverwaltung GmbH ("GmbH") is an Ontario corporation. GmbH is a company incorporated under the laws of Germany. Each of the applicants has assets or does business in Canada. Therefore each is a "company" within the definition of s. 2 of the CCAA. The applicant Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. ("General Partner Company") is the sole general partner of the Limited Partnerships. The General Partner Company has sole control over the property and businesses of the Limited Partnerships. All major decisions concerning the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are made by management operating out of the Lehndorff Toronto Office. The applicants aside from the General Partner Company have as their sole purpose the holding of title to properties as bare trustee or nominee on behalf of the Limited Partnerships. LUPC is a limited partnership registered under the *Limited Partnership Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 ("Ontario LPA"). LPC and LPC II are limited partnerships registered under Part 2 of the *Partnership Act*, R.S.A. 1980, c. P-2 ("Alberta PA") and each is registered in Ontario as an extra provincial limited partnership. LUPC has over 2,000 beneficial limited partners, LPC over 500 and LPC II over 250, most of whom are residents of Germany. As at March 31, 1992 LUPC had outstanding indebtedness of approximately \$370 million, LPC \$45 million and LPC II \$7 million. Not all of the members of the Group are making an application under the CCAA. Taken together the Group's indebtedness as to Canadian matters (including that of the applicants) was approximately \$543 million. In the summer of 1992 various creditors (Canada Trustco Mortgage Company, Bank of Montreal, Royal Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Tokyo Canada) made demands for repayment of their loans. On November 6, 1992 Funtanua Investments Limited, a minor secured lender also made a demand. An interim standstill agreement was worked out following a meeting of July 7, 1992. In conjunction with Peat Marwick Thorne Inc. which has been acting as an informal monitor to date and Fasken Campbell Godfrey the applicants have held multiple meetings with their senior secured creditors over the past half year and worked on a restructuring plan. The business affairs of the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are significantly intertwined as there are multiple instances of intercorporate debt, cross-default provisions and guarantees and they operated a centralized cash management system.

3 This process has now evolved to a point where management has developed a consolidated restructuring plan which plan addresses the following issues:

- (a) The compromise of existing conventional, term and operating indebtedness, both secured and unsecured.
- (b) The restructuring of existing project financing commitments.
- (c) New financing, by way of equity or subordinated debt.
- (d) Elimination or reduction of certain overhead.
- (e) Viability of existing businesses of entities in the Lehndorff Group.
- (f) Restructuring of income flows from the limited partnerships.
- (g) Disposition of further real property assets aside from those disposed of earlier in the process.
- (h) Consolidation of entities in the Group; and
- (i) Rationalization of the existing debt and security structure in the continuing entities in the Group.

Formal meetings of the beneficial limited partners of the Limited Partnerships are scheduled for January 20 and 21, 1993 in Germany and an information circular has been prepared and at the time of hearing was being translated into German. This application was brought on for hearing at this time for two general reasons: (a) it had now ripened to the stage of proceeding with what had been distilled out of the strategic and consultative meetings; and (b) there were creditors other than senior secured lenders who were in a position to enforce their rights against assets of some of the applicants (and Limited Partnerships) which if such enforcement did take place would result in an undermining of the overall plan. Notice of this hearing was given to various creditors: Barclays Bank of Canada, Barclays Bank PLC, Bank of Montreal, Citibank Canada, Canada Trustco Mortgage

Corporation, Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Tokyo Canada, Funtauna Investments Limited, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Fuji Bank Canada and First City Trust Company. In this respect the applicants have recognized that although the initial application under the CCAA may be made on an ex parte basis (s. 11 of the CCAA; *Re Langley's Ltd.*, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) ; *Re Keppoch Development Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.) . The court will be concerned when major creditors have not been alerted even in the most minimal fashion (*Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 310). The application was either supported or not opposed.

4 "Instant" debentures are now well recognized and respected by the courts: see *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44 (N.B. Q.B.) , at pp. 55-56, varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170 (N.B. Q.B.) , reversed on different grounds (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161 (N.B. C.A.) , at pp. 165-166; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 250-251; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101 (C.A.) per Doherty J.A., dissenting on another point, at pp. 306-310 (O.R.); *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) at p. 327. The applicants would appear to me to have met the technical hurdle of s. 3 and as defined s. 2) of the CCAA in that they are debtor companies since they are insolvent, they have outstanding an issue of debentures under a trust deed and the compromise or arrangement that is proposed includes that compromise between the applicants and the holders of those trust deed debentures. I am also satisfied that because of the significant intertwining of the applicants it would be appropriate to have a consolidated plan. I would also understand that this court (Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)) is the appropriate court to hear this application since all the applicants except GmbH have their head office or their chief place of business in Ontario and GmbH, although it does not have a place of business within Canada, does have assets located within Ontario.

5 The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal with their assets so as to enable plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court. In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. See the preamble to and sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 of the CCAA; *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 at p. 661, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 ; *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 219-220; *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleum Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361 (Q.B.) , at pp. 12-13 (C.B.R.); *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (B.C. C.A.) , at pp. 310-311, affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.) , leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (S.C.C.) .; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* , supra, at p. 307 (O.R.); *Fine's Flowers v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of)* (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.) , at p. 199 and "Reorganizations Under The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", Stanley E. Edwards (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587 at p. 592.

6 The CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Where a debtor company realistically plans to continue operating or to otherwise deal with its assets but it requires the protection of the court in order to do so and it is otherwise too early for the court to determine whether the debtor company will succeed, relief should be granted under the CCAA. see *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* , supra at pp. 297 and 316; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* , supra, at pp. 251-252 and *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* , supra, at p. 328 and p. 330. It has been held that the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain approval of creditors. Such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan will succeed: see *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* , supra, at p. 220 (W.W.R.). The possibility that one or more creditors may be prejudiced should not affect the court's exercise of its authority to grant a stay of proceedings under the CCAA because this affect is offset by the benefit to all creditors and to the company of facilitating a reorganization. The court's primary concerns under the CCAA

must be for the debtor and *all* of the creditors: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 108-110; *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.), at pp. 315-318 (C.B.R.) and *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 251-252.

7 One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors. Unlike the *Bankruptcy Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, before the amendments effective November 30, 1992 to transform it into the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("BIA"), it is possible under the CCAA to bind secured creditors it has been generally speculated that the CCAA will be resorted to by companies that are generally larger and have a more complicated capital structure and that those companies which make an application under the BIA will be generally smaller and have a less complicated structure. Reorganization may include partial liquidation where it is intended as part of the process of a return to long term viability and profitability. See *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, supra, at p. 318 and *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* (1987), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 245, reversed on other grounds at (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 71 (Alta. C.A.). It appears to me that the purpose of the CCAA is also to protect the interests of creditors and to enable an orderly distribution of the debtor company's affairs. This may involve a winding-up or liquidation of a company or simply a substantial downsizing of its business operations, provided the same is proposed in the best interests of the creditors generally. See *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.*, supra, at p. 318; *Re Amirault Fish Co.*, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) at pp. 187-188 (C.B.R.).

8 It strikes me that each of the applicants in this case has a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating, although each is currently unable to meet all of its expenses albeit on a reduced scale. This is precisely the sort of circumstance in which all of the creditors are likely to benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it is appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings so as to allow the applicant to finalize preparation of and file a plan of compromise and arrangement.

9 Let me now review the aspect of the stay of proceedings. Section 11 of the CCAA provides as follows:

11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,

(a) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;

(b) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and

(c) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

10 The power to grant a stay of proceeding should be construed broadly in order to permit the CCAA to accomplish its legislative purpose and in particular to enable continuance of the company seeking CCAA protection. The power to grant a stay therefore extends to a stay which affected the position not only of the company's secured and unsecured creditors, but also all non-creditors and other parties who could potentially jeopardize the success of the plan and thereby the continuance of the company. See *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 12-17 (C.B.R.) and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 296-298 (B.C. S.C.) and pp. 312-314 (B.C. C.A.) and *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, supra, at pp. 219 ff. Further the court has the power to order a stay that is effective in respect of the rights arising in favour of secured creditors under all forms of commercial security: see *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, supra, at p. 320 where Gibbs J.A. for the court stated:

The trend which emerges from this sampling will be given effect here by holding that where the word "security" occurs in the C.C.A.A., it includes s. 178 security and, where the word creditor occurs, it includes a bank holding s. 178 security. To the extent that there may be conflict between the two statutes, therefore, the broad scope of the C.C.A.A. prevails.

TAB 4

2009 NSSC 136
Nova Scotia Supreme Court

ScoZinc Ltd., Re

2009 CarswellNS 229, 2009 NSSC 136, 177 A.C.W.S. (3d)
293, 277 N.S.R. (2d) 251, 53 C.B.R. (5th) 96, 882 A.P.R. 251

**In the Matter of The Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36, as amended**

And In the Matter of A Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of ScoZinc Ltd. (Applicant)

D.R. Beveridge J.

Heard: April 3, 2009
Judgment: April 3, 2009
Written reasons: April 28, 2009
Docket: Hfx. 305549

Counsel: John G. Stringer, Q.C., Mr. Ben R. Durnford for Applicant
Robert MacKeigan, Q.C. for Grant Thornton

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.2](#) Initial application

[XIX.2.g](#) Monitor

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous issues

Company was granted protection pursuant to s. 11 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — Monitor was appointed pursuant to s. 11.7 of CCAA — Determination of creditors' claims was set by claims procedure order ("order") — Three creditors submitted proofs of claim by claims bar date set out in order and then submitted revised proofs of claim after claims bar date, but before date set for monitor to complete assessment of claims — Monitor determined errors in proofs of claims were due to inadvertence and issued notice of revision or disallowance, allowing claims as revised if it was determined monitor had power to do so — Monitor brought motion for directions on whether it had authority to allow revision of claim by increasing it after claim's bar date but before date set for monitor to complete assessment of claims — Monitor had necessary authority — Court creates claims process by court order — Determination that claims had to initially be identified and assessed by monitor, and heard first by claims officer, was valid exercise of court's inherent jurisdiction — Logical and practical that monitor, as officer of court, be directed to fulfil analogous role to that of trustee under Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and order accomplished this — Provision in order mandated monitor to review all proofs of claim filed on or before claims bar date and accept, revise or disallow them — While normally monitor's revision would be to reduce proof of claim, nothing in order so restricted monitor's authority — It did not matter that revised claims were submitted after claims bar date — In essence, monitor simply acted to revise proofs of claim already submitted to conform with evidence elicited by monitor or submitted to it.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by D.R. Beveridge J.:

Air Canada, Re (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 23, 2004 CarswellOnt 3320 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Blue Range Resource Corp., Re (2000), 2000 CarswellAlta 30, (sub nom. *Blue Range Resources Corp., Re*) 250 A.R. 239, (sub nom. *Blue Range Resources Corp., Re*) 213 W.A.C. 239, 15 C.B.R. (4th) 192, 2000 ABCA 16 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Blue Range Resource Corp., Re (2000), 2000 ABCA 285, 2000 CarswellAlta 1145, [2001] 2 W.W.R. 477, (sub nom. *Enron Canada Corp. v. National-Oilwell Canada Ltd.*) 193 D.L.R. (4th) 314, 271 A.R. 138, 234 W.A.C. 138, 87 Alta. L.R. (3d) 352 (Alta. C.A.) — followed

Carlen Transport Inc. v. Juniper Lumber Co. (Monitor of) (2001), 21 C.B.R. (4th) 222, (sub nom. *Juniper Lumber Co., Re*) 233 N.B.R. (2d) 111, (sub nom. *Juniper Lumber Co., Re*) 601 A.P.R. 111, 2001 CarswellNB 21 (N.B. Q.B.) — referred to
Federal Gypsum Co., Re (2007), 2007 NSSC 384, 2007 CarswellINS 630, 261 N.S.R. (2d) 314, 835 A.P.R. 314, 40 C.B.R. (5th) 39 (N.S. S.C.) — referred to

Freeman, Re (1922), 55 N.S.R. 545, [1923] 1 D.L.R. 378, 1922 CarswellINS 57 (N.S. C.A.) — considered

Laidlaw Inc., Re (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 790, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re (2006), 25 C.B.R. (5th) 231, 2006 CarswellOnt 6230 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re*) 12 O.R. (3d) 500, 1993 CarswellOnt 182 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Pine Valley Mining Corp., Re (2008), 2008 CarswellBC 579, 2008 BCSC 356, 41 C.B.R. (5th) 43 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to
Siscoe & Savoie v. Royal Bank (1994), 1994 CarswellNB 14, 29 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 157 N.B.R. (2d) 42, 404 A.P.R. 42 (N.B. C.A.) — considered

Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re (2003), 2003 CarswellBC 1399, 2003 BCCA 344, 184 B.C.A.C. 54, 302 W.A.C. 54, 43 C.B.R. (4th) 187, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236 (B.C. C.A.) — considered

Stelco Inc., Re (2005), 253 D.L.R. (4th) 109, 75 O.R. (3d) 5, 2 B.L.R. (4th) 238, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135, 2005 CarswellOnt 1188, 196 O.A.C. 142 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Triton Tubular Components Corp., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 4439, 14 C.B.R. (5th) 264 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 135(2) — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 4 — considered

s. 5 — considered

s. 6 — considered

s. 11 — pursuant to

s. 11.7 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.7(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.7(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.7(3) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.7(3)(d) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 12 — considered

s. 12(1) "claim" — considered

s. 12(2) — considered

Probate Act, R.S.N.S. 1900, c. 158

Generally — referred to

MOTION by monitor appointed under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* for directions on whether it had authority to allow revision of claim after claim's bar date but before date set for monitor to complete its assessment of claims.

D.R. Beveridge J. (orally):

1 On December 22, 2008 ScoZinc Ltd. was granted protection by way of a stay of proceedings of all claims against it pursuant to s.11 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36. The stay has been extended from time to time. Grant Thornton was appointed as the Monitor of the business and financial affairs of ScoZinc pursuant to s.11.7 of the *CCAA*.

2 The determination of creditors' claims was set by a Claims Procedure Order. This order set dates for the submission of claims to the Monitor, and for the Monitor to assess the claims. The Monitor brought a motion seeking directions from the court on whether it has the necessary authority to allow a revision of a claim after the claim's bar date but before the date set for the Monitor to complete its assessment of claims.

3 The motion was heard on April 3, 2009. At the conclusion of the hearing of the motion I concluded that the Monitor did have the necessary authority. I granted the requested order with reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

Background

4 The procedure for the identification and quantification of claims was established pursuant to my order of February 18, 2009. Any persons asserting a claim was to deliver to the Monitor a Proof of Claim by 5:00 p.m. on March 16, 2009, including a statement of account setting out the full details of the claim. Any claimant that did not deliver a Proof of Claim by the claims bar date, subject to the Monitor's agreement or as the court may otherwise order, would have its claim forever extinguished and barred from making any claim against ScoZinc.

5 The Monitor was directed to review all Proofs of Claim filed on or before March 16, 2009 and to accept, revise or disallow the claims. Any revision or disallowance was to be communicated by Notice of Revision or Disallowance, no later than March 27, 2009. If a creditor disagreed with the assessment of the Monitor, it could dispute the assessment before a Claims Officer and ultimately to a judge of the Supreme Court.

6 The three claims that have triggered the Monitor's motion for directions were submitted by Acadian Mining Corporation, Royal Roads Corp., and Komatsu International (Canada) Inc.

7 ScoZinc is 100% owned by Acadian Mining Corp. These two corporations share office space, managerial staff, and have common officers and directors. Acadian Mining is a substantial shareholder in Royal Roads and also have some common officers and directors.

8 Originally Royal Roads asserted a claim as a secured creditor on the basis of a first charge security held by it on ScoZinc's assets for a loan in the amount of approximately \$2.3 million. Acadian Mining also claimed to be a secured creditor due to a second charge on ScoZinc's assets securing approximately \$23.5 million of debt. Both Royal Roads and Acadian Mining have released their security. Each company submitted Proofs of Claim dated March 4, 2009 as unsecured creditors.

9 Royal Roads claim was for \$579,964.62. The claim by Acadian Mining was for \$23,761,270.20. John Rawding, Financial Officer for Acadian Mining and ScoZinc, prepared the Proofs of Claim for both Royal Roads and Acadian Mining. It appears from the affidavit and materials submitted, and the Monitor's fifth report dated March 31, 2009 that there were errors in each of the Proofs of Claim.

10 Mr. Rawding incorrectly attributed \$1,720,035.38 as debt by Acadian Mining to Royal Roads when it should have been debt owed by ScoZinc to Royal Roads. In addition, during year end audit procedures for Royal Roads, Acadian Mining and ScoZinc, other erroneous entries were discovered. The total claim that should have been advanced by Royal Roads was \$2,772,734.19.

11 The appropriate claim that should have been submitted by Acadian Mining was \$22,041,234.82, a reduction of \$1,720,035.38. Both Royal Roads and Acadian Mining submitted revised Proofs of Claim on March 25, 2009 with supporting documentation.

12 The third claim is by Komatsu. Its initial Proof of Claim was dated March 16, 2009 for both secured and unsecured claims of \$4,245,663.78. The initial claim did not include a secured claim for the equipment that had been returned to Komatsu, nor include a claim for equipment that was still being used by ScoZinc. A revised Proof of Claim was filed by Komatsu on March 26, 2009.

13 The Monitor, sets out in its fifth report dated March 31, 2009, that after reviewing the relevant books and records, the errors in the Proofs of Claim by Royal Roads, Acadian Mining and Komatsu were due to inadvertence. For all of these claims it issued a Notice of Revision or Disallowance on March 27, 2009, allowing the claims as revised "if it is determined by the court that the Monitor has the power to do so".

14 The request for directions and the circumstances pose the following issue:

Issue

15 Does the Monitor have the authority to allow the revision of a claim by increasing it based on evidence submitted by a claimant within the time period set for the monitor to carry out its assessment of claims?

Analysis

16 The jurisdiction of the Monitor stems from the jurisdiction of the court granted to it by the *CCAA*. Whenever an order is made under s.11 of the *CCAA* the court is required to appoint a monitor. Section 11.7 of the *CCAA* provides:

11.7(1) When an order is made in respect of a company by the court under section 11, the court shall at the same time appoint a person, in this section and in section 11.8 referred to as "the monitor", to monitor the business and financial affairs of the company while the order remains in effect.

(2) Except as may be otherwise directed by the court, the auditor of the company may be appointed as the monitor.

(3) The monitor shall

(a) for the purposes of monitoring the company's business and financial affairs, have access to and examine the company's property, including the premises, books, records, data, including data in electronic form, and other financial documents of the company to the extent necessary to adequately assess the company's business and financial affairs;

(b) file a report with the court on the state of the company's business and financial affairs, containing prescribed information,

(i) forthwith after ascertaining any material adverse change in the company's projected cash-flow or financial circumstances,

(ii) at least seven days before any meeting of creditors under section 4 or 5, or

(iii) at such other times as the court may order;

(c) advise the creditors of the filing of the report referred to in paragraph (b) in any notice of a meeting of creditors referred to in section 4 or 5; and

(d) carry out such other functions in relation to the company as the court may direct.

...

17 It appears that the purpose of the *CCAA* is to grant to an insolvent company protection from its creditors in order to permit it a reasonable opportunity to restructure its affairs in order to reach a compromise or arrangement between the company and its creditors. The court has the power to order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors for them to consider a compromise or arrangement proposed by the debtor company (s. 4, 5). Where a majority of the creditors representing two thirds value of the creditors or class of creditors agree to a compromise or arrangement, the court may sanction it and thereafter such compromise or arrangement is binding on all creditors, or class of creditors (s. 6).

18 Section 12 of the *Act* defines a claim to mean "any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind that, if unsecured, would be a debt provable in bankruptcy within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*." However, as noted by McElcheran in *Commercial Insolvency in Canada* (LexisNexis Canada Inc., Markham, Ontario, 2005 at p. 279-80) the *CCAA* does not set out a process for identification or determination of claims; instead, the Court creates a claims process by court order.

19 The only guidance provided by the *CCAA* is that in the event of a disagreement the amount of a claim shall be determined by the court on summary application by the company or by the creditor. Section 12(2) of the *Act* provides:

Determination of amount of claim

(2) For the purposes of this Act, the amount represented by a claim of any secured or unsecured creditor shall be determined as follows:

(a) the amount of an unsecured claim shall be the amount

(i) in the case of a company in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, proof of which has been made in accordance with that Act,

(ii) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, proof of which has been made in accordance with that Act, or

(iii) in the case of any other company, proof of which might be made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, but if the amount so provable is not admitted by the company, the amount shall be determined by the court on summary application by the company or by the creditor; and

(b) the amount of a secured claim shall be the amount, proof of which might be made in respect thereof under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act if the claim were unsecured, but the amount if not admitted by the company shall, in the case of a company subject to pending proceedings under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act or the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, be established by proof in the same manner as an unsecured claim under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act or the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, as the case may be, and in the case of any other company the amount shall be determined by the court on summary application by the company or the creditor.

20 The only parties who appeared on this motion were the Monitor, ScoZinc and Komatsu. No specific submissions were requested nor made by the parties with respect to the nature of the court's jurisdiction to determine the mechanism and time lines to classify and quantify claims against the debtor company.

21 Under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* the Trustee is the designated gatekeeper who first determines whether a Proof of Claim submitted by a creditor is valid. The trustee may admit the claim or disallow it in whole or in part (s.135(2) *BIA*). A creditor who is dissatisfied with a decision by the trustee may appeal to a judge of the Bankruptcy Court.

22 In contrast, the *CCAA* does not set out the procedure beyond the language in s.12. The language only accomplishes two things. The first is that the debtor company can agree on the amount of a secured or unsecured claim; and secondly, if there is a disagreement, then on application of either the company or the creditor, the amount shall be determined by the court on "summary application".

23 The practice has arisen for the court to create by order a claims process that is both flexible and expeditious. The Monitor identifies, by review of the debtor's records, all potential claimants and sends to them a claim package. To ensure that all creditors come forward and participate on a timely basis, there is a provision in the claims process order requiring creditors to file their claims by a fixed date. If they do not, subject to further relief provided by the claims process order, or by the court, the creditor's claim is barred.

24 If the Monitor disagrees with the claim, and the disagreement cannot be resolved, then a claimant can present its case to a claims officer who is usually given the power to adjudicate disputed claims, with the right of appeal to a judge of the court overseeing the *CCAA* proceedings.

25 The establishment of a claims process utilizing the monitor and or a claims officer by court order appears to be a well accepted practice (See for example *Federal Gypsum Co., Re*, 2007 NSSC 384 (N.S. S.C.); *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Air Canada, Re* (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 23 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Triton Tubular Components Corp., Re*, [2005] O.J. No. 3926 (Ont. S.C.J.); *MuscleTech Research & Development Inc., Re*, [2006] O.J. No. 4087 (Ont. S.C.J.); *Pine Valley Mining Corp., Re*, 2008 BCSC 356 (B.C. S.C.); *Blue Range Resource Corp., Re*, 2000 ABCA 285 (Alta. C.A.); *Carlen Transport Inc. v. Juniper Lumber Co. (Monitor of)* (2001), 21 C.B.R. (4th) 222 (N.B. Q.B.).)

26 I could find no reported case that doubt the authority of the court to create a claims process. Kenneth Kraft in his article "The *CCAA* and the Claims Bar Process", (2000), 13 *Commercial Insolvency Reporter* 6, endorsed the utilization of a claims process on the basis of reliance on the court's inherent jurisdiction, provided the process adhered to the specific mandates of the *CCAA*. In unrelated contexts, caution has been expressed with respect to reliance on the inherent jurisdiction of the superior court as the basis for dealing with the myriad issues that can arise under the *CCAA* (See: *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re* (2003), 43 C.B.R. (4th) 187 (B.C. C.A.)) and *Stelco Inc., Re*, [2005] O.J. No. 1171 (Ont. C.A.)).

27 Sir J.H. Jacob, Q.C. in his seminal article "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court", (1970) *Current Legal Problems* 23, concluded that it has been clear law from the earliest times that superior courts of justice, as part of their inherent jurisdiction, have the power to control their own proceedings and process. He wrote:

Under its inherent jurisdiction, the court has power to control and regulate its process and proceedings, and it exercises this power in a great variety of circumstances and by many different methods. Some of the instances of the exercise of this power have been of far-reaching importance, others have dealt with matters of detail or have been of transient value. Some have involved the exercise of administrative powers, others of judicial powers. Some have been turned into rules of law, others by long usage or custom may have acquired the force of law, and still others remain mere rules of practice. The exercise of this power has been pervasive throughout the whole legal machinery and has been extended to all stages of proceedings, pre-trial, trial and post-trial. Indeed, it is difficult to set the limits upon the powers of the court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to control and regulate its process, for these limits are coincident with the needs of the court to fulfil its judicial functions in the administration of justice.

p. 32-33

TAB 5

2010 SCC 60

Supreme Court of Canada

Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] Ltd., Re

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, [2010] S.C.J. No. 60, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 409 N.R. 201, 503 W.A.C. 1, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, J.E. 2011-5

Century Services Inc. (Appellant) and Attorney General of Canada on behalf of Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada (Respondent)

Deschamps J., McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ.

Heard: May 11, 2010

Judgment: December 16, 2010

Docket: 33239

Proceedings: reversing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellBC 1195, 2009 G.T.C. 2020 (Eng.), 2009 BCCA 205, 270 B.C.A.C. 167, 454 W.A.C. 167, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 684, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79 (B.C. C.A.); reversing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2008), 2008 CarswellBC 2895, 2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221, 2009 G.T.C. 2011 (Eng.) (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])

Counsel: Mary I.A. Buttery, Owen J. James, Matthew J.G. Curtis for Appellant
Gordon Bourgard, David Jacyk, Michael J. Lema for Respondent

Subject: Estates and Trusts; Goods and Services Tax (GST); Tax — Miscellaneous; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Tax

I General principles

I.5 Priority of tax claims in bankruptcy proceedings

Tax

III Goods and Services Tax

III.14 Collection and remittance

III.14.b GST held in trust

Headnote

Tax --- Goods and Services Tax — Collection and remittance — GST held in trust

Debtor owed Crown under Excise Tax Act (ETA) for unremitted GST — Debtor sought relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Under order of BC Supreme Court, amount of GST debt was placed in trust account and remaining proceeds of sale of assets paid to major secured creditor — Debtor's application for partial lifting of stay of proceedings to assign itself into bankruptcy was granted, while Crown's application for payment of tax debt was dismissed — Crown's appeal to BC Court of Appeal was allowed — Creditor appealed to Supreme Court of Canada — Appeal allowed — Analysis of ETA and CCAA yielded conclusion that CCAA provides that statutory deemed trusts do not apply, and that Parliament did not intend to restore Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under CCAA when it amended ETA in 2000 — Parliament had moved away from asserting priority for Crown claims under both CCAA and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), and neither statute provided for preferred treatment of GST claims — Giving Crown priority over GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy would reduce use of more flexible and responsive CCAA regime — Parliament likely inadvertently succumbed to drafting anomaly — Section 222(3) of ETA could not be seen as having impliedly repealed s. 18.3 of CCAA by its subsequent passage, given recent amendments to CCAA — Court had discretion under CCAA to construct bridge to liquidation under BIA,

and partially lift stay of proceedings to allow entry into liquidation — No "gap" should exist when moving from CCAA to BIA — Court order segregating funds did not have certainty that Crown rather than creditor would be beneficiary sufficient to support express trust — Amount held in respect of GST debt was not subject to deemed trust, priority or express trust in favour of Crown — Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, ss. 222(1), (1.1).

Tax --- General principles — Priority of tax claims in bankruptcy proceedings

Debtor owed Crown under Excise Tax Act (ETA) for unremitted GST — Debtor sought relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Under order of BC Supreme Court, amount of GST debt was placed in trust account and remaining proceeds of sale of assets paid to major secured creditor — Debtor's application for partial lifting of stay of proceedings to assign itself into bankruptcy was granted, while Crown's application for payment of tax debt was dismissed — Crown's appeal to BC Court of Appeal was allowed — Creditor appealed to Supreme Court of Canada — Appeal allowed — Analysis of ETA and CCAA yielded conclusion that CCAA provides that statutory deemed trusts do not apply, and that Parliament did not intend to restore Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under CCAA when it amended ETA in 2000 — Parliament had moved away from asserting priority for Crown claims under both CCAA and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), and neither statute provided for preferred treatment of GST claims — Giving Crown priority over GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy would reduce use of more flexible and responsive CCAA regime — Parliament likely inadvertently succumbed to drafting anomaly — Section 222(3) of ETA could not be seen as having impliedly repealed s. 18.3 of CCAA by its subsequent passage, given recent amendments to CCAA — Court had discretion under CCAA to construct bridge to liquidation under BIA, and partially lift stay of proceedings to allow entry into liquidation — No "gap" should exist when moving from CCAA to BIA — Court order segregating funds did not have certainty that Crown rather than creditor would be beneficiary sufficient to support express trust — Amount held in respect of GST debt was not subject to deemed trust, priority or express trust in favour of Crown.

Taxation --- Taxe sur les produits et services — Perception et versement — Montant de TPS détenu en fiducie

Débitrice devait à la Couronne des montants de TPS qu'elle n'avait pas remis, en vertu de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (LTA) — Débitrice a entamé des procédures judiciaires en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC) — En vertu d'une ordonnance du tribunal, le montant de la créance fiscale a été déposé dans un compte en fiducie et la balance du produit de la vente des actifs a servi à payer le créancier garanti principal — Demande de la débitrice visant à obtenir la levée partielle de la suspension de procédures afin qu'elle puisse faire cession de ses biens a été accordée, alors que la demande de la Couronne visant à obtenir le paiement des montants de TPS non remis a été rejetée — Appel interjeté par la Couronne a été accueilli — Créancier a formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli — Analyse de la LTA et de la LACC conduisait à la conclusion que le législateur ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a modifié la LTA, en 2000 — Législateur avait mis un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne sous les régimes de la LACC et de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (LFI), et ni l'une ni l'autre de ces lois ne prévoyait que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficiaient d'un traitement préférentiel — Fait de faire primer la priorité de la Couronne sur les créances découlant de la TPS dans le cadre de procédures fondées sur la LACC mais pas en cas de faillite aurait pour effet de restreindre le recours à la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la LACC — Il semblait probable que le législateur avait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle — On ne pourrait pas considérer l'art. 222(3) de la LTA comme ayant implicitement abrogé l'art. 18.3 de la LACC, compte tenu des modifications récemment apportées à la LACC — Sous le régime de la LACC, le tribunal avait discrétion pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI et de lever la suspension partielle des procédures afin de permettre à la débitrice de procéder à la transition au régime de liquidation — Il n'y avait aucune certitude, en vertu de l'ordonnance du tribunal, que la Couronne était le bénéficiaire véritable de la fiducie ni de fondement pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse — Montant perçu au titre de la TPS ne faisait l'objet d'aucune fiducie présumée, priorité ou fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Taxation --- Principes généraux — Priorité des créances fiscales dans le cadre de procédures en faillite

Débitrice devait à la Couronne des montants de TPS qu'elle n'avait pas remis, en vertu de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (LTA) — Débitrice a entamé des procédures judiciaires en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC) — En vertu d'une ordonnance du tribunal, le montant de la créance fiscale a été déposé dans un compte en fiducie et la balance du produit de la vente des actifs a servi à payer le créancier garanti principal — Demande de la débitrice visant à obtenir la levée partielle de la suspension de procédures afin qu'elle puisse faire cession de ses biens a été accordée, alors que

la demande de la Couronne visant à obtenir le paiement des montants de TPS non remis a été rejetée — Appel interjeté par la Couronne a été accueilli — Créancier a formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli — Analyse de la LTA et de la LACC conduisait à la conclusion que le législateur ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a modifié la LTA, en 2000 — Législateur avait mis un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne sous les régimes de la LACC et de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (LFI), et ni l'une ni l'autre de ces lois ne prévoyaient que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficiaient d'un traitement préférentiel — Fait de faire primer la priorité de la Couronne sur les créances découlant de la TPS dans le cadre de procédures fondées sur la LACC mais pas en cas de faillite aurait pour effet de restreindre le recours à la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la LACC — Il semblait probable que le législateur avait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle — On ne pourrait pas considérer l'art. 222(3) de la LTA comme ayant implicitement abrogé l'art. 18.3 de la LACC, compte tenu des modifications récemment apportées à la LACC — Sous le régime de la LACC, le tribunal avait discrétion pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI et de lever la suspension partielle des procédures afin de permettre à la débitrice de procéder à la transition au régime de liquidation — Il n'y avait aucune certitude, en vertu de l'ordonnance du tribunal, que la Couronne était le bénéficiaire véritable de la fiducie ni de fondement pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse — Montant perçu au titre de la TPS ne faisait l'objet d'aucune fiducie présumée, priorité ou fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

The debtor company owed the Crown under the Excise Tax Act (ETA) for GST that was not remitted. The debtor commenced proceedings under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA). Under an order by the B.C. Supreme Court, the amount of the tax debt was placed in a trust account, and the remaining proceeds from the sale of the debtor's assets were paid to the major secured creditor. The debtor's application for a partial lifting of the stay of proceedings in order to assign itself into bankruptcy was granted, while the Crown's application for the immediate payment of the unremitted GST was dismissed.

The Crown's appeal to the B.C. Court of Appeal was allowed. The Court of Appeal found that the lower court was bound by the ETA to give the Crown priority once bankruptcy was inevitable. The Court of Appeal ruled that there was a deemed trust under s. 222 of the ETA or that an express trust was created in the Crown's favour by the court order segregating the GST funds in the trust account.

The creditor appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Held: The appeal was allowed.

Per Deschamps J. (McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ. concurring): A purposive and contextual analysis of the ETA and CCAA yielded the conclusion that Parliament could not have intended to restore the Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under the CCAA when it amended the ETA in 2000. Parliament had moved away from asserting priority for Crown claims in insolvency law under both the CCAA and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA). Unlike for source deductions, there was no express statutory basis in the CCAA or BIA for concluding that GST claims enjoyed any preferential treatment. The internal logic of the CCAA also militated against upholding a deemed trust for GST claims.

Giving the Crown priority over GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy would, in practice, deprive companies of the option to restructure under the more flexible and responsive CCAA regime. It seemed likely that Parliament had inadvertently succumbed to a drafting anomaly, which could be resolved by giving precedence to s. 18.3 of the CCAA. Section 222(3) of the ETA could no longer be seen as having impliedly repealed s. 18.3 of the CCAA by being passed subsequently to the CCAA, given the recent amendments to the CCAA. The legislative context supported the conclusion that s. 222(3) of the ETA was not intended to narrow the scope of s. 18.3 of the CCAA.

The breadth of the court's discretion under the CCAA was sufficient to construct a bridge to liquidation under the BIA, so there was authority under the CCAA to partially lift the stay of proceedings to allow the debtor's entry into liquidation. There should be no gap between the CCAA and BIA proceedings that would invite a race to the courthouse to assert priorities.

The court order did not have the certainty that the Crown would actually be the beneficiary of the funds sufficient to support an express trust, as the funds were segregated until the dispute between the creditor and the Crown could be resolved. The amount collected in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada was not subject to a deemed trust, priority or express trust in favour of the Crown.

Per Fish J. (concurring): Parliament had declined to amend the provisions at issue after detailed consideration of the insolvency regime, so the apparent conflict between s. 18.3 of the CCAA and s. 222 of the ETA should not be treated as a drafting anomaly. In the insolvency context, a deemed trust would exist only when two complementary elements co-existed: first, a statutory

provision creating the trust; and second, a CCAA or BIA provision confirming its effective operation. Parliament had created the Crown's deemed trust in the Income Tax Act, Canada Pension Plan and Employment Insurance Act and then confirmed in clear and unmistakable terms its continued operation under both the CCAA and the BIA regimes. In contrast, the ETA created a deemed trust in favour of the Crown, purportedly notwithstanding any contrary legislation, but Parliament did not expressly provide for its continued operation in either the BIA or the CCAA. The absence of this confirmation reflected Parliament's intention to allow the deemed trust to lapse with the commencement of insolvency proceedings. Parliament's evident intent was to render GST deemed trusts inoperative upon the institution of insolvency proceedings, and so s. 222 of the ETA mentioned the BIA so as to exclude it from its ambit, rather than include it as the other statutes did. As none of these statutes mentioned the CCAA expressly, the specific reference to the BIA had no bearing on the interaction with the CCAA. It was the confirmatory provisions in the insolvency statutes that would determine whether a given deemed trust would subsist during insolvency proceedings.

Per Abella J. (dissenting): The appellate court properly found that s. 222(3) of the ETA gave priority during CCAA proceedings to the Crown's deemed trust in unremitted GST. The failure to exempt the CCAA from the operation of this provision was a reflection of clear legislative intent. Despite the requests of various constituencies and case law confirming that the ETA took precedence over the CCAA, there was no responsive legislative revision and the BIA remained the only exempted statute. There was no policy justification for interfering, through interpretation, with this clarity of legislative intention and, in any event, the application of other principles of interpretation reinforced this conclusion. Contrary to the majority's view, the "later in time" principle did not favour the precedence of the CCAA, as the CCAA was merely re-enacted without significant substantive changes. According to the Interpretation Act, in such circumstances, s. 222(3) of the ETA remained the later provision. The chambers judge was required to respect the priority regime set out in s. 222(3) of the ETA and so did not have the authority to deny the Crown's request for payment of the GST funds during the CCAA proceedings.

La compagnie débitrice devait à la Couronne des montants de TPS qu'elle n'avait pas remis, en vertu de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (LTA). La débitrice a entamé des procédures judiciaires en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC). En vertu d'une ordonnance du tribunal, le montant de la créance fiscale a été déposé dans un compte en fiducie et la balance du produit de la vente des actifs de la débitrice a servi à payer le créancier garanti principal. La demande de la débitrice visant à obtenir la levée partielle de la suspension de procédures afin qu'elle puisse faire cession de ses biens a été accordée, alors que la demande de la Couronne visant à obtenir le paiement immédiat des montants de TPS non remis a été rejetée.

L'appel interjeté par la Couronne a été accueilli. La Cour d'appel a conclu que le tribunal se devait, en vertu de la LTA, de donner priorité à la Couronne une fois la faillite inévitable. La Cour d'appel a estimé que l'art. 222 de la LTA établissait une fiducie présumée ou bien que l'ordonnance du tribunal à l'effet que les montants de TPS soient détenus dans un compte en fiducie créait une fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Le créancier a formé un pourvoi.

Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été accueilli.

Deschamps, J. (McLachlin, J.C.C., Binnie, LeBel, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell, JJ., souscrivant à son opinion) : Une analyse téléologique et contextuelle de la LTA et de la LACC conduisait à la conclusion que le législateur ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a modifié la LTA, en 2000. Le législateur avait mis un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne dans le cadre du droit de l'insolvabilité, sous le régime de la LACC et celui de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (LFI). Contrairement aux retenues à la source, aucune disposition législative expresse ne permettait de conclure que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficiaient d'un traitement préférentiel sous le régime de la LACC ou celui de la LFI. La logique interne de la LACC allait également à l'encontre du maintien de la fiducie réputée à l'égard des créances découlant de la TPS.

Le fait de faire primer la priorité de la Couronne sur les créances découlant de la TPS dans le cadre de procédures fondées sur la LACC mais pas en cas de faillite aurait pour effet, dans les faits, de priver les compagnies de la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la LACC. Il semblait probable que le législateur avait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle, laquelle pouvait être corrigée en donnant préséance à l'art. 18.3 de la LACC. On ne pouvait plus considérer l'art. 222(3) de la LTA comme ayant implicitement abrogé l'art. 18.3 de la LACC parce qu'il avait été adopté après la LACC, compte tenu des modifications récemment apportées à la LACC. Le contexte législatif étayait la conclusion suivant laquelle l'art. 222(3) de la LTA n'avait pas pour but de restreindre la portée de l'art. 18.3 de la LACC.

L'ampleur du pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au tribunal par la LACC était suffisant pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI, de sorte qu'il avait, en vertu de la LACC, le pouvoir de lever la suspension partielle des procédures afin de permettre à la débitrice de procéder à la transition au régime de liquidation. Il n'y avait aucune certitude, en vertu de l'ordonnance du tribunal, que la Couronne était le bénéficiaire véritable de la fiducie ni de fondement pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse, puisque les fonds étaient détenus à part jusqu'à ce que le litige entre le créancier et la Couronne soit résolu. Le montant perçu au titre de la TPS mais non encore versé au receveur général du Canada ne faisait l'objet d'aucune fiducie présumée, priorité ou fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Fish, J. (souscrivant aux motifs des juges majoritaires) : Le législateur a refusé de modifier les dispositions en question suivant un examen approfondi du régime d'insolvabilité, de sorte qu'on ne devrait pas qualifier l'apparente contradiction entre l'art. 18.3 de la LACC et l'art. 222 de la LTA d'anomalie rédactionnelle. Dans un contexte d'insolvabilité, on ne pourrait conclure à l'existence d'une fiducie présumée que lorsque deux éléments complémentaires étaient réunis : en premier lieu, une disposition législative qui crée la fiducie et, en second lieu, une disposition de la LACC ou de la LFI qui confirme l'existence de la fiducie. Le législateur a établi une fiducie présumée en faveur de la Couronne dans la Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu, le Régime de pensions du Canada et la Loi sur l'assurance-emploi puis, il a confirmé en termes clairs et explicites sa volonté de voir cette fiducie présumée produire ses effets sous le régime de la LACC et de la LFI. Dans le cas de la LTA, il a établi une fiducie présumée en faveur de la Couronne, sciemment et sans égard pour toute législation à l'effet contraire, mais n'a pas expressément prévu le maintien en vigueur de celle-ci sous le régime de la LFI ou celui de la LACC. L'absence d'une telle confirmation témoignait de l'intention du législateur de laisser la fiducie présumée devenir caduque au moment de l'introduction de la procédure d'insolvabilité. L'intention du législateur était manifestement de rendre inopérantes les fiducies présumées visant la TPS dès l'introduction d'une procédure d'insolvabilité et, par conséquent, l'art. 222 de la LTA mentionnait la LFI de manière à l'exclure de son champ d'application, et non de l'y inclure, comme le faisaient les autres lois. Puisqu'aucune de ces lois ne mentionnait spécifiquement la LACC, la mention explicite de la LFI n'avait aucune incidence sur l'interaction avec la LACC. C'était les dispositions confirmatoires que l'on trouvait dans les lois sur l'insolvabilité qui déterminaient si une fiducie présumée continuerait d'exister durant une procédure d'insolvabilité.

Abella, J. (dissidente) : La Cour d'appel a conclu à bon droit que l'art. 222(3) de la LTA donnait préséance à la fiducie présumée qui est établie en faveur de la Couronne à l'égard de la TPS non versée. Le fait que la LACC n'ait pas été soustraite à l'application de cette disposition témoignait d'une intention claire du législateur. Malgré les demandes répétées de divers groupes et la jurisprudence ayant confirmé que la LTA l'emportait sur la LACC, le législateur n'est pas intervenu et la LFI est demeurée la seule loi soustraite à l'application de cette disposition. Il n'y avait pas de considération de politique générale qui justifierait d'aller à l'encontre, par voie d'interprétation législative, de l'intention aussi clairement exprimée par le législateur et, de toutes manières, cette conclusion était renforcée par l'application d'autres principes d'interprétation. Contrairement à l'opinion des juges majoritaires, le principe de la préséance de la « loi postérieure » ne militait pas en faveur de la préséance de la LACC, celle-ci ayant été simplement adoptée à nouveau sans que l'on ne lui ait apporté de modifications importantes. En vertu de la Loi d'interprétation, dans ces circonstances, l'art. 222(3) de la LTA demeurerait la disposition postérieure. Le juge siégeant en son cabinet était tenu de respecter le régime de priorités établi à l'art. 222(3) de la LTA, et il ne pouvait pas refuser la demande présentée par la Couronne en vue de se faire payer la TPS dans le cadre de la procédure introduite en vertu de la LACC.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by Deschamps J.:

Air Canada, Re (2003), 42 C.B.R. (4th) 173, 2003 CarswellOnt 2464 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to
Air Canada, Re (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 4967 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to
Alternative granite & marbre inc., Re (2009), (sub nom. *Dep. Min. Rev. Quebec v. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Montmagny*) 2009 G.T.C. 2036 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Quebec (Revenue) v. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Montmagny*) [2009] 3 S.C.R. 286, 312 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2009] G.S.T.C. 154, (sub nom. 9083-4185 *Québec Inc. (Bankrupt), Re*) 394 N.R. 368, 60 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 2009 SCC 49, 2009 CarswellQue 10706, 2009 CarswellQue 10707 (S.C.C.) — referred to
ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

studying the *BIA*'s predecessor bill, C-22, seemed to accept expert testimony that the *BIA*'s new reorganization scheme would shortly supplant the *CCAA*, which could then be repealed, with commercial insolvency and bankruptcy being governed by a single statute (*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Consumer and Corporate Affairs and Government Operations*, Issue No. 15, October 3, 1991, at pp. 15:15-15:16).

21 In retrospect, this conclusion by the House of Commons committee was out of step with reality. It overlooked the renewed vitality the *CCAA* enjoyed in contemporary practice and the advantage that a flexible judicially supervised reorganization process presented in the face of increasingly complex reorganizations, when compared to the stricter rules-based scheme contained in the *BIA*. The "flexibility of the *CCAA* [was seen as] a great benefit, allowing for creative and effective decisions" (Industry Canada, Marketplace Framework Policy Branch, *Report on the Operation and Administration of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2002), at p. 41). Over the past three decades, resurrection of the *CCAA* has thus been the mainspring of a process through which, one author concludes, "the legal setting for Canadian insolvency restructuring has evolved from a rather blunt instrument to one of the most sophisticated systems in the developed world" (R. B. Jones, "The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring: Challenges for the Rule of Law", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005* (2006), 481, at p. 481).

22 While insolvency proceedings may be governed by different statutory schemes, they share some commonalities. The most prominent of these is the single proceeding model. The nature and purpose of the single proceeding model are described by Professor Wood in *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law*:

They all provide a collective proceeding that supersedes the usual civil process available to creditors to enforce their claims. The creditors' remedies are collectivized in order to prevent the free-for-all that would otherwise prevail if creditors were permitted to exercise their remedies. In the absence of a collective process, each creditor is armed with the knowledge that if they do not strike hard and swift to seize the debtor's assets, they will be beat out by other creditors. [pp. 2-3]

The single proceeding model avoids the inefficiency and chaos that would attend insolvency if each creditor initiated proceedings to recover its debt. Grouping all possible actions against the debtor into a single proceeding controlled in a single forum facilitates negotiation with creditors because it places them all on an equal footing, rather than exposing them to the risk that a more aggressive creditor will realize its claims against the debtor's limited assets while the other creditors attempt a compromise. With a view to achieving that purpose, both the *CCAA* and the *BIA* allow a court to order all actions against a debtor to be stayed while a compromise is sought.

23 Another point of convergence of the *CCAA* and the *BIA* relates to priorities. Because the *CCAA* is silent about what happens if reorganization fails, the *BIA* scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily supplies the backdrop for what will happen if a *CCAA* reorganization is ultimately unsuccessful. In addition, one of the important features of legislative reform of both statutes since the enactment of the *BIA* in 1992 has been a cutback in Crown priorities (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 39; S.C. 1997, c. 12, ss. 73 and 125; S.C. 2000, c. 30, s. 148; S.C. 2005, c. 47, ss. 69 and 131; S.C. 2009, c. 33, ss. 25 and 29; see also *Alternative granite & marbre inc., Re*, 2009 SCC 49, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 286, [2009] G.S.T.C. 154 (S.C.C.); *Quebec (Deputy Minister of Revenue) c. Rainville* (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 35 (S.C.C.); *Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments: Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency* (1986)).

24 With parallel *CCAA* and *BIA* restructuring schemes now an accepted feature of the insolvency law landscape, the contemporary thrust of legislative reform has been towards harmonizing aspects of insolvency law common to the two statutory schemes to the extent possible and encouraging reorganization over liquidation (see *An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts*, S.C. 2005, c. 47; *Gauntlet Energy Corp., Re*, 2003 ABQB 894, [2003] G.S.T.C. 193, 30 Alta. L.R. (4th) 192 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 19).

25 Mindful of the historical background of the *CCAA* and *BIA*, I now turn to the first question at issue.

3.2 GST Deemed Trust Under the CCAA

TAB 6

2011 ONSC 2215
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re

2011 CarswellOnt 2392, 2011 ONSC 2215, [2011] O.J. No. 1590, 200 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1023, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 156

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, C-36, as Amended**

And In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of
Canwest Global Communications Corp. and Other Applicants

Pepall J.

Judgment: April 7, 2011
Docket: CV-09-8396-00CL

Counsel: Douglas J. Wray, Jesse B. Kugler for Applicant, Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada
David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Monitor

Subject: Insolvency; Labour; Public

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.2](#) Initial application

[XIX.2.f](#) Lifting of stay

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Lifting of stay

C Entities obtained initial order under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) staying all proceedings against them — As part of CCAA proceedings, claims procedure order was granted which established procedure for identification and quantification of claims against C Entities — B was dismissed after having been employed by division of one of C Entities for 20 years — Union filed claims pursuant to claims procedure order in respect of certain outstanding grievances — Claim with respect to B's grievances was not resolved — Plan was implemented, at which time all operating assets of C Entities were transferred and C Entities ceased operations — Stay with respect to employer was terminated — Stay with respect to remaining C Entities was extended — Union brought motion for order lifting stay of proceedings in respect of B's grievances and directing that they be adjudicated in accordance with collective agreement — Motion granted — Generally speaking, grievances should be adjudicated along with other claims pursuant to provisions of claims procedure order within context of CCAA proceedings — Present case was unique — Employer emerged from CCAA protection and was currently operating under different name — B was 20 year employee — Given stage of CCAA proceedings, fact that stay relating to employer had been lifted, and B's employment tenure, B ought to be given opportunity to pursue his claim for reinstatement rather than being compelled to have that entitlement monetized by claims officer if so ordered — No meaningful prejudice would ensue to any stakeholder — Balance of convenience and interests of justice favoured lifting stay to permit grievances to proceed through arbitration rather than before claims procedure officer.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Pepall J.*:

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 2000 CarswellAlta 622 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to
Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 7882, 61 C.B.R. (5th) 200 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

does not have the effect of "excluding the entire collective labour relations process from the application of the *CCAA*." ¹⁵ He went on to write that:

It would be tantamount to paralyzing the employer with respect to reducing its costs by any means at all, and to providing the union with a veto with regard to the restructuring process. ¹⁶

39 In *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*. ¹⁷, I wrote that section 33 of the *CCAA* "maintains the terms and obligations contained in the collective agreement but does not alter priorities or status." ¹⁸ In that case when dealing with the issue of immediate payment of severance payments, I wrote:

There are certain provisions in the amendments that expressly mandate certain employee related payments. In those instances, section 6(5) dealing with a sanction of a plan and section 36 dealing with a sale outside the ordinary course of business being two such examples, Parliament specifically dealt with certain employee claims. If Parliament had intended to make such a significant amendment whereby severance and termination payments (and all other payments under a collective agreement) would take priority over secured creditors, it would have done so expressly. ¹⁹

40 I agree with the Monitor's position that if Parliament had intended to carve grievances out of the claims process, it would have done so expressly. To do so, however, would have undermined the purpose of the *CCAA* and in particular, the claims process which is designed to streamline the resolution of the multitude of claims against an insolvent debtor in the most time sensitive and cost efficient manner. It is hard to imagine that it was Parliament's intention that grievances under collective agreements be excluded from the reach of the stay provisions of section 11 of the *CCAA* or the ancillary claims process. In my view, such a result would seriously undermine the objectives of the *Act*.

41 Furthermore, I note that over 1,800 claims have been processed and dealt with by way of the claims procedure order, many of them involving claims filed by CEP on behalf of its members. CEP was provided with notice of the motion wherein the claims procedure order and the claims officers were approved. CEP did not raise any objection to the claims procedure order, the claims officers or the inclusion of grievances in the claims procedure at the time that the order was granted. The claims procedure order was not an order made without notice and none of the prerequisites to variation of an order has been met. Had I not lifted the stay, I would not have amended the claims procedure order as requested by CEP.

42 CEP's last argument is that the claims procedure order interferes with Mr. Bradley's freedoms under the Canadian *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. In this regard I make the following observations. Firstly, this argument was not advanced when the claims procedure order was granted. Secondly, CEP is not challenging the validity of any section of the *CCAA*. Thirdly, nothing in the statute or the claims procedure inhibits the ability to collectively bargain. In *Health Services & Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia* ²⁰, the Supreme Court of Canada stated:

We conclude that section 2(d) of the *Charter* protects the capacity of members of labour unions to engage, in association, in collective bargaining on fundamental workplace issues. This protection does not cover all aspects of "collective bargaining", as that term is understood in the statutory labour relations regimes that are in place across the country. Nor does it ensure a particular outcome in a labour dispute or guarantee access to any particularly statutory regime. ...

In our view, it is entirely possible to protect the "procedure" known as collective bargaining without mandating constitutional protection for the fruits of that bargaining process. ²¹

43 In my view, nothing in the claims procedure or the *CCAA* impacts the procedure known as collective bargaining.

Conclusion

44 Under the circumstances, the request to lift the stay as requested by CEP is granted. Had it been necessary to do so, I would have dismissed the alternative relief requested.

Motion granted.

TAB 7

2014 ONSC 3393
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Timminco Ltd., Re

2014 CarswellOnt 9328, 2014 ONSC 3393, 14 C.B.R. (6th) 113, 242 A.C.W.S. (3d) 764

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended**

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Timminco Limited and Bécancour Silicon Inc.

Morawetz R.S.J.

Heard: July 22, 2013

Judgment: July 7, 2014

Docket: CV-12-9539-00CL

Counsel: Jane Dietrich, Kate Stigler for Board of Directors, except John Walsh

Kenneth D. Kraft for Chubb Insurance Company of Canada

James C. Orr for Plaintiff, St. Clair Pennyfeather in the Class Action

Maria Konyukhova for Timminco Entities

Robert Staley for John Walsh

Linc Rogers for Monitor

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.2 Initial application](#)

[XIX.2.f Lifting of stay](#)

Civil practice and procedure

[XVI Disposition without trial](#)

[XVI.3 Stay or dismissal of action](#)

[XVI.3.c Grounds](#)

[XVI.3.c.ii Another proceeding pending](#)

[XVI.3.c.ii.E Miscellaneous](#)

Headnote

Civil practice and procedure --- Disposition without trial — Stay or dismissal of action — Grounds — Another proceeding pending — General principles

Representative plaintiff P brought class action against corporate defendant T, individual defendants who were officers of T, and third party — Action was based in alleged misrepresentations by defendants, causing investors to buy stock in T — Some 2.5 years later, T obtained stay of class action under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — T also obtained Claims Procedure Order (CPO) which established deadline for claims against directors — P did not file claim by deadline — P moved to lift stay that remained in place — Motion granted — Stays and orders to lift stay were discretionary — Assets of T had been sold, and distributions had been made to secured creditors — Under these circumstances, stay and claims order did not serve their original purpose — There was no CCAA plan in place, and there was no stated intent to create one — Claims-bar order was not proper bar to P's claim in this case — P's claim was to be decided on merits, and any problems with claim were not bar to claim being able to proceed.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Lifting of stay

Representative plaintiff P brought class action against corporate defendant T, individual defendants who were officers of T, and third party — Action was based in alleged misrepresentations by defendants, causing investors to buy stock in T — Some 2.5 years later, T obtained stay of class action under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — T also obtained Claims Procedure Order (CPO) which established deadline for claims against directors — P did not file claim by deadline — P moved to lift stay that remained in place — Motion granted — Stays and orders to lift stay were discretionary — Assets of T had been sold, and distributions had been made to secured creditors — Under these circumstances, stay and claims order did not serve their original purpose — There was no CCAA plan in place, and there was no stated intent to create one — Claims-bar order was not proper bar to P's claim in this case — P's claim was to be decided on merits, and any problems with claim were not bar to claim being able to proceed.

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Cases considered by *Morawetz R.S.J.*:

Blue Range Resource Corp., Re (2000), 2000 ABCA 285, 2000 CarswellAlta 1145, [2001] 2 W.W.R. 477, (sub nom. *Enron Canada Corp. v. National-Oilwell Canada Ltd.*) 193 D.L.R. (4th) 314, 271 A.R. 138, 234 W.A.C. 138, 87 Alta. L.R. (3d) 352 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

Blue Range Resource Corp., Re (2001), 283 N.R. 391 (note), 2001 CarswellAlta 1209, 2001 CarswellAlta 1210, 299 A.R. 179 (note), 266 W.A.C. 179 (note), [2001] S.C.R. viii (S.C.C.) — referred to

Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 14 C.P.C. (3d) 339, 1992 CarswellOnt 185 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (2008), 48 C.B.R. (5th) 41, 2008 CarswellOnt 6105, 44 E.T.R. (3d) 31 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 2215, 2011 CarswellOnt 2392, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 156 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Green v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (2014), 2014 CarswellOnt 1143, 2014 ONCA 90, 50 C.P.C. (7th) 113, (sub nom. *Millwright Regional Council of Ontario Pension Trust Fund (Trustess of) v. Celestica Inc.*) 118 O.R. (3d) 641, 314 O.A.C. 315, 370 D.L.R. (4th) 402 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

Ivorylane Corp. v. Country Style Realty Ltd. (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2567 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to
Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v. Sino-Forest Corp. (2013), 2013 CarswellOnt 3361, 2013 ONSC 1078, 100 C.B.R. (5th) 30, 37 C.P.C. (7th) 135 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re (2006), 25 C.B.R. (5th) 218, 33 C.P.C. (6th) 131, 2006 CarswellOnt 4929 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Sammi Atlas Inc., Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 1145, 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 2 — considered

s. 5.1 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — considered

s. 5.1(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — considered

s. 12 — considered

s. 19 — considered

Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5

Generally — referred to

MOTION by representative plaintiff to lift stay of class action, obtained by defendant corporation.

Morawetz R.S.J.:

submit that, at this point, Mr. Pennyfeather is asking the court to exercise its discretion to (i) amend the CPO to grant him the authority to file a claim on behalf of the class members; (ii) extend the claims-bar date to allow him to file such claim; and (iii) lift the stay of proceedings. They submit that Mr. Pennyfeather asks this discretion be exercised to allow him to pursue a claim against the Defendant Directors which remains uncertified, is in part statute barred, and lacks merit.

27 Counsel to the Defendant Directors submits that the D&O Claims Procedure was initiated for the purpose of determining, with finality, the claims against the directors and officers. They submit that the D&O Claims Procedure has at no time been contingent on, tied to, or dependent on the filing of a Plan of Arrangement by the Timminco Entities.

28 Simply put, the Defendant Directors submit that the CPO sets a claims-bar date of July 23, 2012 for claims against Directors and Mr. Pennyfeather did not file any Proof of Claim against the Defendant Directors by the claims-bar date. Accordingly, they submit that the claims against the Defendant Directors contemplated by the Class Action are currently barred and extinguished by the CPO.

29 The arguments put forward by Mr. Walsh are similar.

30 Counsel to Mr. Walsh attempts to draw similarities between this case and *Sino-Forest*. Counsel submits this is a case where Mr. Pennyfeather intentionally refused to file a Proof of Claim in support of a securities misrepresentation claim against Timminco and its directors and officers.

31 They further submit that Mr. Pennyfeather is asking for the Court to exercise its discretion in his favour to lift the stay of proceedings, in order to allow him to pursue a proceeding which has been largely, if not entirely neutered by the Court of Appeal (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed). They point out that just like in *Sino-Forest*, to lift the stay would be an exercise in futility where the Court commented that "there is no right to opt out of any CCAA process...by virtue of deciding, on their own volition, not to participate in the CCAA process", the objectors relinquished their right to file a claim and take steps, in a timely way, to assert their rights to vote in the CCAA proceeding.

32 Counsel to Mr. Walsh also takes the position that Mr. Pennyfeather's only argument is a strained effort to avoid the plain language of the CPO in an effort to say that his claim is an "excluded claim" and therefore a Proof of Claim was never required. Even if Mr. Pennyfeather was right, counsel to Mr. Walsh submits that Mr. Pennyfeather still would have been required to file a Proof of Claim, failing which his claim would have been barred. Under the CPO, proofs of such claims were still called for, even if they were not to be adjudicated.

33 They note that Mr. Pennyfeather was aware of the CCAA proceeding and the Initial Order. As early as January 17, 2012, counsel to Mr. Pennyfeather contacted counsel for Timminco, asking for consent to lift the Stay.

34 Counsel contends that the "excluded claim" language that Mr. Pennyfeather relies on is not found in the definition of D&O Claim. Under the terms of the CPO, the language is a carve-out from the larger definition of "claim", not the subset definition of D&O Claim. As a result, counsel submits that proofs of claim are still required for D&O Claims, regardless of whether they are excluded claims. In that way, the universe of D&O Claims would be known, even if excluded claims would ultimately not be part of a plan.

35 Mr. Walsh also takes the position that Mr. Pennyfeather made an intentional decision not to file a claim. Mr. Walsh emphasizes that Mr. Pennyfeather had full notice of the motion for the CPO and chose not to oppose or appear on the motion. Further, at no time did Mr. Pennyfeather request the Monitor apply to court for directions with respect to the terms of the CPO.

36 Mr. Walsh submits he is prejudiced by the continuation of the Class Action and he wants to get on with his life but is unable to do so while the claim is extant.

Law and Analysis

37 For the purposes of this motion, I must decide whether the CPO bars Mr. Pennyfeather from proceeding with the Class Action and whether I should lift the stay of proceedings as it applies to the Class Action. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the CPO should not serve as a bar to proceeding with the Class Action and that the stay should be lifted.

38 As I explain below, the application of the claims bar order and lifting the stay are discretionary. This discretion should be exercised in light of the purposes of both claims-bar orders and stays under the CCAA. A claim bar order and a stay under the CCAA are intended to assist the debtor in the restructuring process, which may encompass asset realizations. At this point, Timminco's assets have been sold, distributions made to secured creditors, no CCAA plan has been put forward by Timminco, and there is no intention to advance a CCAA plan. It seems to me that neither the stay, nor the claims bar order continue to serve their functional purposes in these CCAA proceedings by barring the Class Action. In these circumstances, I fail to see why the stay and the claim bar order should be utilized to obstruct the plaintiff from proceeding with its Class Action.

The Purpose of Stay Orders and Claims-Bar Orders

39 For the purposes of this motion, it is necessary to consider the objective of the CCAA stay order. The stay of proceedings restrains judicial and extra-judicial conduct that could impair the ability of the debtor company to continue in business and the debtor's ability to focus and concentrate its efforts on negotiating of a compromise or arrangement: *Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

40 Sections 2, 12 and 19 of the CCAA provide the definition of a "Claim" for the purposes of the CCAA and also provide guidance as to how claims are to be determined. Section 12 of the CCAA states

12. The court may fix deadlines for the purposes of voting and for the purposes of distributions under a compromise or arrangement.

The use of the word "may" in s. 12 indicates that fixing deadlines, which includes granting a claims bar order, is discretionary. Additionally, as noted above the CPO provided at para. 19 that a D&O Claim could be filed on "such other later date as may be ordered by the Court".

41 It is also necessary to return to first principles with respect to claims-bar orders. The CCAA is intended to facilitate a compromise or arrangement between a debtor company and its creditors and shareholders. For a debtor company engaged in restructuring under the CCAA, which may include a liquidation of its assets, it is of fundamental importance to determine the quantum of liabilities to which the debtor and, in certain circumstances, third parties are subject. It is this desire for certainty that led to the development of the practice by which debtors apply to court for orders which establish a deadline for filing claims.

42 Adherence to the claims-bar date becomes even more important when distributions are being made (in this case, to secured creditors), or when a plan is being presented to creditors and a creditors' meeting is called to consider the plan of compromise. These objectives are recognized by s. 12 of the CCAA, in particular the references to "voting" and "distribution".

43 In such circumstances, stakeholders are entitled to know the implications of their actions. The claims-bar order can assist in this process. By establishing a claims-bar date, the debtor can determine the universe of claims and the potential distribution to creditors, and creditors are in a position to make an informed choice as to the alternatives presented to them. If distributions are being made or a plan is presented to creditors and voted upon, stakeholders should be able to place a degree of reliance in the claims bar process.

44 Stakeholders in this context can also include directors and officers, as it is not uncommon for debtor applicants to propose a plan under the CCAA that compromises certain claims against directors and officers. In this context, the provisions of s. 5.1 of the CCAA must be respected.


45 In the case of Timminco, there have been distributions to secured creditors which are not the subject of challenge. The Class Action claim is subordinate in ranking to the claims of the secured creditors and has no impact on the distributions made to secured creditors. Further, there is no CCAA plan. There will be no compromise of claims against directors and officers.

TAB 8

COURT FILE NO. 1603 09338

COURT Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta

JUDICIAL CENTRE EDMONTON



IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES'*
CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985,
c C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF ALLARCO ENTERTAINMENT 2008 INC. AND ALLARCO
ENTERTAINMENT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

DOCUMENT **ORDER**
(Claims Procedure)

ADDRESS FOR SERVICE AND CONTACT INFORMATION OF PARTY FILING THIS DOCUMENT	McLENNAN ROSS LLP 600 McLennan Ross Building 12220 Stony Plain Road Edmonton, AB T5N 3Y4	Lawyer: Charles P. Russell, Q.C. Telephone: 780-482-9200 Fax: 780-482-9100 Email: curssell@mross.com File No.: 291540
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DATE ON WHICH ORDER WAS PRONOUNCED: January 24, 2017

LOCATION OF HEARING OR TRIAL: Edmonton, Alberta

NAME OF MASTER/JUDGE WHO MADE THIS ORDER: The Honourable Mr. Justice S. D. Hillier

UPON THE APPLICATION of the Applicant, Allarco Entertainment 2008 Inc. and Allarco Entertainment Limited Partnership (collectively "**Allarco**"); **AND UPON** having read the Affidavits of Don McDonald sworn May 19, 2016; June 13, 2016; August 8, 2016; August 26, 2016, January 16, 2017, filed; **AND UPON REVIEWING** the Second Report of PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. (the "**Monitor**"), filed, the Third Report of the Monitor, filed, and the pleadings and proceedings filed herein; **AND UPON** hearing from counsel for Allarco, the Monitor, and any other affected parties that may be present; **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECLARED THAT:**

Service

1. The time for service of the Notice of Application for this Order is hereby abridged and deemed good and sufficient and this Application is properly returnable today.

I hereby certify this to be a
true copy of the original.

for Clerk of the Court

Interpretation and General Provision

2. Capitalized terms not defined herein have the meaning given to such terms in the Initial Order granted by the Honourable Mr. Justice R.P. Belzil on May 26, 2016, pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, RSC 1985, c C-36, as amended (the "**CCAA Initial Order**").
3. For the purposes of this Order (the "**Claims Procedure Order**"), in addition to terms defined elsewhere herein, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
 - (a) "**BIA**" means the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c. B-3, as amended;
 - (b) "**Business Day**" means a day other than a Saturday, Sunday, or statutory holiday, on which banks are generally open for business in Edmonton, in the province of Alberta, Canada.
 - (c) "**Calendar Day**" means a day, including Saturday, Sunday, or any statutory holiday.
 - (d) "**CCAA**" means the *Companies' Creditors' Arrangement Act*, RSC 1985, c C-36, and "**CCAA Proceedings**" means the proceedings commenced by Allarco Entertainment 2008 Inc. and Allarco Entertainment Limited Partnership pursuant to the provisions of the CCAA under Court File no. 1603 09338.
 - (e) "**Claim**" means any right or claim of any Person that may be asserted or made in whole or in part against Allarco, whether or not asserted or made, in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever, and any interest accrued thereon or costs payable in respect thereof, including without limitation, any claim arising in tort (whether intentional or unintentional), breach of contract or other agreement, breach of duty (including, without limitation, any legal, statutory, express, implied, equitable or fiduciary duty) or by reason of any right of ownership to title to property or assets or right to a trust or deemed trust (statutory, express, implied, resulting, constructive, or otherwise) and whether or not any indebtedness, liability or obligation is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, unsecured, present or future, known or unknown, by guarantee, surety or otherwise, and whether or not any right or claim is executory or anticipatory in nature including, without limitation, any right or ability of any Person to advance a claim for contribution or indemnity or otherwise with respect to any matter, action, cause or chose in action whether existing at present or commenced in the future, which indebtedness, liability, or obligation, and any interest accrued thereon or costs payable in respect thereof (A) is based in whole or in part on facts prior to the Filing Date, (B) relates to a time period prior to the Filing Date, or (C) is a right or claim of any kind that would be a debt provable in bankruptcy within the meaning of the BIA had Allarco become bankrupt on the Filing Date, and includes:
 - (i) any right or claim of any Person that may be asserted or made in whole or in part against one or more Directors or Officers of Allarco, or any claim for which such Directors or Officers are by law liable to pay in their capacity as Directors or Officers;
 - (ii) any existing or future right of any Director or Officer against Allarco which arose or arises as a result of any Person filing a Proof of Claim in respect of such Director or Officer for which such Director or Officer is entitled to be indemnified by Allarco;

- (iii) any right or claim of any Person against Allarco in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever resulting from the restructuring, disclaimer, resiliation, termination or breach by Allarco on or after the Filing Date of any contract, lease, license or other agreement, whether written or oral, entered into prior to the Filing Date, and whether or not such restructuring, disclaimer, resiliation, termination or breach took place before the date of this Claims Procedure Order; and
- (iv) any other claim referenced in section 19 of the CCAA;

provided, however, that "Claim" shall not include an "Excluded Claim".

- (f) **"Claimant"** means any Person asserting a Claim and includes the transferee or assignee of a Claim, or a trustee, executor, liquidator, receiver, receiver and manager, or other Person acting on or behalf of or through such Person.
- (g) **"Claims Bar Date"** means 5:00 P.M. on March 17, 2017; or such later date as may be ordered by the Court.
- (h) **"Claims Package"** means the materials to be provided by the Monitor to Persons who may have a Claim, which materials shall include:
 - (i) In the case of a Known Claimant, a Notice of Claim setting out the amount and ranking of such Known Claimant's Claim as determined by Allarco, in consultation with the Monitor, a blank Proof of Known Claim, a Proof of Claim Instruction Letter, and such other materials as Allarco, in consultation with the Monitor, may consider appropriate;
 - (ii) In the case of an Unknown Claimant, a blank Proof of Unknown Claim, a Proof of Claim Instruction Letter, and such other materials as Allarco or the Monitor may consider appropriate;
 - (iii) In the case of a 2016 Disclaimer Claimant, a Proof of 2016 Disclaimer Claim setting out the amount and ranking of that Person's 2016 Disclaimer Claim as determined by Allarco in consultation with the Monitor, before accounting for monies received or to be received through re-leasing or re-licensing during the First Window, the subject matter of the disclaimer, a Proof of Claim Instruction Letter, and such other materials as Allarco in consultation with the Monitor, may consider appropriate; and
 - (iv) In the case of a 2017 Disclaimer Claimant, a Proof of 2017 Disclaimer Claim setting out the amount and ranking of that Person's 2017 Disclaimer Claim as determined by Allarco in consultation with the Monitor, before accounting for monies received or to be received through re-leasing or re-licensing during the First Window, the subject matter of the disclaimer, a Proof of Claim Instruction Letter, and such other materials as Allarco in consultation with the Monitor, may consider appropriate.
- (i) **"Claims Procedure"** means the procedures set forth in this Claims Procedure Order and the schedules thereto.
- (j) **"Court"** means the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, in the Judicial Centre of Edmonton.

- (q) **"Governmental Authority"** means a federal, provincial, state, territorial, municipal or other government or government department, agency, or authority (including a court of law) having jurisdiction over Allarco or its business.
- (r) **"Known Claim"** means the Claim of a Known Claimant, but excluding that Person's Unknown Claim, 2016 Disclaimer Claim or 2017 Disclaimer Claim;
- (s) **"Known Claimant"** means:
 - (i) any Person who, based upon the books and records of Allarco, was owed monies by Allarco as of the Filing Date, and which monies remain unpaid in whole or in part;
 - (ii) any Person who has commenced a legal proceeding in respect of a Claim, or given Allarco written notice of an intention to commence a legal proceeding or demand for payment in respect of a Claim;
 - (iii) any Person who was at or prior to the Filing Date a party to a material lease, license, contract, or other agreement or obligation of Allarco, with respect to which such Person may assert a Claim.
- (t) **"Monitor's Website"** means <http://www.pwc.com/ca/allarco>.
- (u) **"Newspaper Notice to Claimants"** means a notice for publication prepared by the Monitor in substantially the form attached hereto as **Schedule "A"**.
- (v) **"Notice of Claim"** means a notice in substantially the form attached as **Schedule "B"**, applicable to Claims of Known Claimants but not including amounts which may fall due under a 2016 Disclaimer Claim or a 2017 Disclaimer Claim held by a Known Claimant.
- (w) **"Notice of Dispute of Revision or Disallowance"** means a notice in substantially the form attached hereto as **Schedule "C"**, in the case of a Known Claim, an Unknown Claim or a 2016 Disclaimer Claim but not a 2017 Disclaimer Claim.
- (x) **"Notice of Dispute of Revision or Disallowance of 2017 Disclaimer Claim"** means a notice in substantially the form attached hereto as **Schedule "D"**.
- (y) **"Notice of Revision or Disallowance"** means a notice in substantially the form attached hereto as **Schedule "E"**, in the case of a Known Claim, an Unknown Claim or a 2016 Disclaimer Claim but not a 2017 Disclaimer Claim.
- (z) **"Notice of Revision or Disallowance of a 2017 Disclaimer Claim"** means a notice in substantially the form attached hereto as **Schedule "F"**.
- (aa) **"Officer"** means anyone who is, was, may be deemed to be, or have been, by statute, operation of law or otherwise, an officer or *de facto* officer of Allarco.
- (bb) **"Person"** includes an individual, firm, corporation, limited or unlimited liability company, general or limited partnership, association, trust, unincorporated organization, joint venture, Government Authority or other agency, officer or instrumentality thereof or any other entity, wherever situate or domiciled and whether or not having legal status.

- (cc) **"Plan"** means any proposed plan(s) of compromise or arrangement to be filed in respect of Allarco pursuant to the CCAA, as the same may be amended, supplemented or restated from time to time in accordance with the terms thereof.
- (dd) **"Proof of Claim Instruction Letter"** means the instruction letter to Claimants, substantially in the form attached hereto as **Schedule "G"**, setting forth instructions for the completion of a Proof of Claim by a Claimant and regarding the Claims Procedure.
- (ee) **"Proof of Claim"** includes a Proof of Known Claim, a Proof of Unknown Claim, a Proof of 2016 Disclaimer Claim and a Proof of 2017 Disclaimer Claim, or any one or more thereof.
- (ff) **"Proof of Known Claim"** means the Proof of Claim referred to herein, substantially in the form attached hereto as **Schedule "H"**.
- (gg) **"Proof of Unknown Claim"** means the Proof of Claim referred to herein, substantially in the form attached hereto as **Schedule "I"**.
- (hh) **"Proof of 2016 Disclaimer Claim"** means the Proof of Claim referred to herein, substantially in the form attached hereto as **Schedule "J"** which shall include an accounting for the monies received or to be received through re-leasing or re-licensing the subject matter of the disclaimer.
- (ii) **"Proof of 2017 Disclaimer Claim"** means the Proof of Claim referred to herein, substantially in the form attached hereto as **Schedule "K"** which shall include an accounting for the monies received or to be received through re-leasing or re-licensing the subject matter of the disclaimer.
- (jj) **"Secured Claim"** means that portion of any Claim that is:
 - (i) secured by security validly charging or encumbering property or assets of Allarco (including statutory and possessory liens) up to the value of such collateral; and
 - (ii) duly and properly perfected in accordance with the relevant legislation in the appropriate jurisdiction as of the Filing Date,
- (kk) **"Unknown Claim"** means the Claim of an Unknown Claimant.
- (ll) **"Unknown Claimant"** means a Claimant that is not a Known Claimant, a 2016 Disclaimer Claimant or a 2017 Disclaimer Claimant.
- (mm) **"2016 Disclaimer Claim"** means a Claim arising from the disclaimer by Allarco in the period from the Filing Date to December 31, 2016, of one or more of that Person's agreements with Allarco.
- (nn) **"2016 Disclaimer Claimant"** means a Person with a 2016 Disclaimer Claim.
- (oo) **"2017 Disclaimer Claim"** means a Claim arising from the disclaimer by Allarco after January 1, 2017, of one or more of that Person's agreements with Allarco.
- (pp) **"2017 Disclaimer Claimant"** means a Person with a 2017 Disclaimer Claim.

4. All references as to time herein shall mean local time Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, and any reference to an event occurring on a Business Day shall mean prior to 5:00 P.M. on such Business Day unless otherwise indicated herein.
5. The word "including" shall, when used herein, mean "including, without limitation".
6. All Claims shall be denominated in Canadian dollars. Any Claims denominated in a foreign currency shall be converted to Canadian dollars for purposes of any Plan at the Bank of Canada's noon exchange rate in effect on the Filing Date.
7. Copies of all forms delivered hereunder, as applicable, and any determinations of Claims by the Court, shall be maintained by Allarco, and subject to further order of the Court, the applicable Claimant will be entitled to reasonable access thereto by appointment during regular business hours on a Business Day on written request to Allarco or the Monitor.
8. A Person with an Excluded Claim shall not be required to file a Proof of Claim, unless required to do so by further order of the Court, and the Monitor is not required to send a Claims Package to Persons with Excluded Claims.
9. Allarco may, with consent of the Monitor, refer a Claim for resolution to the Court for voting and/or distribution purposes, where in Allarco's view such a referral is necessary or desirable for the resolution of the valuation of the Claim.

Monitor's Role

10. The Monitor, in addition to its prescribed rights, duties, responsibilities and obligations under the CCAA and under the CCAA Initial Order, shall assist Allarco in connection with the administration of the Claims Procedure, and is directed and empowered to take such actions and fulfill such roles as are contemplated by the Claims Procedure Order.
11. In carrying out the terms of this Claims Procedure Order, the Monitor shall:
 - (a) have all the protections given to it by the CCAA, the Initial Order, and this Order, or as an officer of the Court, including the stay of proceedings in its favour;
 - (b) incur no liability or obligation as a result of carrying out of the provisions of this Order, save and except for any gross negligence or willful misconduct on its part;
 - (c) be entitled to rely on the books and records of Allarco and any information provided by Allarco, all without independent investigation; and
 - (d) not be liable for any claims or damages resulting from any errors or omissions in such books, records, or information, save and except for any gross negligence or willful misconduct on its part.
12. Allarco and the Monitor may, where they are satisfied that a Claim has been adequately proven, waive strict compliance with the requirements of this Claims Procedure Order, including the completion and execution of the forms contemplated in the Claims Procedure, and to request any further documentation from a Person that Allarco or Monitor may require in order to determine the validity of a Claim.

Claims Procedure

13. For each of the Known Claims, Allarco, in consultation with the Monitor, shall determine the classification and value of such Known Claims not including Unknown Claims, 2016 Disclaimer Claims or 2017 Disclaimer Claims held by a Known Claimant, on the basis of the books and records of Allarco.
14. The Monitor shall send a Claims Package to each of the Known Claimants and the 2016 Disclaimer Claimants (or to counsel of record for any such Known Claimants or 2016 Disclaimer Claimants) by prepaid ordinary mail, courier, personal delivery or electronic or facsimile transmission, before 11:59 P.M. on February 17, 2017 in accordance with this Claims Procedure Order.
15. The Monitor shall, as soon as practicable after the date of this Claims Procedure Order:
 - (a) cause the Newspaper Notice to Claimants to be published on two separate dates, as soon as practicable after the date of this Claims Procedure Order, in the Edmonton Journal, the Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star; and
 - (b) post to the Monitor's Website electronic copies of the Newspaper Notice to Claimants, a blank Proofs of Claim, and this Claims Procedure Order.
16. The Monitor shall send a Claims Package to any Unknown Claimant (or to counsel of record for such Unknown Claimant) on written request of the Unknown Claimant (or of counsel of record) to the Monitor.
17. A Known Claimant, having received a Claims Package, may notify Allarco and the Monitor that it disagrees with the classification and/or value of its Known Claim as determined by Allarco and the Monitor and as set out in the Claims Package, by delivery of a Proof of Known Claim to the Monitor on or before the Claims Bar Date.
18. An Unknown Claimant wishing to assert a Claim must return a completed Proof of Unknown Claim to the Monitor on or before the Claims Bar Date.
19. A 2016 Disclaimer Claimant wishing to assert a 2016 Disclaimer Claim must return a completed Proof of 2016 Disclaimer Claim to the Monitor on or before the Claims Bar Date. A 2016 Disclaimer Claimant must complete a Proof of 2016 Disclaimer Claim by providing information as to the amounts which the 2016 Disclaimer Claimant may recover through re-leasing the content of the disclaimed agreement or re-licensing the content of the disclaimed agreement during the First Window.
20. Any action taken by Allarco after January 1, 2017, to restructure, disclaim, resiliate, terminate or breach any contract, lease, license or other agreement, whether written or oral, pursuant to the terms of the CCAA or the CCAA Initial Order, may give rise to a 2017 Disclaimer Claim. Allarco must issue any such disclaimers at least fifty (50) Calendar Days prior to the date of any Creditors Meeting. Any notice of disclaimer or resiliation delivered to a 2017 Disclaimer Claimant (or to counsel of record for such 2017 Disclaimer Claimant) shall be accompanied by Proof of 2017 Disclaimer Claim, which shall include Allarco's assessment of the value of such 2017 Disclaimer Claim prior to accounting for amounts which the 2017 Disclaimer Claimant may recover through re-leasing or re-licensing the content of the disclaimed agreement. A 2017 Disclaimer Claimant must complete a Proof of 2017 Disclaimer Claim by providing information as to the amounts which the 2017 Disclaimer Claimant may recover through re-leasing the content of the disclaimed agreement or re-licensing the content of the disclaimed agreement during the

First Window. A 2017 Disclaimer Claimant must complete the Proof of 2017 Disclaimer Claim and return the same to Allarco and the Monitor within fifteen (15) Calendar Days of its (or its counsel's) receipt of a Proof of 2017 Disclaimer Claim from the Monitor.

Barring of Claims

21. Any Claimant may qualify as a Known Claimant, an Unknown Claimant, a 2016 Disclaimer Claimant or a 2017 Disclaimer Claimant, or any two or more thereof. All Claimants who qualify as more than one of a Known Claimant, an Unknown Claimant, a 2016 Disclaimer Claimant and a 2017 Disclaimer Claimant, shall be required to comply with this Claims Procedure Order with respect to each category of Claim attributable thereto, and failure so to do shall give rise to the barring of one or more Claims as contemplated in this Claims Procedure Order.
22. A Known Claimant that does not object to the classification and/or value of its claim as set forth in the Claims Package in the manner directed by this Claims Procedure Order is:
 - (a) deemed to have accepted the classification and value of its Claim as set forth in the Claims Package, and such value will be deemed to be the value of such Known Claimant's Claim, for all purposes other than for that Claimant's Unknown Claim, 2016 Disclaimer Claim or 2017 Disclaimer Claim; and
 - (b) forever barred from disputing the classification and value of the Known Claim as set forth in the Claims Package, and for greater clarity is forever barred from pursuing, enforcing, or otherwise asserting a Claim in the amount exceeding the value of its Known Claim as determined by Allarco in accordance with this Claims Procedure Order.
23. Any Unknown Claimant or a 2016 Disclaimer Claimant that does not return a completed Proof of Unknown Claim or Proof of 2016 Disclaimer Claim to the Monitor on or before the Claims Bar Date, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, shall:
 - (a) not be entitled to vote at any Creditors' Meeting;
 - (b) not be entitled to receive any distribution under any Plan;
 - (c) not be entitled to any further notice in, and shall not be entitled to participate as a Claimant or creditor in the CCAA Proceeding in respect of such Claim;
 - (d) be forever barred from making or enforcing any such Claim against Allarco, or its Directors and Officers, and all such Claims will be forever extinguished and barred without any further act or notification by Allarco; and
 - (e) be forever barred from making or enforcing such Claim against any other Person who could claim contribution or indemnity from Allarco, its Directors and Officers, or any of them, and all such Claims will be forever extinguished and barred without any further act or notification by Allarco.
24. A 2017 Disclaimer Claimant that does not return a completed Proof of 2017 Disclaimer Claim to the Monitor within the timeframes as set out in paragraph 20 of this Claims Procedure Order, shall unless otherwise ordered by the Court:
 - (a) not be entitled to vote at any Creditors' Meeting;
 - (b) not be entitled to receive any distribution under any Plan;

TAB 9

2015 BCSC 399
British Columbia Supreme Court

Veris Gold Corp., Re

2015 CarswellBC 662, 2015 BCSC 399, [2015] B.C.W.L.D. 3289, 23 C.B.R. (6th) 321, 252 A.C.W.S. (3d) 12

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, As Amended**

In the matter of the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44

In the matter of the Business Corporations Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 57

In the Matter of Veris Gold Corp., Queenstake Resources Ltd.,
Ketz River Holdings, and Veris Gold USA, Inc., Petitioners

Fitzpatrick J.

Heard: February 23, 2015
Judgment: March 13, 2015
Docket: Vancouver S144431

Counsel: Magnus Verbrugge, Lisa Hiebert for Petitioners
Guy Martel, Angela Crimeni for Deutsche Bank A.G.
John Sandrelli for Monitor, Ernst & Young Inc.
Kibben Jackson for Whitebox Advisors LLC, WBox 2014-1 Ltd.
Rebecca Morse for Attorney General of Nevada
Bernard Poznanski for Special Committee of Directors
Colin Brousson for NV Energy
John Porter for Government of Yukon
Kieran Siddall for AIG

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Business associations

III Specific matters of corporate organization

III.1 Directors and officers

III.1.d Remuneration

III.1.d.i Directors

III.1.d.i.C Miscellaneous

Headnote

Business associations --- Specific matters of corporate organization — Directors and officers — Remuneration — Directors — Miscellaneous

Special committee of directors — V Corp. began experiencing financial difficulties — V Corp.'s Board of Directors (Board) appointed certain of its members to Special Committee tasked with investigating restructuring options (Special Committee) — Special Committee determined that receiving monthly fee of \$15,000 was preferable to usual \$1,500 per meeting fee for Board committees — Special Committee met 76 times over period of approximately one year, during which period V Corp. was granted protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — At time of application at bar, fees in amount of \$457,500 were owing to Special Committee (fees owing) — V Corp. brought application for order authorizing and directing it to pay fees owing — Application dismissed — Approval of payment of fees owing would not be appropriate — There was no evidence

that fee amounts for Special Committee members were approved by Board — Evidence of V Corp.'s corporate secretary was acknowledged that there were fee arrangements for prior committees established by Board — However, there was no evidence that Board addressed fees for Special Committee, either in terms of setting these fees in same manner as for previous committees, or agreeing to new monthly fee structure — There was no evidence that matter of fees had been delegated by Board to Special Committee — Without Board approval, there was no basis upon which court could conclude that V Corp. agreed to pay these fees to Special Committee — Special Committee members were also members of Board, and no doubt there were arrangements in place to compensate Board members for their participation in Board matters — However, no evidence was before court as to these arrangements.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Fitzpatrick J.*:

Air Canada, Re (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 5296, 47 C.B.R. (4th) 163 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to
Doman Industries Ltd., Re (2004), 45 B.L.R. (3d) 78, 29 B.C.L.R. (4th) 178, 2004 CarswellBC 1262, 2004 BCSC 733, 1 C.B.R. (5th) 7 (B.C. S.C.) — considered
EarthFirst Canada Inc., Re (2009), 1 Alta. L.R. (5th) 311, 2009 ABQB 78, 2009 CarswellAlta 142 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to
Eddie Bauer of Canada Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 3657, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 33 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 1982

Chapter 15 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to

s. 11.5 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.7(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — referred to

s. 44 — referred to

APPLICATION by insolvent corporation for order approving payment of fees to Special Committee of its Board of Directors tasked with investigating restructuring options.

Fitzpatrick J.:

Introduction

1 The petitioner, Veris Gold Corp., is a publicly-traded company. The remaining petitioners are direct or indirect subsidiaries of Veris Gold Corp. Together they form what is referred to as the "Veris Gold Group", which I will simply refer to as "Veris".

2 While corporate and management functions take place in British Columbia, Veris' business is principally comprised of gold-mining operations in Yukon and in the State of Nevada, U.S.A.

3 Veris began experiencing financial difficulty in early 2014, mainly arising from various operational difficulties and the declining price of gold. In addition, Veris' major secured creditor, Deutsche Bank A.G. ("DB"), gave notice of default under its security agreements at that time.

4 As a result of these difficulties, Veris' board of directors (the "Board") appointed certain of its members to a special committee (the "Special Committee"), tasked with investigating restructuring options for Veris. The Special Committee members decided

51 While uncommon, some debtors in *CCAA* proceedings have brought applications to pay pre-filing debts, where exceptional or unusual circumstances warrant a departure from the normal rule: see *Air Canada, Re* (2003), 47 C.B.R. (4th) 163 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at 166; *EarthFirst Canada Inc., Re*, 2009 ABQB 78 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 7; *Eddie Bauer of Canada Inc., Re* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 33 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at 35.

52 In this case, Veris did not, at the time of the application for the initial order, apply for such unusual relief to the effect that the payment of the pre-filing fees was required to ensure the ongoing participation of the Special Committee members, which was also required. Nor is the current application based on any evidence or submissions that would present any basis upon which to treat these debts (if they are indeed a debt of Veris) in any different manner than the other significant unsecured claims advanced against the estate.

53 As argued by the State of Nevada, another unsecured creditor, the payment of such fees would be a preference as against other unsecured creditors of Veris.

54 Accordingly, I see no basis upon which the payment of the pre-filing fees to the Special Committee members (Mr. Marland and Mr. Ruth) would be appropriate.

Post-Filing Fees

55 As with the pre-filing amounts, I will also consider the alternate scenario if Veris is contractually obligated to pay the Special Committee fees after the *CCAA* filing in June 2014.

56 Veris and the Special Committee submit that this has been a debtor-in-possession proceeding from the outset, and that the directors of Veris were integral in terms of advancing the restructuring efforts of Veris in these circumstances. They say that the Special Committee members have committed a significant number of hours to further those restructuring efforts for the benefit of the stakeholders.

57 They further argue that directors of companies in restructuring proceedings are commonly paid for their services throughout *CCAA* proceedings and that the formulation of a smaller committee, with increased independence, may be preferable to pursuing restructuring and/or refinancing strategies. The director's charge that is typically granted in insolvency proceedings does indicate that a board of directors often has a role to play in restructuring proceedings. Indeed, the initial order granted in this proceeding included such a charge.

58 Certainly, outside of insolvency proceedings, the formation of smaller committees by a board of directors is not uncommon. However, Veris' counsel has been unable to find any decisions addressing the creation of such a special committee, either in or outside of insolvency proceedings, nor any decision regarding how such committee members might or should be compensated during such proceedings.

59 In my view, there is little doubt here that the Special Committee played a role in Veris' restructuring efforts and that some time was spent by them in doing so. As argued by them, the course of the proceedings is replete with references to the role of the Special Committee throughout, including dealing with DB, WBox and the various professional advisors, in terms of seeking out restructuring options and negotiating the agreements. Despite the *CCAA* filing, the Board was required in respect of the governance of Veris while Veris continued in these proceedings.

60 In addition, despite the appointment of the Monitor and CRO, the Board continued to have a role in respect of Veris' governance, in that the Monitor and CRO were not tasked with any such role. The documents, including the final CCO, continually refer to the Special Committee working *with* the Monitor and CRO. Even when the CRO's powers were expanded in November 2014, the documents relating to the sales process continued to refer to the role of the Special Committee, although that role was attenuated. Schedule "B" to the order of this Court dated November 18, 2014 regarding the sales process order stated:

2. The Veris Gold Group (which for all purposes within this SSP [sale and solicitation procedure] shall include the special committee of the Veris Gold Group (the "Special Committee")) under the overall supervision of the Monitor and with

TAB 10

2019 ONSC 6966
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Clover Leaf Holdings Company, Re

2019 CarswellOnt 20001, 2019 ONSC 6966, 312 A.C.W.S. (3d) 691, 75 C.B.R. (6th) 124

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CLOVER LEAF HOLDINGS
COMPANY, CONNORS BROS. CLOVER LEAF SEAFOODS COMPANY, K.C.R. FISHERIES LTD., 6162410
CANADA LIMITED, CONNORS BROS. HOLDINGS COMPANY AND CONNORS BROS. SEAFOODS COMPANY

Hainey J.

Heard: November 25, 2019
Judgment: December 4, 2019
Docket: CV-19-631523-00CL

Counsel: Kevin Zych, Sean Zweig, Mike Shakra, for Applicants
Marc Wasserman, Martino Calvaruso, for Monitor
Natasha MacParland, for FCF Co. Ltd.
Peter Rubin, for Wells Fargo
Jeremy Opolsky, for Lion Capital
Robert Chadwick, Christopher Armstrong, for Terms Lenders

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.2](#) Initial application

[XIX.2.h](#) Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Miscellaneous

Applicants were Canadian affiliates of BBF, which was international seafood supplier based in United States — Applicants operated CL group of companies in Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia and had 650 employees — While CL business in Canada was cash flow positive and profitable, balance sheet of BBF, including applicants, had suffered extreme financial pressures primarily due to extensive litigation against BBF in United States — BBF filed voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of United States Code and U.S. Bankruptcy Court granted certain First Day Orders in those proceedings — Applicants sought similar relief to stabilize and protect business in order to complete comprehensive and coordinated restructuring of CL in Canada and BBF in United States — Applicants obtained initial order pursuant to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act for appointment of Monitor and staying all proceedings against applicants and Monitor until December 2, 2019 — Applicants brought application for amended and restated order to supplement limited relief obtained pursuant to initial order — Application granted — Stay of proceedings was extended to December 31, 2019 — Applicants had acted in good faith and with due diligence and required extra time to restore solvency — Proposed debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing was approved — Proposed DIP financing would preserve value and going concern operations of applicants' business, which was in best interests of applicants and stakeholders — Monitor supported proposed DIP financing and confirmed that applicants had sufficient liquidity to operate business in ordinary course — It was appropriate to amend initial order to allow for payment of pre-filing obligations — KERF and KEIP charge were approved — Terms and scope of KEIP were limited to what was

- (a) The need for additional financing by the Canadian debtor to support a going concern restructuring;
- (b) The benefit of the breathing space afforded by *CCAA* protection;
- (c) The lack of any financing alternatives to those proposed by the DIP lender;
- (d) The practicality of establishing a stand-alone solution for the Canadian debtor;
- (e) The contingent nature of the liability of the proposed guarantee and the likelihood that it will be called upon;
- (f) Any potential prejudice to the creditors of the Canadian entity if the request is approved; and
- (g) The benefits that may accrue to the stakeholders if the request is approved and the prejudice to those stakeholders if the request is denied.

23 I have concluded that I should approve the proposed DIP financing and the proposed DIP charge for the following reasons:

- (a) Because of its current financial circumstances, the Bumble Bee Group cannot obtain alternative financing outside of the Chapter 11 and *CCAA* proceedings;
- (b) The applicants' liquidity is dependent on the secured lenders providing the proposed DIP financing;
- (c) The proposed DIP financing is necessary to maintain the ongoing business and operations of the Bumble Bee Group, including the applicants;
- (d) While the proposed DIP financing is being provided by the applicants' existing secured lenders rather than new third-party lenders, eleven third-party lenders were solicited with no viable proposal being received. In my view, this demonstrates that the proposed DIP financing represents the best available DIP financing option in the circumstances;
- (e) The proposed DIP financing will preserve the value and going concern operations of the applicant's business, which is in the best interests of the applicants and their stakeholders;
- (f) Because the DIP lenders are the existing secured lenders, they are familiar with the applicants' business and operations which will reduce administrative costs that would otherwise arise with a new-third party DIP lender;
- (g) Protections have been included in the amended and restated initial order to minimize any prejudice to the applicants and their stakeholders;
- (h) The amount of the proposed DIP Financing is appropriate having regard to the applicants' cash-flow statement; and
- (i) The Monitor supports the proposed DIP financing and its report confirms that the applicants will have sufficient liquidity to operate their business in the ordinary course.

Payment of Pre-Filing Obligations

24 To preserve normal course business operations, the applicants seek authorization to continue to pay their suppliers of goods and services, honour rebate, discount and refund programs with their customers and pay employees in the ordinary course consistent with existing compensation arrangements.

25 The court has broad jurisdiction to permit the payment of pre-filing obligations in a *CCAA* proceeding. In granting authority to pay certain pre-filing obligations, courts have considered the following factors:

- (a) Whether the goods and services are integral to the applicants' business;

- (b) The applicants' need for the uninterrupted supply of the goods or services;
- (c) The fact that no payments will be made without the consent of the Monitor;
- (d) The Monitors' support and willingness to work with the applicants to ensure that payments in respect of pre-filing liabilities are appropriate;
- (e) Whether the applicants have sufficient inventory of the goods on hand to meet their needs; and
- (f) The effect on the debtors' ongoing operations and ability to restructure if they are unable to make pre-filing payments.

26 I am satisfied that it is critical to the operation of their business that the applicants preserve key relationships. Any disruption in the services proposed to be paid could jeopardize the value of their business and the viability of the Sale Transaction. The authority in the proposed amended and restated initial order to pay pre-filing obligations is appropriately tailored and responsive to the needs of the applicants and is specifically provided for in the applicants' cash flows and in the DIP budget. In particular, the payments are limited to those necessary to preserve critical relationships with employees, suppliers, and customers, to ensure the stability and continued operation of the applicants' business and will only be made with the consent of the Monitor. The relief sought is consistent with orders in other *CCAA* cases.

27 Further, in keeping with the requirements in s. 11.001 of the *CCAA* the contemplated payments are all reasonably necessary to the continued operation of the applicants' business so that there will be no disruption in services provided to the applicants and no deterioration in their relationships with their suppliers, customers and employees.

KEIP and KEIP Charge

28 I have also concluded that the KEIP and KEIP charge should be approved because of the following:

- (a) The KEIP was developed in consultation with AlixPartners, Bennett Jones LLP and with the involvement of the Monitor. The Monitor is supportive of the KEIP. The secured creditors also support the KEIP charge;
- (b) The KEIP is reasonably necessary to retain key employees who are necessary to guide the applicants through the *CCAA* proceedings and the Sale Transaction;
- (c) The KEIP is incentive-based and will only be earned if certain conditions are met; and
- (d) The amount of the KEIP, and corresponding KEIP charge, is reasonable in the circumstance.

29 In approving the KEIP and KEIP charge pursuant to s. 11 of the *CCAA* I have determined that the terms and scope of the KEIP have been limited to what is reasonably necessary at this time in accordance with s. 11.001 of the *CCAA*.

30 As the KEIP contains personal confidential information about the applicants' employees, including their salaries, I am granting a sealing order pursuant to s. 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act*, RSO 1990, c. C. 43. This will prevent the risk of disclosure of this personal and confidential information.

Intercompany Charge

31 I am also granting the requested Intercompany Charge to preserve the status quo between all entities within the Bumble Bee group to protect the interest of creditors against individual entities within the group. The Monitor supports the charge which ranks behind all the other court-ordered charges.

Administrative Charge

TAB 11

2009 ABQB 78
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

EarthFirst Canada Inc., Re

2009 CarswellAlta 142, 2009 ABQB 78, [2009] A.W.L.D. 984, 174 A.C.W.S. (3d) 618, 1 Alta. L.R. (5th) 311

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36, As Amended**

And In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of EarthFirst Canada Inc.

B.E.C. Romaine J.

Heard: January 28, 2009
Judgment: February 3, 2009
Docket: Calgary 0801-13559

Counsel: Howard A. Gorman, Randal Van de Mosselaer for EarthFirst Canada Inc.

A. Robert Anderson, Q.C. for Monitor, Ernst & Young Inc.

Brian P. O'Leary, Q.C., Doug S. Nishimura, Trevor A. Batty for WestLB AG

Jeffrey Thom, Q.C. for IDL Projects Ltd.

Susan Robinson-Burns for Synergy Engineering Ltd.

Benjamin La Borie for Gisborne Industrial Construction Ltd.

V. Philippe (Phil) Lalonde for Interoute Construction Ltd.

Subject: Insolvency; Environmental

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.3 Arrangements](#)

[XIX.3.b Approval by court](#)

[XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"](#)

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Corporation was developer of renewable wind energy and was under protection of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("Act") — Corporation applied for order establishing hardship fund to be used to allow payment of pre-filing obligations owing to suppliers in community — Application granted — Local businesses would face bankruptcy if accounts receivable owed by corporation went unpaid — Payments would be considered interim distribution under future plan of arrangement and would be reflected in any final distribution to creditors — Decision to allow hardship fund outweighed prejudice to other creditors — Payments would be limited to bare bone payments to keep suppliers in business — Failure to fund small local businesses that were dependant on continued development of wind farm project could have harsh consequences in surrounding communities — Payment of case specific pre-filing debts would preserve corporation's primary asset, was fair and reasonable in circumstances and in accordance with purpose and objective of Act.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by B.E.C. Romaine J.:

Air Canada, Re (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 5296, 47 C.B.R. (4th) 163 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Smoky River Coal Ltd., Re (2000), [2000] 10 W.W.R. 147, 297 A.R. 1, 83 Alta. L.R. (3d) 127, 19 C.B.R. (4th) 281, 2000

CarswellAlta 830, 2000 ABQB 621 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

APPLICATION by corporation under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* protection for establishment of hardship fund.

B.E.C. Romaine J.:

Introduction

1 EarthFirst Canada Inc., a corporation under the protection of an initial order granted under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-36, as amended, sought to establish a "hardship fund" that would be used to allow it to pay pre-filing obligations owing to certain suppliers and contractors operating in the community near which EarthFirst is developing a wind farm project. I authorized the establishment of this fund, and these are the reasons for my decision.

Background

2 EarthFirst is a publicly-traded developer of renewable wind energy in Canada. It has several projects under development and the most advanced is a wind farm under construction at Dokie Ridge in northeast British Columbia. This project is to be developed in two phases, with the first involving the construction of eight turbines and the second involving a further 40 turbines.

3 EarthFirst's financial difficulties arose primarily from cost overruns on the Dokie Project, combined with difficulties in completing re-financing and/or restructuring initiatives, exacerbated by the general tightening of credit markets.

4 The Dokie Project is located in a remote area of British Columbia close to three first nations' communities. The development has involved local contractors and suppliers whose viability is significantly dependant on this project. Some of these local contractors and suppliers have significant account receivable balances owing from EarthFirst, and some have not received payment from EarthFirst for several months. Certain creditors face immediate financial difficulty, including the inability to fund payroll and purchase critical supplies to continue operations. If some relief is not available, these local operations face bankruptcy.

5 EarthFirst, with the aid and support of the Monitor, proposed the establishment of a fund of \$1.5 million to be disbursed in payment of some pre-filing claims of certain local suppliers who are in significant financial difficulty. Payments from the hardship fund are to be at the discretion of EarthFirst's Chief Restructuring Officer and subject to the approval of the Monitor. Such payments are to be considered an interim distribution under a future plan of arrangement and will be reflected in any final distribution to creditors.

6 The amount of the hardship fund was arrived at following discussions among EarthFirst, the Monitor, the local suppliers and contractors. The proposal recognizes the potential domino effect of a failure to fund small, local businesses that are dependant on the continued development of the Dokie Project and are essential to future construction activities and the preservation of the project's value, and the dire and harsh consequences in the surrounding communities of the inability of such businesses to meet payroll obligations. The company and the Monitor submit that payments from the fund would contribute to necessary goodwill in the area and that cooperation and support of the local community is required to ensure that the value of the project is maximized. EarthFirst also notes that, while a CCAA stay of proceedings affects many creditors, the proposed recipients of the hardship fund in this isolated community are particularly vulnerable and at risk.

7 While the nature of payments from the hardship fund is different from the issue that was before Farley, J. in *Air Canada, Re*, 2003 CarswellOnt 5296 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) (at para. 4), and while EarthFirst is not suggesting that recipients of the fund are "critical suppliers" in the usual sense of the term, it appears to be the case that, as in *Air Canada*, the potential future benefit to the company of these relatively modest payments of pre-filing debt is considerable and of value to the estate as a whole. The decision to allow the hardship fund thus outweighs the prejudice to other creditors, justifying a departure from the usual rule.

8 Counsel for the Monitor noted that the payments are likely necessary in order to preserve the opportunity to complete the Dokie Project, if that option appears to be the best way to maximize recovery for creditors. It was likely the recognition of this factor that led to little opposition to the application, including from the primary secured creditor. The opposition that was expressed related to a lack of certainty over which unsecured creditors would benefit. While the Monitor would not commit to full public disclosure of the recipients of the hardship fund, which might provoke the precise financial embarrassment and consequential business failure that payments from the fund are intended to prevent, the company and the Monitor were clear that payments would be limited to bare-bone payments "essential to keeping the lights of the recipient company on": *Smoky River Coal Ltd., Re*, 2000 CarswellAlta 830 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 40.

9 I am satisfied that the payment of these case-specific pre-filing debts in a limited amount in order to preserve the value of this CCAA-debtor's primary asset and the option of continuing its development for the benefit of all creditors is fair and reasonable in the circumstances and in accordance with the purpose and objectives of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

Application granted.

TAB 12

2012 ONSC 6403
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Futura Loyalty Group Inc., Re

2012 CarswellOnt 14263, 2012 ONSC 6403, 223 A.C.W.S. (3d) 14, 99 C.B.R. (5th) 128

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended**

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of The Futura Loyalty Group Inc. Applicant

D.M. Brown J.

Heard: November 13, 2012
Judgment: November 13, 2012
Docket: CV-12-9882-00CL

Counsel: S. Reid for Applicant
G. Azeff, A. Iqbal for Monitor, Harris & Partners Limited
J. Desjardins for DirectCash Payments Inc.
D. Pearlman for Aimia Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.2 Initial application](#)

[XIX.2.a Procedure](#)

[XIX.2.a.iii Notice](#)

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.2 Initial application](#)

[XIX.2.h Miscellaneous](#)

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Miscellaneous

Debtor's main source of revenues was from selling Aeroplan Miles to merchants as customer reward programme — Some merchants purchased discounted Miles by prepaying debtor — Court made initial order for protection — Debtor applied for order permitting it to honour merchant prepayments made prior to initial order — Application granted — Order was consistent with and fostered objectives of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Ongoing resale of Miles was essential to debtor's viability as going concern — Honouring prepayments would assist debtor's reorganization efforts to maintain merchants as customers — Order was not opposed by monitor or secured creditors.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Procedure — Notice

Debtor's main source of revenues was from selling Aeroplan Miles to merchants as customer reward programme — Some merchants purchased discounted Miles by prepaying debtor — Court made initial order for protection — Debtor applied to vary order by deferring notice to prepaying merchants — Application dismissed — Transparency was foundation upon which Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act rested — Initial order had already been posted on monitor's website and notice was published in newspaper — There was no principled basis upon which to exclude one group of creditors — Risk that some merchants would cancel their participation in reward programme was inherent in proceedings under Act — It was up to debtor to persuade its customers that it was in their long-term interests not to abandon it.

(emphasis added)

12 In *EarthFirst Canada* Romaine J. approved the creation of a "hardship fund" to pay pre-filing obligations owed to certain suppliers and contractors of the applicant. The evidence in that case revealed that some suppliers and contractors in a remote community had become quite dependent upon the applicant's wind farm project and, if they were not paid, they would "face immediate financial difficulty". Romaine J. wrote:

[7] While the nature of payments from the hardship fund is different from the issue that was before Farley, J. in *Re Air Canada*, 2003 CarswellOnt. 5296 (at para. 4), and while EarthFirst is not suggesting that recipients of the fund are "critical suppliers" in the usual sense of the term, it appears to be the case that, as in *Air Canada*, the potential future benefit to the company of these relatively modest payments of pre-filing debt is considerable and of value to the estate as a whole. The decision to allow the hardship fund thus outweighs the prejudice to other creditors, justifying a departure from the usual rule.

13 In those two cases the courts were prepared to countenance the payment of pre-filing obligations to suppliers in order to prevent disruption to the operations of the applicant and to maximize the value of the business for purposes of the re-organization or realization process. In the *EarthFirst Canada* case the court engaged in a form of proportionality or cost-benefit analysis, weighing the cost of the pre-payments against the benefit to the estate as a whole.

14 The present case does not involve a request to make payments to suppliers for pre-filing obligations, but concerns a somewhat analogous request to make payments which would satisfy pre-filing credits enjoyed by some important customers. The kind of cost-benefit reasoning undertaken in the *Eddie Bauer* and *EarthFirst* cases offers some guidance. My Reasons granting the Initial Order stated that the book value of Futura's assets was approximately \$1.35 million. The most recent cash-flow projection filed by the applicant made allowance for "payments to loyalty currency providers", which included the payments in respect of the Prepaying Merchant Customers. When compared against projected inflows from the collection of receivables through to January 18, 2013 of approximately \$440,000 (the only source of cash apart from the increased DIP Financing), the honouring of \$108,000 in pre-paid Aeroplan Miles for the Prepaying Merchant Customers is not an insignificant amount. However, on the other side of the scale is the evidence from Futura that 75% of its revenue comes from the resale of Aeroplan Miles and under its SISP it is seeking to secure a going-concern sale of the company's business.

15 Given the importance of the ongoing resale of Aeroplan Miles to the viability of Futura as a going-concern, the benefit to the company's re-organization efforts of trying to maintain the Prepaying Merchant customers as continuing customers, and the absence of any opposition to the order sought, I conclude that it is appropriate in the circumstances to grant an order "permitting the Applicant to honour prepayments made for Aeroplan Miles by Prepaying Merchant Customers" prior to the making of the Initial Order, as requested in paragraph 5 of Futura's notice of motion. Such authorization, in my view, is consistent with and fosters the objectives of the *CCAA*.

16 Futura submitted a draft order which contained different language of authorization. I informed counsel that the revised language was vague and imprecise, and I would not approve it. Paragraph 5 of Futura's notice of motion was short, sweet and to the point, so the language of the draft order Futura submits for my consideration must reflect that precision.

IV. Dispensing with notice to Prepaying Merchant Customers

17 The Prepaying Merchant Customers were not given notice of this motion. I have made the order authorizing the honouring of their prepayments in any event because it is to their benefit. Futura requests that I vary the *CCAA* s. 23 notice provision in my Initial Order in order to "defer notice to Prepaying Merchant Customers". Again, the Monitor, DirectCash Payments and Aimia Canada support the applicant's request.

18 Section 23(1)(a)(ii)(B) of the *CCAA* requires a monitor, within five days after the making of an initial order, to send, in the prescribed manner, "a notice to every known creditor who has a claim against the company of more than \$1,000 advising them that the order is publicly available". In this case the Monitor has not sent such notice to the Prepaying Merchant Customers.